ORDER Dixit, C. J. 1. This order will also govern the disposal of Misc. Civil Cases Nos. 197 to 209, all of 1965. 2. All these 14 applications are under Articles 133 (1) (b) and (c) of the Constitution of India for certificates for appeal to the Supreme Court from our common order dated 27th August 1965 in Misc. Petition No. 116 of 1965 allowing 14 applications under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution filed by different bus operators challenging the legality of an order dated 2nd February 1965 of one of the respondents in each case, namely, Special Secretary to the State Government in the Home Department approving under Section 68 D (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) five Schemes published under section 68 C of the Act. The order dated 2nd February 1965 of the Special Secretary, the publication of the five approved Schemes in the State Gazette and the subsequent action taken in pursuance thereof under section 68-F were all quashed by us and the cases were remitted to the Special Secretary for a fresh decision in accordance with law in the light of our decision sought to be against. 3. The material facts are that by our order dated 23rd December 1964 in Premchand Jain Vs. State of M. P. and others 1965 JLJ 611 = 1965 MPLJ 434 disposing of 32 applications under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution we quashed the order passed earlier by the Special Secretary approving with some modified the very five Schemes; the publication of the Schemes so approved the orders passed and notices issued under section 68 F of the Act. Our order dated 23rd December 1964 was founded on the ground that although the Special Secretary had been authorized to dispose of the objections received to the Schemes under section 68-D (1) of the Act, he had not been authorized to approve or modify them. Our order dated 23rd December 1964 was founded on the ground that although the Special Secretary had been authorized to dispose of the objections received to the Schemes under section 68-D (1) of the Act, he had not been authorized to approve or modify them. After our decision dated 23rd December 1964 in Premchand Jain's Case (supra) the State Government amended Supplementary Instruction No.2 issued under Rule 13 of the Rules of Business and Rule 7 of the Government Business (Allocation) Rules, and thereafter the Chief Minister expressly authorized the Special Secretary to exercise the powers of the State Government under Section 68-D of the Act to approve or modify the Schemes and also to take all further steps towards that end. After this authorization the Special Secretary again issued notices to the operators concerned to the effect that the various Schemes would be taken up on 30th January 1965 for approval or modification under section 68-D of the Act. Some operators including those who filed applications under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution before us appeared and raised certain objections before the Special Secretary to the Schemes. All those objections were overruled by the Special Secretary by his order dated 2nd February 1965. 4. At the time of the hearing of the petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution the only two contentions that were urged on behalf of the respondent operators were that the empowerment of the Special Secretary by the State Government conferring on him powers under section 68-D to approve or modify the Schemes was not valid and that they, that is, the operators, had not been given an opportunity of hearing as laid down by section 68-D (2) of the Act. We rejected the first contention but accepted the other and accordingly quashed the orders of the Special Secretary approving different Schemes and the subsequent action taken pursuant to the approval. We rejected the first contention but accepted the other and accordingly quashed the orders of the Special Secretary approving different Schemes and the subsequent action taken pursuant to the approval. On the second point we took the view that the duty placed on the State Government under section 68-D (2) of considering the objections before approving or modifying the Scheme meant that the objections must be considered in relation to the question whether the Scheme should be approved or modified; that there could not be a consideration of the objections in vacuo or in abstract or unrelated to the purpose for which the objections were invited; that the effect of our decision in Premchand's case (supra) was that the Special Secretary could entertain and investigate into the Schemes and hold an enquiry for the purpose but the power then given to him to dispose of the objections was totally ineffective when he had not been empowered to approve of modify the Scheme; that consequently when the orders of the Special Secretary modifying the Schemes in Premchand's case were quashed, the result was that the enquiry and investigation held by the Special Secretary into the objections submitted by the operators remained intact but that his decisions on those objections which formed the basis of the orders approving the Schemes came to an end and it was, therefore, incumbent on the Special Secretary to hear the respondent operators on their objections which had already been investigated and to adjudicate upon them afresh before passing any orders with regard to the Schemes. 5. We found that at the resumed hearing before the Special Secretary after the quashing of his decision in Premchand's Case (supra), the Special Secretary only considered certain new objections preferred by the operators and did not consider and decide afresh the old objections already preferred by the operators and that his mind was fore-closed by the conclusions on which he had founded his earlier orders with regard to the Schemes which were quashed by us in Premchand's Case. We also noted that in fact the Special Secretary had stated in his order dated 2nd February 1965 that he had already disposed of the objection preferred by the operators and all that remained to be done by him was to decide "what may be called the policy question; namely, whether in view of the decision taken on the various objections, the Schemes in question should be approved; disapproved or modified to any extent." We observed that this statement of the special Secretary indicated that he totally misconceived the nature of his functions in approving or disapproving or modifying the Schemes and erreds in thinking that the final decision whether any Scheme should be approved or disapproved or modified had to be taken with reference to considerations of policy and not with reference to his conclusions with regard to the objections to the Scheme. 6. In support of these applications Shri Chitaley, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the substantial question raised by our decision dated 27th August 1965 is whether, in view of the fact that in Premchand's case (supra) the orders of the Special Secretary modifying the various Schemes were quashed solely on the ground that he had no power to approve or modify them though he had been validly authorised to dispose of the objections in respect of the several Schemes, our decision in Premchand's case (supra) quashing the orders of the Special Secretary had the effect of keeping intact the decisions of the Special Secretary on the operators' objections and whether only the orders modifying the Schemes came to an end. It was said that the effect of our decision in Premchand's case was that the Special Secretary was not required to adjudicate afresh on the objections he had already decided before passing the orders dated 2nd February 1965 approving the Schemes. It was also urged that as the respondent-operators raised new objections and did not ask for a reappraisal of the evidence which they had already tendered in support of their objections; our conclusion that the Special Secretary should have decided afresh the old objections was erroneous. 7. In our opinion, our decision does give rise to the question formulated by learned counsel for the petitioner. The said question is a substantial one and renders the case a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. 7. In our opinion, our decision does give rise to the question formulated by learned counsel for the petitioner. The said question is a substantial one and renders the case a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. In our view, the petitioner should be granted certificates for appeal to the Supreme Court. We order accordingly. 8. The petitioner M. P. State Road Transport Corporation has in each case made a prayer for staying the operation of our order dated 27th August 1965. We are unable to see how this prayer can be granted when, from the moment our order dated 27th August 1965 was delivered and pronounced, the order dated 2nd February 1965 of the Special Secretary approving the five Schemes and the subsequent action taken by him were quashed. On the quashing of the order of the Special Secretary there remains no valid authority on the basis of which the Corporation can be allowed to run its services on the routes covered by the quashed Schemes. The decision sought to be appealed from having already taken effect in regard to the quashing of the order of the Special Secretary, no question of staying the operation of our decision dated 27th August 1965 so as to postpone the quashing of the order dated 2nd February 1965 of the Special Secretary can at all arise. 9. Shri Chitaley, learned counsel for the applicant, referred us to Order 45, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and urged that as execution of the decree or order could be stayed under that rule, so also the operation of our order dated 27th August 1965 from which the petitioner intends to appeal should also be stayed. In our opinion, there is no anology whatsoever between a decree or an order which has to be executed and the order of this Court which itself quashed the order dated 2nd February 1965 of the Special Secretary. Even with reference to Order 45, rule 13, it has been held in Kalyan Singh Vs. State of U.P. AIR 1961 All. 619 FB that an order under Article 226 refusing certiorari or mandamus was not capable of execution and there is nothing that could be stayed and that interim relief under Order 45; rule 13 staying the operation of the order of the High Court under Article 226 cannot be granted. State of U.P. AIR 1961 All. 619 FB that an order under Article 226 refusing certiorari or mandamus was not capable of execution and there is nothing that could be stayed and that interim relief under Order 45; rule 13 staying the operation of the order of the High Court under Article 226 cannot be granted. The same view has been expressed in Jitendra Narayan Vs. State of Assam AIR 1953 Assam 159; Rajahmundry E. S. Corporation Vs. State of Madras AIR 1953 Mad. 475 ; and Sajjan Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan AIR 1954 Raj. 01. Learned counsel for the applicant sought to distinguish these cases by saying that in all those cases the prayer for the issue of a writ of certiorari was refused by the High Court. It seems to us that the distinction suggested is unreal and artificial. An order of the High Court granting a writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution takes effect from the moment it is delivered and pronounced. That being so, it makes no difference in connection with the grant of an interim relief under Order 45; rule 13, whether the prayer for the issue of a writ of certiorari was granted or refused. It may be noted that in Saruplal Vs. Smt. Kaushalya Devi AIR 1956 Punj. 225 an order of the Chief Commissioner directing de novo commencement of mutation proceedings was quashed by the Punjab High Court by the issue of a writ of certiorari. The Punjab High Court granted a certificate to the unsuccessful party for appeal to the Supreme Court against its order. The prayer made by that party under Order 45, rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for staying the operation of the order of the High Court was, however, rejected on the ground that it did not fall within the scope of clause (d) of rule 13. 10. Our attention was also drawn by learned counsel for the applicant to an order made by the Supreme Court on 10th December 1964 staying the operation of our order in Behari Lal Chaurasia Vs. R. T. A. Rewa 1965 JLJ 498 =1965 MPLC 265= AIR 1965 MP 132 quashing an order of the Regional Transport Authority allowing an application for the grant of counter-signature of a permit on its renewal. R. T. A. Rewa 1965 JLJ 498 =1965 MPLC 265= AIR 1965 MP 132 quashing an order of the Regional Transport Authority allowing an application for the grant of counter-signature of a permit on its renewal. That order was made by the Supreme Court in an appeal preferred against our decision dated 11th November 1964. While granting a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court from our decision dated 11th November 1964 we had rejected the prayer of M/s Bundelkhand Transport Co. for staying the operation of our order dated 11th November 1964 on grounds similar to those stated earlier. It was suggested that as the Supreme Court stayed the operation of our order dated 11th November 1964, this Court could also stay the operation of its order quashing a decision of a tribunal or authority by a writ of certiorari. We are unable to accept this contention. The order passed by the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Bundelkhand Motor Transport Co. (Civil Misc. Petition No. 2883 of 1964) does not at all indicate that in staying the operation of our order dated 11th November 1964 the Supreme Court proceeded on the basis that the High Court had the Power to stay the operation of its order quashing a determination by the issue of a writ of certiorari, and, therefore, the Supreme Court also as an appellate Court could exercise that power. The petitioner's prayer for the stay of the operation of our order dated 27th August 1965 cannot, therefore, be granted. 11. For the above reasons, the petitioner is granted a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court against our decision dated 27th August 1965 in each of these 14 cases. The petitioner's application for the stay of the operation of our order dated 27th August 1965 in each of the 14 cases is rejected.