JUDGMENT-This revision application arises out of Criminal Case No. 1001 of 1963 pending on the file of the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ramtek. The complaint has been filed by the State of Maharashtra through the Regional Inspector of Mines, Parasia Inspection Region, District Chhindwara. 2. The criminal prosecution relates to an accident which took place on 1.6.1963 in a mine at Junawani in Taluq Ramtek, District Nagpur. The mine belongs to the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited, Calcutta. As a result of the report that was received by the Inspector of Mines, he immediately visited the site and after making inquiry and collecting evidence ultimately lodged a criminal case under section 720 (1) (a) and (c) of the Mines Act, 1952, read with section 18 thereof, and Regulation 41 of the Metalliferous Mines Regulations, 1961. The complaint has been filed against six persons. The accused No. 1 is Shri R. K. Gupta who is one of the Directors of the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited. Accused No.2 is Shri N. K. Bhansali, who is the agent and accused No.3 is Shri J. R. Bhalerao who is the Manager of the mine. Accused No.4 is a contractor who was entrusted with the work of the particular excavation where the accident took place. Accused No.5 is the Mate and the accused No.6 is the Foreman of the mine. Accused No.1 was nominated as the Director under section 76 of the Mines Act and this nomination was made on 18.3.1957. It is common ground that this nomination has not been withdrawn and no notice of the cancellation as contemplated by section 76 was ever served upon the Inspector of Mines. That being the position, the Inspector of Mines impleaded, among others, accused No.1 R. K. Gupta as the Director of the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited as their nominee. 3. A preliminary objection that is raised on behalf of the accused No. 1 to the continuance of the prosecution is that there has been a material change in the law and as a result of the amendment of the Mines Act he can no longer be prosecuted under the provisions of section 76 of the Mines Act, 1952. It is admitted that before the amendment of the definition of the word "owner" Shri Gupta would have been perhaps the proper person against whom a charge sheet could be sent up. It is admitted that before the amendment of the definition of the word "owner" Shri Gupta would have been perhaps the proper person against whom a charge sheet could be sent up. However, the amendment of the definition of the word "owner" in section 2 (1) by the Amending Act LXII of 1959 now materially altered the situation. 4. In respect of the accident that took place resulting in the unfortunate death of some persons and injuries to some others, Shri Gupta is being prosecuted in his capacity as an owner under the duties and responsibilities that attach to him under section 18 of the Mines Act. Under section 18, besides those persons who actually contravene any of the provisions of the Act and the Regulations, three other classes of persons are made liable. Those three classes, the owner, agent and manager, are defined in the Act. This is therefore a case of vicarious liability being attributed to the owner. Unless therefore Shri Gupta answers the description of being an owner, he could not be prosecuted. 5. Section 76 of the Mines Act which is also slightly amended by the same amending Act of 1959 deals with the determination of owner in certain cases. Section 18 generally defines the duties and responsibilities of owners, agents and managers. Section 2 (1) (1) defines what is an owner. Section 18 points out in a general manner that owners are responsible for the commission or omission of certain acts. Section 76 lays down a criterion for determining the owner in certain cases. Section 76 deals with three kinds of persons or associations. Where the owner of a mine is a firm or other association of individuals, all or any of the partners or members thereof are made liable. Where the owner of a mine is a company, all or any of its directors are made liable. Under the old section 76 before its amendment in 1959, the only types of owners that were dealt with by section 76 were a firm and association of individuals, and a private or public limited company. However, due to the changed circumstances, it is now contemplated that Government or local authorities can own And operate mines. Provision is therefore made in respect of Government owned or local authority owned mines as to who shall be responsible. However, due to the changed circumstances, it is now contemplated that Government or local authorities can own And operate mines. Provision is therefore made in respect of Government owned or local authority owned mines as to who shall be responsible. In those cases, it is now provided that all or any of the officers or persons authorised by such Government or local authority as the case may be, to manage the affairs of the mines shall be responsible. Having made this substantive provision, a proviso is added by which the firm association or company bas been given an option to nominate anyone of the partners of the firm, or anyone of the members of the association, or anyone of the directors of the company. If such a nomination is made by these owners then only that partner that member or that director shall be liable for certain consequences. 6. In the present case, we are dealing with the case of Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited, which is a public limited company. It is the contention of Mr. Bobde that in view of the amendment to section 2 (1) (1) relating to the definition of the word "owner", the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited no more remained the owners for the purposes of section 76. If the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited continued to be the owners for the purposes of section 76, then there is no doubt that Shri Gupta is being properly made an accused person. 7. The main point of contention between the parties therefore is as to what is the correct meaning of the word "owner" according to the amended definition of that word in section 2 (1) (1). 7. The main point of contention between the parties therefore is as to what is the correct meaning of the word "owner" according to the amended definition of that word in section 2 (1) (1). That definition is as follows: •• owner, when used in relation to a mine, means any person who is the immediate proprietor or lessee or occupier of the mine or of any part thereof and in the case of mine, the business whereof is being owned on by a liquidator or receiver, such liquidator or receiver (and in the case of mine owned by a company, the business whereof is being carried on by a managing agent, such managing agent); but does not include a person who merely received a royalty, rent or file from the mine, or it merely he proprietor of the mine, subject to any lease, grant or licence for the working thereof, or is merely the owner of the soil and not interested in the minerals of the mine; but any contractor for the working of a mine or any part thereof shall be subject to this Act, in like manner as if he were an owner, but not so as to exempt the owner from any liability". (Braoket.1 mine) 8. In the definition which is reproduced above, I have deliberately marked the added portion by the amending Act by brackets. The definition before its amendment was identical in other parts except for the bracketted portion which is a new addition. Mr. Bobde, therefore points out that according to this definition, owner means any person who is the immediate proprietor or lessee or occupier of the mine or any part thereof. Besides the individual who is the immediate proprietor or lessee or occupier, one more case was contemplated by the Legislature before amendment and that related to a mine the business of which was being carried on by a liquidator or receiver. In that case, it was the liquidator or receiver alone who was considered the owner of that mine. He further points out that this is an exhaustive definition of the word "owner" because the wording is owner "means any person". It appears to me from the choice of the words used that the definition of the word "owner" is an exhaustive definition. He further points out that this is an exhaustive definition of the word "owner" because the wording is owner "means any person". It appears to me from the choice of the words used that the definition of the word "owner" is an exhaustive definition. Irrespective of the fact that the mine was a proprietary mine or a leasehold mine, the moment the mine went into liquidation or a receiver was appointed by the Court, it was the liquidator or the receiver who became the owner for the purposes of this Act. The initial or ultimate ownership therefore became irrelevant. In the same way, if there is a company which answers the description of the bracketted portion which is introduced by the amending Act .of 1959, then the managing agents of that company alone would be the owner according to this definition. It is to this owner that section 76 will apply and it will have its own effect upon such an owner. The argument that is advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that the present company, the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited, answers the description of the amended definition, and has a managing agency which is itself a limited company named J. K. Agents (Private) Limited. In the report of the Inspector of Mines, there is a reference to the fact that the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited have a managing agency which is itself another private limited company named J. K. Agents (Private) Limited. The mine is owned by the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited which is a company and this Company which owns the mine has managing agents who are carrying on its business. In the circumstances, the owner of the mine in dispute would be the managing agents J. K. Agentil (Private) Limited and not the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited which may be the owner in the popular sense. If this is the correct position, then what is argued before me is that the nomination of Shri Gupta who is a Director of the parent company viz., the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited, which was made in the year 1957 before the present amendment, becomes ineffective. 9. In order to understand this argument, it is better to reproduce section 76 of the Mines Act for ready reference: "76. 9. In order to understand this argument, it is better to reproduce section 76 of the Mines Act for ready reference: "76. Determination of owner in certain cases: Where the owner of a mine is a firm or other association of individuals, all, or any of the partners or members thereof or where the owner of a mine is a company, all or any of the directors thereof or where the owner of a mine is a Government or any local authority, all or any of the officers or persons authorised by such Government or local authority, as the case may be, to manage the affairs of the mine, may be prosecuted and punished under this Act for any offence for which the owner of a mine is punishable: Provided that where a firm, association or company has given notice in writing to the Chief Inspector that it has nominated,- (a) in the case of a firm, any of its partners, (b) in the case of an association, any of its members, (0) in the case of a company, any of its directors, who is resident in each case in any place to which this Act extends and who is in each case either in fact in charge of the management of, or holds the largest number of shares in, such firm, association or company, to assume the responsibility of the owner of the mine for the purposes of this Act, such partner, member or director, as the case may be, shall, as long as he continues to so reside and be in charge or hold the largest number of shared all aforesaid, be deemed to be the owner of the mine for the purposes of this Act unless a notice in writing cancelling his nomination or stating that he has ceased to be a partner, member or director, as the case may be, is received by the Chief Inspector." The managing agents J. K. Agents (Private) Limited are themselves a company. They are the owner of the mine in view of the present definition after the amendment. They are the owner of the mine in view of the present definition after the amendment. If this is so, what is pointed out is that here is a mine which is owned by a company, namely, J. K. Agents (Private) Limited, and under section 76 all or any of the directors of J. K. Agents (Private) Limited would be responsible or liable, but not the directors of the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited. The nomination of Shri Gupta is not yet cancelled or withdrawn but it would cease to have any effect because he does not answer the description of being one of the directors of J. K. Agents (Private) Limited. Since the law itself is amended, the statutory responsibility of Shri Gupta comes to an end. If J. K. Agents (Private) Limited have not nominated any director under the option given to them under section 76, the Inspector of Mines may take such steps as he can under the law against all or any of the directors of J. K. Agents (Private) Limited. But after the amendment of the Act in 1960, he cannot file a prosecution against the accused No.1 Shri Gupta who is a director of the main company, the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited. 10. So far as the subsequent part of the argument is concerned, there is not much difficulty in accepting it provided the basis is correct. In order to exonerate Shri Gupta from the liability, the basis of the argument is that the owner of the mine in question is J. K. Agents (Private) Limited and not the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited. For that purpose, I will first take into account the definition of the word "owner" under the amended section and thereafter consider the effect of it on section 76. 11. As I said earlier, there is common ground between the parties that the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited have the managing agents J.K. Agents (Private) Limited. The dispute raised on behalf of the State is that the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited do not answer the description of those companies which are contemplated by the amended portion of the definition under section 2 (1) (1). What is argued is that a limited class of companies is contemplated to whom the description of the amendment applies. Mr. The dispute raised on behalf of the State is that the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited do not answer the description of those companies which are contemplated by the amended portion of the definition under section 2 (1) (1). What is argued is that a limited class of companies is contemplated to whom the description of the amendment applies. Mr. Hajarnavis who appears for the State particularly drew my attention to the clause "and in the case of a mine owned by a company" as used in the amended portion of the definition. He says that the company ought to own the mine in the sense that the company ought to be the proprietor of that mine. He then took me to the opening words of the definition where the word "owner" is sought to be defined. The opening clause points out that the owner contemplated is a person who is the immediate proprietor or lessee or occupier of the mine or any part thereof. According to Mr. Hajarnavis, three types of rights relating to the running of the mines are therefore contemplated, by the broader definition of owner which is sought to be made by this defining section. A person may be a proprietor; he may be a lessee; or he may be an occupier of the mine. All three categories of persons are sought to be brought under the broader definition of owner. He says that by enacting this definition, the normal dictionary meaning of owner is being enlarged to comprise three categories of persons. When this is the way the word "owner" is being defined, he says until the definition is complete, this extended meaning of the word "owner" cannot be said to be the meaning of that word whether used as a noun or verb within the body of the definition itself. With this reasoning, he says that the expression used in the case of a company, namely, "a mine owned by" cannot mean anything else but the normal ownership of the mine which means proprietorship. To own, according to the dictionary meaning, would be the popular concept of ownership which is full proprietary right. He, therefore, says that only in those cases where the companies are the proprietors of the mines and such companies have managing agents, the managing agents will become the owners under the present definition. To own, according to the dictionary meaning, would be the popular concept of ownership which is full proprietary right. He, therefore, says that only in those cases where the companies are the proprietors of the mines and such companies have managing agents, the managing agents will become the owners under the present definition. In the case of other companies which are running mines and lessees or occupiers as contemplated by the opening portion of the definition of the word "owner" even if they have managing agents who are carrying on the business of those companies, the managing agents of such companies would not be considered as owners. If this is so, then he says that for the purposes of section 76, in this case the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited would still be the owner of the mine and not the managing agents J. K. Agents (Private) Limited. 12. His other argument is that even if this interpretation of the definition is not being accepted, the definition of the word "owner" given in section 2 (1) (1) is not an all pervasive definition which governs every section of this Act. This is because section 2 (1) opens with the words "In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires". He says that sub-section (1) of section 2 dealing with definitions itself points out that the definitions following thereafter would have the meaning given in that section unless the context otherwise requires. He, therefore, says that the meaning of the word "owner" as given in section 2 (1)(1) cannot be immediately read in section 76 because the context in which section 76 is drafted requires that this meaning is not imported there. I will consider this second argument in detail after I first consider the earlier part of his argument. 13. In the two Courts below, a judgment of the Supreme Court was cited and it is also cited before me and it was Chief Inspector of Mines v. K. G. Phapar (1). That was a case relating to the prosecution of some of the accused including the managing agents of the company which was running the Amlabad Colliery in Manbhum District in the State of Bihar. The managing agents of the company were apparently being prosecuted as owners. The prosecution related to an incident which took place before the amendment of the definition of "owner" in 1959. The managing agents of the company were apparently being prosecuted as owners. The prosecution related to an incident which took place before the amendment of the definition of "owner" in 1959. On a preliminary objection raised by them the matter reached the Supreme Court. The managing agents pointed out that they were not the owners within the definition of that expression in section 2 (1) (1) as it then stood. They were also not either agents or managers as contemplated by section 2 (1) (c) or section 17. In the Supreme Court it was not even suggested that the managing agents were either agents or managers. Both these words have been defined by the Act and their Lordships of the Supreme Court pointed out that the managing agents do not fit in with the description of either agent or manager. An argument was therefore made that they were owners. For that purpose it was pointed out that the expression "owner" includes three kinds of persons, namely, proprietors, lessees or occupiers. The managing agents may not be proprietors or may not be lessees but at any rate they were occupiers of the mine being in actual physical management of the company. The argument was that the managing agents exercise, by reason of their being managing agents of the colliery company, possession over the mine; and so "occupy" the mine. In rejecting the argument, this is what their Lordships say at page 841: "Though the word occupier is not defined in the Act it is patently absurd to suppose that any and every person exercising possession over the mine, is an occupier and thus an owner of the mine, for the purposes of the Mines Act. From the very collocation of the words immediate proprietor, or lessee or occupier of the mine, it is abundantly clear that only a person whose occupation is of the same character, that is, occupation by a proprietor or a lessee, by way of possession on his behalf and not on behalf of somebody else is meant by the word occupier in the definition. Thus, a trespasser in wrongful possession to the exclusion of the rightful owner would be an occupier of the mine, and so be an owner for the purposes of the Act. Thus, a trespasser in wrongful possession to the exclusion of the rightful owner would be an occupier of the mine, and so be an owner for the purposes of the Act. When however a servant or agent of the proprietor or lessee of a mine is in possession of a mine, he is in possession on behalf of his master or his principal, and not on his own behalf. It would be unreasonable to think that the legislature intended such servants or agents liable and responsible as owner of the mine. If possession on behalf of another was sufficient to make a person occupier within the meaning of section 2 (1), every manager would be an occupier and thus have all the responsibilities of an owner." From the above discussion the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the managing agents could not be considered owners and they were certainly not agents or managers. The criminal prosecution against them was therefore mis-conceived. 14. It appears to me that though the Supreme Court judgment came to be decided later, the amendment to the definition is made in 1959 by Parliament perhaps after realizing the lacuna that remained in the original definition. Looking to the provisions of sections 18, 22 and 61 which are quoted by the Supreme Court in the above judgment, it appears that there is a principle behind fastening vicarious liability on certain persons in relation to the Mines Act. The principle is made evident by the provisions of section 18(1). Responsibility is thrown on the owner, agent and manager of every mine to carry on the business of the mine and to conduct it in accordance with the provisions of the Act and of the regulations, rules and bye. laws and of any orders made thereunder, Since there is a statutory responsibility of management upon these three types of persons, if any breach is caused in the observance of the provisions of the statute, regulations, rules or bye-Laws, not only those persons who themselves commit the breach are made liable, but in addition these categories of persons who are responsible for the proper carrying out of the provisions of the Act are also made liable. Even though the judgment of the Supreme Court came later, it clearly indicates that in case of companies whose business was being managed by managing agents, persons actually in management, namely the managing agents, were not being subjected to the penal provisions of the Act as they were neither owners, nor agents, nor managers. Realizing this lacuna, the Legislature has amended the definition and has now pointed out that in case of companies who own mines and whose business is being carried out by the managing agents, the managing agents will be considered owners for the purposes of this Act and as such all the consequences from ownership will be meted out to them. 15. With this background I will take into account the real meaning of the expression "a mine owned by a company". Mr. Hajarnavis who appeared for the State points out that the owning that is referred to in this expression is the proprietary owning of the mine. For that he points out that in the wider definition of the word "owner" which is sought to be laid down by the Legislature, proprietorship as well as leasehold rights are included in the wider concept of ownership. That wider concept of ownership cannot be imported when the verb "to own" is used in another part of the definition. Here the verb "to own" is used in its normal dictionary meaning which is full title. It is possible to conceive, he says, that there can be proprietary mines. In some villages, the zamindar was the full owner not only of the ground but also of the subsoil below. Where such proprietorship of the mine and the subsoil below was recognised and such owner was operating the mine, that would be a proprietary mine. In other cases where leases are obtained either from such owners of lands or from Government, the mine will be a leasehold mine .. The title in such a case will be a lease mine and not a proprietary mine. On this basis, he says that it is an admitted fact in the present case that the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited are not the owners of the subsoil but they are merely lessees from Government. Both the learned counsel told me that there does not seem to be any decided ruling interpreting the word "owner" after its amendment in 1959. On this basis, he says that it is an admitted fact in the present case that the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited are not the owners of the subsoil but they are merely lessees from Government. Both the learned counsel told me that there does not seem to be any decided ruling interpreting the word "owner" after its amendment in 1959. They also told me that there are a number of mines within the territorial area of this State and prosecutions for certain events are of fairly frequent occurrence. It is therefore necessary that this word is judicially interpreted for the guidance of all concerned. 16. I could get the following meaning of the words "own" and "owner" in the Oxford English Dictionary, 1938 Edition: "Own: 1. To make (a thing) one. own, appropriate, take possession of; to seize, win, gain to adopt as ones own. 2. To have or hold as ones own, have belonging to one, be the proprietor of, possess. 3. a. To call (a thing or person) ones own; to acknowledge as ones own. b. To acknowledge or recognise as an acquaintance; to give recognition to. c. To claim for ones own; to lay claim to. Owner: One who owns or holds something as his own; a proprietor, one who has the rightful claim or title to a thing (though he may not be in possession)." There are other meanings of the verb "to own" but they are not relevant for our purposes and therefore I have not quoted them. I will also refer to Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Volume 3, Third Edition, in which the following definition of owner appears at page 2059; "Owner. The owner or proprietor of a property is the person in whom (with his or her assent) it is for the time being beneficially vested, and who has the occupation, or control, or usufruct, of it; e.g. a lessee is, during the term, the owner of the property demised." For this meaning of the word "owner" the judgment of Bramwell L. J., in Eglinton v. Norman (1), is quoted. On the meanings that appear in the Oxford English Dictionary as well as in Strouds Judicial Dictionary, there seems to be no justification for unduly restricting the implication of ownership as absolute proprietary ownership as is being canvassed before me by Mr. Hajarnavis. It was argued before me by Mr. On the meanings that appear in the Oxford English Dictionary as well as in Strouds Judicial Dictionary, there seems to be no justification for unduly restricting the implication of ownership as absolute proprietary ownership as is being canvassed before me by Mr. Hajarnavis. It was argued before me by Mr. Bobde that most of the mines in this country are now held on leases from the State. He told me that he was not in a position to say whether all the State Governments in this country had passed Acts abolishing private proprietorship but he was aware of two such Acts being passed by the States of Bihar and Madhya Pradesh in 1950. Under those Acts all private estates, Mahals and other rights in alienated lands were abolished. Even in cases where the subsoil was owned by private individuals, it was declared by these statutes that the former owners of the subsoil would become statutorily the lessees of the Government. He therefore says that there would hardly be any proprietary mine now in the sense in which the learned Assistant Government Pleader wants to restrict the meaning of a mine which is owned. He therefore argues that if the restricted meaning of owner. ship is accepted and only the companies which are proprietors of the mines in the sense in which it is canvassed are to be taken into account for extending the definition of the word "owner" under the amended definition, then a large number of companies would be outside the purview of this definition and the managing agents of such companies would still be exonerated from the consequences of misdeeds that might occur in the management of those companies. On the interpretation of Mr. Hajarnavis being accepted, the managing agents of all such companies would still be entitled to claim benefit under the judgment of the Supreme Court quoted above. 17. Apart from this, it appears to me that the mining lease is of an entirely different type than a normal lease of land. It is true that even for such contracts or licences where excavation and removal of minerals is permitted to lessees or licensees, the word still used is mining lease. I have doubts whether it has any elements of a lease at all. What is really permitted is excavation and in some cases the entire removal of the soil itself. It is true that even for such contracts or licences where excavation and removal of minerals is permitted to lessees or licensees, the word still used is mining lease. I have doubts whether it has any elements of a lease at all. What is really permitted is excavation and in some cases the entire removal of the soil itself. When we talk of a lease under common law, we never think of destroying the very subject-matter of the lease. The subject-matter of the lease is to be kept intact except when destruction takes place by for major. The usufruct is only permitted to be taken. In the case of a mining lease the very premises demised are themselves allowed to be removed and taken away. Even though we call it a lease, I think it is practically a sale of minerals by taking a price which is called royalty. When therefore such a lease is taken from Government, even though the word "lease" is used, to me it appears that the individual or the company which takes that lease own the mine. "Mine" has been defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of section 2, which means any excavation where any operation for the purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals has been or is being carried on, and thereafter it includes many more things. When mine means excavation for the purpose of searching minerals and that right is leased out, it means that the individual or the company to whom the lease has been granted becomes the owner of the mine so long as the lease subsists. Even if this was not the correct interpretation of the mining lease, I am inclined to think on the authority of the judgment of Bramwell L. J. in Eglinton v. Norman (1), that a lessee during the subsistence of the term of the lease is the owner of the property demised to him. If this is the correct interpretation of the alleged ownership which is required to be present in the company under the amended part of the definition of the word "owner", then it would appear that the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited who are the lessees from Government become the owners of the mine. If this is the correct interpretation of the alleged ownership which is required to be present in the company under the amended part of the definition of the word "owner", then it would appear that the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited who are the lessees from Government become the owners of the mine. If the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited are in this way the owners of the mine, then the further position being admitted in the report of the Inspector of Mines himself, this company has managing agents who are managing the business of this company. J. K. Agents (Private) Limited therefore, who are the managing agents and are managing the business of the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited would be the owners for the purposes of the Mines Act under the definition of that word in clause (1) of sub-section (1) of section 2. 18. Going back to section 76 which determines the owners in certain cases, it would be now relevant to consider whether Shri Gupta could be successfully prosecuted in respect of the alleged crime. According to the above interpretation, here is a mine which is owned by a company and the managing agents of that company being the owners for the purposes of this Act, those managing agents would be vicariously liable as owners. If the managing agency is a firm, then all the partners of that firm would be liable under section 76. If the managing agency is itself a company as J. K. Agents (Private) Limited are in this case, then all the directors of J. K. Agents (Private) Limited would be liable to be prosecuted and not the directors of the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited. Mr. Bobde states that Shri Gupta is not a director and was never a director of J. K. Agents (Private) Limited. However the learned Assistant Government Pleader who appears for the State has no information whether this so. Even under the instructions as he has received from the instructing counsel, it is not possible for him to admit the position that Shri Gupta is not director of J. K. Agents (Private) Limited. It is true that the original report not say that Shri Gupta has been alleged to be a director of J. K. Agents (Private) Limited. Even under the instructions as he has received from the instructing counsel, it is not possible for him to admit the position that Shri Gupta is not director of J. K. Agents (Private) Limited. It is true that the original report not say that Shri Gupta has been alleged to be a director of J. K. Agents (Private) Limited. However, the rules of pleading will not apply to criminal prosecutions, and if Shri Gupta is in fact a director of J. K. Agents (Private) Limited, the prosecution against him could not be said to be bad. 19. On the footing that Shri Gupta is not a director of J. K. Agents (Private) Limited, it appears to me that he could not be prosecuted under section 76 because the nomination made in 1957 under section 76 before the present amendment of the definition of the word "owner" can be of no effect. Since the relevant company for the purposes of section 76 is now J. K. Agents (Private) Limited the nomination ought to be of one of the directors of that company. 20. The next contention that was raised by Mr. Haja.rnavi8 is that the definition of "owner" contained in clause (1) of Sub-section (1) of section 2 cannot be accepted as the definition of owner for the purposes of section 76. There is no difficulty in accepting his argument that if the context otherwise requires, the meanings given in the defining 8eotion to the various expressions and words may not necessarily be accepted for the interpretation of those sections. He says that the expression "owner" used in section 76 speaks of the ownership of the company and the ownership of the mine is necessarily that of the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited. According to him, the technical definition of owner given in section 2 (1) (1) would not be relevant for the penal section 76 because section 76 contemplates the liability of the directors of the company who are supposed to manage the business under their supervision with or without the help of managing agents. The directors of the main company cannot therefore be exempted from the operation of section 76. The directors of the main company cannot therefore be exempted from the operation of section 76. I have already pointed out above that section 76 is one of those sections which deal with vicarious penal liability under the amending Act and the principle for this liability seems to be that those in immediate management cannot be allowed to escape from the consequences that may follow from the misdeeds of anyone else. If immediate management is the principle behind vicarious liability, I see no reason in importing any other meaning to the word "owner" in section 76 than what is given by the definition contained in section 2 (1)(1). For all practical purposes, the managing agents are in physical possession of the mine as well as in effective control of the business of the company. If the owner of the mine for the purposes of section 76 is the main company, namely. the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited, then it would follow that for the misdeeds that may be proved by positive evidence, the directors of the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited, alone could be hauled up but not the directors of J. K. Agents (Private) Limited who are in actual and physical management of the affairs of the mine. This appears to be .contrary .to the spirit of the vicarious liability which is contemplated by sections 18, 22 and 61 of the Act. I am therefore of the view that the expression "where the owner of a mine is a company" used in section 76 has the same import and meaning as the definition of the word "owner" carries. Even for the purpose of section 76 therefore, the owner would be J. K. Agents (Private) Limited who are the managing agents of the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited. 21. Along with this application there was another Criminal Revision Application No. 131 of 1965. That has been withdrawn by the petitioners with the permission of the Court. As a result of the withdrawal of Criminal Revision Application No. 131 of 1965, Criminal Case No. 1001 of 1963 goes back to the file of the learned Magistrate for further disposal according to law. That has been withdrawn by the petitioners with the permission of the Court. As a result of the withdrawal of Criminal Revision Application No. 131 of 1965, Criminal Case No. 1001 of 1963 goes back to the file of the learned Magistrate for further disposal according to law. That being the result of the non-prosecution of other Criminal Revision Application, the director of the Madhya Pradesh Industries Limited Shri Gupta will have to prove to the satisfaction of the Magistrate in terms of my judgment above that he was not a director of J. K. Agents (Private) Limited at the time when the accident took place. If he proves that, then the learned Magistrate will forthwith discharge Shri Gupta as having been wrongly impleaded in this criminal litigation. If however Shri Gupta is proved to be a director of J. K. Agents (Private) Limited on the date of the accident, the case will continue against him also and the whole case will have to be disposed of according to law. In order to enable Shri Gupta to show that he was not a director of J. K. Agents (Private) Limited, the learned Magistrate is directed to give immediate opportunity to him before the case is heard on merits of the accident. Case remanded.