Judgment :- 1. The suit that has led to this second appeal, was for the eviction of the appellant from the suit properties on the ground, that upon a lease deed, Ext. D-4, in his favour being set aside under a preliminary decree for partition of the respondent's tarwad, the possession of the appellant became wrongful. The suit was decreed with respect to item 1 and a but thereon and was dismissed with respect to item 3, in which the third defendant, another member of the respondent's tarwad, was alone interested. The question which survives for determination in this second appeal concerns only item 1 property and the hut. 2. That property belonged to the tarwad of the respondent & had been leased to the appellant's predecessor by Ext. D-5, in the year 1085, for a term of eight years. In the year 1111, the tarwad gave the lease to the appellant by Ext. D-4, reciting that the appellant's possession till then was under an oral lease. By Ext. P-1, the preliminary judgment in O.S. 40 of 1114, a suit for partition by one of the members of the respondent's tarwad, Ext. D-4 and certain tarwad alienations were wholly set aside. Ext. P-1 was on the 26th Medom,1119. But no final decree was passed and so there was no decree for recovery of possession of the suit properties. The present suit was commenced well within twelve years of the date of Ext. P-1. It has been found by the lower courts, in the present case, that Ext. D-4 having been set aside, the appellant's possession was wrongful after Ext. D-4 and that he is liable to be evicted from item 1 and the hut. 3. In this court, learned counsel for the appellant contended, that even if, as found, there had been an implied surrender of the prior lease by the acceptance of Ext. D-4, upon the latter being set aside by Ext. P-1, the former revived. This principle has been given effect to by this Court in Narayana Pillai v. Narayana Pillai 1965 KLT. 250 and by the Andhra High Court in Gangavalla Munuswamy v. Marugu Muniaramiah AIR. 1965 Andhra Pradesh 167. The law has been summarised thus, in 23 Halsbury's Laws of England pp. P-1, the former revived. This principle has been given effect to by this Court in Narayana Pillai v. Narayana Pillai 1965 KLT. 250 and by the Andhra High Court in Gangavalla Munuswamy v. Marugu Muniaramiah AIR. 1965 Andhra Pradesh 167. The law has been summarised thus, in 23 Halsbury's Laws of England pp. 686 & 687: "A surrender by operation of law takes place when the tenant takes a new lease from the landlord to commence during the term of the old lease, even though the new lease is for a shorter term than the residue of the old term. But it is essential to such a surrender that the new lease should be valid and should take effect at once as a lease; hence, there is no implied surrender by the acceptance by the tenant of a new lease which is void, or which is voidable and is in fact avoided." Consistently with the decided cases and with the principle enunciated above, it must follow, that on Ext. D-4 being set aside, the anterior lease, whatever it was, revived. This plea was specifically taken in the written statement, to which there was no demur in the replication, except in very general terms. The Subordinate; Judge was inclined to the view, that Ext. D4 did not purport to be a renewal of Ext. D5, that Ext.D5 expired after the lapse of eight years, and that, as for the oral lease, there was a surrender of it when Ext. D-4 was accepted; he did not advert to the principle of revivor. 4. It may be held, that the lease Ext. D-5 terminated on the expiry of eight years. The respondent's father Pw.1, swore, that at the time of his marriage in the year 1100, the appellant was in enjoyment of the property on lease, and that before that, the appellant and his father had been in enjoyment even from the year 1084. This in a way confirms the case of the appellant, that he and his predecessor have been in possession of the property ever since the date of Ext. D-5. However that be, Ext. D-4 is good evidence, that the property was being enjoyed by the appellant till then on an oral lease. But there is no evidence as to the terms of that lease. In such a situation, S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act is applicable. D-5. However that be, Ext. D-4 is good evidence, that the property was being enjoyed by the appellant till then on an oral lease. But there is no evidence as to the terms of that lease. In such a situation, S.106 of the Transfer of Property Act is applicable. It lays down, that "in the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by six months' notice expiring with the end of a year of the: tenancy...." Under this Section, the presumption is, that the oral lease was from: year to year, the property being agricultural land. The position is, that on Ext. D-4 being set aside, the oral lease revived and the respondent is not entitled to evict: the appellant and others from items 1 and & 2 as trespassers. The respondent's remedy, if at all, is on the basis of the lease. The result is, that the decree for eviction from items 1 & 2 passed by the lower courts is set aside, and this second appeal is allowed; but both parties having raised untenable contentions in the lower courts I direct them to bear their costs in those courts and in this court the appellant shall realise his costs from the respondent. Allowed.