JUDGMENT-This is a notice of motion taken out by the plaintiff for an interim injunction restraining the defendants, their servants and agents and particularly defendants Nos. 2 to 8, their servants and agents from further carrying on the injurious activities mentioned in the plaint and particularly restraining them from using the two Impact Extrusion Presses, dies, patterns, drawings, sketches and other materials taken out or copied from the plaintiff and from attempting to entice away the plaintiffs staff, workmen and customers and carrying on adverse propaganda against the plaintiff and from inducing the plaintiffs creditors into withholding credit to the plaintiff till the final hearing and disposal of the suit. It appears that an ad interim injunction in terms of prayer (a) of the notice of motion was obtained by the plaintiff from the learned Vacation Judge on June 8, 1965 and the same was sought to be served upon the various defendants. According to the plaintiff, defendants Nos. 6 and 7 impeded, obstructed and interfered with the service of the Courts process on them and thereby these defendants are alleged to have committed contempt of the Court. In respect of this alleged contempt the plaintiff has taken out two contempt motions against them; one has been taken out on June 16, 1965, against defendants Nos. 6 and 7, while the other on June 18, 1965, against defendant No.5. Further according to the plaintiff, defendants Nos. 2 to 7 and one Mr. Diogo DSouza, a Foreman of first defendant company used and worked the two Impact Extrusion Presses (referred to in the plaint) in the factory of defendant No. 1 contrary to the ad interim injunction order dated June 8, 1965, the plaintiffs case being that with full knowledge of the said order these defendants and Mr. Diogo DSouza used the said presses on June 9, 10, 11 and 12, 1965 and thereby they have committed contempt of the Courts order. In respect of this alleged contempt the plaintiff has taken out another notice of motion on June 16, 1965, against these persons. Diogo DSouza used the said presses on June 9, 10, 11 and 12, 1965 and thereby they have committed contempt of the Courts order. In respect of this alleged contempt the plaintiff has taken out another notice of motion on June 16, 1965, against these persons. It may also be stated that yet another contempt motion has been taken out by the plaintiff against first defendant-company alleging that the said company through its directors and officers has used and worked the said two Presses with full knowledge of the said ad interim injunction order and this motion has been just served on the company. In other words, apart from the principal notice of motion dated June 8, 1965, for interim injunction the plaintiff has taken out four contempt motions against the various defendants and other persons, two of such contempt motions in respect of the alleged obstruction or interference with the service of the process of the Court, while the other two in respect of the alleged contravention or breach of the ad interim injunction order issued by this Court on June 8, 1965. In the first three contempt motions affidavits in reply and in rejoinder have been filed, while in the last contempt motion first defendant-company has yet to file its reply. 2. On Thursday last the principal motion for injunction and the said three contempt motions appeared on my Board for hearing and when the contempt motions were taken up first, during the course of arguments it transpired that those motions could not be disposed of on affidavits and as the matter required further investigation into the facts and leading of evidence on either side I adjourned those contempt motions for taking evidence. Thereafter, when the principal motion for interim injunction was taken up for hearing Mr. Parpia for the plaintiff urged that the same could not be beard till after the contempt motions were beard and disposed of. Thereafter, when the principal motion for interim injunction was taken up for hearing Mr. Parpia for the plaintiff urged that the same could not be beard till after the contempt motions were beard and disposed of. On the other hand, court S. 31 appearing on behalf of the various defendants contended that there was no necessity to postpone the hearing of the principal motion till after the contempt motions were disposed of; it was pointed out that since the contempt motions had been adjourned for taking evidence it would involve a protracted hearing and that even after these were disposed of on merits one way or the other the aggrieved party might go in appeal and therefore, the principal motion for injunction should be beard. Mr. Parpia then contended that the usual practice always followed by this Court in such a situation was that the contempt motion was beard first and thereafter the principal motion was taken up for hearing, for a party in contempt was not beard unless he purged the contempt or was first dealt with for contempt according to law. On the other hand, Messrs. Nathawani, Mody and Advani contended that there was no such hard and fast rule or practice and that unless either the alleged contemner was shown to have indulged in vexatious conduct or there were any other special reasons, the principal motion could be beard. However, Mr. Nathawani took time till Monday to look into the authorities on the point and that is how the principal motion was again placed on my Board yesterday and since yesterday arguments have been advanced on behalf of the plaintiff as well as on behalf of the defendants on the point as to whether the principal motion for injunction should be beard and disposed of notwithstanding the pendency of the contempt motions, or whether the hearing of the principal motion should be postponed till after the contempt motions were disposed of. I may state that apart from advancing arguments based on first principles, counsel appearing on behalf of the parties referred me to various authorities in support of their rival contentions and since the question arose pretty often I was requested to deal with it fully and deliver a judgment. 3. Before I go to the authorities, certain undisputed facts, which will have a bearing on the question, which I am asked to consider, may be stated. 3. Before I go to the authorities, certain undisputed facts, which will have a bearing on the question, which I am asked to consider, may be stated. In the first place, the ad interim injunction which the plaintiff has obtained on June 8, 1965 is undoubtedly very wide [see prayer (a) of the notice of motion]. By the said ad interim order the plaintiff has not only restrained the defendants, from running defendant-factory No.1 in so far as the use or working of the two Impact Extrusion Presses are concerned as also the use of dies, patterns, drawings said to have been taken or copied from the plaintiff, but has also restrained the defendants from “further carrying on those injurious activities against the plaintiff complained of in the plaint .... and from attempting to entice away the plaintiffs staff workmen and Customers and carrying on adverse propaganda against the plaintiff and from inducing the plaintiffs creditors into withholding credit to the plaintiff". In view of the aforesaid injunction which has been obtained by the plaintiff in very wide terms, it cannot be disputed that great prejudice is being and will be suffered by the defendant so long as the, restraint upon their activities remain in operation secondly, this is not a case where the contempt on the part of the various defendants is an established or proved contempt or a contempt which is very patent on record. The facts constituting the alleged contempt on the part of the various defendants have been seriously disputed by the alleged contemners and therefore, the contempt motions were adjourned by me for taking evidence. Thirdly, the alleged contempt on the part of the various defendants is not a continuous or continuing contempt. The alleged obstruction or interference with the service of the process of the Court is said to have been indulged in by defendants Nos. 5, 6 and 7 only once and for all when the process of the Court was attempted to be served on them. Similarly, defendants Nos. 2 to 8 are said to have worked the two Impact Extrusion Presses on four days viz. June 9, 10, 11 and 12, 1965, contrary to the Courts order. It is, therefore, clear that the alleged contempt on the part of the various defendants is not a continuing contempt. Similarly, defendants Nos. 2 to 8 are said to have worked the two Impact Extrusion Presses on four days viz. June 9, 10, 11 and 12, 1965, contrary to the Courts order. It is, therefore, clear that the alleged contempt on the part of the various defendants is not a continuing contempt. It is in the face of these facts that one has to decide the question whether the hearing of the principal motion should be deferred till after the contempt motions are beard and finally disposed of. Mr. Mody urged that in view of the above facts it was highly desirable that the principal motion should be beard and disposed of as early as possible, and even if it was so beard before the contempt motions were beard no prejudice was going to be caused to the plaintiff, for even after the principal motion was beard and decided one way or the other, the contempt motions could be proceeded with and the defendants, if found guilty, could be properly dealt with by the Court. On the other hand, Mr. Parpia contended that the general rule always was that the party in contempt was never beard unless he purged himself of the contempt or was dealt with in accordance with law for the said contempt. In the present case, he pointed out, the fact that the contempt motions had been adjourned for taking evidence was no reason why the general rule should be departed from and the alleged contempt in the present case being of So very serious nature, the defendants should not be beard on the principal motion till after the contempt motions were finally disposed of. Mr. Mody, however, rejoined by pointing out that the aforesaid rule was never a rule of common law but a rule of canon law and that the same had been adopted by Ecclesiastical Courts and Chancery Courts and was enforced for the purpose of securing obedience to their orders. He contended that since our Courts possess the necessary machinery for securing compliance with their orders and enjoy power to punish a party in default, there was no reason why this canon law rub should be followed by our Courts. He contended that since our Courts possess the necessary machinery for securing compliance with their orders and enjoy power to punish a party in default, there was no reason why this canon law rub should be followed by our Courts. He further contended that even this rule that the party in contempt should not be bard unless he purges himself of the contempt was not an invariable rule and there were several exceptions to it. In support of his contentions Mr. Mody relied upon two passages, one in Oswald on Contempt of Court and the other in Halsburys Laws of England and also placed reliance on several English decisions and in particular upon the observations of Denning L. J. in Hadkinson v. Hadkinson.1 4. On the question as to what is the position of a party in contempt the relevant passage in Oswald on Contempt of Court (3rd edn.) appears at p. 246 and it runs as follows: "The general rule is that parties must clear their contempt before they can be beard, so that a party in contempt, that is to say one against whom a writ of attachment has issued or an order for committal has been made, cannot make an application in the cause until he has purged his contempt, but this is subject to various exceptions. He may be beard if his object is to get rid of the order or other proceeding which placed him in contempt, or to appeal against or resist proceedings taken subsequently to his contempt on the ground of irregularity or want of jurisdiction. If he is brought into Court by a proceeding against him he is entitled to be beard in his defence, as, for instance, to apply for leave to defend in forma pauperis, and any step taken by the opposite party in the cause waives the contempt, as, for instance, the acceptance of an answer from him, or the filing of a cross bill against him." The other passage on which reliance was placed by Mr. Mody appears at para. 73 in Halsburys Laws of England (3rd edn.), Vol. 8. Paragraph 73, runs as follows: "73. Position of party in contempt. The general rule is that a party in contempt, that is a party against whom. Mody appears at para. 73 in Halsburys Laws of England (3rd edn.), Vol. 8. Paragraph 73, runs as follows: "73. Position of party in contempt. The general rule is that a party in contempt, that is a party against whom. a writ of attachment has issued or an order for committal has been made, cannot be beard or take proceedings in the same cause until he has purged his contempt, nor while he is in contempt can be beard to appeal from any order made in the cause; but this is subject to exceptions. Thus a party in contempt may apply to purge the contempt, he may appeal with a view to setting aside the order in which his contempt is founded, and in some cases he may be entitled to defend himself when some application is subsequently made against him. Even the plaintiff in contempt has been allowed to prosecute his action, when the defendant had not applied to stay the proceedings. Probably the true rule is that the party in contempt will not be beard only on those occasions when his contempt impedes the course of justice and there is no other effective way of enforcing his obedience." From the aforesaid two passages and particularly the passage in Halsbury which accurately summarises the position in law pertaining to a party in contempt two propositions appear very clear. In the first place, before the general rule is invoked it must be shown that the party is in contempt, that is to say the contempt must be an established or proved contempt or such as is very patent from the record, for in both the passages it has been stated that a party in contempt meaning a party against whom a writ of attachment has issued or an order for committal has been made, cannot be beard. Secondly, even then it is not an absolute rule and there are several exceptions to it, as for instance when an order which placed a party in contempt is itself with. Our jurisdiction or where a party in contempt may also be beard if his object is to get rid of the order or proceedings which placed him in contempt or where a party in contempt is merely trying to defend himself and not seeking to obtain any assistance or indulgence from the Court on his own. Our jurisdiction or where a party in contempt may also be beard if his object is to get rid of the order or proceedings which placed him in contempt or where a party in contempt is merely trying to defend himself and not seeking to obtain any assistance or indulgence from the Court on his own. The several statements occurring in these passages are based on decided cases cited in the footnotes and I do not think it is necessary to refer to all the cases, but a reference to a couple of cases would not be out of place. 5. In Gordon v. GordonJ the facts were as follows: A decree nisi for the dissolution of marriage on the ground of the wifes adultery had been passed, which directed that the child of the marriage should remain in the custody of the husband until further order and should not be removed out of the jurisdiction without the sanction of the Court. On the same day an order was made ex parte in Chamber that the child should be forthwith delivered to the husband. At that time the child was with the wife out of England. After the decree nisi had been made absolute, the wife returned to England with the child and was for the first time served personally with the orders with reference to the custody of the child. She then took out a summons asking that the decree nisi and the ex parte order might be varied and the custody of the child might be given to her. During the hearing of the summons the wife gave an undertaking not to remove the child out of the jurisdiction of-the Court. On March 10, 1903, the summons was dismissed and the wife was ordered to pay costs out of her separate property notwithstanding that it was subject to a restraint on anticipation. She was also ordered to deliver the child upto the husband forthwith. It was then discovered that she had sent the child out of England 2/3 days before March 10, 1903, and had since gone abroad and remained abroad with the child ever since. On March 12, an order was made for her committal for contempt of Court and directing a writ of attachment to issue against her. It was then discovered that she had sent the child out of England 2/3 days before March 10, 1903, and had since gone abroad and remained abroad with the child ever since. On March 12, an order was made for her committal for contempt of Court and directing a writ of attachment to issue against her. On May 12, the wife gave notice of appeal from so much of the order of March 10, as directed the payment of costs out of her separate estate and it was contended that the Court had no jurisdiction to make it. A preliminary point was raised that when the wife was in contempt her appeal should not be beard. It was held that the general rule that a party in contempt could not be beard until she had purged the contempt applied to proceedings voluntarily instituted by herself in which she made some claim and not to a case where all is set out in respect of some matters of defence, or where, as in that case, she appealed against the order in the case, which is alleged to be illegal as having been made without jurisdiction and that, therefore, the Court would hear the wifes appeal. 6. The above principle, it may be stated, has been accepted by this Court in the case of Ezekiel v. Reuben3 where it was held that the general rule that the party in contempt was not entitled to be beard, did not apply to a case in which the order, for the breach of which contempt is alleged, was challenged on the ground of want of jurisdiction. Chief Justice Beaumont observed as follows (p. 742): " .... No doubt the general rule is that a, party in contempt is not entitled to be beard, but that rule has never been applied to a case in which the order, for the breach of which contempt is alleged, is challenged on the ground of want, of jurisdiction; and the grounds of appeal in this case do assert that the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to order the defendant to execute a formal bill of divorcement. It would certainly be a strange thing if a party directed to do an act by an order beyond the competence of the Court to pass and therefore in law no order, were compelled to do the act before he could challenge the order, I think, therefore, the preliminary objection fails Bud this appeal should be beard," Mirza J., who delivered a concurring judgment, approved of three English decisions: Hill v. Bissel;4. Chuck v. Cremer5 and Gordon v. Gordon and expressed the view that an order made without jurisdiction was a nullity, that there could be no contempt of such an order and that the person, who wanted to challenge the order on that ground should be beard without being required to purge himself of the alleged contempt as a condition for being beard • 7. The other English case of Hadkinson v. Hadkinson though it applied the general rule because of the peculiar facts which obtained therein, would be BO to say a leading case on the subject, inasmuch as it not only discusses the origin but the entire history of this rule of Canori law that was, adopted by the Ecclesiastical and Chancery Courts for the purpose of securing obedience to their orders. The facts in that case were: A wife who had successfully petitioned for divorce, was given the custody of the only child of the marriage, a boy, until further order of the Court, but was directed that he should not be removed out of the jurisdiction 9f the Court without its sanction. Having remarried after the decree absolute she later caused the child to be removed to Australia, where she was living with her present husband. On a summons issued by the father of the child, the Court on May 29, 1952, ordered the mother to return the child within the jurisdiction not later than August 31, 1952. On an appeal by the mother against that order, a preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the father that the appeal should not be beard because the mother had been at all material times and still was in contempt and the Court held that the wifes appeal would not be beard until she had taken the first and essential step towards purging her contempt by returning the child within the jurisdiction. In other words, that was a case where the Court, enforced the general rule that the wife being in contempt could not be beard unless she first obeyed the order of the Court by returning the child within the jurisdiction of the Court. 8. After tracing the origin of this general rule to the ordinance of Lord Bacon of 1618, which laid down that those who were in contempt were not to be beard neither in that suit nor in any other except where the Court of special grace suspended the contempt and after observing that the rule viz. that a party in contempt will not be beard, was never a rule of common law but a rule of canon law, which had been adopted by the Ecclesiastical Courts and Chancery Courts as a means to get the parties to obey their orders. Denning L. J. has gone on to point out that this rule was never applied unless and until the contempt had been established by the issue of writ of attachment or an order for committal. It has been further pointed out by the learned Law Lord that before the Judicature Acts the rule was much used in Chancery, especially in cases where a party had not obeyed an interlocutory order, such as an order to pay costs or to put in an answer and that an attachment was issued ex parte by the clerks in the office without the defaulter being beard, with the result, that he could not be beard in any subsequent proceedings in the suit until he had paid the costs, or put in an answer as the case might be, and also paid the costs of the attachment. After further pointing out that in certain circumstances the ordinance of Lord Bacon was capable of working great injustice and that therefore, in course of practice it came to be much restricted in scope, Denning L. J. has gone on to observe as follows (p. 296): "It was confined to cases where a party in contempt, that is, a party against whom a writ of attachment had issued or an order for committal bad been made, came forward voluntarily and asked for an indulgence in the self same suit. It was no indulgence for a plaintiff to bring his cause to a hearing or for a defendant to defend himself. It was no indulgence for a plaintiff to bring his cause to a hearing or for a defendant to defend himself. Even if he was in contempt, therefore, he was allowed to be beard, unless an order bad been made staying the proceedings: see Ricketts v. Mornington5a and Wilson v. Bates5b. The rule, as so confined to indulgences, continued to be applied in the Chancery court so long as attachment could be issued as of right ex parte without the leave of the court (see Chuck v. Cremer5c); but the rule has seldom been applied since that right was abolished." At page 298 Denning L.J. has made observations in which he has set out what he considered to be the modern rule obtaining in the matter and the observations run as follows : “Those oases seem to me to point the way to the modern rule. It is a strong thing for a court to refuse to hear a party to a cause and it is only to be justified by grave considerations of public policy. It is a step which a court will only take when the contempt itself impedes the course of justice and there is no other effective means or securing his compliance. In this regard I would like to refer to what Sir George Jessel M. R said in a similar connection in In re Clements v. Erlanger5d: I have myself had on many occasions to consider this jurisdiction, and I have always thought that, necessary though it be, it is necessary only in the sense in which extreme measures are sometimes necessary to preserve mens rights, that is, if no other pertinent remedy can be found. Probably that will be discovered after consideration to be the true measure of the exercise of the jurisdiction. Probably that will be discovered after consideration to be the true measure of the exercise of the jurisdiction. Applying this principle I am of opinion that the fact that a party to a cause has disobeyed an order of the court is not of itself a bar to his being beard, but if his disobedience is such that, so long as it continues, it impedes the course of justice in the cause, by making it more difficult for the court to ascertain the truth or to enforce the orders which it may make, then the court may in its discretion refuse to hear him until the impediment is removed or good reason is shown why it should not be removed." 9. From the passages, which I have quoted above from the judgment of Lord Justice Denning in Hadkinson v. Hadkinson, yet another exception to the general rule could be said to have been well established and that is, the general rule would be confined to oases where the party in contempt came forward voluntarily and asked for indulgence from the Court in the self-same cause but would not apply to the party who approached the Court for defending a proceeding that had been launched against him. It has been specifically stated by Lord Justice Denning that it is not an indulgence for a plaintiff to bring his cause to a bearing or for a defendant to defend himself. In other words, when a defendant comes forward to defend he does not seek any indulgence or assistance from the Court, nor does he voluntarily come to the Court to get any benefit for himself on his own and that, therefore, such a party though in contempt, may be beard by the Court. In fact the observations of Denning L. J. appearing at page 298 which I have quoted above, clearly indicate that according to the modern rule it is a strong thing for a Court to refuse to hear a party to a cause and such refusal is only to be justified by grave considerations of public policy, and that such a step the Court may take only when the contempt itself impedes the cause of justice and there is no other effective way of securing obedience. The last portion of the observations also indicates that even where the contempt impedes the course of justice or there is no other way of securing obedience to the orders, the Court has to exercise its discretion in refusing to hear the party in default until the impediment is removed or good reason is shown why it should not be removed. I may observe that the last statement of law appearing in para. 73 in Halsbury (3rd edn., Vol. 8) is based on the aforesaid decision in Hadkinson v. Hadkinson. 10. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion it will appear clear that in the present case there are circumstances which would go to show that the general rule ought not to be followed. In the first place, the contempt said to have been committed by the defendants is yet to be established or proved and it is not a contempt apparent on the record. Secondly, the defendants. are not seeking any indulgence or assistance from the Court, nor have they voluntarily approached the Court to get any benefit for themselves on their own, but are merely defending a proceeding initiated by the plaintiff. Mr. Mody has further pointed out that there is no question of the alleged contempt on the part of the defendants impeding the course of justice in the present cause, inasmuch as the alleged contempt is not a continuing one but a completed conduct on the part of the defendants. In view of these facts and in view of the further fact that great prejudice is being and will be suffered by the defendants so long as the interim injunction remains in operation Mr. Mody urged that the Court in the exercise of its discretion should immediately hear and dispose of the principal notice of motion. 11. Mr. Parpia, however, urged that he was not asking the Court not to hear the defendants at all on the plaintiffs principal notice of motion. He pointed out that his only request was to postpone the hearing of the principal motion till after the contempt motions were disposed of. In other words, Mr. Parpia contended that he was not seeking to shut out the defendants from being beard on the principal notice of motion, but all that he sought was to stay of the hearing of the principal motion till the contempt motions were beard and disposed of. In other words, Mr. Parpia contended that he was not seeking to shut out the defendants from being beard on the principal notice of motion, but all that he sought was to stay of the hearing of the principal motion till the contempt motions were beard and disposed of. However, even on this point certain observations of Dennnig L. J. in Hadkinson v. Hadkinson are very eloquent. The relevant observations which appear at page 296 run as follows: "Since that time (abolition of the Debtors Act, 1869) a party does not to be right to be beard simply by default of pleading or default in payment of costs, nor automatically by disobedience to other interlocutory orders. Other consequence may follow from his default, e. g., proceedings may in the discretion of the Court be stayed until he complies with the order, but unless there is a stay he is not automatically shut out from being beard. It is a matter for the discretion of the court dependent on the circumstances of the case." These observations clearly show that merely because there has been a default or disobedience on the part of a party to carry out any interlocutory order, it does not mean that the right of that party to be beard is automatically barred, unless a Court in its discretion feels that the proceedings should be stayed and these observations again show as to what factors should be taken into account while exercising, the discretion in staying the proceedings and one of such factors to be taken into account while exercising discretion in staying a. plaintiffs action or proceedings is whether the contempt or the disobedience is a continuous one and if so whether the action should be stayed till the order is obeyed. Yet another circumstance, which would weigh with the Court while exercising its discretion whether to stay the proceeding initiated by-the plaintiff or not, would be whether the party in default is guilty of, any contumacious or vexatious conduct in the proceedings, as will be clear from a couple of English authorities. One of the English decisions viz. In re Wickhan, Marony v. Taylor, 6 has been referred to by Denning L.J., in the aforesaid case of Hadkinson v. Hadkinson. One of the English decisions viz. In re Wickhan, Marony v. Taylor, 6 has been referred to by Denning L.J., in the aforesaid case of Hadkinson v. Hadkinson. In Graham v. Sutton, Carden &, Co.7, it was held that mere non-payment of costs of an interlocutory application which the plaintiff has been ordered to pay and his inability to pay furnished no sufficient ground for ordering proceedings in the action to be stayed until payment and the Court has jurisdiction to order such stay in the action is vexatious, or has been vexatiously conducted by him. Lord Justice Lindley observed as follows (p. 368): "The principles as to staying proceedings for non-payment of costs are the same in the Chancery and Queens Bench Divisions, and that a party who has been ordered to pay costs has not paid them because he has no means to pay them is no ground for staying proceedings; and if there were nothing more in the case the order appealed from would be right. But we cannot ignore what was the foundation of the judgment of this Court when the plaintiff was ordered to pay these costs. The evidence then satisfied the Court that the plaintiff, who had got an order in the common form, one which in ordinary circumstances would be right, was making a most oppressive and scandalous use of it. In my judgment, where a plaintiff has been guilty of oppressive conduct in a suit, that with non-payment of costs is a sufficient ground for staying proceedings till the costs are paid." 12. The aforesaid authorities clearly go to show that mere non-obedience of an interlocutory order by itself would not be enough to stay the proceedings and something more by way of vexatious or contumacious conduct on the part of the party in default is required to be shown. Besides, the above two cases dealt with the question as to whether the plaintiffs action, when the plaintiff himself had not carried out an interlocutory order directing him to pay certain costs, should be stayed or not and it has been held that mere non-obedience of an interlocutory order by itself is not sufficient to stay the proceedings. Besides, the above two cases dealt with the question as to whether the plaintiffs action, when the plaintiff himself had not carried out an interlocutory order directing him to pay certain costs, should be stayed or not and it has been held that mere non-obedience of an interlocutory order by itself is not sufficient to stay the proceedings. In the present case it has not been suggested that the defendants or any of them are guilty of any vexatious or oppressive conduct,--save of course the alleged contempt’s, which they are said to have committed in respect whereof contempt motions are still pending. I do not, therefore, think that this is a case where the proceedings in the plaintiffs notice of motion for interim injunction should be stayed till after the motions for contempt are disposed of. In other words, I do not think that the defendants should be even temporarily barred from being beard in defence to the plaintiffs motion for interim injunction. 13. In the result, I direct that the principal motion for interim injunction be proceeded with. Order accordingly: