Judgment :- 1. The revision petition is against an order of the Executive First Class Magistrate purporting to have been made under S.147(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code prohibiting all interference with the exercise of the right of the respondent to use the space in front of the workshop and within the compound wall for the purpose of his trade. 2. A few facts are pertinent for the disposal of this revision petition. The revision petitioner is the owner of 13 rooms in R.S. Nos. 136,137, and 138 in Tiruvangad Amsom, Tellicherry Taluk. Of these, three rooms were let out to the respondent and he is using them as a motor workshop. The plot is about 40 feet in width and the petitioner began to construct a shed after leaving a frontage of 15 feet to the rooms. On 19-9-1963 the respondent filed a petition purporting to be one under S.133 read with S.147, Criminal Procedure Code stating that the construction of the shed will cause inconvenience to him by making it difficult for his customers to take vehicles to his workshop and praying that the revision petitioner may be directed to remove the obstruction caused by digging up the foundation and collecting the stones and to prohibit him from constructing the building. There is also a casual statement that the petitioner is even prepared to use force to carry out his purpose of causing obstruction to the respondent. That petition was forwarded the next day to the Circle Inspector of Police, Tellicherry for report. On 21-10-1963 the Circle Inspector reported that the preparations for the construction of the building caused inconvenience to the petitioner, but the report was significantly silent about the likelihood of any breach of the peace. When that matter was brought to the notice of the Magistrate by the office, he called for a specific report as to the likelihood of a breach of the peace and also as to the possibility of grave loss or injury to the petitioner. When that matter was brought to the notice of the Magistrate by the office, he called for a specific report as to the likelihood of a breach of the peace and also as to the possibility of grave loss or injury to the petitioner. In response to this, a report was sent up by the Circle Inspector on 11-11-1963 stating that there is no likelihood of the breach of the peace, incorporating a report by the Sub-Inspector that on further enquiry he learned that "there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace as both parties are influential", and adding that if the construction of the shed is completed the business of the petitioner will be affected. When these contradictory reports were brought to the notice of the Magistrate, he asked the Circle Inspector for clarification who wrote back saying that it was a slip on his part and action may be taken as recommended by the Sub-Inspector. It may be noted that the Sub-Inspector did not recommend any action. At the foot of this communication by the Circle Inspector is found a note dated 26-9-1963 by the Magistrate "put up a preliminary order under S.133 read with S.147 Criminal Procedure Code." Presumably in obedience to that direction an order was put up with the heading Preliminary Order under S.133 read with S.147, Cr. P.C. which reads: "Whereas it is made to appear that the respondent is creating nuisance by constructing the shed and the Magistrate is satisfied that it is likely to cause a breach of the peace, to remove the obstruction and stop the nuisance within seven days and calling upon the respondent to show cause why the order should not be enforced." This order is dated 27th November, 1963. The petitioner entered appearance and filed his reply stating that the respondent is only entitled to use a limited space in front of the workshop for the convenient use of the three rooms which were rented out and he has constructed the shed leaving enough space for such use and that the petition is a counterblast to the proceedings taken to evict the respondent who has sub-let the rooms. He denied that he had any intention to use force and added that there was neither the occasion nor the need to do so. 3. The case was thereafter posted for evidence. He denied that he had any intention to use force and added that there was neither the occasion nor the need to do so. 3. The case was thereafter posted for evidence. The petitioner in his evidence stated that there was some inconvenience in taking buses and lorries and there was not enough space to reverse the vehicles. He was studiedly silent about the likelihood of a breach of the peace. Three witnesses corroborated the petitioner's evidence. The inspection notes of the Magistrate show "that the construction was completed and that while cars and such small vehicles could even then enter the respondent's workshop, large vehicles like buses and lorries cannot do so with ease and that the construction of the shed causes slight inconvenience in doing so." He also found lorries parked in the available space in the front of the rooms. 4. It is on this material that the learned Magistrate has passed the final order under S.147(2). He has found that as the counter-petitioner has denied the existence of a right to the use of the space, the existence of the right has to be decided by a civil court. However in the same order he has entered a finding that the petitioner had a right to use the open space in front of his workshop for repairs and the construction of the new shed and its use by the petitioner for parking lorries has resulted in interference with the exercise of the right of the petitioner to use the open space. 5. Both the preliminary order under S.133 read with S.147 Cr. P C. and the final order are illegal and bad for want of jurisdiction and must necessarily be set aside. The procedure adopted by the Magistrate in clubbing S.133 & 147 and making a preliminary order under "S. 133 read with S.147" is noval and not warranted by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Proceedings under S.133 are to be taken only in cases of public nuisances as provided for in Chapter X, whereas proceedings under S.147 coming in Chapter XII are entirely for a different purpose. The scope of the two sections as also the procedure to be adopted in initiating and continuing the proceedings are distinct and different. Proceedings under S.133 are to be taken only in cases of public nuisances as provided for in Chapter X, whereas proceedings under S.147 coming in Chapter XII are entirely for a different purpose. The scope of the two sections as also the procedure to be adopted in initiating and continuing the proceedings are distinct and different. This is a case in which even a cursory glance at the allegations in the petition should have told the Magistrate that S.133 is not attracted. Not only is there a total absence of any reference to a public nuisance but there is specific mention that it is only the obstruction of an alleged private right. If S.133 is not to be invoked it is incomprehensible how action could be taken under S.133 read with S.147. This clubbing together is evidently responsible for the passing of a temporary prohibitory order (presumably under S.133) which is not warranted by S.147. The proper procedure for the Magistrate to have adopted was to refuse to take action under S.133 and if he was satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed regarding the alleged right of user of the land to make an order stating the grounds of his being so satisfied and requiring the parties concerned in the dispute to attend the court in person or by pleader and to put in written statements and thereafter to enquire into the matter in the manner provided by S.147 (1) Crl. P.C. In this case the Magistrate could not have acted under S.147 in the absence of a specific allegation regarding the likelihood of the existence of a breach of the peace in the petition itself and on the strength of the belated, halting and contradictory report by the police as to the likelihood of a breach of the peace. The Magistrate gets jurisdiction to take action under S.147 only on being satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists regarding the alleged right of user of any land. S.147 is intended only to provide a speedy remedy for the prevention of the breach of peace arising out of disputes regarding the right of the use of land. 6. S.147 is intended only to provide a speedy remedy for the prevention of the breach of peace arising out of disputes regarding the right of the use of land. 6. It is not possible to lay down any hard and fast rule or to specify the sufficiency of the materials upon which a Magistrate should act before he assumes jurisdiction in any particular case and the High Court will not ordinarily examine whether the grounds upon which the Magistrate was satisfied of the existence of the likelihood of a breach of the peace were adequate to afford a reasonable foundation for his conviction. However it is well settled that in the preliminary order under S.147(1) it is not sufficient to refer to a police report as giving information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists and then stating the Magistrate's satisfaction that the report is correct. At any rate the passing of a preliminary order should not be allowed to lapse into mere routine work as if it were filling up a printed form as has happened in this case. The police report itself on which Magistrate bases the initial order should contain a statement of the facts from which the Magistrate may be satisfied as to the existence of a likelihood of the breach of the peace. At least there should be a definite statement of opinion by a responsible police officer that he apprehends that there will be a disturbance which he cannot himself prevent and therefore seeks for the exercise of the higher powers of the Magistrate to prevent it. In this case what we find in the petition is just a vague and passing observation that the respondent may even resort to force. However that there was no such likelihood is patent from the fact that the original report had nothing to say about it and even a pointed enquiry from the Magistrate about it could only bring out the half-Leaned reply that "as both parties are influential a breach of the peace is likely" and the contradictory report of the Circle Inspector that there was no such likelihood which however he later said was a slip on being asked to explain. Only such a contradictory and halting report could be expected when we find that the petitioner when questioned by the Sub-Inspector had nothing whatsoever to say about the likelihood of a breach of the peace. This report cannot certainly be classed as a definite statement of opinion from a responsible police officer. 7. It is rather surprising that on the foot of such an inconclusive and halfhearted report the Magistrate in his turn asked the office "to put up a preliminary order under S.133 read with 147(1)" as prayed for by the petitioner. The order speaks for itself. It shows that the Magistrate has not applied his mind at all to the question as to the likelihood of a breach of the peace and his part was only to direct the office to prepare an order to be signed by him. The legislature has put in the forefront the satisfaction of the Magistrate as to the likelihood of the existence of a breach of the peace and failure to observe that mandatory provision vitiates the whole proceedings. There is also no whisper of any breach of the peace by the petitioner in his evidence. The object of the section is not to provide parties with an opportunity of bringing their civil disputes before a criminal court or of managing to create evidence for the purpose of a subsequent civil litigation and the Magistrates should guard themselves against the provision being abused by persons using it with the object of getting a declaration in their favour and driving the other side to go to the civil courts to establish his right. It is a typical case in which the Executive First Class Magistrate has fallen into the trap laid by the petitioner who feeling that the slight inconvenience caused to him by the construction of a shed by the owner in a plot which was not included in the rent arrangement could not succeed in the civil court in stopping the exercise of the right by the owner resorted to the criminal court and called in aid S.133 which is not applicable at all and added S.147 and made a passing reference to the possibility of the use of force in support of it. As observed by Raman Nayar, J. in a similar case, the learned Magistrate evidently did not appreciate that he was exercising a judicial function and did not take care to familiarise himself with the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is surprising that having thus passed an order unwarranted by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and without jurisdiction the learned Magistrate should have summoned the courage to say in the counter filed by him before this Court that the revision petitioner is not entitled to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of this Court to canvass the correctness of his order and what is more "there is no jurisdiction for the High Court to interfere with the orders passed" by him. It is high time that the learned Executive First Class Magistrate should learn that the initiation of proceedings under S.133, Criminal Procedure Code where no public nuisance is involved is wrong, the superscription "read with S.147 Criminal Procedure Code" is meaningless and the passing of a final order under S.147(2) without an independent preliminary order under S.147(1) is an open violation of the procedure prescribed, and that the High Court has the jurisdiction to quash such orders passed "without jurisdiction" by subordinate Magistrates. I hope the result of the revision will tell the Magistrate that it is time enough he revises his views about the infallibility of his orders. 8. The revision petition is allowed and the order is set aside. The copy of this order may be forwarded to the learned Executive First Class Magistrate wherever he is. Allowed.