JUDGMENT 1. This is a second appeal by the defendants-tenants, against the decree for their ejectment from the suit premises on the ground that the plaintiff-landlord No.4-genuinely requires the accommodation for starting his own business and that he is not in occupation of any other accommodation in the city of Satna for that purpose. 2. Both the Courts below have decreed the suit, inter alia, holding- (1) That the plaintiffs-respondents were the sole landlords of the defendants-tenants in respect of the suit premises (2) That the tenancy of the defendants-tenants was validly terminated by a notice to quit expiring with the end of the month of their tenancy, which was from the 1st to the 30th or 31st of the English calendar month. (3) That the defendants-tenants had, without the written permission of the landlords, made construction as have materially altered the accommodation to the detriment of the landlords' interest within the meaning of section 4 (c) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955. (4) That the plaintiff - landlords genuinely required the non residential accommodation in question for starting the medical practice of plaintiff-landlord No.4, and that they were not in occupation of any other accommodation in the city of Satna for that purpose within the meaning of section 4 (h) of the Act. 3. All the aforesaid findings are findings of fact based on an appreciation of the evidence on record and consequently not liable to interference in this second appeal. All the aforesaid questions in all their aspects have been very carefully and exhaustively considered by the learned Additional District Judge and nothing has been shown to me how and why they require a reconsideration in this second appeal. 4. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the house in suit had been purchased by Basantlal, the father of the plaintiffs, and in the absence of any partition or registered deed of gift in favour of the plaintiffs, his sons, the sons could not acquire any title to it to make them the landlords of the defendants in respect of the suit premises. The learned Additional District Judge has correctly pointed out that the contention confuses between the ownership and the landlordship. The learned Additional District Judge has correctly pointed out that the contention confuses between the ownership and the landlordship. In the instant case, we are not concerned with the fact whether in law title to the suit premises passed from the father to the sons under an arrangement made by them whereunder possession of the suit house was transferred to the sons who were also made the landlords of it by making the tenants of the suit premises attorn to them. The learned Additional District Judge has found that the defendants had duly attorned to the landlordship of the plaintiffs to whom they were also paying rent in respect of the premises thereafter. The plaintiffs were, therefore, rightly held to be the landlords of the defendants in respect of the suit premises and no exception can be taken to the finding of the learned Additional District Judge on the point. 5. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the defendants were a partnership which had come into existence on 5-11-1956, from which date it had entered into possession, and consequently their month of tenancy could never begin on the 1st of the English calendar month. The argument is misconceived. The date of the partnership entering into possession of the suit premises is one of the circumstances for inferring the date of commencement of the tenancy but not the sole circumstance. The creation of tenancy is a matter of contract. The date on which it is to begin is again a matter of contract the question has to be decided on evidence and in the instant case, besides the evidence of the plaintiffs Shankarlal (P.W.- 1), Balkrishna (P.W. 10) and Shiv Bhagwan (P.W-12) that the month of the tenancy of the defendants commenced on the 1st of the English calendar month and ended with the end of the month, there are also various other circumstance which weighed with the Courts of fact in coming to the conclusion that the month of the tenancy in suit was the full English calendar month, Some of these circumstance are – (1) Rent was paid by the defendant appellants according to the English calendar month-1st to the 28th, 29th, 30th or 31st, as the case may be. (2) Though the new partnership entered into possession on 5-11-1956, it yet paid rent for the full month of November on 28-11-1956. (2) Though the new partnership entered into possession on 5-11-1956, it yet paid rent for the full month of November on 28-11-1956. (3) No objection on this ground was take by the defendants in their replies (Exs, P-10 and P-11) to the notices to quit (Exs. P-6 and P.9) served on them by the plaintiffs. Apart from the aforesaid finding regarding the commencement, of the tenancy which concludes the matter, the learned Additional District Judge has also correctly pointed out that the objection has no force because the notices to quit in terms asked and defendants-appellants, in the alternative, to vacate the suit premises on the expiry of the month of tenancy according to them and even for such a date fifteen days' notice was given. 6. It was next contended that the provisions of clauses (c) and (h) of section 4 of the Act had not been satisfactorily established to enable the plaintiffs-land-lords to eject the defendants-appellants from the suit premises. In my opinion, the findings on both these questions were findings of fact based on evidence, which have been well considered, and need no interference in this appeal. It is, however, contended that the need of one of the landlords cannot enable the plaintiffs to eject the defendants-appellants (tenants) under the provisions of section 4 (h) of the Act. The argument is that the requirement must be of the whole body of the land-lords, if there are more than one. 7. No doubt the language of section 4 (h) of the Act is not very apt; but then, as stated in Maxwell's . Interpretation of Statutes', Eleventh Edition, p.18- “To arrive at the real meaning, it is alwas necessary to get an exact conception of the aim, scope, and object of the whole Act; to consider, according to Lord Coke: (1) What was the law before the Act was passed; (2) What was the mischief or defect for which the law had not provided; (3) What remedy Parliament has appointed, and (4) The reason of the remedy. According to another authority: 'In order properly to interpret any statute it is necessary now as it was when Lord Coke reported in Hevdon's Case (1584) 3 Rep, 7 b, to consider how the law stood when the statute to be considered was passed, what the mischief was for which the old law did not provide, and the remedy provided by the statute to cure that mischief: Re Mayfair Property Co. (1898) 2 Ch, 28, 35, per lindley M.R. At the same time the language of the statute must not be strained to make it apply to a case which does not legitimately, on its terms, apply by invoking consideration of the supposed intention of the legislature Kent C. C. Vs. Gerard (1897) AC 639 per Lord Herscheell." Examined in this way, I do not find any reason to deny to one of the land-lords the benefit of business in the premises of which he is a part owner even though he genuinely requires it for the purpose. 8. Prior to the enactment of the Accommodation Control Laws, the landlords had an undisputed right to do so and even after the coming into force of the Accommodation Control Act, it is not the policy of the law to deprive them of their accommodation if they genuinely require it for their own use. Of course, the law has made no specific provision for joint landlords when one of such landlords needs the tenanted premises for his own use; but I do not read into the Act any intention on the part of the Legislature to deprive him of this benefit. The object of the law is to prevent the landlords from increasing rents taking advantage of the shortage of accommodation these days, as also to give security of tenure to the tenants under certain circumstances. But where the landlords genuinely required the premises for their own use, or where the tenants were making the tenancies onerous for the landlords by not keeping to the terms of their contracts, or where other such like circumstances existed which were specifically mentioned in the Act, no protection was afforded to the tenants. 9. The protection of the tenants was thus not absolute but conditioned by the genuine requirements of the landlords. And, in this analysis the genuine requirement of even one of the joint landlords must prevail over the need of the tenants. 9. The protection of the tenants was thus not absolute but conditioned by the genuine requirements of the landlords. And, in this analysis the genuine requirement of even one of the joint landlords must prevail over the need of the tenants. Otherwise, it would lead to a somewhat absurd and very unreasonable result that where even nine of the ten landlords genuinely required the tenanted premises for their use or occupation, the premises would not be available to them because all the landlords did not need them. It may also well be that the joint landlords may be brothers, some of whom live outside the town concerned because of business or service requirements and may thus not require the tenanted premises for their personal occupation. If the interpretation contended for by the learned counsel for the appellants were to be adopted, some of these brothers who live in the town concerned and genuinely require the tenanted premises for their use or occupation will not be able to get them vacated because all the brothers at one and the same time did not so require them. In my opinion, there appears no justification to so construe the provisions of the Act as to deny to some of the joint landlords the use and occupation of the premises of which they are joint owners when the fact of their genuine requirement is fully established. 10. The word 'landlord' occurs in various Acts, both in India and in England, regulating the relationship of landlords and tenants under modern conditions. In Me Intyre Vs. Hardcastle (1948) 2 KB 82, where two sisters, who were joint owners of a house within the meaning of Rent Restriction Acts, sought possession of the house under Schedule I, para (h), on the ground that the house was required as a residence for one of them, it was held that the case was not within the paragraph and that no order for possession could he made under it. A very strict construction was adopted by reading 'landlords' for 'landlord' and thereafter substituting in strict consonance with such a change 'themselves' for 'himself' and 'their' for 'his' in the other parts of the paragraph [para (h)), which read as follows:' "......(h) the dwelling-house is reasonably required by the landlord (not being a landlord who has become landlord by purchasing the dwelling-house or any interest therein after a certain date) for occupation as a residence for-(i) himself; or (ii) any son or daughter of his over eighteen years of age; or (iii) his father or mother: Provided that an order or judgment shall not be made or given on any ground specified in paragraph (h) of the foregoing provisions of this Schedule if the Court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant greater hardship would be caused by granting the order or judgment than by refusing to grant it." 11. Such a literal and strict construction was not approved of by the High Court of Calcutta in a series of decisions while interpreting clause (h) of the proviso to section 12 (1) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1950, which read as follows: "(h) Where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord either for purposes of building or re-building, or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held: Provided that all sub-tenants in the premises are made parties to the suit and allowed opportunity of contesting claim to decree for ejectment." 12. Bachawat, J. (as he then was), speaking in a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of Mukherjee, J. who had relied on Mc Intyre's case (supra) to refuse relief to one of the joint landlords when the tenanted premises were required for the use of one of them only, in Kanikadevi Vs. A.N. Roy Choudhuri 65 CWN 1078 at pp 1080 & 1081, said: "Mukherjee. J. held that the suit must fail as all the landlords were not jointly interested either in the occupation of the Kha portion of the premises or in the building or re-building of the Ga portion of the premises. A.N. Roy Choudhuri 65 CWN 1078 at pp 1080 & 1081, said: "Mukherjee. J. held that the suit must fail as all the landlords were not jointly interested either in the occupation of the Kha portion of the premises or in the building or re-building of the Ga portion of the premises. He held that the landlords cannot get the benefit of the clause (h) of the proviso to section 12 (1) unless it is proved that all the landlords are interested in the ground of requirement on which the claim for eviction is based. He thought he should follow the principle underlying the case of Mc Intyre & another Vs. Hardcastle (1948) 2 KB 82, a decision given under the English Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions (Amendment) Act, 1933, I find. however, that the ground upon which Mukherjee, J. based his decision can no longer be sustained. In Tarak Chandra Mukherjee and others Vs. Ratanlal Ghosal 1959 CLJ 136., K.C. Das Gupta and B.K. Guha, J f held that we should not guide ourselves in matters of this kind by the views of English Judges interpreting the English statutes and that where out of a number of persons constituting the body of the landlords, one landlord reasonably requires the premises for his own use and occupation, that should be considered to amount to a requirement on the part of all the landlords. This decision was followed by another Division Bench consisting of Renupada Mukherjee and K.C. Sen, JJ. in M. Levi Vs. Dinendra Nath Das First Appeal No. 188 of 1959, decided on the 8th January 1960. an unreported case. In the last case, Renupada Mukherjee, J. expressed an opinion which is contrary to the ruling given by him in the judgment under appeal. It is true that where there are more than one landlord, the word 'landlord' in clause (h) of the proviso to section 12 (1) must be read as 'landlords' and the expression 'for his own occupation' therein must be read as 'for their own occupation'; nevertheless in the light of the decisions of this Court the word 'their' in the last expression must be read as meaning 'of them or of anyone or more of them' so that the requirement of the premises by the landlords for the occupation of one or more of them is sufficient to bring the case within the clause." 13. The aforesaid case was cited with approval by Falshaw. C.J, in Vir Bhan Vs. Avtar Krishan etc. where, while interpreting section 13 (3) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, it was held by him that where out of a number of persons constituting the body of the land lords, one landlord bona fide requires the building for his own use and occupation that should be considered to amount to a requirement on the part of all the landlords. 14. The aforesaid decisions of the Calcutta and Punjab High Courts have my respectful concurrence and accordingly I reject the contention of the defendants appellants on this point. 15. The appeal thus fails and is dismissed with costs.