This review petition has been preferred against the order of the Board of Revenue dateds31-12-60 whereby Sarva Shri Shyamlal and R. N. Hawa accepted the appeal against the judgment and decree of the Collector, Sawai Madhopur dated 21-6-50 upholding the decision of the trial court dated 18-4-49 and ordered that the application presented by the respondents (now applicants before us) for ejectment shall stand rejected throughout. The circumstances leading to the aforesaid appeal have been briefly recited in the impugned order as follows: Juma and others (who were the respondents before the Board of Revenue) presented an application on 24-1-48 before the Nazim Hindaun of the former Jaipur State against Teja (Teja having died in the interval was represented by his son Mangia who was the appellant before the D.B.) for ejectment. It was alleged that the respondents were the patttadar tenants of the disputed land, that on Bhadon Sudi 15, Smt. 2002 they had sub-leased the same to Teja and one other Narain for one year, and that a Kabuliat was executed by them, that Narain ceased cultivating the land after a period of one year, but Teja refused to part with possession and did not even care to pay rent. Hence, a decree for arrears of rent was obtained against him. As Teja had been continuing in possession without their consent, it was prayed that he be ejected from the land, Teja, in his written statement, admitted the execution of the Kabuliat but pleaded fraud in respect thereof. The trial court framed four issues and after recording the evidence of the parties held that the plaintiffs were the pattadar tenants of the disputed land and that the defendant was a subtenant who had failed to pay rent and was therefore liable to be ejected. The defendant filed an appeal before the Collector, Sawai Madhopur but met with no success. Thereupon, a second appeal was filed before the Board of Revenue but as the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance 1949 came into force in the meantime the proceedings relating to the ejectment were temporarily consigned to the record under sec. 5 of the aforesaid Ordinance. When the aforesaid Ordinance was repealed by the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 the appeal was restored on the application of Mangia who had meanwhile succeeded his deceased father Teja. 5 of the aforesaid Ordinance. When the aforesaid Ordinance was repealed by the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 the appeal was restored on the application of Mangia who had meanwhile succeeded his deceased father Teja. A preliminary objection was raised for the respondents that as there was no provision for the revival of appeals in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act the Board had no authority to re-hear it. This contention was held to be untenable by the D. B. It was observed that under sec. 5 of the repealed Ordinance, the appeal was consigned temporarily and that by no stretch of imagination it was to be treated as a final determination of the matter. With the repeal of the Ordinance, it was observed, the appeal could not be allowed to remain consigned and hence it must be decided in accordance with law. The same contention has again been repeated before us through this review petition. It has been urged that as there was no specific provision in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, which repealed the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance, an appeal consigned to records could not be revived. The wording of sec. 5 of the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance is very clear. By virtue of this all suits, appeals, revisions, applications etc. for the ejectment of tenants were temporarily consigned to record. Obviously, temporary consignment would only mean suspension of the contest for the time being but not its final determination. The purpose of the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance was to put a check on the growing tendency of land-holders to ejector dispossess tenants from their holdings and in the wider national interest of increasing the production of food-grains to make provision for their protection from ejectment. Sec. 13 of the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance relates to the power of its withdrawal and sec. 14 relates to the application of sec. 6 of the General Glauses Act. The Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance was enacted to remain in force for a period of 7 years but before the expiry of that period it was repealed by the Rajasthan Tenancy Act of 15-10-55. Under sec. 206(1) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act all suits, cases, appeals, etc. relating to matters dealt with in this Act and pending before a Revenue Court, oncoming into force of this Act were deemed to have been commenced under this Act. Under sec. 206(1) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act all suits, cases, appeals, etc. relating to matters dealt with in this Act and pending before a Revenue Court, oncoming into force of this Act were deemed to have been commenced under this Act. Therefore, proceedings under the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance pending before a revenue court were automatically to be dealt with under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. As the present appeal had only been temporarily consigned to record under sec. 5 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, it could not be deemed to have died. It must consequently be held to have been pending before a revenue court on the commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and we do not agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned members of the Division Bench who heard the appeal committed an error apparent on the face of it in hearing the appeal. The second contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that even if it is held that the appeal could be revived, the application of the appellant for its restoration was barred by limitation under Art. 181 of the Indian Limitation Act. He argued that under Art. 181, the period of limitation is three years, and, therefore, the application of restoration which was made in April, 1959 was barred, as the period of limitation expired on 15-10-58, viz., three years after the commencement of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and the repeal of the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance. This argument is fallacious, as the responsibility for the resuscitation of the appeal cannot be deemed to have rested with the appellant on the repeal of sec. 5 of the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance. It was the duty of the Court to resuscitate the cases temporarily consigned to the record under sec. 5 of the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance, after its repeal. All that the appellant did was to remind the Court of its duty. He did not file a new claim. As has been stated above, consigning of the case to the records temporarily did not confer any right on the respondents and the appellant cannot be barred by limitation in agitating the matter which was already pending before the Court. All that the appellant did was to remind the Court of its duty. He did not file a new claim. As has been stated above, consigning of the case to the records temporarily did not confer any right on the respondents and the appellant cannot be barred by limitation in agitating the matter which was already pending before the Court. As has been stated by Maxwell in his well known treatise on the Interpretation of Statutes, when an Act expires or is repealed it is formerly regarded, in the absence of the provision to the contrary, as having never existed except as to matters and transactions past and closed. The act of consigning the appeal to record temporarily cannot be deemed to have closed the matter and as such the resuscitation of the appeal by the Division Bench cannot by any stretch of legal argument attract the law relating to limitation or review, which can be involved only under conditions specified in O.47 of C.P.C. The third contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner no doubt has the merit of plausibility but on close analysis this must also be rejected. It was contended by him that the learned Division Bench had committed an error in holding that the appellant had become a sub-tenant under sec. 19 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and was therefore immune from ejectment under sec. 180 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act which corresponded to sec. 87 of the Jaipur Tenancy Act under which the original application was filed. Our attention was drawn to Proviso (iii) of sec. 19.(1) and it was contended that the learned Members of the Division Bench had ignored this mandatory provision. It was argued that the proceedings for the ejectment were still pending when the Act came into force and therefore the Board had committed an error in holding that the appellant had acquired khatedari rights. Proviso (iii) of sec. 19(1) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act excludes a person from the benefit of sec. 19 if he has after the commencement of the Act and before the appointed date, ceased to be the tenant of khudkasht or sub-tenant by virtue of lawful surrender or abandonment, in accordance with the provisions of this Act or because of his having been ejected in accordance with those provisions by and under the decree or order of a competent revenue court. Admittedly, the appellant had not been ejected from his possession before the appointed date. Although it is true that two courts had awarded decrees against him, yet the decrees had not become final inasmuch as an appeal against them was pending. The appellant could not, therefore, be deprived of the rights available to him under sec. 19. If the appellant fulfills the conditions laid down under sec. 19, he is entitled to the acquisition of rights which law confers upon him and cannot be justly deprived of them, on the ground that ejectment proceedings were pending against him. The last objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Division Bench of the Board has ignored the fact that legal representatives of Rupa were not admitted in time and the second appeal was, therefore, barred by limitation. It was urged that the application for legal representatives was moved on 5-5-59 after the period of limitation had expired. In reply, the learned counsel for the non-petitioner referred to the order of the Division Bench dated 26-10-60 whereby the question of legal representative was decided. It was pointed out by him that an opportunity had been given to the respondents to contest the application filed by the appellant and that the order passed by the Division Bench was acquiesced in by the petitioner inasmuch as this point was not raised during the course of the final arguments in the appeal. As such, it could hardly form a valid ground for a review petition at this stage. This argument must prevail. The result of the foregoing discussion is that no error apparent on the face of the record in the impugned order has been made out and we are of the opinion that this review petition has no force and must be rejected.