JUDGMENT M. Madhavan Nair, J. 1. This appeal is by the 1st defendant in a suit for permanent injunction against entry into the plaint properties and for damages for wrongful entry and misappropriation of profits already committed. The suit properties belonged to Upparandi tarwad, the karnavan whereof had leased out the trees therein to the plaintiff on September 5, 1945, under Ext. A2 for a term of four years and before the expiry of that term leased the trees afresh on May 6, 1947, as per Ext. A3 for a term of 12 years therefrom. The Munsif found that finding has been upheld by the Subordinate Judge that the defendants have trespassed into the property and have plucked 518 coconuts from the palms there. The 1st defendant is a member of the said tarward and defendants 2 and 3 claim possession under a lease of 1955 from the karnavan. They contended Ext. A3 to be invalid. The courts below found Ext. A3 to be valid and subsisting and therefore the defendants' entry and removal of coconuts wrongful and have decreed the suit. 2. Counsel for the appellant contended that the karnavan could not have granted a fresh lease before the expiry of the term of the prior lease under Ext. A2, that there was no consideration or necessity to justify it and that the karnavan having granted a power of attorney, Ext. B2 dated December 28, 1945, to the Senior Anandaravan in regard to the management of the tarwad, could not himself have executed the lease deed as it would amount to a revocation of the agency that was coupled with interest. I find little force in these contentions. It is open to the lessee and the landlord to agree to terminate a lease between them even before the expiry of its term and law is clear that a fresh lease amounts to an implied surrender of the prior lease. For a surrender of a lease to the lessor karnavan of a tarwad there need not have any consideration or necessity. Ext. For a surrender of a lease to the lessor karnavan of a tarwad there need not have any consideration or necessity. Ext. A3, being for a term of 12 years, comes within the purview of S.33(2) of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, XXII of 1933, which reads: "(2) No lease of any immovable property of a tarwad in cases not referred to in sub-s.(1) shall be valid unless it is executed by the karnavan and where the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929, confers fixity of tenure on the lessee, unless also the written consent of the majority of the major members of the tarwad has been obtained to the lease." No consideration or tarwad necessity is required to support such a lease. Counsel relied on Raman Nair v. Kuppassan Menon (AIR 1919 Mad. 250) and Cheria Kunhammad v. Kunhinni(38 MLJ 461). They are cases governed by the pristine Marumakkathayam law and therefore cannot be of assistance in the present case governed by a specific statutory provision. After the enactment, the common law would apply only to matters for which there is no provision in the Act. 3. S.202, Contract Act, provides: "Where the agent has himself an interest in the property which forms the subject matter of the agency, the agency cannot, in the absence of an express contract, be terminated to the prejudice of such interest." On the strength of this provision, it has been held in Chathu Kutti Nair v. Kundan Appa ( AIR 1932 Mad. 70 ) that a power of attorney executed by the karnavan to a member of the tarwad for collection of rents of tarwad properties cannot be revoked by him. I regret my inability to follow that dictum, which says that a karnavan or a karta desiring to appoint an agent for a purpose concerning family affairs should select a stranger to the family, lest the agency would be construed as an absolute relinquishment of his headship of the family. Under the Marumakkathayam law no member of the tarwad, other than the karnavan, has a share in its management. Under the Marumakkathayam law no member of the tarwad, other than the karnavan, has a share in its management. The interests of a junior member in a Marumakkathayam tarwad, or its properties are as has been pointed out in Padmanabhan Raman v. Raman Narayanan (18 TLR 31 (F. B.)) (1) a right to be maintained out of its income, (2) a right to become the karnavan in due course, and (3) a right to see its properties conserved for future benefit. None of these interests would be affected by the determination or revocation of a power of attorney executed by the karnavan in regard to the management of the tarwad. What S.202 of the Contract Act forbids is the termination of an agency that would affect the agent's interests in the properties which form the subject matter of the agency. The interest contemplated under S.202, Contract Act, cannot be the interest created by the agency itself. As a matter of fact in the present case there was no revocation of the power of attorney granted under Ext. B2. The appointment of an agent, in the absence of an express agreement, does not disable the principal to act himself. In spite of execution of Ext. B2 the karnavan remained competent to grant leases of tarwad properties. Strictly speaking, S.202, Contract Act, has no application to the facts and circumstances of this case. 4. In the result, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs.