Judgment :- 1. This is a petition filed by the 10th accused in Preliminary Enquiry case 5 of 1964 against the order of the Sessions Judge of Trichur directing his committal to the Sessions Court, setting aside the order of discharge passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Kunnamkulam. The charges against accused 1 to 8 were for offences of rioting and murder and against accused 9 and 10 for abetment, offences punishable under S.120 B and 302 read with S.109 I.PC. The case for the prosecution is that on 9-91964 accused 1 to 8 trespassed into the office room of deceased John, Superintendent of Thattil Rubber Estate and accused 1 and 2 stabbed him to death. On a consideration of the evidence adduced in the case and on a scrutiny of the documents produced under S.173 Cr. P.C. the learned Magistrate who held the preliminary enquiry found that there were no grounds for committing accused 9 and 10 and discharged them. The State took up the matter in revision under SAW Cr. P.C. to the Sessions Judge of Trichur, who on a reappraisal of the evidence confirmed the order of discharge as far as the 9th accused was concerned, but set aside the order of discharge of the 10th accused and directed his committal. Aggrieved with the order the 10th accused has come up in revision to this court. 2. In preliminary enquiries relating to cases instituted on police report, the procedure to be adopted has been prescribed under S.207A. The Magistrate after satisfying himself that the accused has been furnished with all the documents referred to in S.173 has to proceed to take the evidence of witnesses produced by the prosecution. 2. In preliminary enquiries relating to cases instituted on police report, the procedure to be adopted has been prescribed under S.207A. The Magistrate after satisfying himself that the accused has been furnished with all the documents referred to in S.173 has to proceed to take the evidence of witnesses produced by the prosecution. Sub S.6 then says: "When the evidence referred to in Sub-S. (4) has been taken and the Magistrate has considered all the documents referred to in S.173 and has, if necessary, examined the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him and given the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, such Magistrate shall, if he is of opinion that such evidence, and documents disclose no grounds for committing the accused person for trial, record his reasons and discharge him, unless it appears to the Magistrate that such person should be tried before himself or some other Magistrate, in which case he shall proceed accordingly." Sub-S. (7) says: "When, upon such evidence, being taken, such documents being considered, such examination (if any) being made and the prosecution and the accused being given an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate is of opinion that the accused should be committed for trial, he shall frame a charge under his hand, declaring with what offence the accused is charged". 3. The scope of S.209, 210 and 207A has been considered by a Division Bench of this court in Ahmed v. State of Kerala (1965 KLT.108). As stated therein, the language in S.210 which says that the Magistrate is satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for committing the accused for trial has not been adhered to in Sub-S. (7) of S.207A, Cr. P.C. Despite this difference in the language it is no more and no less than the converse of Sub-S. (6) and when Sub S. (6) says of no grounds for committing, the opinion referred to in Sub-S. (7) must be that the evidence and documents disclose grounds for committing the accused. So to enable the Magistrate to frame a charge and make an order of commitment for trial he should be of opinion that the evidence and documents before him disclose grounds for committing the accused for trial. 4. In Kushi Ram v. Hashim (AIR. So to enable the Magistrate to frame a charge and make an order of commitment for trial he should be of opinion that the evidence and documents before him disclose grounds for committing the accused for trial. 4. In Kushi Ram v. Hashim (AIR. 1959 S.C. 542), the Supreme Court has referred to the distinction between absence of legal evidence and absence of reliable evidence and stated that if it could be said that there is no legal evidence at all in support of the prosecution case the commitment would be bad, but if on the other hand, there is legal evidence the question whether such legal evidence is also reliable evidence should be left to the Sessions Court. 5. Learned State Prosecutor first submitted that S.215, Cr. P.C. would show that the High Court cannot interfere with the Sessions Judge's order directing a commitment to be made except on a point of law. But it would be seen that S.215 refers only to commitment actually made and not to a case where the Sessions judge in exercise of the powers vested in him by SAW of the Code sets aside an order of discharge made by a Magistrate and directs a committal to the Sessions. In such cases the High Court can consider the facts, as well as the questions of law involved to determine whether the Sessions Judge has exercised his discretion under SAW Cr. P.C. properly. However, I need hardly say that the High Court will exercise this power only where it is manifest that the Sessions Judge's order is improper, as for instance, where there is no evidence to prove the offence charged or where it is clear that no court would act on such evidence. (Vide the decision in Muthia Chetty v. Emperor - ILR 30 Mad. 224). 6. Having heard counsel for the petitioner and the State Prosecutor and having carefully gone through the entire evidence on which the prosecution relies in support of their case against the petitioner, I am of opinion that there is no legal evidence on which the petitioner could have been committed for trial to the Sessions Court for offences either of criminal conspiracy or of abetment. The case of conspiracy was founded mainly or only on the evidence of Pw. 3. The case of conspiracy was founded mainly or only on the evidence of Pw. 3. She is the mother of the accused in a prior murder case, where two mazdoors belonging to the union of accused 9 and 10 were murdered. She is, therefore, a highly interested witness, whose evidence ought to be taken with a grain of salt and subjected to a strict scrutiny. She has deposed that she is a neighbour of the 8th accused, that one Thursday after Onam in the month of Chingam she happened to return early from work and while she was attending to her cultivation in her compound all the accused were seen in the house of the 8th accused, that the labourers complained about their difficulty in continuing the strike and accused 9 and 10 asked them to wait for two or three days more. When the labourers asked them about the removal of the superintendent, accused 9 and 10 told them that accused 1 and 2 would see about that. At the request of the defence counsel a plan was got prepared by the police and that plan showed that Pw. 3's house was 500 feet away from the 8th accused's house and both the courts below have with justifiable reason found that it is impossible for her to have overheard the conversation and that her evidence is false and unacceptable. 7. On the ground that there was no other evidence against the 9th accused, his discharge was confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge, but regarding the petitioner reliance has been placed on the evidence of Pw. 6 and one Pareed, who has not been examined, in the committal court. I have scrutinised the evidence of Pareed as recorded in the case diary. He is a labourer in the estate belonging to the union led by accused 9 and 10. According to him he attended the meeting held in the house of the 8th accused on 27-8-'64. He reached the place at the close of the meeting and when he enquired about the decision taken at the meeting the 9th accused said that Shri Panampilly Govinda Menon had gone to Delhi, that he would return on the second and they could resume work on the 3rd or 4th. He reached the place at the close of the meeting and when he enquired about the decision taken at the meeting the 9th accused said that Shri Panampilly Govinda Menon had gone to Delhi, that he would return on the second and they could resume work on the 3rd or 4th. He has further stated that one Velayudhan, a mazdoor then told the 9th accused that his mother had asked him to go and kill the superintendent. The 9th accused said that he need not enquire whether the superintendent is there or not and that even if he does not go they will get another superintendent to be exclusively in charge of labour. The 9th accused was apparently referring to the terms of the settlement arrived at the meeting held in Ramanilayam on 26-8-'64. Ex-P6 is that deed of settlement. What was agreed upon was that the management would appoint another manager to be in exclusive charge of the labour and the industrial relations in the estate. Pw. 5, Municipal Chairman, Trichur has given evidence about the conference held in Ramanilayam on 25-8-'64 when the then Minister for Labour Sri Achuthan was present and where the terms of the settlement were drafted. Pw. 4 the owner of the estate has given evidence that Pw. 5 had taken Ex-P6 for her signature but she gave the reply that she could sign it only after consulting her legal adviser Sri Panampilly Govinda Menon on his return from Delhi. The further evidence is that the labourers then left the place and the witnesses would say that the 10th accused called back some of the accused persons and were seen talking with them. He does not say what the 10th accused told them. Even if he did talk with them there is nothing sinister about it. Obviously the labourers were not satisfied with indefinite waiting and the explanation given by the 9th accused that it is not improbable that the 10th accused called them back in an attempt to pacify them. From the mere fact of their being called back and the petitioner talking to them, it cannot be stated that he was conspiring with them or goading them on to murder the superintendent. On the evidence of Pw. 3 it is even doubtful whether such an incident did really take place. 8. From the mere fact of their being called back and the petitioner talking to them, it cannot be stated that he was conspiring with them or goading them on to murder the superintendent. On the evidence of Pw. 3 it is even doubtful whether such an incident did really take place. 8. The only other evidence on which reliance is sought for by the prosecution is the evidence of Pw. 6. He is a person who supplies water in a lodge run by one Narayana Iyer at Trichur. Room No. 11 in that lodge was taken on rent by one Jayachandran, secretary of the Youth Congress and the evidence is that the 10th accused used to go and stay in that room occasionally. Pw. 6's evidence is that on the morning of 9-9-'64 he saw accused 1, 2 and 10 in that room, that he supplied water and that accused 2 and 10 had their bath. Apart from the fact that he is not very definite about the date, even if the evidence is true it is scarcely sufficient to prove conspiracy or abetment. There is thus no legal evidence on which a committal could have been based. The order of the learned Sessions Judge is thus based upon no acceptable and legally valid evidence and I am constrained to hold that the Sessions Judge's order is improper and unwarranted on the evidence. 9. In the result, the order of the learned Sessions Judge directing committal of the petitioner is set aside. I am told the petitioner has already been committed to the sessions prior to the receipt of the stay order from this court. His committal is, therefore, quashed. The learned Sessions Judge will now expedite the trial of accused 1 to 8 for the offences charged against them. Revision petition is allowed and the stay petition is dismissed. Allowed.