Research › Browse › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1965 DIGILAW 148 (MP)

AMAR SINGH v. ANOPA

1965-11-24

S.B.SEN

body1965
JUDGMENT S.B. Sen, J. This revision petition arise out of a suit for declaration, that the Plaintiff Anopa is a disabled person and the judgment of the Collector in which it was held that he was not such a person is without jurisdiction aud nullity. Amarsingh had applied u/s 21 of the Abolition of Jagirs Act that he was a tenant in possession of land resumed under the Abolition of Jagirs Act and as such he is entitled to be declared a Pakka tenant u/s 23 of the Act. The Collector granted the same. The suit is for declaration that the Plaintiff is a disabled person and as such the grant of pakka tenancy right was without jurisdiction. I am not giving any details of the plaint or written statement as I do not think it is necessary for disposal of this revision petition. The only point to be decided in this case is whether such a suit for declaration could lie. The contension of the Defendant is that the civil court has no jurisdiction in view of Section 34 of the Abolition of Jagirs Act to decide the suit. The trial Court decided the preliminary issue against the Defendant who has now come up in revision. As to what was the nature of disability, whether it comes under the proviso to Section 21 or not, with which we are not concerned. It is a matter which has to be decided by the trial Court on evidence. What we have to decide is whether the civil Court has jurisdiction to try the case. The learned Counsel for the Defendant has submitted that u/s 34 of the Abolition of Jagirs Act the jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred. Section 34 is quoted below:- (1) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required ro be settled, decided or dealt with by the Tehsildar, the Collector, the Jagir Commissioner, the Board of Revenue or the Government. Section 34 is quoted below:- (1) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required ro be settled, decided or dealt with by the Tehsildar, the Collector, the Jagir Commissioner, the Board of Revenue or the Government. (2) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no order' of the Tehsildar, the Collector, the Jagir Commissioner or the Board of Revenue or the Government under this Act shall be called in question in any Court, He further contends that the Revenue Courts under Sections 21 to 28 have got exclusive jurisdiction to confer the right of a pakka tenant and if that has been conferred the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to consider it again. It is therefore necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act. Section 21 is quoted below: (1) sub-tenant or a tenant of a sub-tenant who is in possession of any land in a resumed Jagir land, may, within the relevant period, apply to the Tehsildar within whose jurisdiction that Jagir land is situated....... .for acquiring the rights of a Pacca tenant in his holding............................. (2) An application under Sub-section A I R 1951 S.C.1l5. shall be in such form as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by a receipted chalan showing the payment into the treasury of the amount specified in Section 22. Provided that a sub-tenant or a tenant of a Sub-tenant shall have no right to make an application under this section if the original tenant or the sub-tenant, as the case(sic) may be, is under a disability specified in Section 74 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samvat 2007 ; Provided further that if the holding be in possession of a tenant of a sub-tenant the right of applying for the acquisition of Pacca-tenancy rights under this section shall firstly, be that of the tenant of the sub-tenant and the sub-tenant may exercise his said right only after the failure of his tenant to exercise the right within the period prescribed in Clouse (a) of the above explanation. It is clear whether a person is disabled or not as specified in Section 74 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act has to be decided when an application is made u/s 21 of the Abolition of Jagirs Act. It is clear whether a person is disabled or not as specified in Section 74 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act has to be decided when an application is made u/s 21 of the Abolition of Jagirs Act. The learned Counsel for the applicant led great stress on the fact that when a Tehsildar can grant a pacca tenancy right after holding that a tenant Or it sub-tenant was not a disabled person, the jurisdiction to decide this question has been given to the Revenue Officer. I have been taken through a number of decisions of the Supreme Court by both the counsel for the parties for a decision of this question. In Rai Brij Raj Krishna and Another Vs. S.K. Shaw and Brothers, their lordships were dealing with a Case under Bihar Buildings (lease rent and eviction) Control Act of 1947. In that case their lordships have observed: The Act has entrusted the Controllor with a jurisdiction which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether there is non-payment of rent or not, as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that there is non-payment of rent, to order eviction of a tenant. Therefore even if the Controller wrongly decides the question of non-payment of rent and orders(sic) eviction of the tenant his order cannot be questioned in civil Court. Relying on the above mentioned one the learned Counsel for the applicant submitted that in this case as Tehsildar had jurisdiction to decide Whether a pacca tenancy should be conferred on a person of not and when he had decided that question, the civil Court will have no jurisdiction. I am afraid this argument is not tenable. If We read carefully Section 21 of the Abolition of Jagirs Act we see that the application has to be made in proper form after which the revenue officer makes inquiries. The application should also be accompanied by the challan. Under Sections 21 and 23 of the Act, Rules were framed regarding the application for and issue of certificate of Pacca-Tenancy. They are as follows:- (a) The application of a sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant for acquiring the rights of a pacca tenant in the holding shall be in from 'A' appended to these Rules. Under Sections 21 and 23 of the Act, Rules were framed regarding the application for and issue of certificate of Pacca-Tenancy. They are as follows:- (a) The application of a sub-tenant or tenant of a sub-tenant for acquiring the rights of a pacca tenant in the holding shall be in from 'A' appended to these Rules. (b) The application shall be accompanied by (i) a certified extract of the latest jamabandi in respect of the holding; and (ii) Treasury challan showing that the amount specified in Section 22 of the Act has been deposited. (a) On receipt of the application the Tehsildar shall cause to be issued proclamation in form 'B' appended to these Rules calling on the persons interested to prefer objections, if any, against the issue of certificate of Pacca tenancy. (b) The copies of the proclamation shall be pasted on the notice board in the court house of the Tehsildar issuing it and also at some place of public resort on or adjacent to the holding to which it refers and if the Tehsildar so directs the proclamation shall be further published by beat of drum on or near the holding to which it refers. On the date fixed for hearing or on any date to which the hearing may be adjourned the Tehsildar shall after examining the parties and taking any other evidence that may be produced by them, pass orders. 4. If the Tehsildar finds that the applicant is not entitled to acquire the rights of a pacca tenant in the holding, he shall dismiss the application and order the refund of the amount deposited by him. ,If the Tehsildar finds that the applicant is entitled for the certificate of pacca tenancy, he shall issue a certificate of pacca tenancy in favour of the applicant in form 'C' appended to these rules. Now on the basis of Rule 5 the learned Counsel argued that Tehsildar has to find out whether the applicant is entitled to the certificate of pacca tenancy. And in order to find out whether the applicant is entitled to be a pacca tenant he has to decide whether the tenant was a disabled person. The Abolition of Jagirs Act conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Tehsildar to determine the ability or otherwise. We have already quoted Section 21. And in order to find out whether the applicant is entitled to be a pacca tenant he has to decide whether the tenant was a disabled person. The Abolition of Jagirs Act conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Tehsildar to determine the ability or otherwise. We have already quoted Section 21. That Section does not say that the Tehsildar can grant pakka tenancy right after finding out whether he is a disabled person as mentioned in the proviso or not. What the proviso simply says is that a disabled person will not be entitled to make an application for this conferral of, right. In fact what Section 21 means is if an application is made for the conferral of the right of pakka tenancy and if he pays the required amount and if he is a tenant or a sub-tenant the will be entitled to be declared a pacca tenant unless the tenant shows that he was a disabled person. It does not say that the Tehsildar before the conferral of the right of a pacca tenant has to decide whether the disability existed with the tenant or not. In the Supreme Court case cited above under Bihar Buildings (Lease rent and Eviction) Control Act 1947, the Controller before ordering eviction has to find out first that there is non-payment of rent. Here as I have already stated that before conferral of a right of pacca tenancy the Tehsildar has not to decide whether the disability existed with the tenant or not. The Supreme Court case mentioned above therefore is not applicable to the present case. In Chaube Jagdish Prasad and Another Vs. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi, , their lordships have observed: There are two classes of cases dealing with power of a tribunal (1) where the legislature-entrusts a tribunal with the jurisdiction including the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts on which the exercise of its jurisdiction depends exists and (2) where the legislature confers jurisdiction on such tribunals to proceed in a case where a certain state of facts exists or is shown to. exist. The difference is that in the former case the tribunal has power to determine the facts giving it jurisdiction and in the latter case it has only to see that a certain state of facts exists. exist. The difference is that in the former case the tribunal has power to determine the facts giving it jurisdiction and in the latter case it has only to see that a certain state of facts exists. Where the landlord asked for determination of reasonable annual rent u/s 3-A of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act on the ground that the accommodation was constructed after June 30, 1946, the House Allotment Officer had power to determine the reasonable annual rent. I am afraid the above observations do not carry the matter further. It is not unknown that there are, few matters which are incidental or collateral to be decided by a tribunal befor coming to a finding. For example we may see that in a claim under the Workmens Compensation Act the Commissioner has to decide whether the claimant is a son of the deceased or not. But that does not debar a civil Court to decide a suit for declaration that the claimant is a son or is not a son of the deceased. The observation made in Magiti Sasamal Vs. Pandab Bissoi, are also of general character. In that case their lordships were dealing with Orissa Tenants Protection Act of 1948. The observation are:- Section 7(1) postulates the relationship of tenant and landlord between the parties and proceeds to provide for the exclusive jurisdiction of the collector to try the five categories of disputes that may arise between the landlord and the tenant. The disputes which are the subject matter of Section 7(1) must be in regard to the five categories. That is the plain and obvious construction of the words "any dispute as regards." On this construction it would be unreasonable to hold that a dispute about the status of the tenant also falls within the purview of the said section. The scheme of Section 7(1) is unambiguous and clear. It refers to the tenant and landlord as such and it contemplates disputes of the specified character arising between them. Therefore even on a liberal construction of Section 7(1) it would be difficult to uphold the argument that a dispute as regards the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant falls to be determined by the Collector u/s 7(1). It refers to the tenant and landlord as such and it contemplates disputes of the specified character arising between them. Therefore even on a liberal construction of Section 7(1) it would be difficult to uphold the argument that a dispute as regards the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant falls to be determined by the Collector u/s 7(1). In the present case whether a person is disabled or not has not been exclusively said to be within the jurishdiction of the Revenue Court. In Smt. Ujjam Bai Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, Das j. has observed:- Jurisdiction means authority to decide, Whenever a judicial or quasi judicial tribunal is empowered or required to enquire into a question of law on fact for the purpose of giving a decision on it, its findings thereon cannot be impeached collaterally or on an application for certtorari(sic) but are binding untill reversed on appeal. There lordships in this decision are not deciding whether Civii Court's jurisdiction Was barred under the provisions of the Act. In Firm Seth Radha Kishan (Deceased) Represented by Hari Kishan and Others Vs. The Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, their lordships have observed: Under Section 9 of the Code of CPC the court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. A statute therefore expressly or by necessary implication can bar the jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of a particular matter. The mere conferment of special jurisdiction on a tribunal in respect of the said matter does not in itself exclude the jurisdiction of civil Courts. The statute(sic) may specifically provide for ousting the jurisdiction of civil courts, even if there was no specific exclusion, if it creates a liability not existing before and gives a spacial and particular remedy for the aggrieved party, the remedy provided by it must be followed. The same principle would apply if the statute had provided for the particular forum in which the remedy could be had. The observations clearly show that if the statute has barred the jurisdiction of the Court either expressly or impliedly the civil Court cannot have jurisdiction. The same principle would apply if the statute had provided for the particular forum in which the remedy could be had. The observations clearly show that if the statute has barred the jurisdiction of the Court either expressly or impliedly the civil Court cannot have jurisdiction. We have already seen that in the present case whether a person is disabled or not has not been exclusively said to be within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court Latest decision of the Supreme Court Kamala Mills Ltd. Vs. State of Bombay, decided on 23-4 65 was cited. It is clear from the decision that Section 20 of the Bombay Sales Tax Act 1946 has exclusively barred jurisdiction of the civil Courts. In the present case what we are deciding is whether or not the Tehsildar or the Revenue officer had exclusively jurisdiction to decide the disability of a person claiming to be a pacca tenant. This decision therefore has no relevency. The learned Counsel for the applicant next argued that the proviso to Section 21 of the Abolition of Jagirs Act has to be considered along with the section and if the Tehsildar had the exclusive jurisdiction to decide the matter expressed in Section 4 he has also jurisdiction to decide it under the proviso. In this connection he relied on the observations reported in The Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore, Travancore-cochin and Coorg, Bangalore Vs. The Indo Mercantile Bank Limited, which are as follows:- The proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by providing the exception and taking out as it were, from the main enactment a portion which but for the proviso would fall within the main enactment. Ordinarily it is foreign to the proper function of a proviso to read it as providing something by way of an addendum or dealing with a subject which is foreign to the main enactment. The territory of the proviso therefore is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and exclude something which otherwise would have been within the section. The territory of the proviso therefore is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and exclude something which otherwise would have been within the section. It has to operate in the same field and if the language of the main enactment is clear it cannot be used for the purpose of interpreting the main enactment or to exclude by implication what the enactment clearly says unless the words of the proviso are such that that is its necessary effect. The learned Counsel contends that we cannot decide the disability or otherwise independent of the section and therefore once we hold that the Tehsildar had exclusive jurisdiction to confer right of a pacca tenancy, he has jurisdiction to decide the matter mentioned in the proviso. On the side of the Respondent the observations made in Addanki Tiruvenkata Thata Desika Charyulu (Since deceased) and after him his legal representatives Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another, were relied on which are as under:- This exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil Courts would be subject to two limitations; first even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Thus we see that the civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the issue whether the Plaintiff is a disabled person or not according to Section 74 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. The revision petition is therefore dismissed with costs. Counsel fee according to scale, if certified. Final Result : Dismissed