Judgment :- 1. This appeal instituted by defendants 1 and 2 in a suit in partition is continued after their death by the 3rd defendant. 2. The suit properties originally belonged to Aiyappan Pillai, the father of defendants 1 and 2. Defendants 1 and 2 had married Janaki Amma, a niece of their father and had two children through her - Chellamma and Raghavan Pillai. When Janaki Amma died they married her sister the 3rd defendant; and the 4th defendant is the daughter of that union. The 1st plaintiff is the widow and plaintiffs 2 and 3 the children of Raghavan Pillai. Chellamma died unmarried. Aiyappan Pillai had executed a will, Ext. P1, devising the plaint A schedule properties to defendants 1 and 2 for enjoyment during their lives with remainder to Chellamma, Raghavan Pillai, the 3rd defendant and the 4th defendant, and the plaint B schedule properties to two other persons for enjoyment for their lives with remainder to the devisees of plaint A schedule properties to be taken as an addition to them. The two persons who had been given life-interest in plaint B schedule properties died before this suit. Plaintiffs claim that under the will (Ext. P1) they are entitled to a moiety in the properties and claim partition and recovery of the same. Defendants 1 and 2 contended that under the will they were entitled to enjoy all the suit properties during their lives and that the remainder was given to the four donees as joint tenants and therefore on the death of Chellamma and Raghavan Pillai enured to defendants 3 and 4 only. The Subordinate Judge declared that the plaint properties, subject to the life-interests of defendants 1 and 2, enured to the 3rd defendant, the 4th defendant, Chellamma and Raghavan Pillai, as tenants-in-common and that the shares of the latter two have devolved on the plaintiffs and decreed partition deferring possession till "after the lifetime of defendants 1 and 2". On appeal, the Additional District Judge affirmed him. Hence this second appeal. As mentioned already, soon after the institution of this appeal defendants 1 and 2 died. The plaintiffs-respondents have thereupon filed a cross-objection claiming physical possession of the properties in this suit itself. 3. On appeal, the Additional District Judge affirmed him. Hence this second appeal. As mentioned already, soon after the institution of this appeal defendants 1 and 2 died. The plaintiffs-respondents have thereupon filed a cross-objection claiming physical possession of the properties in this suit itself. 3. Counsel for the appellant contended that the suit for partition and possession of properties which are subject to life-interests in esse was premature and ought to have been rejected by the Courts below. Though the contention is not without force, this Court can take into consideration events subsequent to the institution of the suit affecting the rights in dispute and mould its decree to accord with the circumstances as they are at the time of the decision. It then follows that the defect of prematurity cannot be urged today when the holders of the life-interests are no more and the right of the plaintiffs to possession of the properties has matured. The contention of prematurity is therefore overruled. 4. On the construction of Ext. P1, I am inclined to agree with the Courts below. The gift of remainder to Chellamma, Raghavan Pillai, 3rd defendant and the 4th defendant cannot constitute them a Tarwad or Tavazhi. A joint tenancy, other than a Tarwad or Tavazhi is not known to Marumakkathayam law, which is admittedly the personal law of the parties. It is conceded that Chellamma and Raghavan Pillai died after the testator, and therefore after the will has come to effect. They being the children of a sister of the 3rd defendant, and the 4th defendant being a daughter of the 3rd defendant, the four donees constituted two collateral tavazhis, and not one. A joint tenancy among the four donees having thus been impossible, they could take the devise as tenants-in-common only. It must then follow that each of the four donees had a 1/4 share in the legacy. That the heirs of Chellamma and Raghavan Pillai are the plaintiffs is not in dispute here. The declaration of title to a moiety of the suit properties in the plaintiffs is therefore right and has to be accepted. 5. Defendants 1 and 2 claimed that they should be awarded compensation for their improvements on the suit properties if and when the plaintiffs are given any share therein. The Courts below have not adverted to this claim as they have disallowed possession to the plaintiffs. 5. Defendants 1 and 2 claimed that they should be awarded compensation for their improvements on the suit properties if and when the plaintiffs are given any share therein. The Courts below have not adverted to this claim as they have disallowed possession to the plaintiffs. Now that the plaintiffs' right to possession has matured and has to be decreed it calls for a decision here. Compensation for improvements was formerly a matter of equity; but it is now governed by statutes. When a matter is governed by statute a claimant thereof has to bring his case straightly within its provisions; or the claim must fail; for, equitable considerations have no place in the application of a statute. It is conceded that the Transfer of Property Act is not helpful to the appellant in this claim. The Kerala Act XXIX of 1958 entitles tenants alone to compensation for improvements. Though the definition of a tenant has been given in the latter Act in the widest manner possible, it has not done away with the essential requisite of a counterpart to him. There cannot be a tenant without a landlord. When property is given to A for life and to B in remainder, neither can be said to be a tenant or a landlord in relation to the other. One practical test of the landlord-tenant relation is the right of the former to evict the latter from the land. However attenuated that right may be on account of statutory restrictions, it has to exist to entitle a person a landlord or proprietor. The donee of a remainder cannot claim such a right as against the donee of a prior life-interest. Defendants 1 and 2 who asserted - rightly indeed - that the plaintiffs had no right to oust them from the properties could not have said by the same breath that they were tenants of the plaintiffs to claim compensation from them for their improvements on the land. Counsel contended that defendants 1 and 2 came in the third category of tenants defined in the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, XXIX of 1958. That Act defines a tenant thus, "2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires. Counsel contended that defendants 1 and 2 came in the third category of tenants defined in the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, XXIX of 1958. That Act defines a tenant thus, "2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires. - (d) 'tenant' with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions includes - (i) a person who, as lessee, sub-lessee, mortgagee or sub-mortgagee or in good faith believing himself to be lessee, sub-lessee, mortgagee, or sub-mortgagee of land, is in possession thereof; (ii) a person who with the bona fide intention of attorning and paying a reasonable rent to the person entitled to cultivate or let waste-land, but without the permission of such person, brings such land, under cultivation and is in occupation thereof as cultivator; and (iii) a person who comes into possession of land belonging to another person and makes improvements thereon in the bona fide belief that he is entitled to make such improvements." For a person to come within the 3rd category in the above definition, he must be in possession of "land belonging to another." I am afraid that when a particular property is given to one for life and to another in remainder, neither can be said to have a title superior to the other, and therefore the property cannot be said to belong to one in preference to the other. The property can only be said to belong to both - to the former for his life and then to the latter. It will be quite incorrect to say that the holder of a life-interest holds the land belonging to another. He holds the land in his own unchallengable right. That right may die with him; but in his hands it is an indefeasible right. None can determine his right. In my opinion, a person to whom a property is given for his life cannot be said to be a tenant within the definition of the Act XXIX of 1958. Ext. P1 gave the suit properties to defendants 1 and 2 to be held and enjoyed for their lives "making suitable improvements thereon", and gave the remainder to other specified persons. It is then implicit that they were to leave the lands for the benefit of the donees of the remainder without any obligation attached thereto. Ext. P1 gave the suit properties to defendants 1 and 2 to be held and enjoyed for their lives "making suitable improvements thereon", and gave the remainder to other specified persons. It is then implicit that they were to leave the lands for the benefit of the donees of the remainder without any obligation attached thereto. There is no provision in the will entitling the personal heirs of defendants 1 and 2 to any right in the lands. When the holder of a life interest dies his interests in the property lapse. No case of eviction arises then. It cannot be said that the heirs of a life interest holder are being evicted from the property by the remainder-man. One interest lapses; and another matures. S.4 of Act XXIX of 1958 which entitles a tenant "on eviction" to compensation for his improvements on the property has no application here. On all the grounds mentioned above, the claim of defendants 1 and 2 for compensation for improvements has to fail. 6. In the result, the appeal is found without force and is dismissed; and the cross-objection is allowed in view of the death of defendants 1 and 2 after institution of this appeal. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their respective costs here. Dismissed.