Judgment :- 1. The appellant and the 1st respondent were applicants Nos. 2 & 1 respectively for the grant of a permit to run a bus on the Kayamkulam-Oyoor route. The Regional Transport Authority granted the permit to the 1st respondent; but, on appeal, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal reversed it and granted the permit to the appellant. The 1st respondent then moved O.P. No. 1638 of 1963 to have the order of the S.T.A.T. quashed by a writ of certiorari under Art.226 of the Constitution. Govindan Nair, J. has allowed the same. Hence this appeal. 2. The learned judge has observed: "It may also be mentioned here that pursuant to the sanctioning of the permit by Ext. P.1 order in favour of the writ petitioner a permit was issued to him and he had been operating on the route from the year 1962.... and so, the writ petitioner has been continuing to operate on the route pursuant to the permit issued to him.". It is now admitted before us that the 1st respondent, who was the writ petitioner before the learned judge, has not put a bus so far on the route. 3. The learned judge has deprecated the admission of additional evidence by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal and observed: "...there has been fresh evidence let in and documents produced before the appellate authority untrammelled by the exercise of any discretion by that authority as to whether grounds existed for allowing the parties to adduce fresh evidence at the appellate stage. There is no provision in the Motor Vehicles Act and/or the rules framed thereunder imposing restrictions about the production of additional documents ascertained in R.27 of 0.41 of the Cod; of Civil Procedure. However, I feel that it will be clearly wrong to allow full freedom to the parties to an appeal to adduce fresh evidence at the appellate stage untrammelled by any discretion exercised by the appellate authority." The powers of the appellate tribunal are not delimited in the Motor Vehicles Act. It is agreed at the Bar that the appellate court has to decide all questions of fact and of law arising in the case. It must then have the power to call for or take additional evidence appearing necessary to decide the question before it justly and correctly. It is agreed at the Bar that the appellate court has to decide all questions of fact and of law arising in the case. It must then have the power to call for or take additional evidence appearing necessary to decide the question before it justly and correctly. If there is no express restriction, its powers in that regard would be co-extensive with its powers to give relief. It is a maxim of general application that 'when anything is commanded, everything by which it can be accomplished is also commanded'. Tie identical question arose recently in United Motor Works and Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar (AIR1964 Pat. 154) when Ramaswami, C.J., with concurrence of Untwalia, J., observed: "The argument was stressed that the appellate authority had no legal power to take these additional documents into evidence because neither the statute nor the statutory rules provide for any power of taking additional evidence before the appellate authority.1 am unable to accept the argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner as correct .... (His Lordship quoted S.47 and continued). It is, therefore, clear that apart from the objections put forward by individuals against the granting of permits, the Regional Transport Authority is also required to consider other matters. In other words, the considerations mentioned in S.47 of the Motor Vehicles Act should be in addition to the considerations of objections raised under sub-section (3) of S.57 of the Act. It is also manifest that the power of the appellate authority is co-extensive with the power of the Regional Transport Authority in this respect; & there is no reason why the appellate authority should not take these matters into consideration in deciding the appeal under S.64 of the Act ... The principle is well established that in the absence of any such prescribed procedure the appellate authority may adopt any procedure which it thinks best for hearing the appeal provided always that the rules of natural justice are observed. The principle is well established that in the absence of any such prescribed procedure the appellate authority may adopt any procedure which it thinks best for hearing the appeal provided always that the rules of natural justice are observed. The matter has been clearly put by Lord Loreburn in the course of his speech in Board of Education v. Rice (1911 AC 179), as follows: Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if they have not originated, the practice of imposing upon departments or officers of State the duty of deciding or determining questions or various kinds ...In such cases the Board of Education will have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the facts. I need not add that in doing either they must act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides, for that is a duty lying upon every one who decides anything. But I do not think they are bound to treat such a question as though it were a trial. They have no power to administer an oath, and need not examine witnessess. They can obtain information in any way they think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their view. It is not alleged by the petitioner that there has been any violation of natural justice in the present case." The above observations apply well to the facts and circumstances of the case before us. 4. That reasons for the admission of additional evidence are not indicated in the order of the Appellate Authority cannot be a ground for interference by this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has observed in Sri Rama Vilas Service (P) Ltd. v. Chandrasekharan (AIR 1965 SC 107) that where the ultimate decision of the Appellate Tribunal is the result of a proper assessment of all the relevant factors, it would not be safe to issue a writ of certiorari against the decision merely on the ground that all relevant reasons have not been set out in the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal or that the High Court would have taken a different view on the evidence adduced in the proceedings. It is not disputed that the factors considered by the Appellate Tribunal were germane to the grant of a permit to run a stage carriage. 5. It is not disputed that the factors considered by the Appellate Tribunal were germane to the grant of a permit to run a stage carriage. 5. The learned judge has held that the appellant, not having 'filed an objection' before the R.T.A. to the application for permit by the 1st respondent, could not have been heard by the Appellate Tribunal on the several grounds taken in his Memorandum of Appeal before it to show that the 1st respondent was less qualified than himself for grant of the permit; and that in an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal no fact can be urged that has not been urged before the R.T.A. by one or other of the parties. We cannot agree. The Supreme Court has, in Ram Gopal v. Anant Prasad (AIR 1959 SC 851) indicated the above views to be unsustainable. A.K. Sirkar J., speaking for the Court has observed: "We were referred to Dholpur Co-operative Transport and Multi-purpose Union Ltd. v. Appellate Authority, Rajasthan (AIR 1955 Raj. 19, 26) in support of this contention. It was there said: 'Where an appeal has been made under cl. (a) against the refusal of a permit, the Appellate Authority will generally have the right to give relief to the appellant by the grant of a permit, but will not have any jurisdiction to cancel the permit granted to another person, unless a foundation has been laid before the Regional Transport Authority for an appeal provided by cl. (f) by an objection of somebody entitled to appeal under that clause. If such an objection has been made then it does not matter whether that particular person appeals or not. In such a case, on an appeal under S.64(a) the Appellate Authority may consider the objection of the nature specified in cl. (f) before the Regional Transport Authority and give its own decision in the matter.'... We are unable to agree that in an appeal which is competent under cl. (a) of the section, the order renewing or granting a permit cannot be set aside unless the case was such that an appeal under cl. (f) would have also been competent. So to hold would result in making the right of appeal given by cl. We are unable to agree that in an appeal which is competent under cl. (a) of the section, the order renewing or granting a permit cannot be set aside unless the case was such that an appeal under cl. (f) would have also been competent. So to hold would result in making the right of appeal given by cl. (a) wholly infructuous in those cases where no relief can be given in the appeal except by setting aside the order granting or renewing a permit, for example, where there was only one permit to grant as in the present case. Such an interpretation has to be rejected. It is based on cl. (f). But this clause cannot be considered in a manner so as to render infructuous another clause in the same section. Nor do we find anything in cl. (f) to justify such a construction. The different clauses in the section deal with different situations. Each is independent of the others. Clause (f) deals with a case where an objection had been filed against the fresh grant or the renewal of a permit but the permit has none the less been granted or renewed. The clause gives the objector a right of appeal against the result of the rejection of his objection if he is one of the persons mentioned in it. The clause gives him that right irrespective of the fact whether he has a right of appeal under any of the other clauses or not. It does not say that a permit granted or renewed cannot be questioned except at the instance of the persons mentioned in cl. (f); it does not affect the right of appeal under the other clauses. If an appeal lies under any of the other clauses, that of course must be an effective appeal and the appellate authority must therefore have all powers to give the relief to which the appellant is found entitled. Again S.64 is not concerned with defining the powers of the appellate authority and does not purport to do so. Nor is there anything in the Act to lead to the conclusion that an applicant for a permit is bound to put in objections against the applications of competing applicants for the grant or the renewal of the permit. Again S.64 is not concerned with defining the powers of the appellate authority and does not purport to do so. Nor is there anything in the Act to lead to the conclusion that an applicant for a permit is bound to put in objections against the applications of competing applicants for the grant or the renewal of the permit. The relief that can be granted in an appeal by any person which is competent would not depend on whether he had put in objections against the applications of the competing applicants or not." The appellant and the 1st respondent were applicants for the grant of a permit. The R.T.A. having granted it to the 1st respondent the appellant was entitled to appeal, under S.64(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, against the refusal of the permit to him. In that appeal the question was who, between the two applicants was better qualified for the grant of the permit. All grounds taken in that appeal to show that the 1st respondent was less qualified than the appellant were therefore relevant and proper. It cannot therefore be said that the S.T.A.T. was in error in having heard and adjudicated on them. 6. The learned judge has also observed: "There were only four permits on the particular route. One permit had fallen vacant and it was for that the two applications were made. Out of the remaining three, two were admittedly held by the 1st respondent (the appellant here). It was suggested that the third permit was also transferred to the son of the 1st respondent for the benefit of the 1st respondent. If this was so and if the permit which had fallen vacant is also issued to the 1st respondent, he would practically have all the permits on the route, a 100 per cent monopoly. Even three out of the four permits would be a very heavy concentration." Neither the Regional Transport Authority nor the State Transport Appellate Tribunal has adverted to the question of monopoly on the route. Whether the grant of a permit to an applicant would result in a monopoly prejudicial to the interest of the public or not is a question of fact for the statutory authorities to consider. It must necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Whether the grant of a permit to an applicant would result in a monopoly prejudicial to the interest of the public or not is a question of fact for the statutory authorities to consider. It must necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. If the statutory authorities did not feel a case of monopoly prejudicial to the interests of the public to arise in the matter it is not for the High Court in a writ petition to go into that question and appreciate facts to enter its own decision or opinion thereon. 7. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal has found on a consideration of relevant factors that the appellant is better qualified than the 1st respondent for the grant of a permit for running a bus on the route. Counsel for the 1st respondent does not challenge that finding; nor is he able to show any violation of natural justice in the proceedings before the R.T.A. or the S.T.A.T. It must then follow that this Court has no ground to intesrfere with the order of the Appellate Tribunal. As observed by the Supreme Court in the decision cited above (AIR 1965 SC 107), "In dealing with applications for writs of certiorari under Art.226 in cases of this kind, it is necessary to bear in mind that the High Court is not exercising the jurisdiction of an Appellate Court in the matter. There is no doubt that in granting or refusing permits to applicants, the appropriate authorities are discharging a very important and a very onerous quasi-judicial function. Large stakes are generally involved in these applications, and so, it is of utmost importance that the appropriate authority should consider all the relevant facts carefully and in its order should set out concisely and clearly the reasons in support of its conclusions. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that applicants for permits whose applications are rejected should be satisfied that all points urged by them in support of their respective claims have been duly considered before the matter was decided. Even so, it would, we think, be inappropriate for the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari mainly or solely on the ground that all reasons have not been set out in the judgment of the appropriate authority. Even so, it would, we think, be inappropriate for the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari mainly or solely on the ground that all reasons have not been set out in the judgment of the appropriate authority. In entertaining writ petitions, the High Court must not lose sight of the fact that decisions on questions of fact under the Motor Vehicles Act have been left to the appropriate authorities which have been constituted into quasi-judicial Tribunals in that behalf and so, decisions rendered by them on all questions of fact should not be interfered with under the special jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art.226, unless the well recognised tests in that behalf are satisfied." 8. In the circumstances, we find the issuance of a writ of certiorari by the learned judge was not justified in this case and the appeal has to be allowed. We do so. The result is that the writ petition, O.P. No. 1638 of 1963 stands dismissed hereby. The appellant will have his costs in this appeal from the 1st respondent. Judgment accordingly.