Judgment 1. This is an appeal by the substituted plaintiffs against the judgment of a single Judge of this Court in Second Appeal affirming the concurrent decisions of the two lower courts and dismissing the plaintiffs suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The plaintiffs case was that through one Ramdeo Singh (the father of the respondent-defendants) they instituted a title suit No. 57 of 1937 against third parties in which there was a decree for costs by the High Court in favour of the said Ramdeo Singh. That decree was also duly executed by the plaintiffs in the name of the ostensible decree-holder, namely, Ramdeo Singh, and the disputed properties were also purchased in court auction in his name. Delivery of possession was also taken and according to the plaintiffs they remained in possession for several years. During the lifetime of Ramdeo Singh there was no trouble, but after his death his sons (the defendant-respondents) got their own names mutated in respect of the disputed property in the khasmahal and also succeeded in dispossessing the plaintiffs on 12-2-1954. Hence the suit was brought for declaration of title and recovery of possession. 2. On the very allegations made in the plaint, all the three Courts rightly had that the suit was not maintainable in view of the express bar imposed by Section 66(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs case all along was that Ramdeo Singh was their benamdar, the decree obtained by him against the previous owners of the property was in reality their own decree and that as the decree stood in his name the execution proceedings were also conducted in his name and the property was also purchased in court auction in his name, but the plaintiffs were the real purchasers and they also remained in possession until dispossessed by the sons of Ramdeo Singh in 1954. In terms Sec. 60(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure is attracted and the Courts, therefore, held that the suit was not maintainable. 3. Mr. Lalnarain Sinha for the appellants was fully conscious of his uphill task but wanted to make a subtle distinction between an auction purchase made by a benamdar who was not a decree-holder on the one hand and an auction purchase made by a benamdar who was the decree-holder on the other. He urged, relying upon some observation in Mt. Mr. Lalnarain Sinha for the appellants was fully conscious of his uphill task but wanted to make a subtle distinction between an auction purchase made by a benamdar who was not a decree-holder on the one hand and an auction purchase made by a benamdar who was the decree-holder on the other. He urged, relying upon some observation in Mt. Bibi Kaniz Ayesha V/s. Mojibul Hassan Khan, AIR 1942 Pat 230 that inasmuch as the plaintiffs had beneficial interest in the decree which was obtained by them by merely using the name of the said Ramdeo Singh, they were entitled to the property subsequently purchased by the decree-holder on the principle of constructive trust and that the fact that the purchase was made benami in the name of Ramdeo Singh should not materially affect this position. He could, however, cite no authority in support of this contention and wanted this Court to make a new departure from the settled law that has prevailed all along. 4. The principle of Sec. 66(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure has been repeatedly laid down in several decisions following the well known decision of the Privy Council in Ganga Sahai V/s. Kesri, AIR 1915 PC 81 where it was observed that the said provision was "designed to create some check on the practice of making what are called benami purchases at execution sales for the benefit of judgment-debtors, and in no way affect, the title of persons otherwise beneficially interested in the purchase". But even if it be held that the beneficial interest in the decree was with the plaintiffs and that the ostensible decree-holder Ramdeo Singh was a mere benamdar, nevertheless Section 82 of the Trusts Act expressly says that the principle of that section shall not apply where Sec. 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure comes into operation. Section 88 of the Trusts Act also cannot be availed of in this case because, as pointed out in a Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Kotaiah V/s. Venkata Subbaiah, AIR 1962 Andh Pra 49 paragraph 19 that section has no application where the purchaser is a benamdar. It envisages a fiduciary acquiring property for himself taking advantage of his position as a fiduciary. Mr. It envisages a fiduciary acquiring property for himself taking advantage of his position as a fiduciary. Mr. Sinha could not cite any other principle of law under which even if it be assumed that the plaintiffs were the real beneficiaries in respect of the decree that was obtained by Ramdeo Singh, they were entitled to the property purchased by the said decree-holder in execution of his decree. 5. Moreover, the language of Sub-section (1) of Sec. 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure is explicit and unambiguous. It completely bars the maintainability of a suit against a person claiming title under a court purchase on the ground that the purchase was made on behalf of some other person. It makes no distinction between a purchase made by a decree-holder on the one hand and a purchase made by a third party auction purchaser on the other. Mr. Sinhas contention that that portion of the plaint which alleged that the auction purchase was made by Ramdeo Singh as benamdar of the plaintiffs may be taken as a mere surplusage and may be ignored cannot obviously be accepted. Once the plaintiff has come forward with specific allegations in the plaint and those allegations attract the provision of Sec. 66(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, it will not be proper for the court to exclude from consideration those allegations dealing with benami purchase and examine whether on the residuary facts the plaintiffs claim would stand. Even if such a procedure is to be adopted, I do not think the appellants can succeed because the only provision of the Trusts Act which can possibly apply to a case of this type is Section 82 and that section expressly excludes from its scope the provisions of Sec. 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. If AIR 1942 Pat 230 on which Mr. Sinha relied, is carefully examined, it will be found that it does not support the extreme contention put forward by him. There it was found that there were several cosharers who had interest in the decree. Some of them put the decree into execution and purchased the property in their exclusive names. If AIR 1942 Pat 230 on which Mr. Sinha relied, is carefully examined, it will be found that it does not support the extreme contention put forward by him. There it was found that there were several cosharers who had interest in the decree. Some of them put the decree into execution and purchased the property in their exclusive names. Then it was held that the remaining cosharers to the decree were entitled to their share in the purchased property following the principles laid down in Dwarka Prasad V/s. Mabadeo Prasad, AIR 1930 All 631 and Bishan Dayal V/s. Kesho Prasad, AIR 1937 All 176. That was not a case of benami purchase and hence Sec. 66(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure had no application. Moreover, their Lordships relied very much on the observation of their Lordships of the Allahabad High, Court in ILR (1937) All 113: (AIR 1937 all 176) to the effect that the principle of Sec. 66 "did not apply to the case of those persons who by operation of law, and not by virtue of any private agreement or understanding, are entitled to treat as joint property an acquisition, made by the use of joint funds, by one or other of them in his own name". But here on the allegations in the plaint, Ramdeo Singh purchased the properly agreeing to be the benamdar of the plaintiffs. Hence the purchase was made by way of "private agreement or understanding" and as already pointed out there is no other provision in the Trusts Act except Section 82 which could possibly apply to this case. It is true that there are observations in AIR 1942 Pat 230 to the effect that "where there is a fund belonging jointly to several persons and one of these persons makes a purchase, of land with that fund that purchase enures to the benefit of all the persons entitled to share in the fund". Mr. Sinha wanted to stress this principle further and say that where the entire fund was supplied by a person but the purchase was made in the name of another person who was a mere benamdar, the person who supplied the money should not be denied his title to the property so purchased. Mr. Sinha wanted to stress this principle further and say that where the entire fund was supplied by a person but the purchase was made in the name of another person who was a mere benamdar, the person who supplied the money should not be denied his title to the property so purchased. The decision does not go so far and, on the contrary, the express provisions of Sec. 66(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure repel any such contention. 7. For these reasons we are satisfied that the plaintiffs suit was rightly dismissed as not maintainable The appeal is dismissed with costs.