ORDER S.N. Singh, J. - This is a Plaintiff's appeal in a suit u/s 180 of the UP Tenancy Act by which the Plaintiff prayed for the ejectment of the Defendants and for recovery of Rs. 84/ as damages. 2. The case of the Plaintiff in brief was that he was the hereditary tenant of the plots in suit. He had filled a suit No. 3 of 1960 against the Custodian Defendant No. 1 u/s 59 of the UP Tenancy Act and in that suit it had been finally decided that the Plaintiff was the tenant of the plots in suit. It was said that after the aforesaid decision the Defendant No. I illegally purported to transfer the plots in suit in favour of Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 and illegally dispossessed the Plaintiff from the plots in suit, as such the necessity of the present suit. On these allegations the Plaintiff filed the instant suit for the relief already mentioned. 3. The Defendant No. 1 did not contest the suit. The suit was contested on behalf of Defendants 2 and 3 who alleged themselves to be the transferees of Defendant No. 1. They denied the tenancy right of the Plaintiff. They claimed to be the proprietors of the land in suit. They challenged the jurisdiction of the civil court and asserted that the suit was not maintainable. The learned Assistant Collector, Farrukhabad, framed as many as 10 issues in the case, but relevant issues for the purposes of this appeal arc: (1) Whether the Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are the proprietors of the land in suit as alleged ? (2) Whether the Plaintiff is hereditary tenant of the land and is entitled to sue ? (3) Whether the decision of the previous suit between the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 is binding upon the parties to the present suit ? (4) Whether the jurisdiction of the court is barred by the provisions of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act ? The issue about proprietary right of Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 was referred to the competent Civil Court which returned its finding to the effect that Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were not the proprietors of the land in suit. (4) Whether the jurisdiction of the court is barred by the provisions of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act ? The issue about proprietary right of Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 was referred to the competent Civil Court which returned its finding to the effect that Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were not the proprietors of the land in suit. The Assistant Collector decided the other three issues land held that in view of the decision in suit No. 3 of 1960 the Plaintiff was the hereditary tenant of the plot in suit and was entitled to sue; that the Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 claimed the land in suit through Defendant No. 1 as such the decision of the previous suit between the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 1 was binding on the Defendants Nos. 2 and 3; and that this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the present suit in view of Sections 8, 9, 10 and 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. On these findings the Assistant Collector dismissed the suit of the Plaintiff. 4. The Plaintiff preferred an appeal before the District Judge, Farrukhabad, who by his order dated 2.2. 1962 affirmed the decision of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. 5. The Plaintiff has come up in appeal to this Court and the learned Counsel for the Appellant has submitted that the title of the Plaintiff was well established by the decision of suit No. 3 of 1960 and the courts below have erred in non-suiting the Plaintiffs even though they have held that the Plaintiff was proved to be the hereditary tenant of the plots in suit and that the courts below have erred in holding that the court had no jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties at great length and in my opinion this appeal should succeed. 6. The zamindari property in which the plots in suit are situate was originally waqf and one Smt. Hidayat Bibi was its Mutwalli. It appears that she migrated to Pakistan. There were certain mango trees on the plots in suit and the plots in suit had the character of grove. The trees appeared to have been cut and the land brought under cultivation. It appears that she migrated to Pakistan. There were certain mango trees on the plots in suit and the plots in suit had the character of grove. The trees appeared to have been cut and the land brought under cultivation. The Plaintiff Achhu Khan claiming to be the hereditary tenant of the plats in suit filed a suit for declaration u/s 59 of the UP Tenancy Act to the effect that he was admitted to tenancy by the Mutwalli Smt. Hidayat Bibi and, therefore, he had become a hereditary tenant. He alleged in that case that there was no notification u/s 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act consequently he could not be bound by any declaration made in respect of the property in suit. To this suit the Plaintiff made the Custodian a party along with Smt. Hidayat Bibi who was the land-holder of the plots in suit. The Assistant Custodian did not file any written statement and Smt. Hidayat Bibi also did not contest the claim of the Plaintiff. The suit of the Plaintiff was decreed on 18.8.1960. It appears that during the pendency of this suit the property was transferred in favour of the present Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 Naksh Band Khan and Smt. Munawar Jan Begum. According to the Plaintiff the present suit has been filed on the Plaintiff having been forcibly dispossessed by the Assistant Custodian on August 13, 1960 who put the Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 named above in possession over the plots in suit. The points for determination in this appeal are: (1) Whether the Revenue Court was competent to grant the declaration u/s 59 of the UP Tenancy Act ? (2) Whether the decision in suit No. 3 of 1960 stated above operates as res judicata between the parties or not ? (3) Whether the present suit was barred by Sections 4,28 and 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act ? All the three points are interconnected and I purpose to take them together. The suit u/s 59 which had been filed by the Plaintiff for the declaration of his hereditary tenancy right had been instituted against the landholder Smt. Hidayat Begum and to this suit the Custodian was also made a party. It was open to the Custodian to have contested the suit. The suit u/s 59 which had been filed by the Plaintiff for the declaration of his hereditary tenancy right had been instituted against the landholder Smt. Hidayat Begum and to this suit the Custodian was also made a party. It was open to the Custodian to have contested the suit. If the Custodian allowed a decree to be passed against him such a decree would be binding on him if the court granting the decree was competent to decide the case. 7. We have now to see as to whether after the passing of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act such a suit could be instituted in the Revenue Court or not ? There is no section in entire Administration of Evacuee Property Act under which such, a suit could be filed. The relevant sections of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act for the purposes this case are Sections 2(f), 4, 7, 8(4) 9, 10, 12, 28 and 46. Section 2(f) defines evacuee property, Section 4 states about the overriding provisions of the Administration of Evacuee Property Section 7, deals with the declaration of the evacuee property; Section 8(4) says that a person in possession of evacuee property will be deemed to be holding on behalf of the Custodian, Section 9 gives the summary power of the Custodian to deal with the evacuee property; Section 10 gives the powers and duties of the Custodian generally. Sub Clause (j) of this section is important for our purposes. It authorises the Custodian to "institute, defend or continue any legal proceeding in any civil or revenue court on behalf of the evacuee or refer any dispute between the evacuee and any other person to arbitration or compromise any claims, debts or liabilities, on behalf of the evacuee" Section 12 deals with the power of the Custodian to cancel leases or allotments of evacuee property. Section 28 deals with the finality of the orders passed by the Custodian in accordance with the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. Section 46 is as follows: 46. Section 28 deals with the finality of the orders passed by the Custodian in accordance with the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. Section 46 is as follows: 46. Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no civil or revenue court shall have jurisdiction- (a) to entertain or adjudicate upon any question whether any property or any right to or interest in any property is or is not evacuee property; or (b) * * * (c) to question the legality of any action taken by the Custodian-General or the Custodian under the Act; or (d) in respect of any matter which the Custodian General or the Custodian is empowered by or under this Act to determine. I have given the resume of the relevant sections of the Act and it appears that the Revenue Court's jurisdiction to entertain a suit u/s 59 of the UP Tenancy Act was not barred by any provision of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. The Revenue Court was, therefore, competent to decide a suit u/s 59 of the UP Tenancy Act even after the passing of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act. If the Revenue Court was competent to decide such a suit obviously the decision given was binding between the parties and would operate as resjudicata between them. 8. The Custodian under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act is authorised to determine as to what property belonged to the evacuee and the same vested in the Custodian. In this case the proprietary right of the Mutwalli along with entire property vested in the Custodian and it is not disputed that by virtue of the property having become evacuee property the proprietary rights in it vested in the Custodian. The Custodian would be the landholder of the property in suit and if a declaration of hereditary tenancy has been obtained against the Custodian it will surely bind the Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 who claimed through the Custodian. Since I have held that the Revenue Court was the competent Court to grant the declaration prayed for in suit No. 3 of I960 the decision in that suit would operate as res judicata between the parties. If that decision operated as res judicata it was not open to the courts below to go into that question again. Since I have held that the Revenue Court was the competent Court to grant the declaration prayed for in suit No. 3 of I960 the decision in that suit would operate as res judicata between the parties. If that decision operated as res judicata it was not open to the courts below to go into that question again. When it has been held between the parties that the Plaintiff was a hereditary tenant his dispossession would be against the provisions of law and he would be entitled to the relief of possession claimed. I have already held that a suit u/s 59 of the U.P. T. Act was maintainable even after the passing of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act no question of the applicability of Sections 28 and 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act arises. 9. The learned Counsel for the Respondents argued that a decision given u/s 59 of the UP Tenancy Act case was a decision without jurisdiction as such that decision would not operate as resjudicata even though the Custodian was a party to that suit and in support of his submissions he has relied on various decision particularly on the cases of Kiran Singh and Others Vs. Chaman Paswan and Others, AIR 1954 SC 340 and Haseena Begum v. Assistant Custodian Evacuee Properties, Muzaffarnagar (2) ( 1962 AWR 229). In my view the authorities cited by the learned Counsel do not help him. The case of Karan Singh and Ors. v. Chaman Paswan and Ors. (1) will only be applicable if it was held that there was no inherent jurisdiction in the Revenue Court to grant the relief of declaration u/s 59 of the UP Tenancy Act. The case of Haseena Begum v. Assistant Custodian Evacuee Properties, Muzaffarnagar (2) is also distinguishable inasmuch as it has interpreted Section 17 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act and has nothing to do with the facts of the present case. 10. To sum up in my view (1) The Revenue Court was competent to decide a suit u/s 59 of the UP Tenancy Act even after the passing of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, (2) the decision in Suit No. 3 of 1960 operated as res judicata between the parties and (3) that Sections 4, 28 and 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act do not bar the present suit. 11. 11. On the above findings the Plaintiff is clearly entitled to the relief claimed. The courts below erred in refusing the same. 12. I accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the decisions of the courts below and decree the Plaintiff's suit as prayed. The Plaintiff Appellant will have his costs of all the courts.