ORDER H. KRISHNAN, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution by the Zamindars praying for the quashing of the order of the Additional Commissioner (ultimately upheld by the Board of Revenue in revision) that the opposite party Nos. 1 to 3 were entitled under section 38 (2) of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, Samvat 2008 (Act 13 of 1951), to be recorded as the pacca tenant on payment of the compensation according to the prescribed formula. The opposite party No. 4 is a co-sharer, but it is common ground that the lands concerned have fallen to the shares of the petitioners. The petitioners opposed the Application on the ground that their predecessor Anandiprasad had inducted the opposite party Nos. 1 to 3 as his sub-tenants. He was one who on account of a bodily infirmity was incapable of personal cultivation of the lands. Accordingly, they took the position that they were entitled, under the proviso to section 74 (1) of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, to continue as pacca Ryots notwithstanding the sub-letting. The Revenue Courts however, held that on the facts, Anandiprasad was not incapable of cultivating personally as indeed he was cultivating other lands in this manner and was seeking to be appointed as 'vasulipatel'. In doing this, they had in effect understood "personal cultivation" or "cultivating personally" in terms of the definition contained in section 54 (xvii) of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 (Act No. 66 of 1950). Consequently, the opposite party were entered as pacca tenants as they had deposited the compensation and the objection of the petitioners was rejected. 2. In this petition, the factual finding that Anandiprasad was not incapable, in spite of his alleged heart trouble, of doing personal cultivation cannot for obvious reasons be challenged as such in this Court. However, the petitioner interprete 'personal cultivation' narrowly to the effect that it should be cultivation done directly by the Zamindar himself and exclude cultivation with the assistance of paid labourers. Here again, the petitioners are up against the decision of a Divisional Bench of this Court in Misc. Petition No. 373 of 1962 (Jabalpur) decided on 6.3.1963 Mainabai vs. Raghunath 1963 JLJ SN 126. Here again, the petitioners are up against the decision of a Divisional Bench of this Court in Misc. Petition No. 373 of 1962 (Jabalpur) decided on 6.3.1963 Mainabai vs. Raghunath 1963 JLJ SN 126. There also the Zamindar contended that he was incapable of doing personal cultivation, which was sought to be interpreted narrowly and on that basis claimed the exemption under the proviso to section 74 (1) Madhya Bharat Land Revenue & Tenancy Act. However, this Court held that 'cultivating personally' or 'personal cultivation' meant any of the three alternatives set out in section 54 (xvii). Since in that case the Zamindar was in a position to do cultivation in one of the three alternative manners, this Court held that he was disentitled to the benefit of the proviso. Faced with this, the present petitioners urged that the judgment in M.P. No. 323 of 1962 (Jabalpur) calls for reconsideration by a larger Bench because certain aspects of the problem have not been properly visualized and in particular, the effect of section 54 (xvii) has not been appreciated. 3. Thus from the very simple questions of fact before the revenue Courts, we have been taken into a very elaborate discussion of what 'personal cultivation' or 'cultivating personally' might mean in different situations. 4. As the matter stood before the Revenue Courts, there were two main questions. Firstly, whether Anandiprasad suffered from any physical infirmity worth mentioning and secondly, if he did suffer from any whether it was such as to render him incapable of personally cultivating these lands. On these questions the Additional Commissioner has given clear findings which the Board of Revenue has, after two hearings, confirmed and refused to modify in revision. Thus, whether or not the Board could have exercised its powers of revision, it did not actually do so and we have the Additional Commissioner's decision before us which is to the effect that even on the assumption that Anandiprasad did have physical infirmity of a weak or diseased heart, it was not such as to render him incapable of cultivating personally. These are findings of fact and we, in exercise of our powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, would not feel called upon to examine either the nature of the infirmity or its effect on the ability to cultivate personally but if we do, we have the indisputed fact that Anandiprasad was engaged in certain activities or was seeking to engage in them which by the very nature showed that he was capable of cultivating personally. This of course should be normally the end of the controversy here but the petitioners have advanced argument of a complicated nature regarding real purport of the phrase 'personal cultivation' or 'cultivating personally'. Even this has been settled by the Division Bench ruling but a case is sought to be made for further consideration. It, therefore, becomes necessary to consider the new arguments for what they are worth. 5. In sections 74 and 54 (xvii) of the M.B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, we have the phrase 'to cultivate personally'. Heading (xvi) which immediately precedes the definition of 'personal cultivation', does not have any pew principle but only defines 'a bona fide agriculturist' who may be actually doing personal cultivation or may be reasonably expected, having due regard to the fact of the case to cultivate personally. This definition acquired a practical significance, whenever there was a prayer to the Collector for permission to transfer agricultural land, on such an occasion the Collector would have had to decide whether the transferee designate was reasonably likely to cultivate personally or was going to make the land a commercial investment. In the former event, he would sanction the transfer and in the latter, refuse it because the policy behind the law was, as far as possible, to keep the Pacca tenant in personal contract and responsibility for the cultivation of his land. Heading (xvi) provides for the assessment by the authority of the reasonable expectation that a particular person would do personal cultivation. Heading (xvii) defines 'personal cultivation' in the three forms it might take. 6. Before summarising the purport of the three forms we are quite clear in our minds that "to cultivate personally" and "personal cultivation" mean precisely the same thing, being, no more than cognate grammatical forms to suit the manner in which the sentence is cast. Heading (xvii) defines 'personal cultivation' in the three forms it might take. 6. Before summarising the purport of the three forms we are quite clear in our minds that "to cultivate personally" and "personal cultivation" mean precisely the same thing, being, no more than cognate grammatical forms to suit the manner in which the sentence is cast. The emphasis is on the two concepts, the physical process of cultivation on the one hand, and the direction and responsibility of the human agency on the other. No cultivation can be, strictly speaking, done by one person alone unless he is a Robison Crusoe on the lonely island. At different stages, different people will be assisting and it is always operation by a team and not by an individual. Even when it is said "by ones own labour" it is only meant that for the most part the labour comes from one person, though obviously at different stages a certain proportion must necessarily come from others. The others again may fall into one or other of the following categories viz., members of the cultivator's family, paid labourers, etc., they again getting their wages in cash or in kind but even when outsiders come in, the supervision and the direction is the cultivator's own or, which comes to the same thing, the supervision of any member of the cultivator's family. Cropsharing can prove a trap and has been expressly excluded. In other words, where the cultivator gives all the physical labour or a part of it or, in extreme cases, none of it and gets it from the other members of his family or from hued labour, the direction and the responsibility and the risk have to be his. On the last analysis, it is this direction or supervision, as it has been called, that will be the real test. Where it is for the most part done with the labour of the cultivator or his family, there will be altogether no doubt about the direction and the responsibility but were it is a case of outsiders helping in the cultivation, the question is answered by seeing whether the personal cultivator has divested himself of any part of the responsibility, direction and the risk. If he has, he is no more cultivating personally. If he has, he is no more cultivating personally. If he has not, he is still cultivating personally notwithstanding the fact that he is not holding the plough or the sickle. All this is obvious, but has been expressly provided for in the definition (xvii). As for (xvi), this is the proper way of understanding the words "cultivate personally", there also the only difference being that, that in the interpretation of (xvi), we are thinking at times of reasonable expectation. 7. The argument here is that the words 'incapable of personally cultivating' in section 74 (i) should be interpreted 'grommatically by which is apparently meant so narrowly as to include sub-heading' (i) by ones own labour only in section 54 (xvii). If this is accepted the applicants hope that by showing that Anandiprasad had a weak heart, it would become an infirmity rendering him incapable of personal cultivation. Actually, this wore has been defined and there being no repugnancy in the context, we have to apply the definition which is of course much wider than what is called the grammatical meaning. Just as at one end, the cultivation may be by the cultivator's own labour it can be at that other end by servants only but under his personal supervision or the personal supervision of a member of his family both form personal cultivation, the key being the direction and responsibility and not the actual handling of the scythe. It is unnecessary to explain this any further as we are in agreement with the Divisional Bench ruling already referred to. 8. The applicant has given a complete summary of the principles for the interpretation of statutes. There is no controversy in regard to them nor do we feel that there is any necessity for departure from these established criteria. Applying them, we find no justification for making a reference as the general problem is simple enough and has been fully answered in the judgment. 9. We find no substance in this petition and we dismiss it accordingly. Costs payable by the petitioners to opposite party Nos. 1 to 3, Rs. 100.