JUDGMENT 1. THE petition dated March 5, 1965, I have now been called upon to decade is one for amendment of an unusual plaint presented to this Court on December 21, 1962. An unusual plaint, because the relief the plaintiff prays the court for is a decree for Rs. 10,280 on the foot of a life policy taken by his deceased brother (whose nominee he is) from the Life Insurance Corporation of India, (shortened hereafter into "lic" as far as possible), but the parties sued against are A. L. Dutta, Zonal Manager of LIC, the Managing Director and the Chairman of LIC, the last two being represented by the said A. L. Dutta, although under section 3 (2) of the Life Insurance Corporation Act 31 of 1956 LIC is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal and may by its name sue and be sued. What is worse still, the three defendants by their written statement filed on April 26, 1963, pleaded just this: LIC is a body corporate and may by its name be sued (paragraph 1) and pleaded too the non-maintainability of the suit because of absence of a contract between them and the plaintiff, lack of cause of action against them, and the impossibility of the Managing Director and the Chairman being sued by their designations (paragraph 25 ). Even such clear and categorical averments failed to galvanize the plaintiff into action. Only when the suit came up before me for hearing on February 16, 1965, and Mr. Bachawat appearing for the defendants raised the preliminary objection of the type just noticed about the maintainability of the suit, the plaintiff realized what he was up against. And on the prayer of Mr. Bagchi appearing for the plaintiff I directed the suit to go out of the list so that such steps as were thought fit might be taken for amendment of the plaint. Not that I had directed so suo motu, as has been averred by implication in the fifth paragraph of the petition under consideration. This is the background of the petition for amendment of the plaint. 2. THE amendments sought for are-A. In the cause title, (i)Managing Director, now figuring as defendant no. 2, be struck out, leaving behind Life Insurance Corporation of India, Central Office, bombay, represented by the said a. L. Dutta, Zonal Manager etc. This is the background of the petition for amendment of the plaint. 2. THE amendments sought for are-A. In the cause title, (i)Managing Director, now figuring as defendant no. 2, be struck out, leaving behind Life Insurance Corporation of India, Central Office, bombay, represented by the said a. L. Dutta, Zonal Manager etc. and (ii) Chairman with the usual long description, now figuring as defendant no. 3, be struck out too. B. In the body of the plaint, (i) a new paragraph is sought to be inserted as paragraph 8a the pith of which is that in the course of correspondence between the parties, the last of which is dated August 10/11, 1961, LIC acknowledged the liability and admitted the existence of the jural relationship between the parties as that of debtor and creditor ; (ii) in paragraph 9 what is wanted to be inserted is that lic repudiated the claim, by a certain letter referred to therein, the in place and stead of the words-failed to make payments for the plaintiff's claim ; and (iii) in paragraph 14 a consequential amendment is prayed for touching the service of notice under section 80 of the Procedure Code. About the amendment of the cause title, Mr. Bagchi sees in it a mere misdescription; whereas Mr. Bachawat sees in it an addition of a party. In order to decide what the amendment sought realty comes to, it is necessary to see what the plaint before me is like. On November 8, 1959, the plaintiff's brother, late Purna Sudha Roy, made a proposal for insurance on his own Life for Rs. 10,000 with LIC (paragraph 1 ). The plaintiff was made the nominee in the said proposal "in the event of the death of the insured" (paragraph 2 ). After medical examination by a medical officer of LIC and submission of a personal statement by the assured on November. 27, 1958, the proposal was accepted by LIC who acknowledged the payment of the first premium on December 31, 1958, and issued the policy (paragraphs 3 and 4 ). LIC accepted too the second premium on March 26, 1959, (paragraph5 ). On June 6, 1959, the assured died. Result. LIC became liable to pay the plaintiff, the assureds nominee, the sum insured (paragraph 6 ). LIC accepted too the second premium on March 26, 1959, (paragraph5 ). On June 6, 1959, the assured died. Result. LIC became liable to pay the plaintiff, the assureds nominee, the sum insured (paragraph 6 ). A claim having been made to that end, LIC acknowledged on September 22, 1959, the receipt of "the completed claim forms and accompanying papers" (paragraphs 7 and 8 ). On November 21, 1961, LIC through its Divisional Officer failed to make the payment-words for which the words-repudiated the claim-are sought to be inserted. On June 22, 1962, "the plaintiff made a final demand" through his "lawyer" whose letter was acknowledged by LIC on June 23, 1962, and replied to by LIC on July 18/19, 1962, reiterating its refusal to pay (paragraphs 9 and 10 ). The other averments in the plaint refer to acknowledgment of liability by the defendants during the correspondence (paragraph 11), the amount claimed (paragraph 12), accrual of cause of action resting on lic's two letters of November 21, 1961 and July 18119, 1962, (paragraph 13), service of notice under section 80 of the Procedure Code (paragraph 14) and valuation of the suit (paragraph 15) Last, come the prayers as usual. 3. GOING by this conspectus of the plaint, what clearly emerges is that LIC is its central theme. LIC is the other party to the contract. And LIC, though liable to pay in terms of the policy, is refusing to make the payment in breach of the terms. Only because the drafter is ignorant of the relevant law, he has imp leaded three officers of LIC as defendants instead of having imp leaded LIC alone. LIC is a juristic person and can act through a human agency only. That too has fostered the error I see in the cause title of the plaint. The real intention is to recover the money prayed for from LIC. Surely, the three officers or office bearers named in the cause title will not pay the money from their own pockets, should the suit succeed. Even the drafter of the plaint did not think like that, but recorded instead that LIC was liable to pay. So, what else can it be but a mere misdescription, as Mr. Bagchi contends ? 4. M. B. Sirkar and Sons v. Powell and Co. (1) A. I. R. 1956 Calcutta 630, Mr. Bachawat cites-and Mr. Even the drafter of the plaint did not think like that, but recorded instead that LIC was liable to pay. So, what else can it be but a mere misdescription, as Mr. Bagchi contends ? 4. M. B. Sirkar and Sons v. Powell and Co. (1) A. I. R. 1956 Calcutta 630, Mr. Bachawat cites-and Mr. Bachawat has argued this interlocutory matter with ability-does not show anything different. In that case, P. B. Mukharji, J. allowed an amendment by which the defendant, M. B. Sirkar and Sons, a firm, was converted into a company of the same name. This, the Court of Appeal, presided over by Chakravartti. C. J. and Sarkar, J., holds, was not permissible. That would be substituting a new legal entity for another, a company for a firm. Explaining what misdescription really means, Chakravartti, C. J. observes : "A case can properly be said to be a case of misdescription when the party, really intended to be imp leaded, had always been the same and such intention appeared clearly from the body of the plaint in spite of the inaccurate description in the cause title " Just as is the case before me. From the body of the plaint I have summarized above, it appears to be more than clear that the party, really intended to be imp leaded, is LIC in spite of the grossly inaccurate description in the cause title. Chakravartti, C. J., continues : "What an amendment does in such cases is not to add a new party to the suit or substitute a new party for the original one, but to make the identity of the party originally imp leaded clearer by amending or rectifying the inaccurate description". Further down:- "Common examples of misdescription are cases where a plaintiff, intending to sue a railway, sues it by its Agent without, however, claiming any personal relief against him but asking for relief against him but asking for relief against the railway alone, or cases where a plaintiff, intending to sue a municipality, does so by its name and not by the Chairman and the Commissioners, as the law requires. " Such is the case now depending before me. Instead of having sued LIC, as the law requires, the plaintiff has sued three of its office-bearers. " Such is the case now depending before me. Instead of having sued LIC, as the law requires, the plaintiff has sued three of its office-bearers. But the tenor of the whole plaint makes it clear that no personal relief is sought against them or any one of them. A decree is sought against LIC against whom the plaint is replete with one allegation after another, averring in the 6th paragraph that the liability is of LIC to pay. Hence naming the office-bearers of LIC in the cause title appears to be nothing like so important as has been imagined. Common examples of misdescription Chakravartti, C. J., refers to are illustrated by two of the three cases Mr. Bagchi relies upon. One such case is Radhe Lal v. East Indian Railway Company Limited, (2) I. L. R. 5 Patna 128, where upon a fair reading of the plaint the suit was regarded in substance as a suit against the Railway, even though the suit was against the Agent, going by the cause title, and what is more, a decree was prayed for against the Agent too, going by the relief portion. The Railway Company, it was held, was the real defendant the description about which was a mere error. Another is Saraspur Manufacturing Company Limited v. B. B. C. I. Railway Company, (3) I. L. R. 47 Bombay 785, where the description in the cause title: The Agent, B. B. and C. I. R y. Company Ltd., was held to be only a misdescription in the title of the railway company and leave to amend the title by omitting the words "the Agent" was directed. The plaintiff before me is praying for no more: for having the words "managing Director" omitted from the cause title. What will then remain is LIC-the real defendant-just as what remained in Saraspur case after omission of "the Agent" was B. B. and C. I. R y. Company Ltd. The last case Mr. Bagchi cites is (4) Madhosingh v. Union of India, A. I. R. 1955 Rajasthan 57, a Bench decision, which recognizes the principle that if the intention to sue the railway and to get relief against the railway is clear, the suit against the Manager or the Agent gives rise merely to a misdescription, but does not apply the principle to the facts of the case revealing a suit against Mr. Rawlins, Manager of Jodhpur Railway, against whom personally recovery of damages was sought. Nothing like it can be said of the case in hand. 5. THIS aspect of the matter therefore presents no difficulty. What does create a difficulty is this. Say, I grant the amendment prayed for. Such amendment will relate back to the filing of the suit on December 21, 1962. Even so, Mr. Bachawat contends, the suit is barred by limitation, filed as it was more than three years after June 6, 1959, when the plaintiff's brother (the assured) died. Under article 86 (a) of the First Schedule to the old Limitation Act, which governs this litigation, the position is that, the contention runs, from which the plaintiff cannot escape. So why allow this sort of useless amendment of the plaint which cannot cross the bar of limitation, concludes Mr. Bachawat. When I try to translate the principle of those decisions on article 31 of the Limitation Act, 1908 laying down that time begins to fun after a definite refusal to deliver the goods-here the definite refusal to pay was on November 21, 1961-Mr. Bachawat submits that if I have in my mind the view expressed in cases like (5) Jainarain v. Governor-General of India, representing the Bengal and Assam Railway, A. I. R. 1951 Calcutta 462, that has been overruled by the Supreme Court in (6) Boota Mal v. Union of India, A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 1716. The position is indeed so. More, if this be the law now laid down by the Supreme Court on article 31 under which the starting point of limitation is that 'liquid' date when the goods ought to be delivered, there can a fortiori be no difficulty whatever in reckoning time from so certain a date in article 86 (a): "the date of the death of the deceased", here June 6, 1959, no matter what the correspondence was between the plaintiff and LIC and how long ti dragged its slow length That being so, the suit, filed as it was on December 21, 1982, more than three years after the assureds death, must go down as barred by limitation, even if I grant the amendment which will then relate back only to December 21, 1962 (when the suit was already barred)-and not beyond. 6. 6. IN (7) Krishnaji Shivaji Pawar v. Hanmaraddi Mallaraddi Maidur, A. I. R. 1934 Bombay, 385, Mr. Bachawat refers me to, Beaumont, C. J. and Barlee, J. refused to grant an amendment by substituting the father for the son under Order 1, rule 10, sub-rule (1), on the ground that the suit was barred and that it would be useless to do so. Another case Mr. Bachawat cites is (8) Sailesh Nath Bisi v. J. Chaudhuri and others : [1945] 50 C. W. N. 540. A decision of Gentle, J., it is an authority for the proposition that where the plaint, on the face of it, discloses no cause of action so as to merit rejection under Order 7, rule 11 (a) of the Procedure Code, the Court has no jurisdiction to allow an amendment. No doubt, what faces the plaintiff here is not absence of cause of action, but limitation. That, however, matters little. He escapes the frying pan of clause (a) of rule 11 of Order 7, but only to fall into the fire of clause (d) ibid which provides that the plaint shall be rejected "where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law". It does so appear here, the plaint by its sixth paragraph averring that the assured died on June 6, 1959,-a plaint which was "presented and admitted" on December 21, 1962, more than three years after the death of the assured From the very statement in the plaint pleading the date of the assureds death as June 6, 1959, the suit appears to be barred by a law, to wit, the 1908 Limitation Act: article 86 (a) thereof. Therefore, the principle Gentle, J. lays down governs the suit in hand too, though what is seen here is limitation, not absence of cause of action. It only remains to be noticed that only clauses (b) and (c) of rule 11 of Order 7 do not apply to this side of the Court. Clauses (a) and (b) ibid do: vide Order 49, rule 3. The conclusion I have therefore come to is that I have no jurisdiction to allow the amendment, though well-merited, because the suit appears from the very statement in the plaint to be barred under article 86 (a) of the 1908 Limitation Act. 7. Clauses (a) and (b) ibid do: vide Order 49, rule 3. The conclusion I have therefore come to is that I have no jurisdiction to allow the amendment, though well-merited, because the suit appears from the very statement in the plaint to be barred under article 86 (a) of the 1908 Limitation Act. 7. THIS conclusion enables me to dismiss the application for amendment of the plaint. But what about the suit? though clearly does it appear to be barred by limitation, shall I keep it pending and fix a firm date for its hearing ? A barren course as that would do good to none of the parties whose costs would only increase. Unfortunately, it did not: strike me when I was hearing the petition for amendment on may 10, 1965. Hence I directed this case to appear in the list of May 13, 1965, marked: To be mentioned. It did appear. I broached to the learned counsel what was troubling me. I was glad to find that they too shared my view. As agreed to by Mr. Bagchi and mr. Mullick, I fixed an issue : is the suit barred by limitation under article 86 (a) of the Limitation Act, 1908 ? with a view to deciding the suit as well. Mr. Bagchi submitted that he had little to add to the arguments he had addressed me on May 10, 1965, save that he reiterated the point of acknowledgment by LIC-a point I now proceed to notice. 8. IN LIC s letter no. Zm. /complts-CLM-CDO/jr. /11297 of August 10/11, 1961, to the address of the plaintiff informing him that: " our Calcutta Divisional office has already been advised to expedite disposal of the claim" under his deceased brother's policy, Mr. Bagchi sees acknowledgment by LIC of its liability. Mr. Bachawat does not. Nor do I. To expedite disposal of the claim-the expression Mr. Bagchi relies upon - does not mean expediting payment of the claim. The accent is on disposal. And a claim is as much disposed of when it is conceded as when it is rejected. So, it is impossible to spell out an acknowledgment of liability that way. What I see here is ignorance of the right on the part of the plaintiff and, if I may say so, on the part of his adviser too. Necessarily I see hardship as well. So, it is impossible to spell out an acknowledgment of liability that way. What I see here is ignorance of the right on the part of the plaintiff and, if I may say so, on the part of his adviser too. Necessarily I see hardship as well. Hence I have tried on my own to find a way out, so that the litigation may be fought out on merits instead of going down on the ground pf limitation. But, I confess, I have failed. Were the sum insured not payable immediately after proof of the death of the plaintiff's brother, article 86 (a) could have been got rid of, and article 115 attracted instead. The starting point of limitation would have then been the date when the contract was broken. But examining the policy, to get which also I had ordered the case to be listed on May 13, 1965, I find that way barred against the plaintiff. Because it is clearly provided in the policy that the sum assured is payable "on the stipulated Date of Maturity if the life Assured is then alive or at his death if earlier. " 9. AGAIN, I have been anxious to see if the plaintiff can avail himself of arty ''special circumstances" which outweigh the consideration that the Court's power to make the amendment "should not as a rule be exercised where its effect is to take away from a defendant a legal right which has accrued to him by lapse of time', as emphasized by the Privy Council in (9) Mohummud Zahoor Ali Khan and Mussumat Thakooranee Rutta Koer and others, [1867] 11 M. I. A. 467, and (10) Charan Das and others v. Amir Khan and othrs, 47 I. A. 255: A. I. R. 1921 P. C. 50, 310 less by the Supreme Court in (11) L. J. Leach and Co., Ltd., and another v. Messrs. Jardine Skinner and Co., A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 357. But there also I fail. Because none of these cases haw the effect of antedating the filing of the plaint to a date falling within the period of limitation. Indeed, no court, howsoever much it may feel for an ignorant plaintiff advised by one equally ignorant, has the power to do so. But there also I fail. Because none of these cases haw the effect of antedating the filing of the plaint to a date falling within the period of limitation. Indeed, no court, howsoever much it may feel for an ignorant plaintiff advised by one equally ignorant, has the power to do so. To take the case before me, I cannot direct that the plaint filed on December 21, 1962, may be deemed to have been filed on June 5, 1962, thus keeping limitation out of the plaintiff's way. In all the three decisions cited above two of the Privy Council and one of the Supreme Court-the plaints were there in time. And amendments thereof were allowed, even though by the time they were allowed, legal rights had accrued to the defendants by lapse of time. In exceptional circumstances, that was done, and the amendments granted related back to the filing of the suits. That is the maximum a Court cam do. I am prepared to do so here. Even then, as Mr. Bachawat rightly contends, the suit is barred. I find the sole issue so. This is a hard case. But a hard case cannot blind me to what is the obvious law it is refreshing to find that the new Limitation Act 36 of 1963 by its article 44 (a) makes time run from "the date of the death of the deceased, or where the claim on the policy is denied, either partly or wholly, the dale of such denial. ' No more then will be the tyranny of an arbitrary period (inevitable in a statute of repose) rendered a greater tyranny by the bureaucratic red-tapism of LIC consuming a good portion of that period under the plea that the matter is receiving consideration. This wholesome provision, however, eludes the plaintiff whose suit I am seized of is governed by the old Act because of section 31 of the new Act. 10. IN the result, the petition equally with the suit be dismissed. In all circumstances here, each party do pay and bear its costs.