MAHENDRAKUMAR GULABCHAND MERCHANT v. STATE — 1965 DIGILAW 112 (GUJ)

N. M. MIABHOY, N. K. VAKIL, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition is filed by the petitioner to obtain inter alia an appropriate writ quashing the order of his removal from government service passed by the State of Gujarat on the 22nd of September 1961 and which was confirmed in appeal by the State Government on the 4th of April 1962 and for a declaration that the petitioner continues in the service of the State of Gujarat. ( 2 ) IN the year 1950 the petitioner was selected for the post of the Superintendent Class II and by a Resolution dated 1-9-1950 of the Government of the erstwhile State of Bombay was appointed as a supernumerary Superintendent of Prohibition and Excise. His service in the said department came to an end due to retrenchment but Government decided to absorb him in the Sales-tax Department and after an interview by the Public Service Commission he was selected for the post of Sales Tax Officer (Junior) and was appointed to the said post on 10th of October 1952 as a probationer for two years. During his probationary. period he had to deal with cases of dealers for assessment to sales-tax. Two of such cases dealt with by him particularly are relevant in the matter to be considered by us. One of them was a case of Messrs. Azad Hind Tanneries (R. C. No. B. G. /1803 ). The petitioner had first assessed this dealer for the period 1-11-1952 to 30-9-1953 and had found that Rs. 18-14-3 were due from the assessee. Then on the 23rd of June 1954 the Inspection Branch had inspection of his office and certain instructions were orally given. The petitioner reassessed the dealer. After this was done the petitioner instructed his office to send a memo to the Inspection Branch informing that the instructions were complied with. ( 3 ) THE second case was of Messrs. Misrimal Pokhraj and Co. . (B. G. 1748 ). This firm was assessed on 30th of April 1954 and for the period from 1-4-1951 to 30-9-1952 Rs. 44-13-9 were found due to be refunded. On reassessment however Rs. 401-13-6 were found due from the firm as tax. ( 3 ) THE second case was of Messrs. Misrimal Pokhraj and Co. . (B. G. 1748 ). This firm was assessed on 30th of April 1954 and for the period from 1-4-1951 to 30-9-1952 Rs. 44-13-9 were found due to be refunded. On reassessment however Rs. 401-13-6 were found due from the firm as tax. ( 4 ) ON the 20th of July 1957 the petitioner received a letter dated - the 18th of July 1957 from H. P. Munshi the Additional Collector of Sales Tax Central Division Bombay as the Inquiry Officer with which a charge-sheet and a statement of allegations were sent. By the letter the petitioner was directed to comply with the requirements of the said notice within 15 days. Here we may shortly refer to the charge-sheet. The said; charge-sheet Contained five charges. The Inquiry Officer had found charges Nos. 2 4 and 5 proved. We do not propose to refer to charge No. 2 also as finally the petitioner was found guilty only under charges Nos. 4 and 5 by the Government (the competent authority concerned ). Charge. No. 4 in the first part of it was a general charge alleging that the - petitioner while assessing dealers had been grossly irregular negligent and perfunctory in the performance of his duties and the second part thereof mentioned that in particular in the two cases of Azad Hind Tanneries and Misrimal Pokhraj the assessees were either deliberately or negligently under-assessed. The 5th charge was that in order to shield himself from adverse criticism that the firm of the Azad Hind Tanneries was initially very much under assessed the petitioner deliberately made a false report to the Collector of Sales Tax making it appear that the reassessment resulted in only a nominal increase in the demand. Later when we have to deal with the specific contentions raised by the petitioner we shall deal with these two charges in details. The statement of allegations apart from referring to the above stated two cases also referred to two more cases. They were of M/s. New Central Stores (B. C. No. ID-1468) and Messrs. New Patel Stores (ID-1835 ). As regards the first it was alleged that the petitioner had disregarded instructions of the Collector of Sales Tax in respect of passing of the seizure orders while removing books of accounts from the place of the dealers. They were of M/s. New Central Stores (B. C. No. ID-1468) and Messrs. New Patel Stores (ID-1835 ). As regards the first it was alleged that the petitioner had disregarded instructions of the Collector of Sales Tax in respect of passing of the seizure orders while removing books of accounts from the place of the dealers. As regards the other case it was alleged that he had passed a wrong order which had to be set aside by the appellate authority. It was alleged that he had shown great high-handedness and arbitrariness and had behaved in a manner unworthy of a responsible officer in that case. ( 5 ) ON the 31st of July 1957 the petitioner addressed a letter to the Inquiry Officer whereby he requested that the case records and documents mentioned therein be supplied to him for his perusal to enable him to meet effectively the charges made against him. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The petitioner carried on some further correspondence with the Inquiry Officer complaining that he was greatly handicapped in his defence as all the case files as requested were not made available to him and ultimately on 5th of April 1958 he filed his written statement. We will not be concerned with all the details contained in this written statement. The relevant part thereof is only the one whereby he showed cause against the charges Nos. 4 and 5. As regards charge No. 4 he stated that so far as the first part of the charge was concerned it was neither definite nor specific and was vague and complained that he found it difficult to deal with it in the absence of any details. As regards the latter part of the charge in which the two cases of Azad Hind Tanneries and Misrimal Pokhraj were referred to his stand was that the charges levelled against him of deliberately or negligently under-assessing the said dealers were unjustified and were baseless. He gave his explanation at length in respect of both of them. We need not enter into those details at this stage as we shall be referring to them when we deal with the respective contentions of the parties. He gave his explanation at length in respect of both of them. We need not enter into those details at this stage as we shall be referring to them when we deal with the respective contentions of the parties. As regards the two other cases of New Central Stores and New Patel Stores which though not mentioned in the charge-sheet were mentioned in the statement of allegations also he gave his detailed explanation. As regards the New Central Stores he gave his explanation as to why the seizure orders could not be given immediately. As regards the New Patel Stores also he gave the detailed explanation referring to the charge levelled against him. At the end he made the following requests:- (1) An opportunity to personally explain his reports may be given to him. (2) An opportunity may be given to him to point out and put on record the missing documents and documents not shown to him. (3) He may be allowed to examine Shri Gore Assistant Collector of Sales Tax Range II Bombay. (4) He may be permitted to re-examine Balwantsing on certain points of importance. The matter was then fixed for hearing by the Inquiry Officer from time to time. ( 6 ) ON the 24th February 1960 the petitioner received a letter from the Commissioner of Sales Tax with which was forwarded the show cause notice dated the 22nd February 1960 along with its accompaniments. A copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer was also sent therewith. By this show cause notice the petitioner was informed that on the basis of the said report of the Inquiry Officer the Government had come to the conclusion that the charges Nos. 4 and 5 mentioned in the charge-sheet served on him were fully proved against him and that the Government proposed by way of punishment to revert him from the post of Sales Tax Officer to the post of Sales Tax Inspector for a period of three years on the ground that he had been found guilty of the aforesaid charges. He was then called upon to show cause within 15 days from the receipt of the notice why the proposed action should not be taken in regard to him. . . . . . . . . . . . . He was then called upon to show cause within 15 days from the receipt of the notice why the proposed action should not be taken in regard to him. . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 7 ) ON the 2nd of April 1960 in reply to the show cause notice served on him the petitioner filed his written statement. At the outset the petitioner expressed his satisfaction in noting the fact that inspite of the finding of the inquiry Officer on charge No. 2 as having been proved it was not included in the second show cause notice. But he pointed out that the show cause notice stated that charges No. 4 and 5 were considered to have been fully proved though the Inquiry Officer had considered charges Nos. 4 and 5 as only partially proved. He complained that the show cause notice did not afford an opportunity to him to know the grounds on which the Government had considered charges Nos. 4 and 5 as fully proved inspite of the fact that the Inquiry Officer had held them to be partially proved as no grounds were given in the show cause notice on which the Government could come to the conclusion that the charges were fully proved. These charges were considered as partially proved by the Inquiry Officer inasmuch as he had categorically rejected the allegation that favouritism was shown by the petitioner and what was found proved was only negligence on his part. He reiterated the complaint that he was not supplied with the documents called for by him under his letters dated 31st July 1957 and 27th October 1957. He also complained that the file of Misrimal Pokhraj was not made available to him at the time of hearing He further complained that the inspection compliance report in respect of Azad Hind Tanneries was not supplied to him. He further pointed out that the necessary papers in respect of the other two cases were also not supplied to him. We will refer to the other parts of his statement as and when necessary while dealing with the specific contentions raised by the petitioner. ( 8 ) AFTER this written statement was filed on the 1st of May 1960 the State of Bombay was re-organised and the States of Maharashtra and Gujarat came into existence. We will refer to the other parts of his statement as and when necessary while dealing with the specific contentions raised by the petitioner. ( 8 ) AFTER this written statement was filed on the 1st of May 1960 the State of Bombay was re-organised and the States of Maharashtra and Gujarat came into existence. It is the petitioners case that he has been allotted to the State of Gujarat. On 1st of July 1960 the petitioner received another show cause notice from the Government of Gujarat. It informed him that on re-consideration the Government proposed by way of punishment to remove him from service under Government. He was therefore called upon to show cause within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice as to why the proposed action should not be taken. This notice was served on him on the 13th of July 1960. On 20th of July 1960 the petitioner addressed a letter to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Gujarat in the Finance Department from whom he had received the above-stated notice. In the said letter he requested that the grounds on which the Government had thought fit to revise the decision may be given to enable him to submit the defence in its proper perspective. In reply to this letter he received a communication on the 22 of July 1960 wherein it was stated that it was within the power of Government to reconsider its original proposal as regards the punishment to be imposed on him and to serve a fresh notice on him to show cause. As regards the proposed punishment it was pointed out that it was not necessary that the Government should let him know the reasons as to why the Government has reconsidered its former proposal and formulated a fresh one. It was further mentioned that both the original and revised proposals were based on the findings of the inquiry Officer copies of which were already supplied to him. On the 8th of August 1960 the petitioner filed his written statement to the aforesaid show cause notice in which he mentioned that be was filing the second written statement keeping alive the contentions raised by him in his statement filed in reply to the first show cause notice dated 22-2-1960. On the 8th of August 1960 the petitioner filed his written statement to the aforesaid show cause notice in which he mentioned that be was filing the second written statement keeping alive the contentions raised by him in his statement filed in reply to the first show cause notice dated 22-2-1960. Then he complained that reasonable opportunity was not given to him by the Inquiry Officer inasmuch as the charge was vague and inspite of his demand certain important documents which were made the very basis of the charge were not supplied to him. He gave the details of all the documents which he had asked for and which were not supplied in respect of the four cases. He requested that he may be given a personal hearing. On the 22nd of September 1961 the petitioner received a letter from the Commissioner of Sales Tax together with the order of the Government of even date and the recommendation of the Public Service Commission. By that order the Government of Gujarat had removed him from service with effect from the date of that order. ( 9 ) THE petitioner then filed an appeal to the Government of Gujarat. On the 4th of April 1962 he was informed by a memorandum from the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Gujarat Finance Department that his representation had been carefully considered and the Government regretted that it saw no ground for revising the orders passed. ( 10 ) THE petitioner has therefore filed this petition for an appropriate writ as stated aforesaid. In reply to the petition on behalf of the State Mr. M. Y. Hansia the Under-Secretary to the Government Finance Department has filed an affidavit. It will be convenient to refer to the averments made therein as and when the occasion arises in the course of the discussion that follows. The petitioner has also filed an affidavit in rejoinder. ( 11 ) MR. S. B. Vakil the learned advocate for the petitioner broadly speaking raised two main contentions. (1) The Order of the Government of Gujarat in continuation of the proceedings of the former State of Bombay is not valid and (2) reasonable opportunity to show cause was not given to the petitioner as contemplated by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. S. B. Vakil the learned advocate for the petitioner broadly speaking raised two main contentions. (1) The Order of the Government of Gujarat in continuation of the proceedings of the former State of Bombay is not valid and (2) reasonable opportunity to show cause was not given to the petitioner as contemplated by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. ( 12 ) IN respect of the first contention it was argued that the order is bad as the former proceedings started against him by the erstwhile State of Bombay could not just be continued by the Government of Gujarat; if the Government of Gujarat wanted to take any disciplinary action against him after his services were allocated to the Gujarat Government then under law the whole of the proceedings should have been started de novo. In order to substantiate his submission Mr. Vakil firstly relied upon various provisions of the Bombay Reorganization Act (No. 11 of 1960) and it will be necessary to refer to the relevant sections of the said Act. Sec. 3 of the said Act provided for the formation of the State of Gujarat and Maharashtra and from the appointed day that is to say from 1st of May 1960 the new State of Gujarat comprising of parts of territories mentioned therein of the old State of Bombay came into existence. Part VIII of the said Act laid down the provisions as to services and it consist of secs. 80 to 84. Sec. 80 relates to All-India Services with which we are not concerned but secs. 81 and 82 are the material sections for our purpose and they are as follows :- 81 Provisions relating to other services. (1) Every person who immediately before the appointed day is serving in connection with the affairs of the State of Bombay shall as from that day provisionally continue to serve in connection with the affairs of the State of Maharashtra unless he is required by general or special order of the Central Government to serve provisionally in connection with the affairs of the State of Gujarat. (2) As soon as may be after the appointed day the Central Government shall by general or special order determine the State to which every person provisionally allotted to the State of Maharashtra or Gujarat shall be finally allotted for service and the date with effect from which such allotment shall take effect or be deemed to have taken effect. (3) Every person who is finally allotted under the provisions of sub-sec. (2) to the State of Maharashtra or Gujarat shall if he is not already serving therein be made available for serving in that State from such date as may be agreed upon between the two State Governments or in default of such agreement as may be determined by the Central Government. (4) The Central Government may by order establish one or more advisory Committees for the purpose of assisting it in regard to (a) the division and integration of the services among the States of Maharashtra and Gujarat; and (b) the ensuring of fair and equitable treatment to all persons affected by the provisions of this section and the proper consideration of any representations made by such persons. (5) The foregoing provisions of this section shall not apply in relation to any person to whom the provisions of sec. 80 apply. (6) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect after the appointed day the operation of the provisions of Chapter I of Part XIV of the Constitution in relation to the determination of the conditions of service of persons serving in connection with the affairs of the State of Maharashtra or Gujarat:- provided that the conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day to the case of any person provisionally or finally allotted to the State of Maharashtra or Gujarat under this section shall not be varied to his disadvantage except with the previous approval of the Central Government. 82 Provisions as to continuance of officers in same post-Every person who immediately before the appointed day is holding or discharging the duties of any post or office in connection with the affairs of the State of Bombay in any area which on that day falls within the State of Maharashtra or Gujarat shall continue to hold the same post or office in that State and shall be deemed as from that day to have been duly appointed to the post or office by the Government of or other appropriate authority in that State:- provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a competent authority after the appointed day from passing in relation to such person any order affecting his continuance in such post or office. ( 13 ) ON behalf of the petitioner it was urged that he was in the service of the former Bombay State and from the appointed days under sec. 82 he must be deemed to have been duly appointed in service of the Government of Gujarat as he was holding a post 9r office in connection with the affairs of the State of Bombay in the area which fell within the State of Gujarat on the 1st of May 1960. It was submitted that therefore this was a fresh appointment in service of the new State of Gujarat and consequently the old proceedings started by the old State of Bombay cannot just be continued or taken advantage of. We are not able to endorse this submission made by Mr. Vakil nor the construction placed by him on sec. 82. In our view it cannot be construed that sec. 82 contemplates a fresh appointment in service of the State of Gujarat of all persons who were in the service of the Bombay State and who held any posts at any place falling within the territory of the State of Gujarat on the appointed day. Reading secs. 81 and 82 together it becomes clear that sec. 81 contained provisions that refer to services and sec. 82 refers to the post or office held by a person in the service. On the analysis of the two sections the picture that emanates is that under sub-sec. (1) of sec. Reading secs. 81 and 82 together it becomes clear that sec. 81 contained provisions that refer to services and sec. 82 refers to the post or office held by a person in the service. On the analysis of the two sections the picture that emanates is that under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 81 on the appointed day all the Government employees in the service of the State of Bombay were to continue provisionally to be in the service of the State of Maharashtra unless the Central Government by a special order required any of such persons to serve provisionally in connection with the affairs of the State of Gujarat. This provisional state of affairs was to come to an end by the passing of a special or general order by the Central Government whereby every person who was provisionally allotted to either of the new State was to be finally allotted for service in one or the other State and also the date from which such allotment should take effect or be deemed to have taken effect was to be determined. So on the 1st of May 1960 the State Government servants in the employ of the State of Bombay provisionally continued in the service of the State of Maharashtra unless any of them by a special order of the Central Government was required provisionally to serve in connection with the affairs of the State of Gujarat and this provisional arrangement was to be ended by the Central Government by passing special or general orders allotting permanently the Government servants in the service of either of the two States. What is important to note is that the provisions of the said Act indicate that the two concepts of service and the holding of a post or office are treated separately. Sec. 81 deals with the former while sec. 82 with the latter. Sec. 82 contemplates only the continuance of the various Government Officers in the same post or office. It is obvious that on the coming into effect of the two new States on the bifurcation that took place neither the services of the Government employees could be allowed to come to an end nor could the various offices or posts held by them be allowed to fall vacant or they be allowed to hold them without being duly appointed to those posts and carry on administration. The affairs of the two States must continue to work smoothly through the instrumentality of the Government employees posted in various offices despite the bifurcation and at the same time the interests and the rights and liabilities of such Government servants were also to continue in the two respective new States. To achieve the former objective sec. 82 was included and to achieve the latter sec. 81 finds its place in the Act. Sec. 82 requires the Government servants to continue in their respective posts that they held on the 1st of May 1960. Apparently it was also necessary then to provide that the respective State Governments will be considered to have appointed them in those respective posts on the appointed day in order to enable the respective Governments of the two States to effectively carry on the administration through those officers and also exercise effective administrative control. This was deemed to be the appointment to the post or office of the respective employees and not an appointment in the Government service of either of the States. There is therefore no force in the submission that under sec. 82 the petitioner must be deemed to be appointed afresh in the service of the State of Gujarat and therefore all that had been done by the State of Bombay as regards the inquiry cannot be relied upon by the State of Gujarat that ultimately removed him from service. ( 14 ) IT was then urged that even if the above construction put on secs. 81 and 82 by us were to be accepted it would mean that the petitioner had continued in the service of the State of Maharashtra on the appointed day and then was finally appointed by the Central Government in the service of the State of Gujarat when he was finally allotted to serve in the State of Gujarat. Under that circumstance the appointing authority being the Central Government he could not be removed by the State Government; that would violate clause (1) of Article 311 of the Constitution. . . . . . . However having given our best consideration to the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner and for reasons stated hereunder we are unable to accept the submission that the petitioner should be taken to have been appointed in the service of the State of Gujarat by the Central Government. . . . . . . However having given our best consideration to the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner and for reasons stated hereunder we are unable to accept the submission that the petitioner should be taken to have been appointed in the service of the State of Gujarat by the Central Government. What the Central Government did was to allocate the service of the petitioner to the State of Gujarat. The Central Government did not make any fresh appointment in the service of the State of Gujarat. As pointed out everything concerned with the administration of the territories of the two States was intended to continue to run and so were the services of the Government employees continued in the first instance provisionally with the State of Maharashtra unless by order made by the Central Government any of them were required to serve with the State of Gujarat; and then the Central Government had to merely finally allocate the service of the Government employees that was continuing to the respective States. Neither sec. 81 nor sec. 82 contemplates any fresh appointments in the service of the two States. ( 15 ) THIS Court in the case of Hariprasad Raghuram Dave v. State of Gujarat and others A. I. R. 1965 Gujarat 283 has observed as follows:-ARTICLE 311 (1) is a general provision intended to give protection to all those who are employed in Government service either in the Centre or a State and who are civil servants or hold civil posts all over the country and in any of the departments. It is also intended to govern the cases of Government servants originally employed in one department and who may be transferred to another department or from the State service to the Centre or from one State to another. Therefore the words authority subordinate to would not mean only one directly subordinate or that the removing authority must be a direct superior to the appointing authority. The word subordinate has therefore necessarily to be given a wider connotation. It was further observed that it was not possible to lay down any single or universal test. As to who can be called the subordinate authority the question has to be answered by the Court keeping in mind the facts of each case which may emphasise one or the other of the elements of the general concept of subordination. It was further observed that it was not possible to lay down any single or universal test. As to who can be called the subordinate authority the question has to be answered by the Court keeping in mind the facts of each case which may emphasise one or the other of the elements of the general concept of subordination. The concept of subordination has to be mostly judged from the point of view of rank or grade but sometimes it has to be judged even from the point of view as to whether the removing authority is the head of a department just as the appointing authority was the head of his department particularly when both the authorities belong to the same department or the same set up. On the principles that have been discussed in the said case and the above observations of this Court in our mind we are clear that so far as the present case was concerned the Government of Bombay was the first competent authority and after the extinction of the State of Bombay the Government of the State of Gujarat is the competent authority so far as the question of dismissal removal or reduction in rank of the petitioner is concerned. The petitioner was appointed by the Government of Bombay in the Sales Tax Department in October 1952. So long as that State was in existence the competent authority to take disciplinary action against the petitioner and to dismiss remove or reduce him in rank was the State Government of Bombay. On the extinction of that State and the services of the petitioner having been allotted to the State of Gujarat the competent authority to take such disciplinary action and to inflict the punishment of dismissal removal or reduction in rank is the Government of the State of Gujarat and not the Central Government. ( 16 ) MR. S. B. Vakil then contended that even if it is assumed that it is the Government of the State of Gujarat that has the authority to remove the petitioner still the question remains as to whether the Government of Gujarat can rely on any part of the inquiry made by the State of Bombay or it must start the inquiry afresh. It was urged that if the Government of Gujarat wanted to remove the petitioner it should have started the proceedings afresh and it was not competent to the State of Gujarat to rely upon the inquiry held by the State of Bombay to make any order of removal of the petitioner from the service. He mainly relied upon Article 311 of the Constitution for this submission of his. The relevant part of Article 311 of the Constitution for this submission as it stood before its amendment in 1963 was as follows:-311 (1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all - India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. There was a proviso added to clause 2 thereof but that proviso or clause 3 thereof have no bearing on the question on hand. There is no dispute that in the present case Article 311 as it stood before its amendment applies. It was argued before us that it is the removing authority itself which has to make up its mind and give an opportunity to the person in the civil service of the State as required under Article 311. The Government of the State of Gujarat could not rely upon that part of the inquiry which was made by the Government of Bombay to serve the second show cause notice dated the 6th of July 1960 as to why he should not be removed from service. The first stage of the inquiry when the charge is framed and the delinquent officer is called upon to show cause against it as well as the second stage when he is called upon to show cause against the proposed punishment are judicial inquiries and therefore the requirement of clause (2) of Article 311 must be fulfilled in its entirety from the beginning to the end by the authority who could remove him from office. Now there is no doubt that the disciplinary inquiry at both stages is judicial in nature. Now there is no doubt that the disciplinary inquiry at both stages is judicial in nature. But we find no justification to accept the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the present competent authority that is the Government of the State of Gujarat cannot act upon the data collected at the first stage of inquiry carried on by the then competent authority the Government of the State of Bombay. We do not find anything in Article 311 that would preclude such a procedure. All that is required is that no person who holds a civil post shall be dismissed or removed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed and that no such person shall be dismissed removed or reduced in rank unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken. The only requirement therefore is that the inquiry at all stages must be by a competent authority. As we have pointed outs the first stage of inquiry was handled by the Government of the State of Bombay which was the then competent authority and so also the second stage which is being handled by the Government of the State of Gujarat which is the present competent authority and we see no reason why what was done by the then competent authority cannot be continued by the present competent authority or taken advantage of what was legally done by the said competent authority. There is nothing to indicate in Article 311 that what was done by the then competent authority and under the circumstances aforesaid when the Government servant comes under another competent authority whatever was properly and legally done by the then Competent authority becomes useless and cannot be made use of by the present competent authority. We therefore reject the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that the provisions of Article 311 preclude the Government of the State of Gujarat from relying upon the report of the Inquiry Officer appointed by the Government of the State of Bombay and that the Government of Gujarat should have started the inquiry afresh if it so chose to take the disciplinary action against the petitioner. ( 17 ) MR. ( 17 ) MR. Vakil then argued that even if Article 311 cannot be interpreted in the manner in which he did as the State of Gujarat came into existence under the statutory provisions of the Bombay Reorganization Act unless and until there was some provision in the Act itself to entitle the Government of Gujarat to rely upon the previous proceedings taken by the Government of Bombay it cannot be so done. It was submitted that the provisions of the said Act do not permit such a procedure. We are not able to endorse this submission made on behalf of the petitioner. As indicated hereinabove the bifurcation of the State of Bombay did not bring to an end either the services of the Government servants of the State of Bombay or their privileges and liabilities. Sec. 81 is a clear indication in the Act of the legislative intent of the continuity of the service and all things going with it. Even the holding of the respective posts by Government employees was continued and this becomes most apparent when we see sec. 82 of the Act. If we have a look into secs. 91 and 92 also the idea of continuity is patently impressed thereon. Sec. 91 deals with the pending legal proceedings and it is provided that where immediately before the appointed day the State of Bombay was a party to any legal proceedings with respect to any property rights or liabilities subject to apportionment between the States of Maharashtra and Gujarat under this Act the State of Maharashtra or Gujarat which succeeded to or acquired a share in that property or those rights or liabilities by virtue of any provision of the Act should be deemed to be substituted for the State of Bombay as a party to those proceedings and proceedings shall continue accordingly. Then sec. 92 provides for transfer of pending proceedings. Every proceeding pending immediately before the appointed day before a court tribunal authority or officer in any area which on that day fell within the State of Maharashtra if it was a proceeding relating exclusively to the transferred territory stood transferred to the corresponding court tribunal authority or officer in the State of Gujarat A question arises whether the instant case would directly be covered by the provisions of sec. 92 or not because it was urged on behalf of the State that the present proceedings will be directly covered by sec. 92 and should stand transferred to the competent authority in the State of Gujarat. While on the other hand Mr. Vakil urged that sec. 92 had no application at all to the present proceedings and besides it cannot be said to be a proceeding which related exclusively to the transferred territory. We are inclined to agree with Mr. Vakil on this point that the present case does not directly fall within the purview of sec. 92. Sec. 92 only provides that if any proceedings is pending before any court tribunal or authority which has gone to Maharashtra State on the appointed day if the matter relates exclusively to the transferred territory of Gujarat then they shall stand transferred to the corresponding authority court or officer in the State of Gujarat. It is doubtful whether the departmental proceedings would fall within the purview of this section or not. But apart from that it is difficult to accept the submission that the departmental proceeding against the petitioner was a matter exclusively relating to the territory that has gone to the State of Gujarat. We agree with Mr. Vakil that sec. 92 has no direct application to the present case. However that does not mean that the departmental proceedings started by the prior Government cannot be relied upon at the stage of issue of the second show cause notice by the Government of Gujarat. The idea of continuity of all things concerned on the bifurcation is implicit throughout the provisions of the said Act. There can be no manner of doubt that on the bifurcation all rights and privileges of the Government servants continued and they did carry them with themselves in the service allotted to them in the new States. It then cannot be that they only carried their rights and privileges with them and not their liabilities. It is true that though rarely strange consequences may follow on coming into force of legislative enactments but reading the provisions of this Act and putting a reasonable construction thereon in our judgment no such strange consequences follow. We may also refer to secs. 88 and 89. It is true that though rarely strange consequences may follow on coming into force of legislative enactments but reading the provisions of this Act and putting a reasonable construction thereon in our judgment no such strange consequences follow. We may also refer to secs. 88 and 89. Sec. 88 deals with the power to adapt laws that existed in the original State of Bombay and had their application to the State of Bombay in the new States. Sec. 89 is more pertinent which provides for power to construe laws and it says that Notwithstanding that no provision or insufficient provision has been made under sec. 88 for the adaptation of a law made before the appointed day any court tribunal or authority required or empowered to enforce such law may for the purpose of facilitating its application in relation to the State of Maharashtra or Gujarat construe the law in such manner without affecting the substance as may be necessary or proper in regard to the matter before the court tribunal or authority. It is true as pointed out by Mr. Vakil that this provision even cannot come to the help of the Government if Article 311 gives the petitioner the right which he claims. As we have already pointed out no such right as claimed has been given to him under Article 311 that is to say to urge that the whole proceeding against him is bad because the present competent authority of the Government of the State of Gujarat relied upon the report of the Inquiry Officer of the then State of Bombay. These two provisions also give a deep impress of the intention and effort of the legislature at continuity of all things concerned of the old State to newly organized States. Mr. Vakil then tried to rely upon secs. 51 and 52 to urge that these two sections indicate that no such intention of continuity can be found from the provisions of this Act. In our view these two sections have no bearing as such on the question of the continuity of the services of the Government employees and their rights and liabilities. 51 and 52 to urge that these two sections indicate that no such intention of continuity can be found from the provisions of this Act. In our view these two sections have no bearing as such on the question of the continuity of the services of the Government employees and their rights and liabilities. Sec. 51 provides for the division of credits in certain funds of the composite State of Bombay in certain proportion and some of the investments relating to subjects confined to local areas belonging to one or the other State were given to the respective States. Similarly sec. 52 deals with the setting up of special Revenue Reserve Fund in Gujarat. We therefore hold that the proceedings which were already pending against the petitioner before the competent authority in the State of Bombay continued and it was not necessary for the Government of the State of Gujarat to start the proceedings de novo and it was competent to the Government of the State of Gujarat to rely upon the report of the Inquiry Officer. ( 18 ) THAT brings us to the consideration of the second main contention on which the impugned order is challenged before us. It was contended that no reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner as laid down in article 311 (2 ). In support of this general contention various infirmities were pointed out. The first of these infirmities pointed out to us was that the first part of charge No. 4 of the charge-sheet that was given by the Government of the State of Bombay to the petitioner was very vague and therefore it was extremely difficult for the petitioner to effectively meet that charge which was held to be proved. ( 19 ) HAVING regard to all these circumstances pointed out we are unable to agree with the learned advocate for the petitioner that charge No. 4 was so vague as to amount to no reasonable opportunity being given to him to meet the charge. ( 20 ) BEFORE we go to consider the next contention on behalf of the petitioner on the ground of no reasonable opportunity to show cause having been given to him we would like to deal with one general contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. ( 20 ) BEFORE we go to consider the next contention on behalf of the petitioner on the ground of no reasonable opportunity to show cause having been given to him we would like to deal with one general contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. It was that the affidavit filed on behalf of the State should not be looked into at all and the State cannot be allowed to rely upon it. This contention is made to rest on two grounds. Firstly that it is made by an Under Secretary of the Finance Department and obviously he had no personal knowledge about the facts with which we are concerned and secondly that the affidavit is not made in the form required by law that is to say the person making it has not stated anywhere that any part of it was according to his knowledge or was according to his belief or information. It is true that the affidavit is not made in strict compliance with the provisions of law. At the same time it is made clear in the very opening part of the affidavit that the person filing the affidavit had perused all the papers and had got conversant with all the files and the facts of the case and as such was in a position to file his affidavit. It clearly shows that he never intended to claim any personal knowledge in respect of the matters concerned and had filed the affidavit on the information that he had collected from the files. Looking to this and the other facts and circumstances on the record we are not inclined to take a very strict and technical view to discard altogether the affidavit from our consideration. What weight under such circumstances can be given to the contents thereof is a different matter. At the same time we would like to observe that the parties must adhere to the requirement of the provisions of law in filing affidavits and we do disapprove of the attitude of disregard to the provisions of law in the filing of the affidavit in this case on behalf of the State. . ( 21 ) ON behalf of the petitioner it was next urged that though demanded copies of some documents relied upon even to hold the charges proved against him were not supplied. . ( 21 ) ON behalf of the petitioner it was next urged that though demanded copies of some documents relied upon even to hold the charges proved against him were not supplied. Important documents and records were not made available to him at the hearing and as such he was not given as required by law a reasonable opportunity to show cause. This is indeed a very grave allegation made against the respondent and the officers concerned and there can be no doubt that if the grievance made can be substantiated the petition must succeed. If it is established that copies of documents despite demand by the petitioner were not given and some of these documents were actually made the basis of the charge and the charges were held proved on the basis of such documents then it would be a clear breach of the rule of natural justice and would also be against the requirement of Article 311 (2) inasmuch as one has to come to the conclusion that no reasonable opportunity as required by Article 311 (2) was given to the petitioner. We therefore now turn to examine the details of this grievance of the petitioner. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 22 ) ALL the above stated discussion leads us to the conclusion that the grievance made by the petitioner that he was not given a reasonable opportunity to defend is justified and has to be accepted. We have shown hereinabove that important documents were not given to him in respect of both the charges Nos. IV and V and some of the documents were not made available to the petitioner at important stages These documents were of importance to him for his defence because they were made the very basis of the two charges and not only that but these were also relied upon by the Inquiry Officer to hold that the charges had been proved. It would be impossible to accept the submission on behalf of the State that the non-supply of these documents could not amount to non-giving of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to show cause and therefore we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner has substantiated this contention raised by him which entitles him to succeed in this petition and we shall order accordingly. ( 23 ) BUT before we come to a close there are certain other points which were placed before us for our consideration and we have to deal with them. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that:- (1) Under law he was entitled to a personal hearing even at the stage of the show cause notice issued in respect of the proposed punishment as no reasons were given by the Government of Gujarat for reconsidering the case and proposing the punishment of removal in place of reduction and that he had made a special request as regards the giving of a personal hearing before passing the final order but that was not given by the Government of Gujarat. According to the petitioner the notice must not only expressly state the conclusions reached but the authority must also indicate the reasons on which he came to those conclusions. The second show cause notice therefore did not give him the reasonable opportunity as required by Article 311 (2) Even if it is held that personal hearing is not contemplated by law under the facts and circumstances of this particular case such a personal hearing was necessary and in the absence whereof it cannot be said that the reasonable opportunity was given to him to show cause as is required by article 311 (2 ). We shall consider the contentions in the above order. ( 24 ) IN respect of these contentions our attention was drawn to the petitioners letter to the Gujarat Government dated the 20th July 1960. In that letter the petitioner had stated that he was served with the show cause notice but before he could file his statement in respect of the show-cause notice the grounds on which the Government had reconsidered and revised the decision should be furnished to him as that would facilitate the petitioner to submit the defence in the proper perspective. In that letter the petitioner had stated that he was served with the show cause notice but before he could file his statement in respect of the show-cause notice the grounds on which the Government had reconsidered and revised the decision should be furnished to him as that would facilitate the petitioner to submit the defence in the proper perspective. In reply to this letter the Government wrote that it was within the power of the Government to reconsider its original proposal as regards the punishment to be imposed on him and to serve a fresh notice to show cause against the revised proposal as regards the punishment. It was not necessary that the Government should supply him the reasons why Government had reconsidered its original proposal and formulated the fresh one and finally it was stated that both the original and the revised proposals are based on the findings of the Inquiry Officer a copy of which had already been supplied to him. ( 25 ) TO substantiate the first part of his contention reliance was placed on the decision in The High Commissioner for India and another v. I. M. Lall A. I. R. 1948 P. C. 121 and Khem Chand v. Union of India and others A. I. R. 1956 S. C. 300. We may mention that we do not find it necessary to deal with these decisions in details as the point raised before us and the said decisions have been directly dealt with in the later decision of the Supreme Court in The State of Assam and another v. Bimal Kumar Pandit A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 1612 to which we shall presently make a reference to show that the contention was positively negatived by the Supreme Court. But before we refer to the said decision of the Supreme Court which is so far the last word on the point we may as well point out that the Privy Council decision referred to above was given by the Judicial Committee in an appeal filed before them from the decision of the Federal Court of India in Secretary of State v. I. M. Lall A. I. R. 1945 F. C. 47 and while discussing the point raised the Supreme Court in its later decision of The State of Assam and another v. Bimal Kumar Pandit has also dealt with the said Federal Court decision. In the Privy Council decision the principle laid down was that the provision to give reasonable opportunity is mandatory and that there is no difficulty in the statutory opportunity being reasonably afforded at more than one stage. The Privy Council decision nowhere appears to lay down any principle that if reasons or grounds are not stated in the second show-cause notice it would amount to giving no reasonable opportunity to the delinquent officer. It is true however that in the Federal Court decision aforesaid there were some observations to the effect that grounds or reasons should be stated in the second show cause notice to comply with the requirements of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 240 of the Government of India Act (which was almost the same in substance as Article 311 (2 ). But these observations were not approved of as laying down any general principle even by the earlier Supreme Court decision in Khem Chand v. Union of India and others A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 300 and it was pointed out that those observations are to be read in the context of the other relevant observations made therein. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court in their later decision of the State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar Pandit have fully discussed and explained the observations made in the said Federal Court decision and other decisions in which they appeared to lay down as a general principle of law to the effect that Article 311 (2) contemplates that the authority concerned would necessarily in its order requiring the civil servant to show cause mention not only the punishment to be inflicted but also the reasons or grounds for coming to that conclusion. The Supreme Court however held that such a view was not justified by the requirements of Article 311 (2) and it was not necessary to give grounds or reasons in the second show cause notice particularly when the competent authority gives the notice to show cause against the proposed punishment after accepting the findings of the Inquiry Officer. Therefore the contention that as no reasons or grounds were given it was not possible to show cause effectively by a mere representation in writing and that he should have been given a personal hearing to comply with the requirements of Article 311 (2) must fail. Therefore the contention that as no reasons or grounds were given it was not possible to show cause effectively by a mere representation in writing and that he should have been given a personal hearing to comply with the requirements of Article 311 (2) must fail. Moreover there is no rule that when a reasonable opportunity is to be given under Article 311 (2) at the second stage a personal hearing is a necessary ingredient of the concept of reasonable opportunity referred to in Article 311 (2 ). This is well settled by the Supreme Court in S. Kapur Singh v. Union of India A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 493. What is contemplated is as is laid down in Khem Chand v. Union of India and others A. I. R. 1958 S. C. p. 300 (supra) an opportunity to make his representation as to why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted on him. This opportunity was given to the petitioner by the competent authority indicating that he had considered the report of the Inquiry Officer and had also indicated the proposed punishment in the said notice. The petitioner had made the representation and the final order was passed after taking into account the Inquiry Officers report and his representation. The first part of the contention raised by the petitioner therefore fails. ( 26 ) THAT brings us to the second part of the said contention raised by the petitioner. In support of this contention it was urged that the record of the present case discloses that the punishing authority of the State of Bombay as well as the State of Gujarat in the respective show cause notices issued by them as to why the respective punishment should not be imposed neither of them had clearly indicated that he had accepted the findings of the Inquiry Officer. On the contrary the said notices indicated that the authorities had not accepted the findings of the Inquiry Officer. Under the circumstances the petitioner could not have known on what grounds the punishing authority decided to impose upon the petitioner the penalty of removal from service. On the contrary the said notices indicated that the authorities had not accepted the findings of the Inquiry Officer. Under the circumstances the petitioner could not have known on what grounds the punishing authority decided to impose upon the petitioner the penalty of removal from service. It was also urged that the show cause notice issued and the final order passed by the Government of Gujarat did not show that it had applied its mind to the findings of the Inquiry Officer and appeared to have even considered certain charges having been proved though the Inquiry Officer had not held them to be proved. It was further urged that inspection and copies of important documents which were made the basis of the charges were not given. In all these circumstances the mere giving of the opportunity to put in a written representation was not enough and under the special facts of the case oral hearing should have been given and failure to do so amounted to not giving of a reasonable opportunity. ( 27 ) NOW it is beyond dispute that the inquiry though it may be in two stages at both the stages is in the nature of a judicial inquiry and that opportunity to show cause has to be given to the Government servant concerned. The question raised is that under the circumstances of the present case it was incumbent on the punishing authority to give the petitioner a personal hearing as was demanded by him. ( 28 ) ON behalf of the petitioner it was pointed out that reading the charge-sheet and the statement of allegations together it is clear that the petitioner was called upon to meet so far as charges Nos. IV and V were concerned composite charges inasmuch as they were based on the allegations of negligence as well as deliberate attempt at favouritism or deliberate attempt to under assess. The report of the Inquiry Officer indicates clearly that both under charge IV as also under charge V the allegations of deliberate attempt to show favouritism to the assessee or deliberate attempt to under assess were not held proved and only negligence was held to have been proved by the Inquiry Officer. The report of the Inquiry Officer indicates clearly that both under charge IV as also under charge V the allegations of deliberate attempt to show favouritism to the assessee or deliberate attempt to under assess were not held proved and only negligence was held to have been proved by the Inquiry Officer. Despite these clear facts the show cause notice given by the Government of Bombay as to why the punishment of reducing him in rank should not be meted out while referring to the findings of the Inquiry Officer had stated that the Inquiry Officer had found the charges Nos. IV and V fully proved and on the basis of that provisional conclusion reached the competent authority had called upon him to show cause. In the written statement filed in reply to that notice the petitioner had clearly pointed out the discrepancy and had showed his surprise at the provisional conclusion reached by the punishing authority. So the competent authority in the State of Bombay appeared to have proposed the punishment of reduction in rank on the provisional conclusion reached of charges Nos. IV and V having been fully proved. It was further argued that thereafter when the bifurcation took place the competent authority of the Gujarat State issued another show-cause notice in continuation of the show-cause notice issued by the authority in the Bombay State by which the petitioner was informed that on reconsideration of the matter notice was given to show-cause as to why he should not be removed from service. It did not disclose clearly any indication of the provisional conclusion reached by that authority and the reason why the punishment was proposed to be enhanced. It was urged that the petitioner should have been given a reasonable opportunity to show that the competent authority of the Bombay Government appeared to have proposed the lesser punishment of reduction taking both the charges Nos. IV V having been fully proved; and that as a matter of fact when the said charges are shown not to have been fully proved the punishment should be reduced but the competent authority of the Gujarat State on the contrary issued a show-cause notice for removal thus proposing the extreme penalty. IV V having been fully proved; and that as a matter of fact when the said charges are shown not to have been fully proved the punishment should be reduced but the competent authority of the Gujarat State on the contrary issued a show-cause notice for removal thus proposing the extreme penalty. It was submitted that having regard to all the facts in order to explain all this and to effectively show cause against the proposed enhanced punishment a personal hearing ought to have been given and in absence thereof the requirement of giving of reasonable opportunity as contemplated by Article 311 (2) cannot be said to have been given. ( 29 ) PRIMA facie the submission made may appear to be impressive but when subjected to scrutiny we cannot find any substance in it. In the first places we do not find any specific ground made out in the petition that the order of removal was bad because the provisional conclusion reached by the punishing authority differed from the findings of the Inquiry Officer inasmuch as the charges Nos. IV and V were wrongly believed to have been fully proved and inspite of that the Bombay Government had proposed a lesser punishment and that the Gujarat Government had without disclosing any ground proposed a higher punishment and that therefore a personal hearing was a necessity to comply with the requirements of a reasonable opportunity under Article 311 (2 ). But apart from that in order to represent his grievance as above in showing cause against the proposed punishment of removal from service it was not at all a question of needs must that only by a personal oral hearing the said grievances could be put forward. In his written representation also it could be clearly placed that the competent authority should not take the two charges as fully proved because the Inquiry Officer had held that they are partially proved and that on that basis the punishment should if at all be even less than reduction in rank if his plea that he was not guilty of any charge and deserved no punishment at all was not accepted. In the alternative it could also have been represented in writing that even if the charges were held to be proved there was no justifiable reason to propose a higher punishment than reduction which proposed by the Bombay Government on the basis of the said two charges having been fully proved. We therefore do not agree that an opportunity of a personal oral representation was a necessity to put forward effectively his defence before the punishing authority on the aforesaid grounds. ( 30 ) MR. Sompura the Assistant Government Pleader then pointed out that the emphasis put by the petitioner on the fact that the competent authority appeared to differ from the findings of the Inquiry Officer because in the notice issued by the Bombay Government to show causes against the proposed punishment of reduction it was mentioned that charges Nos. IV and V were fully proved and all the arguments based thereon are not justified if we closely look at the relevant papers. We find ourselves in agreement with the learned Assistant Government Pleader in this submission of his. It is true that in the body of the report while discussing the two charges the Inquiry Officer has held that the allegations of deliberate underassessment or favouritism to assess were not established and only negligence was proved But when we go to the end of his report what he has said is:-ON consideration of the evidence and the documents before me my findings on each charge are as follows:- Charge No. (i) Not proved. Charge No. (ii) Proved Charge No. (iii) Not proved. Charge No. (iv) Proved. Charge No. (v) Proved. In the said findings he has not stated that the said charges were partially proved or fully proved. Looking to these facts it may be that the competent authority of the Bombay State in the second show cause notice referred to the charges as having been fully proved. The whole emphasis is laid on the word fully. But the fact remains that a copy of the whole of the Report was supplied to the petitioner and he had therefore the opportunity to bring to the notice of the competent authority the fact which to him appeared to be the discrepancy. The whole emphasis is laid on the word fully. But the fact remains that a copy of the whole of the Report was supplied to the petitioner and he had therefore the opportunity to bring to the notice of the competent authority the fact which to him appeared to be the discrepancy. Again merely because the word fully was used by the competent authority it cannot be said that in fact the competent authority had differed from the actual finding of the Inquiry Officer. The very show cause notice given by the Government of Bombay in which this word fully is used the Government had specifically stated that on the basis of the said report Government has come to the conclusion that. . . . . . . . So it is clear that the conclusion was based on the report of the Inquiry Officer as a whole. Again if we look to the subsequent correspondence and the notice issued by the Government of Gujarat and the final order it becomes amply clear that the competent authority had not as a matter of fact in any way differed from the findings of the Inquiry Officer on the said two charges of which the petitioner was found guilty by the Inquiry Officer and that the competent authority had ultimately agreed with the Inquiry Officer (except that it did not find the charge No. II duly proved which the Inquiry Officer had held to be proved) and on the basis of the report as it was as a whole had proposed the enhanced punishment and had passed the final order. In any case the petitioner had full and sufficient opportunity to represent in writing his case to the competent authority and we cannot be persuaded to hold that because no personal hearing was given in the present case it can be said that a reasonable opportunity was not given to the petitioner as required by Article 311 (2 ). ( 31 ) IN the decision of the State of Assam v. Bimal Kumar (supra) on which reliance was placed for the second prong of his contention it was held by the Supreme Court that it was desirable that the dismissing authority should indicate in the second notice its concurrence with the conclusions of the enquiry officer before it issues the notice under Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. But the failure to so state expressly in the notice does not necessarily justify the conclusion that the notice given in that behalf does not afford a reasonable opportunity to the delinquent officer and amounts to a contravention of Art. 311 (2 ). If the dismissing authority differs from the findings either wholly or partially recorded in the enquiry report it is essential that the provisional conclusions reached by the dismissing authority must be stated in the notice in order to give the delinquent officer a reasonable opportunity to show cause under Art. 311 (2 ). But where the dismissing authority purported to proceed to issue the notice after accepting the enquiry report in its entirety (as in the instant case) and a copy of the enquiry report was also enclosed along with the notice it must have been obvious to the delinquent officer that the findings recorded against him by the enquiring officer had been accepted and so it would not be reasonable to accept the view that the civil servant concerned had no reasonable opportunity as required by Art. 311 (2 ). In the instant case the show cause notice given by the competent authority of the Bombay State did as a matter of fact disclose the provisional conclusion reached by it on the report. Therefore even if it were correct to say that the competent authority had differed from the findings of the Inquiry Officer in the present case the provisional conclusion reached by the competent authority was disclosed to the petitioner and he also made a special reference to it in his reply to that notice. The show cause notice that was given by the Gujarat Government was in continuation of the previous notice and it only stated that on reconsideration Government proposed by way of punishment to remove the petitioner from service and that he may show cause why the higher punishment of removal should not be imposed on him. The show cause notice that was given by the Gujarat Government was in continuation of the previous notice and it only stated that on reconsideration Government proposed by way of punishment to remove the petitioner from service and that he may show cause why the higher punishment of removal should not be imposed on him. We have already held that it was permissible in law to the competent authority of the Gujarat State to rely upon that part of the proceedings taken by the Government of Bombay and therefore there was no irregularity or illegality committed if the last show cause notice merely drew the attention of the petitioner to previous show cause notice and did not again specifically refer to the Inquiry Officers report and indicate whether it accepted or differed from his findings. ( 32 ) IN the light of the discussions made and the conclusions reached by us on the ground that important and necessary documents were not made available to the petitioner no reasonable opportunity can be said to have been given to the petitioner as required under Article 311 this petition is allowed. The order passed on the 22nd of September 1961 by the Government removing the petitioner from service and the order passed by the Government on the petitioners appeal on 4-4-1962 are quashed and it is declared that the petitioner continues in the service of the State of Gujarat till the date of the petition. It is further ordered that the costs of the petitioner shall be paid by the respondent. Petition allowed. .