Judgment Mahapatra, J. 1. The appellants instituted a suit on the 1st October, 1956, for partition of their eight annas share in the properties described in Schedule 4 of the plaint. Schedule 1 showed the ancestral properties, Schedule 2 the acquired properties and Schedule 3 the joint family properties that were alleged to have been allotted to one coparcener Baldeo Singh (defendant No. 7) at the time of his separation from the joint family and later gifted to his daughter. The plaintiffs claimed that the other three members of the joint family after the separation of Baldeo continued joint as before and remained in joint possession of the rest of the joint family properties, described in Schedule 4. A genealogy was given from which it appears that one Suchit Singh had six sons, of whom two died issueless. The remaining four sons were Ramautar, Gopinath, Baldeo and Gaya. Plaintiff No. 1 is the son of Ramautar; and the other plaintiffs are the two sons and two grandsons of plaintiff No. 1. Baldeo Singh has one daughter Chulhan Kuer, who is impleaded as defendant No. 8. Defendants Nos. 1 to 6 are the sons and grandsons of Gaya Singh. He died on the 23rd October, 1949. His widow is Mosammat Ramnak Kuer (defendant No. 3a). The plaintiffs stated that Baldeo separated from the joint family about twelve years ago near about 1943; and after that, while the other brothers continued as before, Gaya Singh died in a state of jointness leaving his widow and sons and his two surviving brothers. In a state of jointness, Gopinath also died on the 6th October, 1953, without leaving any issue. His wife predeceased him long before. Ramautar, father of plaintiff No. 1, had also died beforehand. Thus, on Gopinaths death in October. 1953, Jaigobind Singh, plaintiff No. 1, son of Ramaular, and the descendants of Gaya Singh remained in possession of the joint family properties, which are described in Schedule 4 of the plaint. Baldeo Singh (defendant No. 7), however, claiming to have succeeded to the estate of Gopinath Singh, executed a deed of gift in respect of that in favour of Brij Bihari Singh (defendant No. 1) on the 5th of October, 1955. Baldeo Singh (defendant No. 7), however, claiming to have succeeded to the estate of Gopinath Singh, executed a deed of gift in respect of that in favour of Brij Bihari Singh (defendant No. 1) on the 5th of October, 1955. Before that he had executed another deed of gift in favour of his daughter (defendant No. 8) in respect of a major portion of the properties with which he had separated from the joint family (Schedule 3). After taking the deed of gift from Baldeo Singh, defendant No. 1, and his brothers claimed exclusive right over those properties against the plaintiffs which ultimately led to the present suit. The plaintiffs claimed that as the two branches of Ramautar and Gaya Singh were in possession of the Schedule 4 properties, being the surviving coparceners, they asked for partition of half share in that. 2. The suit was resisted by the defendants. Their case was that in 1350 Fasli, corresponding to 1943, there was separation between Gopinath, Baldeo, Gaya and Jaigobind; and the joint family properties, ancestral and acquired, were divided between them in equal shares. But soon after, Gopinath, who had no issue and whose wife had predeceased him already, lived in joint mess with Gaya Singh and there was joint cultivation of the lands that fell to his share and that of Gaya Singh. Since Gopinath died in 1953 in a state of separation, Baldeo Singh, the nearest heir to him, succeeded to his properties; and in that respect he also made a gift in favour of defendant No. 1 on the 5th March, 1955, by a registered instrument. Baldeo (defendant No. 7) himself filed a written statement on the same line, but he filed a second written statement at a later stage in which he lent support to the plaintiffs case and disputed the story of complete partition or separation between the four branches of Ramautar, Gopinath, Baldeo and Gaya Singh. He asserted, like the plaintiffs, that he alone had separated with one-fourth share of the joint family properties and the rest continued joint as before. On these pleadings the parties went to trial. The main issue for decision was if Gopinath died in a state of jointness or separation. He asserted, like the plaintiffs, that he alone had separated with one-fourth share of the joint family properties and the rest continued joint as before. On these pleadings the parties went to trial. The main issue for decision was if Gopinath died in a state of jointness or separation. If he died in a state of separation, then undoubtedly Baldeo Singh was entitled to succeed to his estate and the gift made by him of that cannot be challenged by the plaintiffs. But if Gopinath died in a state of jointness, Baldeo Singh could not have any title to transfer that to defendant No. 1 by gift. In other words, the court was to find whether there was a complete partition (or separation) as alleged by the contesting defendants between the four branches in 1943 or only one of them, Baldeo Singh, separated leaving the rest to continue as members of the joint family as before. The defendants no doubt also raised other pleas such as limitation, fraud in respect of the deed of gift executed by Baldeo Singh (Ext. B(1) ) in favour of defendant No. 8, but they were all negatived by the court. The defendants case that there was a complete partition between the four branches toy metes and bounds was not accepted by the trial judge, but he, however, held that there was separation between the four branches; and in that view, Gopinath died in a state of separation and was succeeded by Baldeo Singh alone. The plea of Baldeo Singhs partition with one-fourth of the joint family properties was not accepted but he was held to be entitled to one-fourth share like the other three branches in all the properties of the joint family described in Schedules 1 and 2 of the plaint, and, therefore, the suit was decreed in the following manner; the plaintiffs to get one-fourth share, defendants 1 to 6, one-fourth share, Baldeo Singh (defendant No. 7) with his daughter (defendant No. 8), one-fourth share and the remaining one-fourth share, which was of Gopinath Singh and inherited by Baldeo Singh and gifted to Brij Bihari (defendant No. 1) would go to the donee. The plaintiffs felt aggrieved by this judgment and decree and came in appeal here. 3. Learned counsel challenged the finding about the separation between the four branches. The plaintiffs felt aggrieved by this judgment and decree and came in appeal here. 3. Learned counsel challenged the finding about the separation between the four branches. He insisted upon the plaintiffs case that in 1943 Baldeo Singh (defendant No. 7) alone had separated from the joint family and took out one-fourth share of the properties of the family. The defendants version also includes the separation of Baldeo with a specific share of the properties of the joint family. Exhibit B(1) is a registered deed of gift executed by Baldeo Singh on the 14th August, 1950, in respect of a large portion of such divided properly in favour of his only daughter, defendant No. 8. The description of the properties in Exhibit B(1) shows specific portions of different plots which comprised the joint family estate. So, the common case is that Baldeo Singh was separate with his one-fourth share. It is not possible, however, to find out which properties other than those covered by Exhibit B(1) were given to Baldeo Singh. In his evidence he has said that he kept a portion and gave the rest to his daughter. Schedule 3 of the plaint only gives the properties which Baldeo Singh had conveyed to his daughter. In paragraph 8 of the plaint was stated that Baldeo Singh had given in mortgage a part of the properties which were allotted to him and the rest he gave to his daughter by way of gift. The total of the properties given in Schedule 4 of the plaint which, according to the plaintiffs, are the remaining properties of the joint family after separation of Baldeo Singh, indicates that the one-fourth share would have been near about 10 acres. The land given under Exhibit B(1) measured 7.64 acres. Neither the plaintiffs nor defendant No. 7 nor any of the contesting defendants have given a complete schedule of the properties which allegedly were given to Baldeo Singh on partition. Thus, though separation of Baldeo Singh is admitted by all the sides, it will not be possible, on the evidence on record, to hold which specific properties were actually allotted to him besides those mentioned in Exhibit B(1). It would be, therefore, necessary, in case a decree for partition of the properties belonging to the erstwhile joint family is passed, to include in that partition the one-fourth share that belonged to Baldeo Singh. 4. It would be, therefore, necessary, in case a decree for partition of the properties belonging to the erstwhile joint family is passed, to include in that partition the one-fourth share that belonged to Baldeo Singh. 4. The point in controversy in the suit is if with the separation of Baldeo Singh the three remaining branches, Gopinath, Gaya and the plaintiffs, continued joint as before, or they also became separate with their respective one-fourth share each. The legal presumption that a Hindu family is joint is broken when one of the coparceners separates and goes out of the family with his share. There will be no legal presumption that the coparceners other than the separated one are joint or remained united. Presumptions are of two kinds: legal and natural. Even there will be no natural presumption about the jointness of the other coparceners of the family after one coparcener separates. On the other hand, there may be a natural presumption, though not any legal presumption, that the joint status was also broken in respect of the other coparceners. The probability will be more in that direction, as their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Balabux Ladhuram V/s. Rukhmabai, 30 Ind App 130 (PC) observed. "In many cases it may be necessary, in order to ascertain the share of the outgoing member, to fix the shares which the other coparceners are or would be entitled to, and in this sense the separation of one is said to be a virtual separation of all," It will, no doubt, be open to the remaining members of the joint family to remain united or even to reunite, but that will depend upon their intentions or agreement. Such intention or agreement has to be proved like any other fact in a particular case, where jointness is claimed even after the separation of one coparcener. If it is a case of reunion, it can only be possible between persons who were already separate; and that will necessarily depend upon an agreement to that effect between the parties concerned. Since there will be no legal presumption of jointness in the family after one coparcener separates, the continuance of the jointness between the remaining coparceners will have to be proved. Since there will be no legal presumption of jointness in the family after one coparcener separates, the continuance of the jointness between the remaining coparceners will have to be proved. That can, no doubt, be inferred from the circumstances, conduct of the parties and management of the affairs of the family subsequent to the separation of one coparcener. What it appears to me is that with the separation of one coparcener the greater probability is the separation of the other coparceners, whose shares must have necessarily been determined for the purpose of giving away the share of the separating coparcener. Even though the joint family estate is divided to carve out only the share of the separating coparcener and there is no division by metes and bounds of the other shares, yet the joint status of the other coparceners stands separated. I must make it clear that there is no legal presumption of such separation, but only, at the most, a natural presumption or a probability which can be rebutted by evidence or substantial inference otherwise. The view taken by the Judicial Committee in the case of 30 Ind App 130 (PC) has been repeatedly affirmed by the Judicial Committee and our Supreme Court. In the case of Palani Ammal V/s. Muthuvenkatachala Moniagar 52 Ind App 83 : (AIR 1925 PC 49), their Lordships opined that the mere fact that the shares of the coparceners have been ascertained does not by itself necessarily lead to an inference that the family had separated. The reason is obvious. If the determination of shares of all the coparceners is not in the context of separation of one of them, the inference of virtual separation of all does not follow. In my view, it cannot be argued that the latter case, 52 Ind App 83: (AIR 1925 PC 49) detracted anything that was said in the former case. On the other hand, their Lordships referred to the earlier case of 30 Ind App 130 (PC) and affirmed its authority in the same paragraph while dealing with the reunion of the other coparceners which, they enjoined, must be strictly proved as any other disputed fact is proved. On the other hand, their Lordships referred to the earlier case of 30 Ind App 130 (PC) and affirmed its authority in the same paragraph while dealing with the reunion of the other coparceners which, they enjoined, must be strictly proved as any other disputed fact is proved. Whether the remaining members of the coparcenery continued to be joint after the separation of one coparcener, their Lordships considered and said that if that is disputed, it "may be inferred from the way in which their family business was carried on after their previous coparcener had separated from them." So, continuance of jointness of the remaining coparceners is required to be proved as laid down in Balabuxs case 30 Ind App 130 (PC) or is required to be inferred from the circumstances, as observed in Palani Ammal a case 52 Ind App 83: (AIR 1925 PC 49). In either view, there will be no legal or natural presumption about the jointness. In the case of Bal Krishna V/s. Ram Krishna, 58 Ind App 220: (AIR 1931 PC 154) the Judicial Committee also referred to the earlier decisions on the point and affirmed, "The general principle undoubtedly is that every Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved. If it is established that one member has separated, does the presumption continue with reference to the others? The decisions of this Board show that it does not: per Lord Devey in 30 Ind App 130 (PC) followed in Jatti V/s. Banwari Lal 50 Ind App 192: (AIR 1923 PC 136). But it is equally clear on these decisions that the other members of the family may remain joint: it is again, their Lordships think, a question of their intention, which must no doubt be proved." Learned counsel for the plaintiffs appellants referred to the case of Bhagwati Prasad Sahay V/s. Rameshwari Kuer, AIR 1952 SC 72 , where their Lordships dealt with such a question. It was observed that - "The general principle undoubtedly is that a Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved, but, as it is admitted here that Imrit, one of the coparceners, did separate himself from the other members of the joint family and had his share in the joint property partitioned off for him, there is no presumption that the rest of the coparceners continued to be joint. There is no presumption on the plaintiffs side too that because one member of the family separated himself, there has been separation with regard to all. It would be a question of fact to be determined in each case upon the evidence relating to the intention of the parties whether there was a separation amongst the other coparceners or that they remained united. The burden would undoubtedly lie on the party who asserts the existence of a particular state of things on the basis of which he claims relief. These principles which have been laid down in several pronouncements of the Judicial Committee seem to us to be perfectly sound; vide 58 Ind App 220: (AIR 1931 PC 154); 52 Ind App 83: (AIR 1925 PC 49); 30 Ind App 130 (PC)." From the above quotation I do not find any justification for the contention that the probable inference of a virtual separation of all the coparceners in a case in which their respective shares are required to be determined before separating one coparcener with his share in the joint family property (as laid down in Balabuxs case, 30 Ind App 130 (PC) ) was ruled out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. When they said that there is no presumption that because one member of the family separated himself, there has been separation with regard to all, they obviously mean the absence of any legal presumption because in the immediately preceding sentence they spoke of absence of such legal presumption of jointness in the family after the separation of one coparcener, The position that emerges is, therefore, like this: when one coparcener of the joint family is admitted or proved to have separated with his share in the family estate, the remaining coparceners will prove as a fact or will invoke an inference from the circumstances that prevail after such separation in regard to the management of the affairs or business of the family and the like that they had the intention to continue and/or they continued as before as a joint family. If they are unable to do so, then the probability or natural presumption of "a virtual separation" of the other, coparceners will apply and evidence in support of such separation will be viewed in that light. If they are unable to do so, then the probability or natural presumption of "a virtual separation" of the other, coparceners will apply and evidence in support of such separation will be viewed in that light. Where, however, a coparcener separates with a portion of the joint family property, but not based on what may have been his legitimate share at that time, there will be no need for the determination of the respective shares of the other coparceners; and, therefore, the question of their "virtual separation" will not arise. 5. xxx 6. In the instant case, the plaintiffs claimed that the three branches of Gopinath, Gaya and the plaintiffs, continued joint in spite of the separation of Baldeo Singh with one-fourth share. They are to show that their intention at that time was to continue so, though their respective shares must have been determined to be one-fourth each before fixing the share of Baldeo at the same figure. They can succeed if they rebut the probability of their virtual separation or if they prove as a fact that they had an intention at that time to remain joint as before, or show by evidence that they continued joint as before. (After discussing the oral and documentary evidence his Lordship held that the oral testimony of the witnesses had failed to prove continuance of jointness of the three branches after 1943 and that there was no support for the plaintiffs case of jointness from their oral or documentary evidence). 7. On the other hand, that is very much rendered improbable in face of some of the previous statements made by Gopinath Singh and Baldeo Singh in registered documents executed at times when the present controversy had not raised its head between the parties. Exhibit E is a usufructuary mortgage bond given by Gopinath Singh on the 13th October, 1949, to one Abdul Ghani Mian and another in respect of 46 acres comprised of survey plots Nos. 298 and 301 in Mauza Banbhaiya. There, Gopinath stated that the land was owned and possessed by him by virtue of a private partition. If all the four branches were not separate when Baldeo went out of the family, a statement of this nature by Gopinath would not have been possible. There was no reason why he would make a false statement of that nature. There, Gopinath stated that the land was owned and possessed by him by virtue of a private partition. If all the four branches were not separate when Baldeo went out of the family, a statement of this nature by Gopinath would not have been possible. There was no reason why he would make a false statement of that nature. Learned counsel for the appellants urged that because he was the head of the family consisting of the three branches, he spoke in that strain on behalf of all of them. Separation of Baldeo as pleaded by the plaintiffs did not make out that there was any allotment made to the three branches together. If the three branches continued joint as before and Gopinath executed this document as the karta of those three branches, he would have been expected to state that it belonged to the joint family and not that it was given to him on partition. In my view, this statement is of great value in determining the controversy in this case and very much supports the case of separation of the four branches. The admissibility of this statement cannot be questioned. In exhibit B(1), the deed of gift, executed by Baldeo-Singh in favour of his daughter (defendant No. 8) on the 14th August, 1950, he stated that he had become separate and so also Gopinath Singh and Gaya Singh, his brothers and Jaigobind Singh, his nephew. All the lands of the family were partitioned and all of them remained in separate possession, one having no connection or concern with the property and affairs of the others. The fact involved in this statement renders the fact in issue as alleged by the plaintiffs improbable; and in that sense this statement is admissible under Sec.11(2) of the Evidence Act. Statements involving similar facts recorded in registered documents were held admissible in the cases of Radhoba Baloba V/s. Aburao Bhagwantrao, AIR 1929 PC 231; Chhatradharr V/s. Akleshwar AIR 1952 Pat 382 ; and Nihar Bewa V/s. Kadar Bakas Mohamed, AIR 1923 Cat 290. Learned counsel for the appellants urged against their admissibility to evidence relying upon the case of Soney Lal Jha V/s. Darabdeo Narain Singh, ILR 14 Pat 461: AIR 1935 Pat 167 (FB). There, the statement was in a document between third parties and not between the parties as Exhibit B(1) is (between defendants Nos. 7 and 8). Learned counsel for the appellants urged against their admissibility to evidence relying upon the case of Soney Lal Jha V/s. Darabdeo Narain Singh, ILR 14 Pat 461: AIR 1935 Pat 167 (FB). There, the statement was in a document between third parties and not between the parties as Exhibit B(1) is (between defendants Nos. 7 and 8). In that case, the court was not concerned with whether the facts spoken about in that statement were relevant. They were only dealing with the method of proving or the admissibility under any provisions of the Evidence Act. They ruled out consideration of Sec.11 on that account and went to consider if the statement in third parties document can at all come as admissible under Sec.32, Clauses (2) and (3) or any other section of the Evidence Act and held that a statement of boundaries in a document of title between third parties who are dead at the time the statement is sought to be put in evidence is not admissible. That decision has no application here. Similarly, in the case of AIR 1923 Cal 290, the question was about a recital in a deed of release executed by a third party in favour of the defendant in that suit. The learned Judges observed that the fact that a third party had executed a deed of release constituted a transaction, which was relevant for the purpose of investigation of the question in controversy in the suit; but the recitals in that document did not become a part of the evidence as they were assertions by a person who was alive and who might have been brought before the court if either of the parties to the suit had so desired. A statement of one who is not a party to the litigation, cannot be brought in evidence unless the person, if not dead, or not capable of being brought before the court, is examined as a witness. On that principle they ruled out the recital in that document. In the present case the position is entirely different. Learned counsel for the appellants further contended that no reliance should be placed on this statement of Baldeo Singh because by filing two different written statements in the present case he has shown his unreliable nature. On that principle they ruled out the recital in that document. In the present case the position is entirely different. Learned counsel for the appellants further contended that no reliance should be placed on this statement of Baldeo Singh because by filing two different written statements in the present case he has shown his unreliable nature. It is true that he adopted a different attitude when he filed his second written statement to support the plaintiffs, but he cannot escape from his previous statement unless he explains that. In his evidence he admitted that what he stated in the deed of gift to his daughter was correct. In 1950 there was no occasion for him to make a false statement in that document. Thus, the value of such a statement at that time by one of the parties cannot be overlooked or under-estimated. Exhibit D is a deed of sale on the 17th September, 1951 by Gopinath Singh, Jaigobind Singh, Shyam Bihari Singh (defendant No. 2, son of Gaya Singh) and Baldeo Singh in favour of Abdul Ghani Mian and another in respect of .46 acres comprised of survey plots Nos. 298 and 301, which were the subject matter of the mortgage under exhibit E. It is very significant that Baldeo Singh, who was admittedly separate, joined in this document as the three other branches did. This is more consistent with the four separated members executing a joint document to transfer their respective interest in the land concerned. The explanation of such joint execution was given by (plaintiff No. 1) P. W. 7. The explanation for this execution was that the vendee wanted all the executants of the mortgage bond (Ext. E) to join together. Exhibit E was executed only by Gopinath Singh and not by the other three. The explanation was obviously wrong. A previous deposition of Baldeo Singh in a rent suit on the 23rd November, 1954, was proved on behalf of the defendants and marked as Exhibit I. There, he asserted that he was the heir of Gopinath Singh deceased. He was a plaintiff in that rent suit along with Gopinath Singh, who had died of cholera. Baldeo Singh could only be his heir if Gopinath Singh died separately as by that time Gaya Singh was already dead (Gaya Singh died on the 23rd October, 1949 and Gopinath Singh died on the 1st October, 1953). He was a plaintiff in that rent suit along with Gopinath Singh, who had died of cholera. Baldeo Singh could only be his heir if Gopinath Singh died separately as by that time Gaya Singh was already dead (Gaya Singh died on the 23rd October, 1949 and Gopinath Singh died on the 1st October, 1953). These statements to which I have already referred made much earlier than the present controversy arose, go very much to disprove the plaintiffs case of jointness and lend support to the other version that with the separation of Baldeo Singh the other three branches also became separate. 8. Several witnesses on the contesting defendants side were examined to say that all the four branches were separate. They included defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 as D. Ws. 11 and 12. The witnesses spoke about actual partition and division of properties, which was recorded on paper. Defendant No. 1 said that that chart was destroyed. The trial court has not accepted the testimony about actual division of properties into four lots and the defendants did not challenge that finding in this appeal. It is, therefore, not necessary to go into a detailed examination of the oral evidence on that aspect. Separate mess and residence between the plaintiffs and the defdts. before the suit, was admitted on both sides. Evidence also disclosed separate cultivation, but that was neither in accordance with their respective shares nor division by metes and bounds. Admittedly, Gopinath Singh, if separated, had one fourth share, which devolved on Baldeo and was transferred to defendant No. 1 under Exhibit B. Similarly, one-fourth share belonged to Baldeo Singh, of which he transferred title for the most part to defendant No. 8 under Exhibit B(1). The plaintiffs and the other contesting defendants had one-fourth share each also. The trial courts preliminary decree for partition in accordance with these shares was correct. In making the final decree, care should be taken to allot the lands covered by Exhibit B(1) to the share of Baldeo Singh and his daughter (defendant No. 8), Chulhan Kuer, so that the letters possession over those properties may not be affected. The one-fourth share belonging to Gopinath Singh when demarcated will go to defendant No. 1, whereas defendants Nos. 1 to 6 including defendant No. 3A would get the one-fourth share which belonged to Gaya Singh. The one-fourth share belonging to Gopinath Singh when demarcated will go to defendant No. 1, whereas defendants Nos. 1 to 6 including defendant No. 3A would get the one-fourth share which belonged to Gaya Singh. The plaintiffs will get their one-fourth share in the properties in Schedules 1 and 2 of the plaint, instead of eight annas share which they claimed in Schedule 4 properties. 9. The result is that the judgment and decree of the trial court are affirmed; and this appeal is dismissed, but, in the circumstances of the case, without costs. Ramratna Singh, J. 10 I agree.