This revision petition is directed against the order of the Additional Collector, Bharatpur, dated 24-9 1963, whereby he reversed the orders of the Tehsildar Nadbai dated 11-6-1963 in a case under sec. 251 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, relating to the apportionment of the share of water from a well between the parties. A preliminary objection was raised by the counsel for the non-petitioners on the ground of limitation. It was stated that under Article 131 of the Indian Limitation Act, the period of limitation for an application to be made to a court for the exercise of its powers of revision under the Code of Civil Procedure is 90 days, and that, as the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act are applicable to suits, appeals, applications and proceedings under and in pursuance of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act under sec. 214 (3) of the aforesaid Act, the present revision application, which was filed on 4-2-1964, is barred by time as it was filed 4 months and 12 days after the pronouncement of the impugned order. Allowing six days for the obtaining of the copy and 90 days for revision, it was filed one month and 6 days after the period of limitation, and no satisfactory explanation has been advanced by the petitioner nor has any application under sec. 5 of the Limitation Act been attached as required under Rule 17 (d) of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual, Part I. On the other hand, the counsel for the petitioner argued that Article 131 of the Limitation Act which applies to only revisions filed under the Code of Civil Procedure and Cr.P.C. would not be attracted in this case. This argument, however, cannot be accepted for a moment in view of the express provisions of law contained in sec. 214 (3) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The only exceptions are provided in sub-sec. (1) and (2). Sub-sec. (1) lays down that the suits and applications specified in the Third Schedule shall be instituted and made within the time prescribed therein for them. In the Third Schedule there is no mention of revision petitions. The other provisions contained in sub-sec. (1) and (2) are not relevant to the point under issue. The learned counsel for the petitioner, then, sought the protection of sec. 30 (b) of the Limitation Act. This provision certainly comes to his aid. In the Third Schedule there is no mention of revision petitions. The other provisions contained in sub-sec. (1) and (2) are not relevant to the point under issue. The learned counsel for the petitioner, then, sought the protection of sec. 30 (b) of the Limitation Act. This provision certainly comes to his aid. According to this section, any appeal or application for which the period of limitation is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, may be preferred or made within a period of 90 days next after the commencement of this Act, or within the period prescribed for such appeal or application by the Indian Limitation Act, whichever period expires earlier. It is obvious that this liberal treatment has been extended to cover lapses likely to occur during the period of interregnum with the coming into effect of the amending law, seeking to curtail the period of limitation. It was felt desirable to introduce this provision as it was realised that sudden curtailment would cause undue hardship and might in some cases extinguish the rights previously available, thereby leading to inequity and injustice. Now, under the law prevailing before the commencement of this Act, there was no statutory period of limitation for filing of revisions. This has now been reduced to 90 days. As the period of limitation now prescribed is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, the petitioner is certainly entitled to the benefit of this section and this application for revision is, therefore, maintainable. In this view of the matter, as the present application is found to have been filed within time, it was obviously not necessary for the petitioner to file an application under sec. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act and this objection, too, is rejected. Now to examine the merits of the application. It has been stated that the lower appellate court has committed an illegality in the exercise of its jurisdiction by reversing the order of the original court and reducing the share of water allowed to the petitioner. It has been argued that the order of the appellate court is not borne by evidence produced before the lower court and that the local enquiry referred to by the Tehsildar has been ignored by the appellate court. In this respect, the legal position is clear. It has been argued that the order of the appellate court is not borne by evidence produced before the lower court and that the local enquiry referred to by the Tehsildar has been ignored by the appellate court. In this respect, the legal position is clear. As was rightly observed in Ram Dev Versus Ram Pratap (R. R. D. 1962 Page 174); it is not in the competence of a court of revision to substitute its judgment for the judgment of the lower court. A court of revision can interfere only for the reasons given in sec. 230 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, where it appears that a subordinate court has either exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The same view was taken by me in Gohari Lal versus Rameshwar (R.R.D. 1261 Page 264), wherein I observed that it was not advisable to take too technical a view and to necessarily interfere in every case where an order has been made irregularly or even improperly, unless grave injustice or hardship would result from a failure to do so. Where the court exercises its jurisdiction in the manner prescribed but arrives at a conclusion or a decision which is erroneous in law or fact, it does not act illegally or with material irregularity but decides erroneously in the proper exercise of jurisdiction and unless the finding of the court is perverse and is likely to result in gross injustice, it is not a good ground for revision. In an enquiry under sec. 251 of the Rajsthan Tenancy Act, which is essentially of a summary nature, a revenue court can interfere in the event of any holder of land, in actual enjoyment of a right of way or other easement or right having, without his consent, been disturbed in such enjoyment, otherwise than in due course of law. A person aggrieved by an order passed under this section is competent to establish his right or easement by a regular suit in a competent civil court. An enquiry under sec. 251 (1) is nothing more than a summary enquiry meant to be undertaken to restore the situation existing immediately prior to the disturbance. A person aggrieved by an order passed under this section is competent to establish his right or easement by a regular suit in a competent civil court. An enquiry under sec. 251 (1) is nothing more than a summary enquiry meant to be undertaken to restore the situation existing immediately prior to the disturbance. As the perusal of the record and evidence shows, in the present case no illegality has been committed by the lower appellate court, to warrant interference under the revisional powers of this Court and the aggrieved party is competent to have its right determined by a regular suit in a competent Civil Court. I, therefore, reject this revision petition.