JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - The disputed land is 1 gunth, 1 biswa and 8 gandas in area. It is a portion of plot 505 measuring 1 man and odd which belonged to one Jatindra Mohan Dhar who died in 1952 leaving behind five Bons, Niroj, Jnanoj, Pankoj, Saroj and Manoj. Manoj died leaving behind his widow Jayanti and three senior sons. By various sale deeds the heirs of Jatindra transferred all the lands in plot 505 excepting 15 gunths, 15 biswas and 4 gandas which was in their possession. On 16.3.1954 Niroj, Jnanoj, Pankoj and Jayanti on behalf of herself and her minor sons executed a registered power of attorney (ext. 3) in favour of Saroj for disposal of the lands inherited by them. On the basis of this authority, Saroj executed a registered sale-deed (ext. C) on 18-10-1955 in favour of Defendant No. 1 in respect of 3 gunths, 15 biswas and 16 gandas out of plot 505. On 28-3-1960 Saroj executed a registered deed of gift (ext. 4) on behalf of himself and the other heirs in favour of the Plaintiff in respect of 11 gunths, 15 biswas and 8 gandas out of plot 505. Defendant No. 1 is the wife of Defendant No. 2. Plaintiff?s case is that the Defendants while constructing their house encroached upon the disputed land which is a part of the Plaintiff?s land obtained under Ext. 4. The suit is for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The defence case is that the south-eastern portion of plot 505 measuring 1 gunth and odd lying adjacent to the west of the municipal road was completely covered by a ditch of about 10 feet depth. Defendant No. 1 purchased under Ext. C 3 gunths, 15 biswas and 16 gandas to the west of the ditch portion and platform the margin of the municipal road. The ditch portion was set apart for a Rasta. Defendants accordingly claimed that the suit land is a part of their purchased land. A further defence was taken that the Plaintiff acquired no valid title under Ext. 4 as the gift was not authorised by the power of attorney (ext. 3). Defendants started construction in 1956. As the Plaintiff?s predecessors-in-interest did not raise any objection at the time of construction, Plaintiff?s suit is barred by estoppel and waiver. 2. A further defence was taken that the Plaintiff acquired no valid title under Ext. 4 as the gift was not authorised by the power of attorney (ext. 3). Defendants started construction in 1956. As the Plaintiff?s predecessors-in-interest did not raise any objection at the time of construction, Plaintiff?s suit is barred by estoppel and waiver. 2. Both the courts below concurrently recorded the following findings: (i) The disputed land constitutes a part of the land gifted to the Plaintiff? under Ext. 4 and it does not constitute part of the land purchased by Defendant No. 1 under Ext. C. (ii) Though the Defendants started construction of their house before 1958, the Suit is not barred by estoppel or waiver. (iii) Plaintiff acquired a valid title under Ext. 4. Mr. Sinha does not challenge the first two findings. 3. The only contention advanced by Mr. Sinha is that Saroj had no authority to make a gift of the lands under Ext. 4 and that the Plaintiff acquired no title. To appreciate this contention, it is necessary to extract the material terms of the power of attorney (ext. 3): Whereas we have our properties situated in different places in India and whereas we have to execute petitions, applications, and also to manage, supervise and if necessary to dispose of or lease out our properties inter-alia our landed property at Baripada...we all do individually and collectively nominate, appoint and authorise our brother, (brother-in -law) and co-sharer Sri Saroj Mohan Dhar, as our general, legal and lawful attorney to do the following acts and deeds on our behalf and as our agent. (1) To negotiate, invite offers and accept the same in respect of our aforesaid property at Baripada and to enter into a contract for sale with any purchaser for any reasonable price and to receive, accept and obtain any money in consideration of the sale thereof by advance or otherwise and in full and to grant, discharge or issue receipts for the same. (2) To sell, transfer, lease out, or deal or dispose of the said property on our behalf and on signing our names in the deeds or convents for the purpose thereof (3) To appear before any Registrar of Assurance anywhere in the union of India and specially at Baripada in the district of Mayurbhanj for the registration of the deed of transfer or lease or agreement signed by us and to admit execution on our behalf, and to grant execute the receipt authorising the purchaser to obtain delivery of the document from the Office of the Registrar on receipt of the consideration on our behalf. 4. Before examining whether on the terms of Ext. 3 Saroj had authority to make a gift of the lands, it is necessary to examine the rule regarding construction of power of attorney. Where an act purporting to be done under a power of attorney I is challenged as being in excess of the authority conferred by the power, it is necessary to show that on a fair construction of the whole instrument the authority in question is to be found within four corners of the instrument, either in express terms or by necessary implication Section 43 Indian Appeal 848 (55) The general words used in the subsequent clauses of a power of attorney must be read with the special powers given in the earlier clauses and cannot be construed so as to enlarge the restricted powers there mentioned (See AIR 1933 P.C. 781);Thus a power of attorney must be construed strictly. 5. Applying the aforesaid tests to Ext. 3, it would be manifest that it does not authorise the making of a gift. The underlined expression in the first clause indicates unequivocally that the transfer must be for consideration. There is an indication that even less than reasonable price should not be accepted. Saroj was authorised to accept money in consideration of the sale. The second clause does not take away the effect of the specific mandate given in the first clause. It is contended by Mr. Murty that use of the words "to transfer" or "to dispose of" is capable of the construction that Saroj had power to transfer the property otherwise than for consideration. The contention is contrary to the dicta laid down in the aforesaid Privy Council decisions. It is contended by Mr. Murty that use of the words "to transfer" or "to dispose of" is capable of the construction that Saroj had power to transfer the property otherwise than for consideration. The contention is contrary to the dicta laid down in the aforesaid Privy Council decisions. The general words used in the subsequent clauses must be read with the special powers given in the earlier clauses and cannot be construed so as to enlarge the restricted powers. In 11 India Appeal 94 their Lordships repelled such a contention. The observation was as follows: The Appellant?s counsel relied mainly upon the word "negotiate" and also upon "dispose of". In order to see what was intended by these words, they must be looked at in connation with the context as well as with the general object of the power. The entire object of the power, when the document is read as a whole, eschews out any contention that the authority extended even to the making of a gift. The under lined expression therein emphasises the fact that the registration is to be done only on receipt of consideration. I am satisfied that Ext. 3 does not authorise Saroj to make a gift of the property. 6. The aforesaid conclusion does not invalidate Ext. 4 as a whole. In respect of properties gifted away Saroj had one fifth interest. Ext. 4 was executed by Saroj on behalf of himself and on behalf of four other branches. The gift of his own share is valid in law as the genuineness, execution and acceptance of the gift are not questioned. The gift would, however, fail in respect of four-fifths share of the disputed properties as Ext. 3 conferred no power on Saroj to make a gift. Plaintiff has thus title to one-fifth share of the disputed properties. He is entitled to declaration of title in respect of one-fifth share of the disputed properties and to delivery of joint possession. The decrees of the Courts below must be set aside and the Plaintiff be granted a decree as indicated above. 7. In the result, the second appeal succeeds in part, the judgments of the courts below are set aside and the Plaintiff?s suit is decreed in part. In the circumstances, parties to bear their own costs throughout.