Judgment.- This Second Appeal arises out of a suit filed by the appellant for a permanent injunction restraining the Corporation of Madras from interfering with the peaceful possession of the property or from removing the tea stall. The appellant’s case is that he is in occupation of a small vacant space 713 sq. ft. bearing R.S. No. 11715/1, George Town, Madras, that he has constructed a stall wherein he is carrying on business in vending tea and some other miscellaneous articles to the public since 1957, that he has paid rent up-to-date to the Tahsildar and also the tax due to the Corporation for the stall, and that he has obtained supply of electricity from the Electricity Board. The appellant further contends that all on a sudden, under section 220 of the Madras City Municipal Act, the Corporation gave notice, on the ground that he has constructed a stall on a public place the control of which is vested with the Corporation. The appellant alleges in his plaint that the said notice is invalid and irregular in law, that the Corporation cannot ask him to remove the stall which he has constructed at a cost of Rs. 4,000 and that therefore he had to file the present suit, out of which the appeal has arisen for an injunction restraining the respondent Corporation from interfering with his possession or from removing the stall. The respondent Corporation has resisted that the suit property was originally part and parcel of Survey No. 11715. R.S. No. 11715/2 was taken over by the Corporation from the Collector and handed over to the Reserve Bank of India. R.S.No. 11715/1 was retained by the Corporation for road purposes. The respondent further contends that the appellant has no right to occupy this portion and that his occupation is illegal, the construction of the building is unauthorised and that mere obtaining of electricity or amenities like water supply will not confer any right or title in the appellant. As the land is vested in the Corporation, it has full powers of removing the unauthorised occupation of the appellant. The Corporation further contends that the notice issued under section 220 is legal, regular and valid and the Corporation is therefore entitled to proceed against the appellant, who is in unlawful occupation of the property. As the land is vested in the Corporation, it has full powers of removing the unauthorised occupation of the appellant. The Corporation further contends that the notice issued under section 220 is legal, regular and valid and the Corporation is therefore entitled to proceed against the appellant, who is in unlawful occupation of the property. The learned Vth Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, framed as many as six issues, the important ones being whether the suit property has been vested in the Corporation by the Government, whether the appellant has been in uninterrupted possession and enjoyment of the suit land since 1957 and whether the occupation of the suit land by the appellant was unauthorised and he is therefore liable to be removed by the respondent. On a consideration of oral and documentary evidence, the learned judge has found that the appellant has not shown any legal right to be in possession of the land or to have put up the superstructure in an unauthorised manner, that the Corporation has therefore ample powers to remove the appellant and the superstructure put up by him and that the notice issued under section 220 is legal and valid. In the end, he dismissed the suit. On appeal, this finding was confirmed. The only point that was argued before the Additional Judge was whether the suit property was a public place the control of which was vested in the Corporation. The learned Judge found, while confirming the finding of the trial Court, that the suit property was vested in the Corporation of Madras for a public purpose. The plaintiff has preferred the Second Appeal. Learned Counsel for the appellant has contended that the Corporation has no jurisdiction to issue notice and that if at all anybody could take action against him, it would only be the Government under the relevant Act. Therefore, the only question that arises for consideration here is whether the notice issued by the Corporation under section 220 is legal, and the proposed action to be taken for removal of the superstructure valid and proper. It is true that the entire area once belonged to the Government. It was handed over to the Corporation for certain purposes. The Corporation authorities have made an entry in the Land Register (Exhibit B-7). At page 63, there is an entry regarding R.S. No. 11715/1. It is true that the entire area once belonged to the Government. It was handed over to the Corporation for certain purposes. The Corporation authorities have made an entry in the Land Register (Exhibit B-7). At page 63, there is an entry regarding R.S. No. 11715/1. Under the column, ‘Whether the Corporation public or private’, we find the entry the ‘Corporation public’. Similarly in another register, Exhibit B-11, in regard to this resurvey number, under column 3 dealing with tenure the description is Corporation public. Again, item 34 in the printed list of lands maintained by the Corporation (Exhibit B-13) relates to the suit property. Under column 9, whether public or private, it is noted as public. The learned Judge, after a consideration of oral and documentary evidence, came to the conclusion that the suit property was a public place the control of which vested in the Corporation. When there were encroachments in the suit property, the Revenue Authorities noted the encroachments including that of the appellant and issued an order providing that it was competent to the Corporation to take action against unlicensed construction on Government land including removal of such construction. Learned Counsel for the appellant seriously contended that once the corporation itself had recognised the title of the appellant, expressly or impliedly, as the owner of the superstructure by collecting property tax from him, allowing him to obtain electricity from the concerned authorities, permitting him to get water supply from the Corporation and taking a licence fee from him for running the tea stall, they could not say that he had put up an authorised superstructure on a vacant plot belonging to the Government. It at all there was any encroachment, it was for the Government to take proceedings under section 6 of the Land Encroachment Act. In support of this argument, the appellant has produced two letters, Exhibit A-1 and Exhibit A-2, to show that the Tahsildar was levying a penal assessment even in the year 1962 and that therefore the Corporation could not take proceedings under section 220. There may be some force in the contention, but we have to consider what is the effect of describing the suit property in the Property Register maintained by the Corporation as public. It is common ground that the suit" property along with other property originally belonged to Government. There may be some force in the contention, but we have to consider what is the effect of describing the suit property in the Property Register maintained by the Corporation as public. It is common ground that the suit" property along with other property originally belonged to Government. It is also common case that this property was assigned to the Corporation for certain purposes, viz., laying out road and for construction public buildings. Once it is entered in the Land Register, the suit property becomes vested in the Corporation. Therefore the Corporation has get control and possession of that property. That was why, when the encroachment was noticed by the Government, they brought it to the notice of the Corporation and directed them to take proceedings immediately for the removal of the encroachment. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the Corporation could take proceedings only if there was any construction in or over any street or public place the control of which vested in the Corporation. This property is admittedly abutting the North Beach Road. Even under section 3(20), a public street is defined as any street, road....passage over which the public have a right of way and includes the road over any public bridge of causeway or the footway attached to any street. The appellant’s suit property is on the edge of the North Beach Road. The property is for the benefit of the public. The public uses that pathway while going to purchase tea and other miscellaneous articles from the bunk constructed there. In effect, the appellant has constructed the superstructure only on a public place-certainly it cannot be called either a private street or a private road.- In any event, the appellant has proved title to the property. He has not proved or explained in detail how he got possession of the suit property. He has not stated that he obtained the permission of the Corporation or the Collector of Madras to put up superstructure on the land. He only states that he has applied for grant of lease of the suit property to the Collector of Madras. Even assuming that expressly or impliedly he has been permitted to carry on the business, the nature of interest is only to vend tea in the superstructure constructed by him on the piece of land. He only states that he has applied for grant of lease of the suit property to the Collector of Madras. Even assuming that expressly or impliedly he has been permitted to carry on the business, the nature of interest is only to vend tea in the superstructure constructed by him on the piece of land. Mere licence to vend tea in a bunk he has constructed on a land, which, according to him, belongs to Government, does not vest possession of the land in him. An interest in the land would not be created by merely allowing him to transact business in the superstructure put up by him. The right of suit would depend upon true possession, right possession and legal possession of land but not on mere detention of a piece of land or mere occupation of a bunk constructed by him on a piece of land. Mere visible occupation of bunk on the land is not sufficient to get an order of injunction against the Corporation, restraining them from removing the superstructure. He must have juridical possession. In regard to the contention urged by learned Counsel for the appellant that the Corporation itself collected the property tax and supplied water, the Corporation has neither established nor contended that the appellant is not the owner of the superstructure erected by him. Learned Counsel for the Corporation contended that mere collection of either property tax or the mere providing of amenities would not clothe the appellant with title to the property on which he has constructed the superstructure. The Corporation is only interested in collecting the property tax on the superstructure. Lord Herschell observed is Holvwell Union v. Halkya District Mines Drainage Co.1. "The question whether a person is an occupier or not within the rating law is a question of fact and it is not dependent upon legal title." In the same case, Lord Macnaghten observed at page 127 of the report: "Liability to rates is not a matter of title. "The question whether a person is an occupier or not within the rating law is a question of fact and it is not dependent upon legal title." In the same case, Lord Macnaghten observed at page 127 of the report: "Liability to rates is not a matter of title. The question in each case must be whether there is in fact such an occupation as, according to the statute of Elizabeth and a course of decisions which have been recognised and established at law carried with it liability for rating purposes." In Calcutta Corporation v. Sailendra Nath1,the Calcutta High Court referring to Coomber v. Berks2observed as follows: " If a person in de facto possession of land were to claim to show that his possession was that of a trespasser, and on this ground to escape rateability, he could be taking advantage of his own wrong." These two cases were referred to in Calcutta Corporation v. Sailendra Nath1. The assessee in that case questioned the propriety of the Corporation collecting the property tax on building illegally erected thereby reaping the benefit of the illegal acts by members of the public. The Calcutta High Court repelled the contention and observed that they did not think that any question of public policy arose in a case of that description. It further observed: "If the assessee makes a building without getting a sanction of the Corporation, he reaps advantage arising therefrom by using it himself, or by having an income by letting it out, and if a rule of public policy is at all to be introduced that would be against the assessee who is liable to pay the rates on the income which that property yields. Under no rule of public policy can the owner and the occupier be allowed to use the building without payment of rates until it may be after years as in the present case, an order for demolition is obtained." Admittedly, in this case, the appellant did not obtain the sanction from the Corporation to put up the superstructure. It is an unlicensed construction. He did not submit any plan. He put up the superstructure without notice to the Corporation and therefore he could not take shelter by contending that he has been paying and the Corporation has been accepting the property tax from him. That would not clothe him with legal ownership of the land. It is an unlicensed construction. He did not submit any plan. He put up the superstructure without notice to the Corporation and therefore he could not take shelter by contending that he has been paying and the Corporation has been accepting the property tax from him. That would not clothe him with legal ownership of the land. The appellant is a trespasser and he is in unlawful occupation of the land. The land on which he has put up the superstructure vests in the Corporation. The Corporation has got every right to take proceedings against the appellant under the provisions of the City Municipal Act. Even assuming that the property belongs to the Government, the Corporation has been authorised by the Government to take proceedings against the appellant. Time is given 3 months for removal of the superstructure and handing over the vacant possession of the land. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. No leave. R.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.