ORDER Bhave J. 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order, dated 5-11-1963, passed by the Collector, Sagar (respondent 2), under section 14 (2) of the Madhya Pradesh Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960. The appellate order, dated 18-11-1964, passed by the Deputy Secretary to Government of Madhya Pradesh, Agriculture Department (respondent 3), confirming the order of the Collector, has also been challenged. 2. The petitioner is the Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Khurai, a statutory body constituted under the Madhya Pradesh Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). After a 'market yard' was notified the petitioner requested the Municipal Council Khurai (respondent 1), as provided for under sub-section (1) of section 14 of the Act, to transfer all lands and buildings belonging to the Municipal Council and situated within the market yard. The terms and conditions could not be settled by mutual agreement between the parties within the period of thirty days prescribed under sub-section (1) of section 14. As a result of this, the property vested in the petitioner subject to payment of compensation to be determined by the Collector. The Collector, Sagar, was, therefore, called upon to determine compensation in the manner prescribed under sub-section (2) of section 14, read with sub-section (4) ibid. The two sub-sections are as under:– “14. … … … … (1) … … … … (2) Where within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of requisition by the local authority under sub-section (1) no agreement is reached between the local authority and the market committee under the said sub section, the land or building required by the market committee shall vest in the committee for the purposes of this Act and the local authority shall be paid such compensation as may be determined by the Collector under sub-section (4) : Provided that no compensation shall be payable to a local authority in respect of any land or building which had vested in it by virtue of the provisions contained in the enactment relating to the constitution of such local authority without payment of any amount whatsoever for such vesting: Provided further that any party aggrieved by the order of the Collector may, within thirty days from the dale of such order, appeal to the State Government. (3) … … … … (4) The Collector shall fix the amount of the compensation for the use and occupation of the land or building having regard to– (i) the annual rent for which the land or building might reasonably be expected to be let from year to year; (ii) the condition of building and the site of the land; (iii) the amount of compensation paid by the local-authority for the acquisition of such land or building; and (iv) the cost or the present value of any building erected or other work executed on the land by the local authority.” 3. It appears that the Collector directed the Sub-Divisional Officer to make an enquiry after giving opportunity to both the parties to put forward their respective claims and/or objections and to make a report to the compensation that should be paid to the Municipal Council. The property, for which the compensation was to be determined is as under: – "(1) Vacant land of grain-ganj, 1,84,286 sq. ft. (2) A pucca well ingrain-ganj. (3) A building-Grain Ganj Chouki. (4) Krishak Vishram Graha. (5) Municipal quarter. (6) Vacant area of Bhusa Ganj, 1,71,891 sq. ft. (7) Well in Bhusa Ganj." The Sub-Divisional Officer recommended that a total compensation of Rs. 3,87,853 was payable to the Municipal Council. The compensation was determined by the Sub-Divisional Officer on the basis of the market value of the property on the date of vesting. 4. When the matter came for consideration of the Collector, it was realised by the Collector that under sub-section (4) of section 14 of the Act, compensation had to be fixed for the use and occupation of the land or building that had vested in the market committee and that compensation on the basis of the market value of the property could not be awarded. 5. The Collector, Sagar, however, accepted the market value determined by the Sub-Divisional Officer as correct and held that 6 per cent of the value so determined would be adequate compensation per annum for the use and occupation of the land or building that vested in the petitioner. According to the said calculation, the annual compensation was fixed:– "1. Vacant land of Grain Ganj Rs. 16,585 74 nP. 2. Grain Ganj Chouki Rs. 113.40 nP. 3. Krishak Vishram Grah Rs. 310.50 nP. 4. Municipal Quarter Rs. 243.00 nP. 5. Vacant area of Bhusa Ganj Rs. 5,778.54 nP. According to the said calculation, the annual compensation was fixed:– "1. Vacant land of Grain Ganj Rs. 16,585 74 nP. 2. Grain Ganj Chouki Rs. 113.40 nP. 3. Krishak Vishram Grah Rs. 310.50 nP. 4. Municipal Quarter Rs. 243.00 nP. 5. Vacant area of Bhusa Ganj Rs. 5,778.54 nP. ----------------------- Total:– Rs. 23,031.18 nP. The Deputy Secretary, who heard the appeal, proceeded on the same lines; He observed : "For this purpose (for determining annual rent) it will be necessary to work out the price of the land or building at the current market value and then work out the annual rent, payable on such price." Thus the basis adopted by the Collector for assessment of compensation was upheld in appeal by the Deputy Secretary. 6. Shri Dabir, learned Counsel for the petitioner, urged, and in our opinion rightly, that the basis adopted by the Collector in determining the compensation was not warranted. Sub-section 4 of S. 14 provides that the Collector shall fix the amount of compensation for the use and occupation of the land or building having regard to the matters enumerated in items (i) to (iv) of the said sub-section. It is evident from the orders of the Collector and the Deputy Secretary that in determining the amount of compensation neither of them paid any regard to the matters enumerated in section 14 (4). 7. The Privy Council in the case of Ryots of Garabandho Vs. Zamindar of Parlakimedi AIR 1943 PC 164=70 IA 129 has explained the implication of the words "having regard to" as under: "The view taken by the majority of the Collective Board of Revenue in making the order dated October 19, 1936, which is now complained of is that the requirement to 'have regard to' the provision in question has no more definite or technical meaning than that of ordinary usage, and only requires that these provisions must be taken into consideration... ....................... .....This view of the effect of the direction to 'have regard to' the provisions of the Act for determining rates of rent payable by a Ryot is supported by the decision of the High Court in Valluri Narasingha Rao Vs. Ryots of Peddamamidipalli AIR 1926 Mad 480 =ILR 49 Mad. 499.........................................................Their Lordships find themselves in this matter in agreement with the view taken by the majority of the Collective Board." 8. Ryots of Peddamamidipalli AIR 1926 Mad 480 =ILR 49 Mad. 499.........................................................Their Lordships find themselves in this matter in agreement with the view taken by the majority of the Collective Board." 8. Bose, J. of the Calcutta High Court has observed in the case of Messrs S. N. Transport Co. Vs. State Transport Authority (3) as under: "It appears to me that the words 'shall have regard to' in S. 47 (of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939) imply that the section is not exhaustive. The requirement of the section is that the matters specified in the section must be taken into consideration; in other words, the primary duty of the Regional Transport Authority is to take into consideration the matters specified. But it does not follow that the hands of the Regional Transport Authority are tied to the consideration of these matters alone and they must shut their eyes to everything else." 9. The decisions referred to above make it dear that the authorities are not precluded from considering other relevant factors while determining the compensation. But they are in no case entitled to ignore the factors having regard to which the statute requires that compensation should be fixed. It must be noted that under section 14 (4) of the Act the amount of compensation to be fixed is "for the use and occupation of the land or building". This necessarily implies that the land or building for which compensation is to be determined has not been acquired out and out that had been the position, then certainly the 'market value' of the building would have been a very material factor in determining compensation. Under section 14 (4) compensation has to be assessed at the value of possession of the property to the Municipal Council. It cannot also be urged that in the fixation of the amount of annual compensation on the basis of a certain percentage of the market value of the property, a consideration of the factors mentioned in section 14 (4) was necessarily involved. Clause (1) of section 14 (4) requires the Collector to have regard to the annual rent for which "the land or building might reasonably be expected to be let from year to year". The 'annual rent' mentioned in clause (i) may not at all correspond with the rent of the property calculated on a certain percentage of its market value. Clause (1) of section 14 (4) requires the Collector to have regard to the annual rent for which "the land or building might reasonably be expected to be let from year to year". The 'annual rent' mentioned in clause (i) may not at all correspond with the rent of the property calculated on a certain percentage of its market value. The annual rent for which land or building might reasonably be expected to be let out from year to year may be higher or lower than this percentage. Again, as clauses (ii), (iii) and (iv) of section 14 (4) are worded, in the consideration of the matters enumerated in those clauses the element of "market value" does not come into the picture. There is thus clearly an error of principle when both the Collector and the Deputy Secretary took the market value of the land or building as the sole basis in assessing the compensation. 10. Shri R. K Pandey, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, contended that adequate opportunities was given to the petitioner to produce all the relevant material before the Sub-Divisional Officer, and if it failed to produce the material required for the purpose of section 14 (4), the authorities could not be blamed if the annual compensation was determined on some other basis. This argument altogether misses the petitioner's objection that the Collector and the Deputy Secretary totally ignored the matters mentioned in section 14 (4) in assessing the compensation. If, as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent No.1, the petitioner did not produce any material to determine compensation by the guiding principles stated in section 14 (4), that could not justify the Collector to ignore altogether the matters mentioned in section 14 (4) and proceed to determine the annual compensation on percentage basis of the market value of the property. If the petitioner did not produce any evidence, the Collector was bound to obtain the relevant material through his officials to enable him to discharge his duty of determining the compensation in accordance with section 14 (4). 11. If the petitioner did not produce any evidence, the Collector was bound to obtain the relevant material through his officials to enable him to discharge his duty of determining the compensation in accordance with section 14 (4). 11. Shri Dabir, learned counsel for the petitioner, also urged that the Collector erred in holding that certain buildings constructed by businessmen on the land leased out by the Municipal Council and located in the market yard, which the petitioner required the Municipal Council to transfer to it, had not vested in the Petitioner-Committee, and that the Municipal Council was allowed to recover the rent of the land on which the buildings stand. Undoubtedly under section 14 (1) the market committee has the right to require a local authority to transfer any land or building belonging to the local authority, which is situated within the market yard and which immediately before the establishment of the market was being used by the local authority for the purposes of the market. As we are quashing the orders of the Collector and the Deputy Secretary fixing the compensation, it is not necessary for us to consider whether the land or building referred to by the learned counsel satisfied the condition mentioned in section 14 (4) and vested in the committee under sub-section (2). This is a question which the authorities must determine in the fresh proceedings that will now have to be taken for determination of the compensation. If the said land or building did vest in the committee, then the Collector must take into account that property also in the determination of the compensation payable by the petitioner to the Municipal Council. 12. The result is that the petition is allowed and the order dated the 5th November 1963 passed by the Collector, Sagar, and the order dated the 18th November 1964 passed by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Madhya Pradesh, Agricultural Department (respondents 2 and 3) are hereby quashed. The respondent No.1 shall pay the costs of the petitioner. Hearing fee is fixed at Rs. 150. The amount of security deposited by the petitioner shall be refunded.