JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - Petitioners are the heirs of late Samant Radha prasanna Das in whose name the decree stands. The judgment-debtor raised an objection u/s 47, Code of CPC that the execution case was not maintainable for want of a succession certificate. This objection was upheld by the executing Court on 6-2-1962 and the execution case was struck off. In cellaneous Appeal No. 35 of 1963, High Court restored the execution case on the following terms: The Appellants will be given an opportunity to produce the succession certificate within three month from the date of receipt of records by the executing Court. As soon as it is filed, the case may be disposed of according to law. The records in the execution case were received by the Munsif, Bhadrak, on 11-5-1964. On 12-5-1964 the learned Munsif passed the following order Copy of the order in M.A. 35/63 passed by the Hon'ble Court is put up. As per order of the Hon'ble Court, the decree-holders are directed to produce succession certificate within three months from today, that is, by 12-8-1964, when put up for further order. The execution case which was struck off the file is restored as per above order. Inform lawyers. Despite this order the advocates for the parties were intimated about the receipt of the records on 1-7-1964. On 12-8.1964, the Petitioners applied for time for filing the succession certificate; The learned Munsif dismissed this application stating. In view of the clear order of the Hon'ble High Court, this Court cannot allow further time. Hence the execution case is struck off the file. The Civil Revision has been filed against this order. It may be incidentally mentioned that against the very order cellaneous Appeal No. 44 of 1964 was filed before the District Judge, Balasore, who dismissed, the appeal holding that no appeal lay against the order, and even if an appeal lay, the appeal filed before him was barred by time by one day without any sufficient cause for condonation of delay. No appeal or revision has been filed against the order of the District Judge. 2. A preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. Roy that the impugned order is appealable and that no revision lies. He also argued that the Petitioners not having filed the succession certificate within the period granted by the High Court, the execution case was rightly dismissed. 3. 2. A preliminary objection has been raised by Mr. Roy that the impugned order is appealable and that no revision lies. He also argued that the Petitioners not having filed the succession certificate within the period granted by the High Court, the execution case was rightly dismissed. 3. On the arguments of the parties, two questions arise (i) Was the impugned order proper in refusing time for filing succession certificate? (ii) Is it revisable? 4. The order of the High Court in M.A. 35/63 was clear that the succession certificate be produced within three months from the date of the receipt of the records by the executing Court. "Date of receipt of the records" must always be construed to mean "the date of intimation of the receipt of the records in the lower Court to the concerned advocate or party". The date of receipt of the records cannot obviously be within the knowledge of the parties. They cannot also be expected to attend Court daily and make inquiries as to when the records were received. The natural construction to be placed on the High Court's order is that the succession certificate was to be filed within three months from the date of intimation of the receipt of the records. The learned executing Court also understood the High Court's order in that manner and accordingly had passed the order for informing the lawyers. The advocates for the parties were given intimation on 1-7.1964. Petitioners were, therefore, entitled to file the succession certificate as of right on or before the 1st of October 1964. When they applied for time on 12-8-1904, the executing Court, was bound to grant time at least till 1-10-1964. The order refusing time on 1-8-1964 for filing succession certificate is directly contrary to the order of the High Court and without jurisdiction. It is unnecessary in this case to consider the further question whether the executing Court had powers to grant time after the expiry of the time granted but the High Court. On merits, therefore, the impugned order cannot be supported. 5. It is, however, necessary to examine whether a revision lies. The High Court cannot exercise its power u/s 115, Code of CPC in which an appeal lies to it whether by way of first appeal or second appeal. The question for consideration is whether the order dated 12-8-1964 is appealable. On merits, therefore, the impugned order cannot be supported. 5. It is, however, necessary to examine whether a revision lies. The High Court cannot exercise its power u/s 115, Code of CPC in which an appeal lies to it whether by way of first appeal or second appeal. The question for consideration is whether the order dated 12-8-1964 is appealable. After refusal to grant time, the execution case was struck off the file. Mr. Murty contends on the basis of certain authorities that striking off the execution case does not amount to its dismissal. The contention is fantastic. Whether an order saying that the execution case is struck off, amounts to its dismissal, will depend upon the contents of the order. In this the execution case had originally been dismissed for non-production of the succession certificate. After the expiry of the period granted by the High Court, the executing Court again struck it off the file which obviously means that the execution case was dismissed. The order of dismissal relates to the execution of the decree and comes within Section 47, Code of Civil Procedure. The question for consideration is whether the order of dismissal is either a decree or an appealable order. 6. Section 2(2), Code of CPC defines a decree."Decree" means a formal expression of adjudication which so far as the Court expressing it conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to exclude the rejection of a plaint and the determination of the question within Section 47 or Section 144, Code of CPC but shall not include (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or (b) any order of dismissal for default .... Thus though the impugned order comes within Section 47, it would not be a decree if it is an appealable order, or if it is construed as one of dismissal for default. Section 2(14), CPC defines an "order" as meaning the formal expression of any decision of Civil Court which is not a decree. Orders from which appeal lies are provided u/s 104 and Order 43, Rule 1, CPC Code. The impugned order does not come within their purview and is not clearly an appealable order. 7. Section 2(14), CPC defines an "order" as meaning the formal expression of any decision of Civil Court which is not a decree. Orders from which appeal lies are provided u/s 104 and Order 43, Rule 1, CPC Code. The impugned order does not come within their purview and is not clearly an appealable order. 7. The further question for investigation is whether the impugned order is one of dismissal for default. The expression "dismissed for default" is not confined to dismissal for default in suits or appeals. It extends to applications u/s 47, Code of CPC which are "dismissed for default". It has been held in some cases that the word "default" refers to default of appearance only". In In Re: N. Kayambu Pillai their Lordships observed that the word "default" need not be confined only to default of appearance and may include other defaults as well. This decision has been followed in Tafazzul and Others Vs. Shah Mohammad and Others, and In re: Chunduru Venkata Subramanyam AIR 1955 A.P. 75 (F.B.). The aforesaid view has my respectful concurrence. The word "default" is not qualified by an adjective and must be given its full natural meaning. There is nothing in the context to render it a limited construction. Dismissal of the execution case for non-production of the succession certificate amounts to dismissal of the case for default. Thus the impugned order is not a decree. 8. The impugned order is neither a decree nor an appealable order and from it no appeal lay. The order refusing time contrary to the direction of the High Court being without jurisdiction, it is open to this Court to quash that order u/s 115, Code of Civil Procedure. 9. In the result, the Civil Revision is allowed, the order dated 12-8-1964 passed by the executing Court is set aside and the execution case is restored to file. The Petitioners are allowed to file succession certificate within one month from the date of intimation of the receipt of records by the executing Court. In the circumstances, parties to bear their own costs throughout. Final Result : Allowed