This is an appeal by the defendant No. 1. (2) The facts leading to this appeal are that the defendant No. 1 attached the disputed property in execution of his decree for Rs. 1,858. 44p. The plaintiff filed an objection under Order 21 Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure claiming 20 Bighas of the attached properly as belonging to him under a sale deed dated 19-7-55 executed by the defendant No. 2 in favour of the plaintiff. That objec­tion was dismissed for default. Thereafter the plaintiff brought a suit in the Court of the Munsifff in the year 1958 for declaration of his title to 20 Bighas of the property on the ground that the same belonged to him and was not liable to attachment and sale in execution of the decree by defendant No. 1 against defen­dants 2 to 4. This suit has been decreed by the courts below and the present appeal has been filed by defendant No. 1. (3) Mainly two points have been urged before me. Firstly it is contended that the suit was barred by limitation. The facts relevant are that the suit was first filed in the Court of the Munsiff in the year 1958. That suit was well within time. It was, however, found on the objection raised by the defendant-appellant that the valuation put by the plaintiff in that suit was less and the property was valued more than what was alleged by the plaintiff. Thus, the Munsiff had no jurisdiction to try the suit. The Munsiff decided the matter and held that he had no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit and returned the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper Court. The plaint was then presented before the Court of the Subordinate Judge and the suit was decreed by the courts below (4) The contention of the appellant is that the plaintiff in the circumstances of the case was not entitled to the benefit of Sec­tion 14 of the Limitation Act. It cannot be doubled that if the period during which the case was prosecuted before the Munsiff is excluded from limitation, the present suit will be within time. The only question is whether the plaintiff was entitled to get the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Section 14 reads as follows: "14. It cannot be doubled that if the period during which the case was prosecuted before the Munsiff is excluded from limitation, the present suit will be within time. The only question is whether the plaintiff was entitled to get the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. Section 14 reads as follows: "14. (1) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whe­ther in court of first instance or in a court of ap­peal, against the defendant, shall be excluded, where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of action and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any application, the time dur­ing which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or in a court of appeal against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded,, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of .jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to enter­tain it. Explanation I.-In excluding the time dur­ing which a former suit or application was pending the day on which that suit or application was instituted or made, and the day on which the proceeding therein ended, shall both be counted. Explanation II.--For the purpose of this section, a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding Explanation III.-- For the purposes of this section mis-joinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect or jurisdiction." Two things are essential before the benefit of Section 14 can be claimed by the plaintiff. Firstly that the suit must not have been enter­tained by the former court for want of jurisdic­tion and secondly that the plaintiff must be prosecuting his case with due diligence and in good faith. If these two conditions are satis­fied then the plaintiff is entitled to get the benefit of S. 14. Firstly that the suit must not have been enter­tained by the former court for want of jurisdic­tion and secondly that the plaintiff must be prosecuting his case with due diligence and in good faith. If these two conditions are satis­fied then the plaintiff is entitled to get the benefit of S. 14. The point raised before the court below was that the plaint was deliberately undervalued though the plaintiff knew that the property was valued much more than Rs. 2,000/- and thus it cannot be said that the plaintiff prosecuted his case with due diligence and in good faith. The courts below have come to the categorical finding that the plaintiff was prosecuting his case before the Munsiff with due diligence and in good faith. The circums­tances taken into consideration by the courts below are firstly that the decree-holder him­self in the execution of the decree had valued 44 Bighas of land at Rs. 3.000/- and secondly the plaintiff had himself purchased in the year 1955 27 Bighas of land for Rs. 3.000/-. If under those circumstances, the plaintiff valued his suit at Rs. 2,000/-, it cannot be said that know­ingly and deliberately he undervalued his suit so as to raise an inference that there was want of good faith and due diligence on his part. Mr Lahiri appearing for the appellant has referred to the case of Madhavrao Narayan-rao Patwardhan v. Ramkrishna Govind Bhanu reported in 1959 SCR 564 : ( AIR 1958 SC 767 ) On a close scrutiny of the facts of that case it will appear that the facts are so glaring that no benefit of section 14 could be claimed in that case. The two broad propositions of law that emerge out of that decision are firstly that the Court has not only to come to the conclusion that the action of the plaintiff is not malafide but has further to be satisfied that the plaintiff was prosecuting his case with due diligence before that court and secondly that the burden lies on the plaintiff to prove the circumstances which entitle him to claim the benefit of section 14. The propositions laid down in this case are too well known to require any reiteration. The whole question is whether in the totality of the circumstances it can be aid that the plaintiff was prosecuting his case with due diligence. The propositions laid down in this case are too well known to require any reiteration. The whole question is whether in the totality of the circumstances it can be aid that the plaintiff was prosecuting his case with due diligence. Prosecution includes prosecution in the initial stage, namely, in the fil­ing of the plaint itself and if it can be said that the plaintiff deliberately undervalued the suit, it will be a case of prosecution without due diligence and there will be want of good faith. There may be cases where the initial fil­ing may not be due to want of good faith and yet subsequent prosecution of the case may be without due diligence, and in that case also Section 14 will not be attracted, because the entire period during which the previous pro­ceedings are prosecuted is to be excluded in computing the period of limitation. No circum­stances were pointed out by the defendant No. 1 to show that during the course of the proceedings the plaintiff did not take proper steps and thus subsequent prosecution of the suit was without due diligence The whole emphasis was on the fact that the suit itself was deliberately undervalued and on that be­sides the findings of the courts below which are findings of fact, the circumstances pointed out do not conclusively lead to the inference that the plaintiff did not act in good faith nor can it be said that the plaintiff in the circums­tances could not have been misled to put the valuation of the property at Rs. 2,000/-. There is thus no substance in this contention. (5) The next point urged is that the sale deed was executed by the defendant No. 2 fraudulently with a view to defeat and delay the claim of the creditor. In effect Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act was pleaded by the defendant No. 1 in the present case. Both the courts below have found that there was no fraudulent intention on the part of the judgment-debtor. There are three circumstances which go to show that the sale cannot on the face of it be said to be with a view to defeat and delay the claim of the creditor. Both the courts below have found that there was no fraudulent intention on the part of the judgment-debtor. There are three circumstances which go to show that the sale cannot on the face of it be said to be with a view to defeat and delay the claim of the creditor. Firstly, the property which was available to the decree-holder in this case was 44 Bighas and the property which was sold to the plaintiff and which the plaintiff has claimed is 20 Bighas. Thus it cannot be said that the debt of the defendant No 1 decree-holder could not b» discharged out of the remaining property, and if.there was sufficient property to discharge the debt of the defendant No. I it cannot be said that the sale was with a view to defeat and delay the claim of the creditor. The decree was obtained in the year 1953. The sale deed was taken in the year 1955. Even the property which was attached in the execution was 44 Bighas, much more than the property claimed by the plaintiff. The defendant No. 1 has not examin­ed himself nor has he examined any other witnesses. In the circumstances if the courts below have drawn the inference that the action of the plaintiff is not fraudulent the inference cannot be said to be perverse nor can it be said that the sale was with a view to defeat and delay the claim of the creditor. It cannot be said that the finding is vitiated by any error of law on the part of the courts below. Though the courts below have not used the words 'not with a view to defeat and delay the claim of the petitioner" in the findings but in fact the defendant's plea was under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Ac I and the courts below have considered all the circumstances. (6) In the result, therefore, there is no force in this appeal and it is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs of this appeal. Appeal dismissed.