Collector Of Customs v. Kanungo — 1965 DIGILAW 146 (CAL)

JUDGMENT 1. ON October 17, 1959, the establishment of the respondent No. 1, who carries on business as importer and dealer of watches, at No. 129, Radhabazar Street, Calcutta, was searched by the customs authorities. 390 pieces of wrist watches were seized by the customs authorities on the ground that these watches were not lawfully or validly imported. On January 27, 1960, 43 out of the said 3:90 watches were released by the customs authorities. A further lot of 64 watches were released on September 5, 1960, leaving a balance of 283 watches which still remained in the custody of the customs authorities. A notice dated August 12, 1960, was served upon the respondent calling upon it to produce documentary evidence in support of legal importation of 283 watches, within one week. In this notice it was stated that failing production of sufficient evidence as required, the respondent No. 1 was to show cause why the said 283 watches should not be confiscated under Section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act. It is necessary to set out the material portion of the said notice which is as follows :- "The importation of watches into India without a valid import Trade Licence is prohibited under section 19 of the Sea Customs Act read with section 3 (1) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 and Govt. of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry order No. 17155, dated 7. 12. 55 (as amended), the offence being punishable under section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act read with section 3 (2) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act. In view of the foregoing M/s. Kanungo and Co. are required to explain the matter in writing within one week from the date of receipt of this notice. They are also called upon to show cause in writing within the same period of time why the said 280 pieces of watches should not be confiscated under section 167 (8) Sea Customs Act read with section 3 (2) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 and why penal action should not be taken against them under section 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act. " 2. " 2. THE respondent No. 1 therefore moved a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution and obtained a rule nisi which was disposed of by an order made by consent on January 25, 1962, on the following terms:- "This Rule is disposed of by consent. It is agreed that the customs authorities shall decide grounds 10, 11 and 13 mentioned in paragraph 27 of the petition on which this Rule was issued as preliminary issues first of all. If the customs authorities decide the preliminary issues against the petitioner, then only they will be entitled to proceed with the case against the petitioner on merits. It is further agreed that the petitioner shall file its explanations showing cause against the charges leveled against it within a fortnight from today and the customs authorities shall take up the case against the petitioner within one week, thereafter. It is also agreed that the customs authorities shall deliver a judgment on the preliminary issues and then proceed with the case, if at all. The petitioner will have liberty to move against the preliminary judgment if it likes. " In terms of the said order the customs authorities considered the preliminary issues mentioned therein and decided them against the respondent No. 1. Aggrieved by this Order the respondent No. 1 again moved a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution and obtained a rule nisi. At the hearing of the said rule, the learned counsel for the customs authorities made certain concessions, which were recorded in the order by which the said rule was disposed of, which are as follows: - "With the two clarifications agreed upon by Mr. Kar namely (1) that if the petitioner is found guilty of having violated the order under section 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Order made in 1955 and (2) if it be found to have imported watches across the customs frontiers as notified under section 3a of the Sea Customs Act, then only the charge will be taken as established. I do not think that the charge leveled against the petitioner suffers from vagueness as complained of by the petitioner any longer. With the two clarifications made in the charge the adjudication proceedings against the petitioner should now proceed. Subject to the clarifications as hereinbefore made, I discharge the Rule. I do not think that the charge leveled against the petitioner suffers from vagueness as complained of by the petitioner any longer. With the two clarifications made in the charge the adjudication proceedings against the petitioner should now proceed. Subject to the clarifications as hereinbefore made, I discharge the Rule. Let the adjudication proceedings against the petitioner now proceed on the charges as hereby clarified. " 3. ON the basis of this order the matter was again considered by the respondent No. 2, who by his order dated June 15, 1963, directed confiscation of 280 wrist watches. On this order of confiscation being made, the respondent No. 1 moved this Court for the third time under Art. 226 of the Constitution for the issue of appropriate writs for quashing the said order and also for an order directing the customs authorities not to give effect to the said order. A rule nisi was issued and this rule was made absolute on July 21, 1964, by Banerjee, J., by a judgment and order, whereby the said order dated June 15, 1963, was quashed and the watches, unless made the subject-matter of other proceedings, were directed to be returned to the respondent No. 1. This appeal is directed against this judgment and order. 4. MR. G. P. Kar, learned counsel far the appellants, contended that in order to appreciate the scope and effect of the restrictions in force on the import (of clocks and watches, it was necessary to trace the historical development of these restrictions. I do not think that for the purpose of this appeal, it is necessary to examine the historical development of the law relating to restrictions imposed on import of watches and clocks in this country. But since a good deal of emphasis was laid on this question, I should briefly note Mr. Kar's contentions. Mr. Kar argued that until 1939 there was free trade in the matter of import of clocks and watches in India, there being no restrictions on such imports. After the commencement of the war restrictions were imposed on the import of various commodities, including watches and clocks. But the object of these restrictions was not so much to control or regulate trade and commerce, as to save shipping space for war purposes. After the commencement of the war restrictions were imposed on the import of various commodities, including watches and clocks. But the object of these restrictions was not so much to control or regulate trade and commerce, as to save shipping space for war purposes. The Defence of India Act, 1939, was enacted to deal with various questions connected with the prosecution of the war and the Defence of India Rules were also framed in 1939 to give effect to the objects of the Defence of India Act. By Rule 84 (2) of the said Rules the Central Government assumed powers to prohibit or restrict the import or export of all goods or goods of any specified description from or to any specified person or class of persons. By Rule 84 (3) the Central Government assumed powers to issue notifications prohibiting, restricting or otherwise controlling, interalia, import, export or shipment of all goods or goods of any specified description. By a Notification dated July 1, 1943, issued by the Central Government in exercise of the powers under Rule 84 (3) of the said Rules, the bringing into British India by sea, land or air various goods was prohibited, except certain goods, specified in the schedule to the said Notification and subject to the conditions laid down thereby. Clause (xiii) of the said Notification provided that goods specified in the schedule to the said Notification might be imported on a special license. Item No. 308 of Part (IV) of the Schedule to the said Notification was clocks and watches and parts thereof. Therefore, the result of this Notification was that clocks, watches and parts thereof could be imported only on a licence issued for that purpose. The next Notification referred to by Mr. Kar was a Notification of the Ministry of Commerce dated September 12, 1949, where-by the rig our of the restrictions on imports was relaxed. Item No. 308 (ii) of Appendix E to the said Notification dealt with the question of import of watches and parts thereof. Under this Notification watches could not be imported at all from Dollar area or West Germany, but restricted import was permitted from Switzerland subject to quota and. monetary ceiling. Mr. Kar next argued that the Defence of India Act expired in 1946, but by Ordinance XV of 1946 the operation of the Defence of India Act was continued till March 24, 1947. monetary ceiling. Mr. Kar next argued that the Defence of India Act expired in 1946, but by Ordinance XV of 1946 the operation of the Defence of India Act was continued till March 24, 1947. From March 25, 1947, the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, came into force and therefore, the restrictions which were imposed on import of various goods including clocks and watches came to be controlled by the provisions of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. By S. 3 (1)of the said Act the Central Government was given powers, which were identical with those which were conferred upon it by Rule 84 of the Defence of India Rules. S. 3 (2) of the said Act had a very important bearing on the import and export of goods. It provided that all goods to which any order under subsection (1) of section 3 applied should be deemed to be goods of which the import or export had been prohibited or restricted under S. 19 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and all the provisions of that Act should have effect accordingly. In other words, restrictions imposed on the import or export of goods under S. 19 of the Sea Customs Act were made applicable to all goods in respect of which an order was made under S. 3 (1) of the said Act. Further all the provisions of the Sea Customs Act were made applicable to goods in regard to which an order under S. 3 (1) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, was made. In exercise of the powers conferred by S. 3 and S. 4 (a) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, the Government of India issued the Imports (Control) Order, 1955. Under clause (3) of this Order, no person is to import any goods set out in Schedule 1 thereto except in accordance with a licence or customs clearance permit granted by the Central Government or by any officer authorised in that behalf. Referring to the several provisions in the Defence of India Rules, the Imports and Exports (Control) Act and the Imports (Control) Order, Mr. Kar contended, that from 1939 up to the time the respondent No. 1 moved its petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, prohibition and restrictions were imposed on the import of watches. Referring to the several provisions in the Defence of India Rules, the Imports and Exports (Control) Act and the Imports (Control) Order, Mr. Kar contended, that from 1939 up to the time the respondent No. 1 moved its petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, prohibition and restrictions were imposed on the import of watches. Import from some countries were altogether prohibited, while import from some other countries was regulated by imposing a condition that such import could be made only on a licence to be issued by the appropriate authorities. Mr. Kar argued that at all material times the import of watches without a licence, or a customs clearance permit, was illegal and such import would attract the penal provisions of the Sea Customs Act which, inter alia, provided for confiscation of goods illegally imported into India. It is this penalty of confiscation which has been imposed in respect of watches which were seized by the customs? authorities from the respondent No. 1. The principal question before us in this appeal is whether this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Act. 226 of the Constitution can interfere with the order confiscating 280 wrist watches made by the respondent No. 2 on June 15, 1963. That order was made in exercise of the power conferred by S. 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. The jurisdiction to make an order under S. 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, is vested in the customs authorities and on nobody else. 5. THE statute has imposed a duty on the customs authorities to make an order for confiscation in certain circumstances. If any goods, the importation of which is prohibited or restricted, are found to have been imported into the country contrary to such prohibition or restriction, such goods are liable to be confiscated, and persons concerned with the offence, are liable to a penalty not exceeding three times the value of the goods or not exceeding Rs. 1000/ -. That is how the statute has dealt with illegal importation of goods, the importation of which is prohibited or restricted. S. 19 of the sea Customs Act is attracted by reason of the provisions in S. 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act and Section 3 (2) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. 1000/ -. That is how the statute has dealt with illegal importation of goods, the importation of which is prohibited or restricted. S. 19 of the sea Customs Act is attracted by reason of the provisions in S. 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act and Section 3 (2) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. As I have said earlier, in exercise of the powers under Sections 3 and 4 (a) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, the Imports (Control.) Order dated December 7, 1955, was issued by the Central Government, prohibiting the importation of various goods mentioned in the Schedule to the said Order and item No. 308 of Part (IV) of the Schedule to the said Order specified clocks and watches and parts thereof. On August 21, 1961, a show cause notice was served upon the respondent No. 1 by which it was informed that importation of watches into India without a licence was prohibited under S. 19 of the Sea Customs Act read with S. 3 (1) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, and the said Imports (Control) Order, dated December 7, 1955, and the offence of illegal importation was made punishable under S. 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act read with S. 3 (2) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act. The said Notice was challenged by the respondent No. 1 on the ground that no Notification was issued under S. 19 of the Sea Customs Act, and the Imports (Control) Order dated December 7, 1955, did not appear to have been made under S. 19 of the Sea Customs Act and was not a Notification under that Section and further that the provisions of the sea Customs Act were not attracted to the seized goods and therefore, the provisions of S. 167 (8) of the said Act did not apply to the seized goods. The said show cause notice which is the basis of the impugned order of confiscation is annexure 'c' to the petition of the respondent No. 1 and is to be found at page 32 of the Paper Book. All the particulars of the charges against the respondent No. 1, regarding the importation of the wrist watches have been set out in great detail in the said show cause notice. All the particulars of the charges against the respondent No. 1, regarding the importation of the wrist watches have been set out in great detail in the said show cause notice. By the said notice the respondent No. 1 was called upon to furnish its explanation, with regard to the charges, within a week from the date of receipt of the notice, and it was also called upon to show cause why the said 280 wrist watches should not be confiscated under the different statutory provisions, mentioned above. The impugned adjudication order dated June 15, 1963, by which the penalty of confiscation was imposed, is annexure 'k' to the petition and is to be found at page 78 of the Paper Book. From this order it appears that after deciding the three preliminary issues, the respondent No. 2 made the said confiscation order. Personal hearing was given to the respondent No. 1 before determination of the said preliminary issues and also before making the final order of confiscation. It appears from the said show cause notice dated August 21, 1961, that the respondent No. 1 had furnished various explanations regarding its possession of the watches which formed the subject-matter of the charges. Regarding 54 watches it was alleged that they were received from various customers for correction and repair, and a correction slip book and a repair receipt book were produced in support of this contention. Enquiries were further made by the customs authorities from the persons from whom the said 54 watches were alleged to have been received by the respondent No. 1 and the answers given by these persons are set out at page 34 of the Paper Book. 6. REGARDING the watches alleged to have been given to the respondent No. 1 by various persons for repairs, it was found that none of such persons gave any watches to the respondent No. 1 for repairs and they were not in possession of any repair receipts. With regard to one watch alleged to have been received from one Haren Chakravarty, the address of the person was not produced. Regarding 48 wrist watches a cashmemo of National Watch Company, Bigbazar, Pondicherry, was produced. But it was found that no such firm was in existence at Pondicherry. With regard to one watch alleged to have been received from one Haren Chakravarty, the address of the person was not produced. Regarding 48 wrist watches a cashmemo of National Watch Company, Bigbazar, Pondicherry, was produced. But it was found that no such firm was in existence at Pondicherry. Regarding 40 wrist watches a cashmemo of Pankaj Watch Company, 129, Radhabazar Street, Calcutta, was produced, but this cashmemo was not found on October 17, 1959 at the shop room of the respondent No. 1, which was searched on that date. But even then the said firm of Pankaj Watch Company was found not to exist at 129, Radhabazar Street, on June 11, 1959, that being the date on the cashmemo, which was produced. Regarding a further lot of 66 watches a cashmemo of Trailakyanath Auddy bearing the date June 29, 1958, of 83, Monohardas Street, Calcutta, was produced, but this cashmemo was not found on the date of search which was October 17, 1959. But even then this firm of Trailakyanath Auddy was found not to exist at 83, Monohardas Street, Calcutta, on June 29, 1959. Regarding a further lot of 11 Castell watches, it was found on investigation that they were not imported from Switzerland by Ruby Watch Company as was claimed. Regarding 6 Rocar wrist watches it was found that they were not purchased from Ruby Watch Company as claimed by the respondent No. 1. A further lot of 4 pieces of Cavalry and 2 pieces of Tiny wrist watches were claimed to have been purchased from Anglo Swiss Watch Company, Calcutta. On investigation it was found that these watches were not purchased from Anglo Swiss Watch Company. One Romer watch claimed to have been imported from Switzerland was not found in the stock register of the respondent No. 1 and in respect of 11 watches, the respondent No. 1 failed to produce any documentary evidence in support of its claim to have imported these watches. I have dealt with the charges in the show cause notice dated August 21, 1961, at some length. The show cause notice shows that investigation was conducted by the customs authorities into each single explanation offered by the respondent No. 1 with regard to its claim for lawful importation of the watches. I have dealt with the charges in the show cause notice dated August 21, 1961, at some length. The show cause notice shows that investigation was conducted by the customs authorities into each single explanation offered by the respondent No. 1 with regard to its claim for lawful importation of the watches. Evidence produced by the respondent No. 1 was sifted, enquiries made, receipts and vouchers were checked to verify the truth or falsity of the claims advanced by the respondent No. 1. Consideration of the manner in which the customs authorities dealt with the charges it is necessary to see if the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ of certiorari can be invoked by the respondent No. 1. The principles on which this Court directs issue of a writ of certiorari to interfere with a decision of the Tribunal are indeed well settled and I shall now proceed to discuss the question of jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ of certiorari to quash the adjudication order made by the respondent No. 2. 7. THE question of jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with a decision of a Tribunal by issuing a writ of certiorari has been the subject-matter of several decisions of the Supreme Court and also of this Court. In dealing with a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution for a writ of certiorari this Court does not sit in appeal over the decision of the Tribunal which is impugned, nor is it for this Court to appreciate the evidence on which the Tribunal acted in arriving at its decision. The correctness of the Tribunal's decision cannot be questioned or rectified merely on the ground that there is an error of fact on the records or that the decision has been vitiated by incorrect appreciation of evidence by the Tribunal. The sufficiency of evidence is a matter for the exclusive consideration of the Tribunal itself, and such matter cannot be agitated before a writ Court. The law on this question has been settled by the Supreme Court in (1) T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, (1954) S. C. A. 620, (2) Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd., (1952) S. C. A. 287, (3) Girdharilal Bansidhar v. The Union of India and Ors., A. I. R. (1964) S. C. 1519, (4) The State of Orissa and anr. v. Murlidhar Jena, A. I. R. (1983) S. C. 405. The same question was considered by this Court in (5) Addl. Collector of Customs and Ors. v. Sohanlal Bahl, 69 C. W. N. 439 and upon a consideration of the views expressed by the Supreme Court in the several decisions mentioned above, this Court came to the conclusion that the correctness of the decision of the Tribunal could not be rectified merely on the ground that there was an error of fact on the face of the records or that the decision of the Tribunal had been vitiated by an incorrect appreciation of the evidence by the Tribunal. In dealing with the question of the correctness of the Tribunal's decision, this Court does not sit in appeal over the decision of the Tribunal, nor is it for this Court to appreciate the evidence on which the Tribunal acted in arriving at the decision. The principles on which this Court interferes with a decision of a Tribunal by issuing a writ of certiorari as enunciated by the Supreme Court in (6) Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, (1955) S. C. A. 105, have been accepted by the Supreme Court in later cases as the correct statement of law on this question. After referring to several earlier decisions the Supreme Court in that case held at p. 243 of the report as follows:- "On these authorities, the following propositions may be taken as established: (1) 'certiorari' will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) 'certiorari' will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of 'certiorari' acts in the exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal, even if they be erroneous. (3) The Court issuing a writ of 'certiorari' acts in the exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal, even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to re-hear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in 'certiorari'. These propositions are well settled and are not in dispute. " 8. THIS statement of the law makes it plain that even if the customs authorities were wrong in their decision, it is not for this Court in a writ petition, to interfere with, revise, set aside or correct such a decision. Mr. B. C. Dutt, however, contended that in the appeal now before us there was no material to show that his client had illegally imported the wrist watches. He argued that unless there was evidence of such illegal importation, the customs authorities could not make an order for confiscation under S. 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act. Mr. Dutt argued that so far as the question of illegal importation of the wrist watches by his client was concerned, there was no evidence at all. Mr. Dutt's contention was that it was not a question of sufficiency of evidence on which the customs authorities acted. But it was a question of the customs authorities having come to a conclusion on the question of illegal importation on no evidence at all. Such conduct on the part of the customs authorities, Mr. Dutt argued, warranted interference by a writ of certiorari. There is, however, no force in this contention of Mr. Dutt. The customs authorities had before them ample materials for coming to a decision on the question. Such conduct on the part of the customs authorities, Mr. Dutt argued, warranted interference by a writ of certiorari. There is, however, no force in this contention of Mr. Dutt. The customs authorities had before them ample materials for coming to a decision on the question. Firstly, the wrist watches undoubtedly were of foreign make, secondly, they were seized from the custody of the respondent No. 1, thirdly, no licence was issued for the importation of these wrist watches, fourthly, according to the respondent No. 1 the wrist watches were obtained by it from various parties either for repair or for correction Or by purchase and these statements were found to be false and finally no satisfactory explanation was produced by the respondent No. 1 with regard to its possession of the same. It is on these materials that the customs authorities came to the conclusion that the watches had been illegally imported without a licence and therefore, they were liable to be confiscated. Mr. Dutt argued that even assuming that his client had failed to produce satisfactory explanation as to how he came into possession of these watches, such failure was no proof of illegal importation and unless illegal importation was proved, an order for confiscation could not be made. But we are not impressed by this contention of Mr. Dutt. If the customs authorities had materials from which they could draw an inference of fact, it is not for this Court, in a writ petition, to interfere with such decision of the customs authorities by issuing a writ of certiorari. If there were materials from which an inference of fact could be drawn and such an inference has in fact been drawn, this Court should not interfere with a writ of certiorari with the decision based on such inference. In (7) Syed Yakoob v. K. S. Radhakrishnan and Ors., A. I. R. (1964) S. C. : 477, this very question, namely, the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere had been gone into and it was held at page 479 of the report as follows: "There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or question in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was in-sufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. " If, therefore, the customs authorities had on the material before them drawn an inference of fact that the wrist watches were imported illegally, it would not be for this Court to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal based on such an inference. Indeed the customs authorities had released a number of wrist watches with regard to which satisfactory explanation was produced by the respondent No. 1 and the order of confiscation was made with regard to only 280 watches. In making the order of confiscation, if the Tribunal had drawn an inference that these watches were illegally imported, it would not be for this Court to quash the decision of the Tribunal based on such an inference of fact drawn from materials before the Tribunal. Mr. In making the order of confiscation, if the Tribunal had drawn an inference that these watches were illegally imported, it would not be for this Court to quash the decision of the Tribunal based on such an inference of fact drawn from materials before the Tribunal. Mr. Dutt contended that the trial Court had come to the conclusion that mere possession of the watches by the respondent No. 1 would not lead to the inevitable inference that the respondent No. 1 had imported or been concerned in the importation of the watches seized. But on the law as it stands, it is not for this Court to draw an inference on the facts, namely, that the respondent No. 1 had not illegally imported the wrist watches, and then substitute such inference for the inference drawn by the customs authorities. If a decision is based on an inference of fact, such a decision can be interfered with a writ petition only on the principles discussed above and on no other. It was next contended by Mr. Dutt that before an order for confiscation could be made, there must be evidence that his client was involved in or concerned with the illegal importation of the wrist watches. In support of this contention he referred to the two concessions made by the learned counsel for the customs authorities as recorded in the judgment of Banerjee, J., dated March 7, 1963, in Matter No. 151 of 1982. These concessions are:- (a) That there was a Notification made under S. 3 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, being Notification No. 17/55 dated December 7, 1955, and if the customs authorities failed to bring; the wrist watches within the mischief of the Notification, the charge against the petitioner must fail; (b) that there was a Notification defining the Customs frontier of India made under S. 3a of the Sea Customs Act and if the petitioner was found guilty of having imported wrist watches from beyond such frontier, then only the Charge against the petitioner would be taken to have been proved. Relying upon these concessions made in the earlier proceedings, Mr. Relying upon these concessions made in the earlier proceedings, Mr. Dutt contended that before the order for confiscation could be made by the customs authorities, it must be proved that his client was responsible for the illegal importation across the customs frontier and unless this was proved the order for confiscation could not be made. Mr. Dutt argued that the proceedings before the customs authorities, in which the impugned order was made, must be held subject to the concessions mentioned above. In other words the liability of his client to the charge of illegal importation would depend upon proof of its having been involved it. such importation. This contention of Mr. Dutt is not well conceived. It is true that certain concessions had been made in Matter No. 151 of 1962 (Kanungo and Co, v. Collector of Customs and Ors), but the rule issued in that matter was discharged, and we are concerned in this appeal only with the rule issued in Matter No. 358 of 1963, out of which this appeal arises, and that rule was expressly limited to grounds I, II, III set out under paragraph 40 of the petition. It is, therefore. necessary to examine the said three grounds to which the rule was expressly limited. In ground I it is alleged that the directions given by the Court in the orders dated January 25, 1962, and March 7, 1963, have not been followed or complied with and therefore, the order is bad and illegal. In ground II it is alleged that there was no finding by the customs authorities that the seized watches were imported after 1955 and there is no evidence before the Additional Collector of Customs that the watches were imported after 1955. In ground III it is alleged that there is no finding by the customs authorities that the seized watches were imported into India across the customs frontier as notified under S. 3a of the Sea Customs Act. In the first of the two concessions mentioned above., the customs authorities are required to bring the wrist watches within the mischief of the Import (Control) Order, 1955. dated December 7, 1955, to which reference has been made by me earlier in this judgment Clause (3) of this Order is the material Clause. In the first of the two concessions mentioned above., the customs authorities are required to bring the wrist watches within the mischief of the Import (Control) Order, 1955. dated December 7, 1955, to which reference has been made by me earlier in this judgment Clause (3) of this Order is the material Clause. Under this Clause no person shall import any goods of the descriptions specified in Schedule I of the Order except under and in accordance with a licence or a customs clearance permit granted by the Central Government or by any officer specified in Schedule II. In the first place, clocks and watches and parts thereof are Item No. 308 of Part. (IV) of Schedule I to the said Order. Therefore, quite plainly, wrist watches cannot be imported except on the terms of a licence to be issued by the appropriate authorities. Admittedly the respondent No. 1 had obtained no licence for the importation of the wrist watches seized. If goods mentioned in the Schedule to the said Order are to be imported, such importation can be made only on a licence and according to the terms there-of. No licence was obtained by the respondent No. 1 for the importation of the wrist watches. Therefore, the customs authorities in making the order of confiscation had fulfilled the terms imposed by the first concession mentioned above. Turning now to the second concession, it will be seen that this related to a Notification issued under the powers conferred by S. 3a of the Sea Customs Act, by which the Central Government defined the customs frontiers of India as the boundaries of the territories of India including territorial waters of India. Under the second concession the charge against the respondent No. 1 would be taken to have been proved, if it was found guilty of importing the wrist watches from beyond such frontiers. The customs authorities in course of their investigation, had collected various materials for the purpose of verifying the claim made by the respondent No. 1 regarding its possession of the writ watches. As I have noticed earlier all the wrist watches are of foreign make. From enquiries made by the customs authorities they came to the conclusion that the explanation offered by the respondent No. 1 regarding possession of the watches was false. These explanations were verified and checked by the customs authorities. As I have noticed earlier all the wrist watches are of foreign make. From enquiries made by the customs authorities they came to the conclusion that the explanation offered by the respondent No. 1 regarding possession of the watches was false. These explanations were verified and checked by the customs authorities. The respondent No. 1 was informed about the result of the verifications, Yet no attempt was made by the respondent No. 1 to prove or substantiate the claims made by it with regard to its possession of the watches. It is from these facts that the customs authorities drew the inference of illegal importation of the watches across the customs frontiers by the respondent No. 1. Although the respondent No. 1 knew that the explanation offered on its behalf had been found to be false, no attempt was made by it to prove the truth or correctness of the explanations. It is in the facts of the case, and on the result of the enquiries and investigations made by the customs authorities, that they drew the inference about illegal importation. The inference was an inference of fact and the customs authorities were entitled to draw the inference in the adjudication proceedings. 9. I have already discussed the question of jurisdiction of the customs authorities to draw an inference of fact and also the jurisdiction of this Court to interfere with such an inference of fact. I, therefore, need not revert to that topic once again. In ground No. II it was alleged that there was no finding that the seized watches were imported into India after 1955 and there was no evidence of importation of the watches after 1955. There is nothing in this ground requiring proof of importation of the watches by the respondent No. 1. The only question raised in this ground was regarding proof of importation after 1955. But the case made out by the respondent No. 1 in the adjudication proceedings was that the watches had been purchased by it between 1956 and 1959. It was not its case that the watches were acquired by purchase or otherwise at any time before 1956. In ground No. III the only question raised was about importation of the watches across the customs frontier. It was not its case that the watches were acquired by purchase or otherwise at any time before 1956. In ground No. III the only question raised was about importation of the watches across the customs frontier. No additional or further evidence was necessary to prove such importation as undoubtedly all the watches seized were of foreign make, and they must have been imported into this country across the customs frontier. Grounds I, II and III are the only grounds to which the rule issued in this matter was limited and we cannot accept Mr. Dutt's contention that the order for confiscation could not be made by the customs authorities without proof of importation and the there was in fact no such proof. Sufficiency of proof is a matter into which this Court cannot go In a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. That : s a matter entirely for the consideration of the adjudicating officer who made "he order of confiscation. 10. THE next contention of Mr. Dutt was that onus of proof of the importation of the wrist watches was entirely on the customs authorities who failed to discharge the onus and therefore, the order for confiscation could not be made. In support of this contention, Mr. Dutt referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in (8) Amba Lal v. Union of India, A. I. R. (1961) S. C. : 264, In that case it was held that where the charge;; were made regarding illegal importation of goods and a penalty was imposed under the Sea Customs Act, the burden of proof was on the customs authorities and they had to bring home the guilt to the person alleged to have committed a particular offence by adducing satisfactory evidence. But in that case it was held that no such evidence was forthcoming to prove the case of the customs authorities, A question was raised in that case of shifting of the onus from the customs authorities to the person charged, but it was held that the onus did not shift either under the provisions of S. 178a of the Sea Customs Act or S. 5 of the Land Customs Act or S, 106 of the Evidence Act. But in that case the customs authorities produced no evidence at all in support of their case. But in that case the customs authorities produced no evidence at all in support of their case. In this case, on the other hand, the customs authorities had ample evidence in their possession to disprove the claim of the respondent No. 1 that the wrist watches were acquired by the respondent No. 1, lawfully between the years 1956 and 1959. Having produced this evidence which completely demolished the claim of the respondent No. 1, that the wrist watches had been obtained by it by various lawful means, the customs authorities had discharged the onus of proof which undoubtedly was on them. If the respondent No. 1, who way fully aware of the evidence collected by the customs authorities, desired to challenge such evidence, it was for it to produce evidence to repel or controvert the case sought to be made out by the customs authorities. In the facts of this case the onus of proof was sufficiently discharged by the customs authorities and the onus of proof regarding lawful importation of the wrist watches shifted on the respondent No. I. Mr. Dutt also referred to a Bench decision of this Court reported in 68 C. W. N. 383. In that case certain quantities of dyes of foreign make and certain other articles were seized by the police. The customs authorities obtained possession of the goods on the basis of an order of a Magistrate and thereafter a charge was made against the petitioner that the goods were imported without a permit or a valid import licence and for that reason they were liable to be confiscated. The petitioner's case was that be was bonafide purchaser of the seized goods and he also alleged that he produced documentary evidence in support of his purchase. But this allegation regarding production of documentary evidence was denied and the Court placed no reliance on the story of purchase. It way in these facts that it was held that the onus of proof that the goods were imported without a licence or a permit was on the customs authorities. 11. THIS decision is of no assistance to the respondent No. 1 in the appeal now before us, inasmuch as the customs authorities had in their possession ample evidence to disprove the contention of the respondent No. 1 regarding its claim of lawful possession of the watches. 11. THIS decision is of no assistance to the respondent No. 1 in the appeal now before us, inasmuch as the customs authorities had in their possession ample evidence to disprove the contention of the respondent No. 1 regarding its claim of lawful possession of the watches. The show cause notice dated August 21, 1961, was an intimation by the customs authorities to the respondance No. 1, that materials collected upon investigation, were to be used as evidence against the respondent No. 1 of illegal importation. In paragraph 21 of the said notice it was stated that the respondent No. 1 was to show cause why 280 wrist watches should not be confiscated under S. 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act read with S. 3 (2) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act. The evidence collected by the customs authorities was, according to them, sufficient to establish a case of illegal Importation by the respondent No. 1. It was thereafter for the respondent No. 1 to produce evidence to prove, if indeed it could prove it at all, that the charge against it was false and that there was no violation of the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, the Imports and Exports (Control) Act and the Imports (Control) Order, 1955, being Order No. 17/55 dated December 7, 1955. It should be recalled that out of 390 wrist watches seized by the customs authorities on October 17, 1959, 110 wrist watches were released by the customs authorities to the respondent No. 1, who had produced satisfactory explanation with regard to the possession of the same. The order of confiscation was made with regard to the rest of 280 wrist watches, with regard to which the respondent No. 1 failed to produce explanation to the satisfaction of the customs authorities. In answer to the show cause notice dated August 21, 1961, the respondent No. 1 submitted a written representation to the customs authorities, which appears to be undated. This representation is annexure 'f' to the petition and is to be found at page 43 of the Paper Book. In this representation, the respondent No. 1 challenged the search and seizure of the wrist watches, on the ground that the Sea Customs Act did not apply to the wrist watches seized, and there was no notification under S. 19 of the said Act. In this representation, the respondent No. 1 challenged the search and seizure of the wrist watches, on the ground that the Sea Customs Act did not apply to the wrist watches seized, and there was no notification under S. 19 of the said Act. It was further alleged that the Imports (Control) Order No. 17/55 dated December 7, 1955, was not a notification issued under the Sea Customs Act and such notification could not make the provisions of S. 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act applicable to the wrist watches seized. In paragraph 19 of the said representation the respondent No. 1 stated that it was not dealing with the merits of the show cause notice in view of the order made by Banerjee, J., on January 25, 1962, in Matter No. 261 of 1961. It was further stated that only the preliminary objections to the show cause notice were raised without going into the merits. Not one of the several allegations in the said show cause notice dated August 21, 1961, was controverter by the respondent No. 1 and no attempt was made by it to deal with any of the facts stated in the said show cause notice. The respondent No. 1 submitted a further written representation in answer to the notice dated March 17, 1962, regarding the hearing of the preliminary issues. This reorientations is annexure 'g' to the petition and is to be found at page 51 of the Paper look. In this representation the respondent No. 1 challenged the jurisdiction of the Deputy Collector of Customs to deal with the matter, It was alleged that there was no evidence as to how the said watches were imported into India. But again there was no reference to the allegation of the customs authorities in the show cause notice regarding the watches. On April 21, 1962, the lawyer of the respondent No. 1 again submitted a written representation. This representation was submitted after determination of the preliminary issues and the various arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent No, 1 were recorded. It appears that, the contention of the respondent No. 1 was that in the absence of definition of the customs frontier, S. 19, of the Sea Customs Act was not attracted. But again no attempt was made to controvert the allegations of the customs authorities contained in the show cause notice. It appears that, the contention of the respondent No. 1 was that in the absence of definition of the customs frontier, S. 19, of the Sea Customs Act was not attracted. But again no attempt was made to controvert the allegations of the customs authorities contained in the show cause notice. It will has be seen that the respondent No. 1 made several representations regarding the charges made against it, But no attempt was made in any of these representations to controvert the charges recorded by the customs authorities in the said show cause notice. The onus of proof that the wrist watch 53 were lawfully Imported into India had shifted on the respondent No. 1 after the customs authorities had informed the respondent No, 1, of the result of their enquiries and investigations, regarding the claim made by it, with regard to its possession of the said watches. This onus,-the respondent No. 1 failed to discharge. 12. THE only other question that remains to be discussed is the appellant's contention, that the penalty of confiscation could be imposed under the Sea Customs Act, wherever the unlawfully imported goods were found, and even if they were not found In the possession of the person who was responsible for the unlawful importation. In support of this contention Mr. Kar relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court in (9) Shew Pujan Rai v. Collector of Customs, (1958) S-C. A. 916 and (10) Pukhraj v. D. R. Kohli and Anr., AJ. R (1962) S. C. 1559. It was held by the Supreme Court in Pukhraj's case that if S. 167 (8) applied then there could be no doubt that as soon as it was shown that certain goods had been imported contrary to the statutory prohibition or restriction, such goods would be liable to confiscation. Such confiscation was not based on the fact that they were found in the possession of a person who was concerned with the unlawful importation and therefore, once S. 1g7 (8) was held to be applicable, the validity of the order of confiscation of the smuggled goods could not be challenged. Mr. Such confiscation was not based on the fact that they were found in the possession of a person who was concerned with the unlawful importation and therefore, once S. 1g7 (8) was held to be applicable, the validity of the order of confiscation of the smuggled goods could not be challenged. Mr. Kar argued that even if it was held that the respondent No, 1 did not unlawfully import the wrist watches, the order of confiscation could not be challenged by it as the importation of the wrist watches was made without a licence or permit and in violation of the statutory prohibition and restriction regarding such importation. This contention of Mr. Kar is well founded and indeed Mr. Dutt did not controvert this proposition of law. The facts brought to light as a result of the investigation conducted by the customs authorities can leave no room for doubt that the watches were imported in contravention of the statutory restrictions. Even if we hold that the respondent No. 1 was not responsible for the illegal importation, which we do not, the confiscation order could not lie challenged by the respondent No. 1 the watches were seized from the possession of the respondent No. 1, who had not obtained a licence or a customs clearance permit for importation of the same. They were of foreign make and must have been imported across the customs frontier. The explanations offered by the respondent No. 1 regarding its coming into possession of the same between 1956 and 1959 were found, upon enquiries by the customs authorities, to be false. The result of these enquiries were communicated to the respondent No. I, who was thereafter heard by the adjudicating officer, yet no attempt was made by the respondent No. 1, to substantiate its claim regarding lawful importation of the watches. In this same matter, the respondent No. 1 came to this Court twice previously with writ petitions, for relief, and appropriate reliefs were granted to it. Yet it failed to satisfy the customs authorities that 280 watches were not imported in violation of the statutory ; restrictions. The customs authorities came to the conclusion that the said 230 watches were illegally imported and there upon made an order for confiscation of the same. Yet it failed to satisfy the customs authorities that 280 watches were not imported in violation of the statutory ; restrictions. The customs authorities came to the conclusion that the said 230 watches were illegally imported and there upon made an order for confiscation of the same. It is not for this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution, to revise, set aside or quash this order, in the facts of this case. For the reasons mentioned above this appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of Banerjee, J., dated July 21, 1964, are set aside and the Rule is discharged. Each party to pay its own costs.