JUDGMENT Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - This second appeal arises out of a suit for cancellation of a deed of gift dated 24th June 1955 purporting to have been executed by the plaintiff Smt. Tilesara Kuar in favour of the three defendants who are the appellants before me, and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's possession over the land comprised by the deed. The relief of possession, in case the plaintiff is held to be out of possession, has also been sought. The plaintiff is the widow of one Sahab Lal Rai and the defendants are his sister's sons. The deed of gift is with respect to about twenty bighas of land and this appears to be the entire land which the plaintiff held as a Bhumidhar. 2. The case of the plaintiff is that she is an old and illiterate Pardanashin woman and is also hard of hearing; that the defendants, had been helping her in her cultivation and looking after her affairs; that defendant No. 3 Rameshwar Rai who used to live mostly with the plaintiff impressed upon her that she should execute a general power of attorney in his favour to enable him to conveniently manage her property; and that Rameshwar Rai fraudulently contrived to get the deed in question executed by her by taking unfair advantage of her old age, illiteracy and hardness of hearing, and also of her trust and confidence in himself and of the position he occupied in relation to her. It is stated that the deed was never read over or explained to the plaintiff and she believed, as it was falsely represented to her by Rameshwar Rai, that she was executing only a general power of attorney in his favour. She denies having ever intended to execute any deed of gift and avers that at the time of the registration of the deed she only nodded her assent to everything, as she had been instructed to do by Rameshwar Rai. The plaintiffs claims to have continued in possession and not to have discovered the real nature of the deed until 5th December 1959 when she obtained a copy of it consequent upon the refusal of the defendants to give her the produce of her land and their assertion of title to the land as donees. 3. The plaintiffs claims to have continued in possession and not to have discovered the real nature of the deed until 5th December 1959 when she obtained a copy of it consequent upon the refusal of the defendants to give her the produce of her land and their assertion of title to the land as donees. 3. In defence the allegations of fraud and misrepresentation and the fact that the plaintiff is a Pardanashin woman have been denied and it has been asserted that the plaintiff validly conveyed the property in suit to the defendants by means of the deed of gift and that the deed was executed by the plaintiff voluntarily and out of her free will. It has also been alleged that the defendants are in possession of the property in suit under the deed of gift. 4. The trial court dismissed the suit with the finding that the execution of the deed of gift was not brought about by means of fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence and the defendants were in possession of the property conveyed to them by the deed. On appeal, however, the judgment of the trial court was reversed by the lower appellate court which came to the conclusion that the impugned deed was not the outcome of a conscious act of the plaintiff but was a result of fraud, undue influence and misrepresentation. The lower appellate court further held that the plaintiff has continued in possession. A decree cancelling the deed of gift, declaring that it conveyed no title to the defendants, and restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff was accordingly granted by it to the plaintiff. Aggrieved by that decree, the defendants have appealed to this Court. 5. It has been strenuously contended by Mr. Bakshi, learned counsel for the defendant, that the approach of the lower appellate court to the case was vitiated by application to the deed in question of those principles which govern deeds by Pardanashin ladies, in spite of a finding that the plaintiff has not been proved to be a Pardanashin lady. 5. It has been strenuously contended by Mr. Bakshi, learned counsel for the defendant, that the approach of the lower appellate court to the case was vitiated by application to the deed in question of those principles which govern deeds by Pardanashin ladies, in spite of a finding that the plaintiff has not been proved to be a Pardanashin lady. He has urged that circumstances which might invalidate the deed of gift and, deprive it of legal effect had to be positively established by the plaintiff, and the lower appellate court erred in thinking that it was for the defendants to prove that the deed had been explained to the plaintiff and she executed it after fully understanding its nature, contents, and consequences. The evidence relating to the physical condition and mental capacity of the appellant and to the circumstances of her life, however, makes it abundantly clear that even though the plaintiff is not a Pardanashin lady she is entitled to the same protection as the law gives to a Pardanashin lady and a transaction by her in regard to her property must be viewed in the light of those very principles and be subjected to those very tests which apply to a transaction by a Pardahnashin lady affecting her property. 6. Admittedly, the plaintiff is totally illiterate. It is also not disputed that at the time of the execution of the deed of gift the plaintiff was over sixty years of age and this fact is mentioned in the deed itself. Again, it is undeniable that since before the execution of the deed of gift the plaintiff has been hard of hearing and there is a note about her hardness of' hearing in the endorsement made by the Sub-Registrar on the back of the deed at the time of its registration. Then, there is the clinching admission made by the defendants themselves in the plaint (Ex. 2) filed by them in suit No. 238 of 1948 in which they described the plaintiff as a foolish and rustic woman completely devoid of intelligence. On a consideration of the evidence in the case the lower appellate court has recorded a clear finding to the effect that the plaintiff is of an extremely weak intellect and the defendants had described her very correctly in suit No. 238 of 1948. On a consideration of the evidence in the case the lower appellate court has recorded a clear finding to the effect that the plaintiff is of an extremely weak intellect and the defendants had described her very correctly in suit No. 238 of 1948. This finding is amply borne out by the material on record and must be accepted. 7. What Mr. Bakshi has urged against the finding is that since suit no. 238 of 1948 had been filed by the defendants against the plaintiff and one Vishwa Nath Rai for a declaration that the said Vishwa Nath Rai was not an adopted son of Sahab Lal Rai as claimed by him and for restraining the plaintiff from committing waste of the property of Sahab Lal Rai, the allegations made in the plaint of that suit, regarding the mental capacity of the plaintiff should not be taken seriously, as they might have been made solely with the object of strengthening the attack against the alleged adoption and of making out a case for an injunction against waste. I have considered this argument carefully but I find it unacceptable. 8. It is true that, except in situations creating an estoppel, it is open to a party to show that the circumstances attending the making of a statement, which is sought to be used against him as an admission, were such as diminished or even destroyed its value; he may prove that the statement was incorrect, or even deliberately untrue and made in order to gain a particular object or serve a particular purpose. But he can do so only by evidence of a cogent and satisfactory nature, and he cannot get rid of the force and effect of his admission merely by suggestions made in argument as to possibility of error or probable reason or motive for the statement having been incorrect or untrue. The value and effect of an admission were emphasised by the Supreme Court in Narayan Bhagwant Rao Gosavi Balajiwala v. Gopal Vinayak Gosavi, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 100, in the following words: "An admission is the best evidence that an opposing party can rely upon, and, though not conclusive, is decisive of the matter, unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous." 9. In the present case, the admission has not been withdrawn or proved to be erroneous; indeed, no attempt has been made in that direction. In the present case, the admission has not been withdrawn or proved to be erroneous; indeed, no attempt has been made in that direction. The admission is contained in a solemn document, and it was obviously made with deliberation. The fact to which it relates is one that must naturally have been in the personal knowledge of the defendants, and the language of the admission is most explicit, unequivocal and emphatic. A copy of the document containing the admission had been filed by the plaintiff and accepted in evidence by the Court before the evidence in the case began to be recorded and yet Rameshwar Rai, the only defendant examined as a witness in the case, did not say a word in explanation of the admission. In fact lie stated nothing about the mental capacity of the plaintiff and, therefore, nothing either contrary to the admission or indicative of the fact that the admission was incorrect. Even Sarju Rai, the only other witness examined on behalf of the defendants, said nothing regarding that matter. The admission, therefore, remained not only unexplained, but also un rebutted by any other evidence. In these circumstances it constitutes evidence of a decisive character, particularly when there is other material on record in support of it and confirming its correctness. 10. If a party desires that a previous statement made by him and amounting to an admission may not be effective against him the least that he is expected to do is to repudiate the correctness or truth of that statement by his evidence and to explain the circumstances in which the statement came to be made and the reason or the motive for making it. But if even that is not done by him, he cannot ask the Court to ignore the admission or minimise its value and effect on the basis of a mere hypo thesis put forward in argument. I may be that the defendants had motive for making a wrong allegation regarding the mental capacity of the plaintiff in a suit filed by them for assailing an alleged adoption and restraining her from wasting her husband's property, but there is no reason. whatever for the Court to suppose, in the absence of evidence, that the statement made by them in that respect was actually prompted by that motive and it did not represent the truth. The admission contained in Ex. whatever for the Court to suppose, in the absence of evidence, that the statement made by them in that respect was actually prompted by that motive and it did not represent the truth. The admission contained in Ex. 2 is, consequently, of utmost value in the case and it deserves the weight that has been attached to it by the lower appellate court. 11. It has also been submitted by Mr. Bakshi that the attention of Rameshwar Rai defendant who was examined as a witness on behalf of the defendants was not drawn to the statement contained in Ex 2 and on account of non-compliance of the requirement of Section 145 if the Evidence Act the statement cannot be used against them. This objection completely overlooks the fact that the statement in question is not the previous statement of a witness but is an admission made by the opposite parties to the suit and it can, therefore, be used as substantive evidence. Reference may here be made to the Full Bench case of Ajodhya Prasad Bhargava v. Bhawani Shanker Bhargava, AIR 1957 Allahabad 1. Further, it is only when a party makes a statement inconsistent with an earlier statement that the occasion for calling his attention to the inconsistency may arise, but when no statement at all is subsequently made by him in regard to the matter on which he had made the earlier statement there is no inconsistency to which his attention may be called, and obviously Section 145 of the Evidence Act cannot in that case act as a bar to the use of the earlier statement. The section cannot be construed as requiring that even though a party has not chosen to state anything contrary to or explanatory of an admission already on record he should be questioned with reference to it in cross examination and asked whether he adheres to it or repudiates it, before the admission can be utilised against him. This would amount to requiring that the party who has not repudiated or stated anything contrary to an earlier statement of his amounting to an admission should first be given a chance to contradict himself and then to reconcile or explain the contradiction if he can. There is nothing either in Sec, 145 of the Evidence Act or in principle to support this proposition. There is nothing either in Sec, 145 of the Evidence Act or in principle to support this proposition. The result, therefore, is that the admission of the defendants contained in Ex. 2 can properly be used in evidence against them and the objection raised in regard to it on behalf of the appellants is entirely unsustainable. It has been necessary to dwell at some length upon the admission because it has naturally loomed large in the argument of Mr. Bakshi and he has taken great pains in truing to remove it out of the way of the defendants. 12. In addition to the disabilities of the plaintiff arising from her age. illiteracy. hardness of hearing, and mental difference, there is the fact that the defendants are not only closely related to the plaintiff but they were also living with her at the time of the execution of the deed of gift and were looking after her and helping her, as the recitals in the deed themselves bear out. These things must have created in her a sense of dependence and a feeling of and confidence towards the defendants. The point to he considered is whether, in these circumstances, the lower appellate court was in error in judging the evidence led in the case and determining the validity of the gift in the light of the principles applicable to deeds of Pardahnashin ladies. 13. In support of his argument on this aspect of the case Mr. Bakshi has placed reliance on the decision of the Privy Council in Hodges v. The Delhi and London Bank Limited I.L.R. 23 All. 137. A close examination of the decision will, however, show that it does not at all help Mr. Bakshi's argument, and in fact it lends support to the proposition that the rules of law which have been established in regard to transactions by women belonging to the class of Pardahnashin ladies may be extended to transactions by women outside that class on proof of the disabilities which are presumed to exist in case of Pardahnashin ladies. The deed involved in that case had been executed among others by one Mrs. Katherine Hodges in favour of a bank in 1886. The contract entered into by means of the deed was sought to be enforced after the death of Mrs, Katherine Hodges against her executor along with the other executant of the deed. The deed involved in that case had been executed among others by one Mrs. Katherine Hodges in favour of a bank in 1886. The contract entered into by means of the deed was sought to be enforced after the death of Mrs, Katherine Hodges against her executor along with the other executant of the deed. Undoubtedly, and in fact admittedly, Mrs. Katherine Hodges was not a Pardahnashin lady. She had been born in a Kashmiri Muslim family but she had married Mr. Hodges according to Christian rites in 1838, and she lives with her husband till the latter's death in 1857. Thereafter, during her widowhood, she resided some times with her son-in-law who was a Major in the army but much with a Christian missionary. She was found to have been a woman of superior mental capacity and to have managed her affairs with ability. It was, however, in evidence that even after her marriage with Mr. Hodges she did not cease to be a Muslim in religion, retained some of her Indian habits and did not appear before strangers. On this basis it was argued that 'Mrs. Hodges was a quasi-Pardahnashin lady and was entitled to the same protection as the law gives to a Par dahnashin lady. Dealing with this argument the Privy Council observed : "In this part of the case there is no discrepancy in the evidence except on some small immaterial details, and none at all in the findings of the two Courts. It is abundantly clear that Mrs. Hodges was not a pardahnashin. The term quasi-pardanashin seems to have been invented for this occasion. Their Lordships take it to mean a woman who, not being of the pardahnashin class is yet so close to them in kinship and habits and so secluded from ordinary social intercourse, that a like amount of incapacity for business must be ascribed to her, and the same amount of protection which the law gives to pardanashins must be extended to her. The contention is a novel one, and their Lordships are not favourably impressed by it. As to a certain well known and easily ascertained class of women, well known rules of law are established, with the wisdom of which we are not now concerned. The contention is a novel one, and their Lordships are not favourably impressed by it. As to a certain well known and easily ascertained class of women, well known rules of law are established, with the wisdom of which we are not now concerned. Outside that class it must depend in each case on the character and position of the individual woman whether those who deal with her are or are not bound to take special precautions that her action shall be intelligent and voluntary, and to prove that it was so in case of dispute. Mrs. Hodges was an independent woman of more than ordinary capacity for, and experience in, dealing with property. It would be very unjust to hold that the bank was bound to treat her on any other footing." 14. The principle laid down, therefore, is' that while the mere fact that a woman is a Pardahnashin lady will attract the operation of the well known rules of law established in regard to that class of women, those rules cannot apply to a woman falling outside the class unless her character and position call for the application of those rules, and it is obviously implied that if the character and position of a woman are proved to be such necessitate the protection of those rules just as much as in the . case of a Pardahnashin lady, she would be similarly protected. 15. It will be noticed that this Privy Council case was made the basis of his decision by Mitter, J. in Chinta Dasya v. Bhalku Das, AIR 1930 Calcutta 591, where it was laid down that rules regarding transactions by a Pardahnashin lady are equally applicable to an illiterate and ignorant woman though she may not be a Pardahnashin. After referring to the above quoted observations of the Privy Council the learned Judge said: "So even in the case of a woman who is outside the regular pardahnashin class it is for those who lived with her to establish that she had the capacity of understanding the transaction that was entered into and that she entered into the transaction voluntarily and with full knowledge and import of what the transaction meant." 16. The observations of Graham, J., the other learned Judge who constituted the Bench in the above Calcutta case, were more explicit, although he did not in his judgment refer to the Privy Council decision in Hodges' case.2 The observations were as follows: "The rule of law so far as parda nashin women is concerned is well known and has been clearly laid down in many decisions of the Privy Council. It is true that most of those decisions relate to the case of pardahnashin ladies. We have not been referred to any case in which the principles has been extended to the case of other women who do not come within that class; but that does not seem to be any reason why a rule which is applicable to pardanashin ladies on the ground of their ignorance and illiteracy should be restricted to that class only and should not apply to the case of a poor woman who is equally ignorant and illiterate and is not pardahnashin simply because she does not belong to that class. If the view of the matter were adopted the effect clearly would be to confer an unfair advantage upon rich women as compared with poor women. The object of the rule of law is to protect the weak and helpless, and it should not, in my judgment, be restricted to a particular class of the community." 17. With the principle enunciated in the passages quoted above from the judgment in Chinta Dasya's case. I respectfully agree, and the learned counsel for the appellants has not been able to cite any case to the contrary. I may also draw attention to the case of Rajaram Rajaram v. Khandu Babu, XV Indian Cases 529, where a learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court had before him a suit challenzing a deed of gift executed by an old and an infirm woman belonging to a gang of working women and not to the class of Pardahnashin ladies. Although the learned Judge upheld the deed on the facts proved in the case, he nevertheless held that the burden of proving that it was executed with the full knowledge of its contents and that the executant did so willingly and without any pressure or solicitation, which might have amounted to exercise of undue influence, lay heavily on the donee. Although the learned Judge upheld the deed on the facts proved in the case, he nevertheless held that the burden of proving that it was executed with the full knowledge of its contents and that the executant did so willingly and without any pressure or solicitation, which might have amounted to exercise of undue influence, lay heavily on the donee. Dealing with the rules that have developed in regard to transactions by Pardahnashin ladies Lord Sumner observed as follows in Mt. Farid-un-nisa v. Munshi Mukhtar Ahmad, A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 204: "The law of India contains well known principles for the protection of persons, who transfer their property to their own disadvantage when they have not the usual, means of fully understanding the nature and effect of what they are doing. In this it has only given the special development, which Indian social usages make necessary, to the general rules of English law, which protect persons, whose disabilities make them dependent upon or subject them to the influence of others, even though nothing in the nature of deception or coercion may have occurred. This is part of the law relating to personal capacity to make binding transfers or settlements of property of any kind." 18. Obviously it is not by reason of the Pardah itself that the law throws its protection round a Pardahnashin lady but by reason of those disabilities which a life of seclusion lived by a Pardahnashin lady gives rise to, and which are consequently presumed to exist in the case of such a lady. But the disabilities which make the protection necessary may arise from other causes as well. Old age, infirmity, ignorance, illiteracy, mental deficiency, inexperience and dependence upon others, may by themselves create disabilities that may render the protection equally necessary. If, therefore, it is proved that a woman, although she is not a Pardahnashin lady, suffers from the disabilities to which a Pardahnashin lady is presumed to be subject, the validity and the bindin nature of a deed executed by her have to be judged in the light of those very principles which are applied to a deed by a Pardahnashin lady. 19. As I have already noted above the plaintiff is illiterate and when she executed the deed in question she was not only more than sixty years old but was also hard of hearing. 19. As I have already noted above the plaintiff is illiterate and when she executed the deed in question she was not only more than sixty years old but was also hard of hearing. She was described by the defendants themselves as a foolish and rustic woman completely devoid of intelligence, and according to the finding of the lower appellate court she was correctly described as such. Besides, the defendants stood in relation to her in a position of active confidence. In such circumstances there can, to my mind, be no doubt that she is as much entitled to the protection of the law as a Pardahnashin lady and the lower appellate court was perfectly justified in its approach to the case. 20. In Mst. Kharbuja Kuer v. Jangbahadur Rai, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1203 the Supreme Court laid down the principle governing deeds of Pardahnashin ladies in the following words: "The burden of proof shall always rest upon the person who seeks to sustain a transaction entered into with a Pardahnashin lady to establish that the said document was entered into by her after clearly understanding the nature of the transaction. It should be established that-it was not her physical act but also her mental act. The burden can be discharged not only by proving that the document was explained to her and that she understood it but also by other evidence, direct and circumstantial." 21. It is in the light of this principle that the learned Judge of the lower appellate court has examined the evidence and he has found that the burden that lay on the defendants remained undischarged and they Mailed to prove that the plaintiff voluntarily executed the deed of gift after, understanding its nature and effect. The finding having been reached by examining the case from a correct perspective it is not open to interference in second appeal. 22. Mr. Bakshi has also contended that the finding of the lower appellate court that the deed of gift was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation is not based on reliable evidence and that the evidence led on behalf of the plaintiff falls short of the standard required for establishing allegations of that kind. It has further been urged by the learned counsel that there is no evidence at all to justify the finding of the court below regarding undue influence. It has further been urged by the learned counsel that there is no evidence at all to justify the finding of the court below regarding undue influence. It is, however, not necessary to ascertain whether fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence has been established when it has been. found that a deed executed by a Pardahnashin lady has not been executed by her voluntarily and after appreciating the nature and import of the transaction, and the latter finding alone is sufficient for holding that the deed is not binding on her and it conveyed no title. if the establishment of fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence were necessary f,r the avoidance of a deed by a Pardahnashin lady, she would not be standing on a footing different in any manner from that of other persons who have entered into a contract, and the protection which the law ensures to her would lose all its meaning. In Mst. Kharbuja Kuer's cases the Supreme Court has pointed out the error of regarding that as necessary and has summed up the position in the following words: "It is, therefore, manifest that the rule evolved for the protection of Pardahnashin ladies shall not be confused with other doctrines such as fraud, duress and actual undue influence, which apply to all persons whether they be Pardahnashin ladies or not." 23. These observations will apply with equal force to a transaction by a woman who is found to be entitled to the same protection as a Pardahnashin lady. 24. Even apart from the question of fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence, therefore, on the finding recorded by the lower appellate court the transaction in question cannot be upheld. But over and above this, there is the statement of the plaintiff herself and her witness Chandrika Rai in support of her allegations of fraud and misrepresentation and on the basis of this evidence the lower appellate court has recorded a finding that the deed of gift in question was the result of recorded a finding that the deed of gift in question was the result of fraud and misrepresentation. This finding cannot be disturbed in second appeal. Even if the finding as to undue influence is ignored the finding as to fraud and misrepresentation was quite sufficient for the setting aside of the, impugned deed of gift. 25. The appeal, therefore, fails and it is a accordingly dismissed with coats