Judgment :- 1. The second appeal was admitted by Madhavan Nair, J. "Notice on ground No. 10". The learned Advocate General questions the correctness of piecemeal admission of second appeals like this. He draws my attention to a few decisions on the question. The first of them is P. Lakshmi Kutty Pillai v. P. Velayudhan Pillai (ILR. 1952 T.C. 385). Subramania Iyer, J. has discussed the various decisions on the question and has also considered the effect of R.11 and 12 of O. XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure. Ultimately, the learned judge has considered two Full Bench decisions, one, of the Madras High Court in Vattipalle Eswariah v. Vattipalle Rameswarayya (AIR. 1940 Mad. 483) and the other, of the Bombay High Court in Krishnaji Shrinivas Jalvadi v. Madhusa Appansa Ladaba (AIR. 1934 Bom. 207). In the Bombay decision the Full Bench held that if the subject-matter of an appeal was severable, it was open to the judge to admit it and at the same time to restrict the grounds on which the appeal was to be heard. In the Madras ruling it was held that the court had no jurisdiction to admit an appeal in part and dismiss it in part, even if the appeal consisted of distinct and severable parts. Subramania Iyer, J. has held that in the case before him the conflict between the Madras and the Bombay High Courts did not arise, because the subject-matter in that case was not severable in parts. 2. In the Bombay case two survey numbers were involved; and Barlee, J., who heard the appeal under R.11, ordered notice to issue on one of the survey numbers, but said nothing about the other survey number. The learned judges of the Full Bench held that it was open to the judge who heard the appeal under R.11 to dismiss the appeal in part and admit it in part; but, as the subject-matter of the appeal was not severable in parts, the judge could not restrict the grounds on which the appeal was to be heard. Ultimately, the Full Bench held that Barlee, J., did not dismiss the appeal as to one survey number, but said nothing about it and he admitted the appeal as to the other survey number. Ultimately, the Full Bench held that Barlee, J., did not dismiss the appeal as to one survey number, but said nothing about it and he admitted the appeal as to the other survey number. In that situation, since the appeal was not dismissed regarding one survey number, the Full Bench held that the entire appeal could be heard. The Full Bench also indicated that in the Bombay High Court there was, rightly or wrongly, a practice of admitting appeals in part. A reading of this decision impels me to think that the prevailing practice in the Bombay High Court was largely responsible to make the judges take such a course. 3. The Madras Full Bench has not accepted the Bombay view. It has held that the appellate court may dismiss the appeal without serving notice on the respondent under R.11 of O. XLI; but, if it does not so dismiss the appeal summarily it must, by virtue of R.12 (1), fix a day for hearing the appeal, which means the entire appeal. The learned judges have, however, pointed out that if at the time of admission the counsel of the appellant confined his case to some of the grounds raised in the memorandum of appeal and the judge who heard the appeal under R.11 made a note of that, the appeal may be confined to those grounds alone. This, the learned judges have made clear, was different from passing a substantive order admitting the appeal in part. - 4. Another decision brought to my notice is Rekha Thakur v. Ramanadan Rai (AIR. 1936 Pat. 7). There also a Division Bench of the Patna High Court has held that there was no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure enabling the court of appeal to pass art order partly admitting and partly dismissing an appeal; and that in the prevailing state of the jaw, it must be held that an appeal could not be admitted on a limited ground, but could be admitted only as a whole. The decision has proceeded to state that if at the time of admission the appellate court was informed that the appeal would be confined to certain specified grounds only and that the other grounds were abandoned or if it was conceded on behalf of the appellant that the grounds other than those specified were not fit to be urged in appeal; there was nothing to prevent the court before which the appeal was placed under R.11 from making note of that fact; that was really not admitting the appeal in part. 5. Thus, these decisions hold that an appeal cannot be admitted piecemeal Since the Bombay Full Bench decision was based more on the practice of that Court, I am inclined to accept the Madras view and hold that the appeal can be admitted or dismissed only as a whole, Ira this Court there is no general practice, as in the Bombay High Court, of admitting appeals in part or on some grounds in the memorandum of appeal, excepting that one judge or two judges occasionally resorted to that course. Therefore, the consideration of a settled practice that influenced the judges of the Full Bench of Bombay need not detain or deter me from expressing my opinion on the point of law. As the provisions of O. XLI R.11 and 12 now stand, it is clear that an appeal has to be admitted or dismissed under R.11 or 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure only as a whole and not in part. It is also desirable that no contrary practice overtakes us unawares. 6. The learned advocate of the respondents draws my attention to two decisions, one, a Division Bench ruling of the Nagpur High Court and two, a ruling of Ramaswami, J. of the Madras High Court. In the Nagpur decision the learned judges have disagreed with the view of the Madras High Court in the Full Bench already referred to and have held that if there were severable and distinct subject-matters in the appeal, so that the memorandum of grounds might be construed as several distinct appeals, the appeal might be admitted regarding one or more of such distinct parts and might be dismissed regarding the others. In that case the order of the judge who heard the appeal under R.11 specifically dismissed one part of the appeal and admitted only the other, which does not obtain in the case before me, because the order under R.11 in this case does not dismiss any part of the appeal. It merely says that the appeal is admitted on ground No. 10, as in the Bombay Full Bench case. Thus, even if I am inclined to agree with the view of the Nagpur High Court - which I am not - still, that decision will not apply to the case before me. 7. The only other decision which has to be noted is the Madras decision of Ramaswami, J. in MR. LN. SN. Ramaswamy Chettiar v. Adaikammal (AIR. 1960 Mad. 341), wherein the learned judge says that in fact the Law Commission has gone to the extent of suggesting that the judge admitting the appeal should state the point or points of law which arise for consideration in the second appeal and that the High Court should in its discretion even be permitted to go further and order that the appellant should be heard only on the point or points of law stated by the judge admitting the appeal. Ramaswami, J. observes further that it is to be hoped that this contingency may not arise if the High Court subjects to "stricter and better scrutiny" the second appeals at the stage of admission, because if such a statutory requirement is made, only a negligible percentage of second appeals will get admitted and a valuable corrective in reserve conferred under S.100 of the Code of Civil Procedure will be greatly lost to the detriment of the litigant public and efficient administration of civil justice. It is evident that this is not an interpretation of any provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, but is only a hope expressed by the learned judge, which has no binding force as a judicial precedent. 8. In this view, I am hearing the entire second appeal without confining to ground No. 10. (Paras. 9 onwords dealing with the facts of the case omitted)