JUDGMENT W. Broome, J. - Jaswant Singh Sarna, a licensed arms dealer carrying on business at Gorakhpur under the name of Gorakhpur Arms Corporation and at Lucknow under the name of India Arms Corporation, has filed this writ petition to challenge orders (Annexures M & N) passed by the State Government on 17-8-1964, refusing to renew his licences. 2. In 1954 a rifle club was started in Gorakhpur under the auspices of the district authorities, with the District Magistrate as ex-officio President and the City Magistrate as Secretary. This club secured allotments of shotgun cartridges from the State Trading Corporation of India; and in order to overcome the financial difficulties arising out of this arrangement, it appointed the Gorakhpur Arms Corporation (the petitioner's firm) as its agent, under an agreement executed in February 1962. Accordingly the petitioner arranged for the purchase and transport of the cartridges supplied by the State Trading Corporation and kept them in stock, to be sold to the members of the Rifle Club as and when required. This privileged position obtained by the Gorakhpur Arms Corporation, however, is said to have aroused the jealousy of other arms dealers of Gorakhpur, including the United Arms Stores, which was run by the son and the nephew of Sri Istifa Husain, a former Parliamentary Secretary in the Home Department of the U. P. Government; and the petitioner asserts that at the instance of this concern a regular campaign was launched against him, which has eventually resulted in the Government refusing to renew his,licences not only in Gorakhpur but also in Lucknow. Rumours were set afloat that the petitioner was selling the Rifle Club's cartridges in the black market and that he was smuggling cartriges into Nepal. The State Government ordered an inquiry to be made through the C. I. D. and in April 1963 the petitioner's records were seized. On 13-11-1963 a show-cause notice was issued, calling upon the petitioner to explain certain alleged irregularities in his dealings with the members of the Rifle Club and in his maintenance of the records relating to the Club's stock of cartridges; and at the same time the licence of the Gorakhpur Arms Corporation was suspended. This was followed on 19-2-1964 with a similar order suspending the licence of the India Arms Corporation run by the petitioner at Lucknow. This was followed on 19-2-1964 with a similar order suspending the licence of the India Arms Corporation run by the petitioner at Lucknow. The petitioner thereupon filed writ petition No. 1903 of 1964 in this Court, challenging the orders of 13-11-1963 and 19-2-1964, and by way of interim relief prayed that the State be restrained from enforcing the suspension of his licences. At a subsequent hearing it came to light that the petitioner's licences had meanwhile expired and had not been renewed; and accordingly this Court on 29-4-1964 directed the petitioner to apply for renewal and asked the State Government to dispose of those renewal applications expeditiously. There was some delay on the part of the Government in complying with this injunction, but eventually on 17-8-1964 it passed the orders which are impugned in the present petition, refusing to renew the petitioner's licences for the Gorakhpur Arms Corporation and for the India Arms Corporation, Lucknow. The earlier writ petition, having become in fructuous, was thereupon allowed to be withdrawn and the present writ petition was filed in September 1964. 3. The grounds on which renewal of the petitioner's licences have been refused are set forth in the impugned orders as follows: "From the information in the possession of the State Government it is clear that Sri Jaswant Singh Sarana in his capacity of the sole authorised Agent of M/s Gorakhpur Arms Corporation, Golghar, Gorakhpur, has not maintained correct accounts of the cartridges belonging to the said Corporation and the Rifle Club Gorakhpur, has misused the authority conferred on him and the said Corporation by the agency of the Rifle Club Gorakhpur, which authority could be bestowed on him and the Corporation, because of their being regular arms and ammunition dealer and have been participants in bogus and fictitious sales of the cartridges belonging to the said Corporation and the Rifle Club Gorakhpur and in forgeries and in other acts in contravention of the licences as for example: (1) In the stock registers of N/s Gorakhpur Arms Corporation neither receipt of 20,000 Polish Cartridges exchanged from the stock of the Rifle Club Gorakhpur nor the transfer of equal number of cartridges from the stock of the firm to the stock of the Club was shown. There is an entry showing the transfer of only 3,000 cartridges on April 2, 1962 instead of 20,000 cartridges, which were actually exchanged. There is an entry showing the transfer of only 3,000 cartridges on April 2, 1962 instead of 20,000 cartridges, which were actually exchanged. (ii) In the case of one Mohammad Yasin a licensee the sale of 50 cartridges was actually made from the stock of M/s Gorakhpur Arms Corporation, but in the licence of Mohammad Yasin the sale was fraudulently shown to have been made from the stock of the Gorakhpur Rifle Club. (iii) On one Transport licence, cartridges can be transported only once to other firms, but Sri Jaswant Singh Sarna, the sole authorised Agent of Al/s, Gorakhpur Arms Corporation committed breach of this rule. On transport licence No. 27 dated February 15, 1963 he transported cartridges to Rai Saheb Ganga Ram Chaudhry, Sadia, Assam, twice, once 1,200 cartridges on February 16, 1963 and 3,800 cartridges on March 4, 1963. Similarly, on Transport licence No. 75, dated November 13, 1962, he transported 300 cartridges on November 16, 1962 and 500 cartridges on February 18, 1963 to M/s East and Arms Company, Imphal, Manipur State. Again on Transport licence No. 85 dated January 22, 1963 he transported 1,000 cartridges on February 4, 1963 and 2,000 cartridges on February 29, 1963 to M/s Capital Gun I-louse, New Delhi. Then again on Transport licence No. 46 dated September 1, 1962, he transported 500 cartridges on November 2, 1962, 500 on November 20, 1962 and 500 on December 3, 1962 to India Arms Corporation, Lucknow. Again on Transport licence No. 31 dated May 25, 1962 he transported 2,000 cartridges on May 29, 1962 and 1,000 on June 23, 1962 to Shakti Shastragar Meerut. Again vide Transport licence No. 86 dated January 20, 1963 he transported 550 cartridges on January 28, 1963 and 1,200 cartridges on January 29, 1963 to Singh Gun House, Shahjahanpur. (iv) Bogus and fictitious sale entries have been made in the gun licences and the sale register of the Rifle Club Gorakhpur in respect of about 8,100 Polish Cartridges belonging to the Rifle Club Gorakhpur in as many as 19 cases." 4. The arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner may be summarised as follows. Firstly, it is contended that the petitioner was entitled to an. The arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner may be summarised as follows. Firstly, it is contended that the petitioner was entitled to an. opportunity of showing cause and being heard before the renewal of his licences was refused; and that the failure to grant him such an opportunity renders the impugned orders liable to be quashed, because (a) the refusal to renew an arms dealer's licence is a quasi-judicial matter and (b) such a refusal, even if deemed to be administrative, must affect the dealer's inherent right to carry on his trade, Secondly, it is contended that the impugned orders are vitiated by mala fides on the part of Sri Hargovind Singh (the Home Minister of the U. P. Government), who is said to be backing the rival firm, the United Arms Stores of Gorakhpur, on account of his close friendship with Sri Istifa Husain (Ex-Parliamentary Secretary). And thirdly, it is argued that the impugned orders are arbitrary and unreasonable, being based on totally insufficient grounds. 5. The plea of mala fides must be eliminated straight-away, for there is nothing tangible in the material before me to show that the action taken against the petitioner was due to any bias or oblique motive on the part of the Home Minister Sri Hargovind Singh. As a matter of fact it is clear that steps were taken by the U. P. Government in this matter some months before Sri Hargovind Singh assumed charge of the Home Department, which was not until August 1963; and the C. I. D. inquiry appears to have been ordered by the then Chief Minister, Sri C. B. Gupta. on the basis of various complaints that had been raised and discussed in the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council in 1962. No particular friendship or association has been shown to exist between Sri Hargovind Singh and Sri Istifa Husain, who it may be pointed out, worked as Parliamentary Secretary during the regime of Dr, Sampurnanand, at a time when Sri Hargovind Singh was not in the Cabinet at all. A :ouster-affidavit. sworn by Sri Hargovind Singh has been filed in this case, which effectively meets the legation's levelled against him. 6. I now turn to consider the main question that arises in this case viz. whether the petitioner was entitled to an opportunity of being heard, before the orders refusing to renew his licences were passed. A :ouster-affidavit. sworn by Sri Hargovind Singh has been filed in this case, which effectively meets the legation's levelled against him. 6. I now turn to consider the main question that arises in this case viz. whether the petitioner was entitled to an opportunity of being heard, before the orders refusing to renew his licences were passed. It is admitted by counsel appearing for the State that no such opportunity was given to the present petitioner. It is further conceded that if the refusal to renew an arms dealer's licence be held to involve not a mere administrative decision but a quasi judicial decision, failure to grant such an opportunity would vitiate the orders passed. The first point to be determined in this connexion, therefore, is whether the refusal to grant renewal of licences in a case like the present is quasi-judicial or not. 7. Arms licences of all kinds, granted under the Arms Act, 1959, are renewable under the provisions of Sec, 15(3) of the Act, which runs as follows: "15 (3) . Every licence shall, unless the licensing authority for reasons to be recorded in writing otherwise decides in any case, be renewable for the same period for which the licence was originally granted and shall be so renewable from time to time, and the provisions of Sections 13 and 14 shall apply to the renewal of a licence as they apply to the grant thereof." 8. This has to be read subject to Sections 13 and 14, the relevant portions of which are: "13(3) The licensing authority shall grant- (b) a licence under Section 5 (for manufacture, sale etc.) if the licensing authority is satisfied that the person by whom the licence is required has a good reason for obtaining the same. 14 (1) Notwithstanding anything in Section 13, the licensing authority shall refuse to grant (b) a licence ... . (I) where such licence is required by a person whom the licensing authority has reason to believe... to be for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act. 14 (1) Notwithstanding anything in Section 13, the licensing authority shall refuse to grant (b) a licence ... . (I) where such licence is required by a person whom the licensing authority has reason to believe... to be for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act. (3) Where the licensing authority refuses to grant a licence to any person it shall record in writing the reasons for such refusal and furnish to that person on demand a brief statement of the same unless in any case the licensing authority is of the opinion that it will not be in the public interests to furnish such statement." 9. It is important to note that Section 15 (3) provides that arms licences shall be renewable unless the licensing authority otherwise decides. This suggests that renewal is the rule and refusal the exception and that unless cogent material is forthcoming to convince the licensing authority that the licensee is unfit, renewal should be automatic. Furthermore, if there is such material, the authority concerned has to indicate what it is, by incorporating the reasons for refusal in a written order. 10. The question of what constitutes a quasi-judicial act has been discussed in numerous rulings of the Supreme Court. It is settled that where the statute expressly requires the authority concerned - to act judicially or where there is a xis to be decided between two contesting parties, the decision given will be quasi-judicial. But in the present case the statute contains no such express provision and the dispute is not between two parties but between a single party and the State. In such a case, as laid down in Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P. v. Ghanshyam leas Gupta, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1110 : 1962 A.L.J. 776. "No one circumstance alone will, be determinative of the question whether the authority set up by the statute has the duty to act judicially or not. The inference whether the authority acting under a statute where it is silent has the duty to act judicially will depend on the express provisions of the statute read along with the nature of the rights affected, the manner of the disposal provided, the objective criterion if any to be adopted, the effect of the decision on the person affected and other indicia afforded by the statute." 11. In that case it was held that an Examinations Committee dealing with instances of examinees cheating at examinations must be deemed to be acting quasi-judicially, because (a) the decision must be based on a consideration of materials placed before the Committee and (b) the decision of the Committee was likely to have serious effects on the future careers of the examinees in question. Similarly in the present case it can be argued that the licensing authority, when determining whether an arms dealer's licence should be renewed or not, has to consider whatever materials may be brought to its notice by the police or other Government agencies to show that the person in question is unfit to hold a licence. And it cannot be denied that the refusal to renew the licence of an arms dealer who has been carrying on business for years entails very serious consequences, as it will have the effect of depriving him of his livelihood. It would seem therefore that on the analogy of the Supreme Court's ruling with regard to the Examinations Committee, the refusal of the licensing authority to renew an arms dealer's licence should also be deemed to be a quasi-judicial act. This view is further strengthened when we turn to examine the procedural provisions incorporated in the Arms Act. Section 14(3) of the Act requires the licensing authority to record reasons for its refusal in writing and to furnish a brief statement of the same to the person concerned. And Section 18 of the Act provides for an appeal against refusal to grant or renew a licence (unless ordered by the Government itself). No doubt, in the present instance, the orders of refusal have been passed by the Government instead of by the District Magistrate and so are not appealable; but there is no getting away from the fact that normally the refusal to renew a licence in form XIII (the main licence held by the petitioner) would be by order of the District Magistrate and would thus be normally open to appeal. 12. 12. The learned Advocate General, appearing for the State of U. P., has drawn my attention to the case of Kishan Chand Arora v. Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 705, in which it was held that the refusal of a licence for an eating house under the Calcutta Police Act was purely an administrative matter, and argues from this that every case of refusal of a licence to carry on a trade should be treated as administrative and not as quasijudicial. But each such case has to be determined on its own facts and in relation to its own particular statute; and the case relied upon by the Advocate General is clearly distinguishable from the one with which we are at present concerned, for there is no provision under the statute in question (the Calcutta Police act) for recording reasons for the refusal, nor is there any provision for appeal the decision whether or not to grant a licence appears to be left to the unfettered subjective satisfaction of the Commissioner of Police. 13. As pointed out above, the question of whether an authority's order is purely administrative or quasi judicial, if the relevant statute is silent on this point, has to be decided on the cumulative effect of a variety of circumstances; and it seems to me that in the present case the extremely serious consequences entailed by the refusal to renew an arms dealer's licence, the nature of the platters to be considered by the licensing authority before coming to its decision, the requirement of the statute that the reasons for refusal shall be reduced to writing and communicated to the person concerned, and the fact that under the normal procedure envisaged by the statute such a refusal is appealable, all these circumstances taken together lead to the inescapable conclusion that the refusal to renew an arms dealer's licence is a quasi-judicial act. 14. If the refusal was quasi-judicial, the petitioner undoubtedly had a right to be heard before the orders were passed. Learned, counsel for the petitioner has contended, however, that he had this right even if the refusal be treated as a purely administrative act, because natural justice demands that a person shall not be deprived of his property without an opportunity of being heard. Learned, counsel for the petitioner has contended, however, that he had this right even if the refusal be treated as a purely administrative act, because natural justice demands that a person shall not be deprived of his property without an opportunity of being heard. In this connexion reliance is placed on the judgment of Mootham, J. in Rameshwar Prasad Kedarnath v. D. M., AIR 1954 Allahabad 144, in which the following decision of Willes, J. in Cooper v. Board of Works for Wandsworth District, 1863-14 C.B. N.S. 180 was quoted with approval: "I apprehend that a tribunal which is by law invested with power to affect the property of one of Her Majesty's subjects, is bound to give such subject an opportunity of being heard before: it proceeds: and that that rule is if universal application, and founded upon the plainest principles of justice." Mootham, J. went on to observe: "The loss of a man's right to carry on his business may be no less serious in its consequences than the loss of his property; and under the constitution the right to hold property and the right to carry on a business are equally fundamental rights possessed by every citizen. If there be authority-as I think there is, founded upon the plainest principles of justice-that (in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary) a man be not deprived of his property without being heard, I can see no reason why that principle should not be applied to the protection of another fundamental right, naively the right to carry on business." 15. A similar view was expressed by Tandon, J. in Babu Ram Gupta v. N.M. Majumdar, Entertainment Tax Officer, Sitapur, 1960 A.L.J. 894, in the following words: "When right of property or other substantial right of a person is affected by an order it is the duty of the authority making the order to give an opportunity to the person affected. The rule of fairplay, which is often called the rule of natural justice, demands that the authority making the order should not condemn a man without giving him the opportunity of being heard. This rule has been held to apply not only to judicial and quasi-judicial orders but also to cases where some substantial right of the person proceeded against is affected." 16. This rule has been held to apply not only to judicial and quasi-judicial orders but also to cases where some substantial right of the person proceeded against is affected." 16. The learned Advocate General has conceded that where the termination of a running licence is concerned, natural justice may insist on the person affected being given an opportunity of being heard, but contends that the renewal of a licence that has expired stands on a different footing. It seems to me, however, that no valid logical distinction can be drawn between these two classes of cases. I have already pointed out that arms licences are normally renewed auto inatically under Section 15 (3) of the Act; and the matters that have to be taken into consideration by the licensing authority both when deciding whether to revoke a running licence under Section 17 (3) (a) and when deciding-whether to refuse to renew a licence under Sec, 14(l) (b) are precisely the same. 17. I am satisfied, therefore, that the refusal to renew the licences of the petitioner in the present case stands vitiated by the failure of the licensing authority (or the Government) to afford the petitioner an opportunity of being heard before the orders were passed, firstly because that refusal was a quasi-judicial act and secondly because it affected his right to carry on his trade. 18. In view of these findings, it is unnecessary for the to consider the last contention of the petitioner viz. that the impugned orders are arbitrary, unreasonable and based on insufficient grounds. 19. The writ petition is allowed with costs. the impugned orders of the State Government dated 17-8-1964 being quashed. The Government should now take up afresh the petitioner's applications for the renewal of his licences; and if valid grounds for refusal are found to exist, he should be supplied with a statement of those grounds within one month from today and should be given an adequate opportunity of being heard before final orders are passed.