JUDGMENT : Ahmad, C.J. - On the 22nd February, 1964 which was a Saturday, there was a brawl at about 4 p.m. in the liquor shop of one, Balai Majhi (p.w.3) in village Dhobadiha, Police Station Chamakpur. In that brawl the persons who were said to have taken part were, on one side, the Appellant Hrushi, his son Maheswar (p.w.1) and cousin Sanatan ; and on the other the deceased Sudarsan Dibar. They all then resided in the same village Dhanurjoypur and were, while in the Liquor shop dead drunk. The claim of p.w.3 is that in the course of that brawl he saw Hrushi chasing Sudarsan with a lathi in his hand which he, and one Kalakar Naik (p.w.4) who was also at that time present at the shop taking liquor snatched from him. At this Hrushi took a knife from the pocket of Sanatan and raised it towards Sudarsan. Seeing that p.w.3 caught hold of the wrist of Hrushi and prevented him from dealing any blow therewith. Thereafter, Sudarsan ran towards the jungle. The other three also immediately followed him. Thus, so far as the liquor shop was concerned the matter ended there. 2. That evening however Sudarsan did not reach his house. Therefore, on the day following there was a search made for him by his elder brother Daria Dibar (p.w.5). In the course of that search he is said to have found his dead body lying at a place in between his village and the liquor shop-at a distance of about a mile from the latter. His evidence is that from there he first went to the liquor shop where he came to know from p.w.3 about the incident of the previous evening and then to Bamunibahal police outpost, where, on his statement, the first information was recorded on that very day (23-2-1964) by the A.S.I. (p. w, 10). The A.S.I. having done that got out for the place of occurrence and reached there at 8 p.m. on that every day. There he first took the statements of Balia Majhi (p.w.3), Rukmini Dei (p.w.2) sister of Appellant Hrushi, and Maheswar (p.w.1) and then seized a knife (M.O.I) which was produced before him by Maheswar. On the next day (24-2-1964) he made the inquest over the dead body and thereafter post mortem was held on 25-2-1964 by the Assistant Surgeon (p.w.9). There he first took the statements of Balia Majhi (p.w.3), Rukmini Dei (p.w.2) sister of Appellant Hrushi, and Maheswar (p.w.1) and then seized a knife (M.O.I) which was produced before him by Maheswar. On the next day (24-2-1964) he made the inquest over the dead body and thereafter post mortem was held on 25-2-1964 by the Assistant Surgeon (p.w.9). The doctor according to his evidence in the committing Court found the following injuries (i) On wound 21 x I" bone deep on the face, directed Obliquely, extending from the inner canthus of the right eye across the bridge of the nose to the left side of the forehead. (ii) One wound 21 x 1/2" and bone deep directed transversely on the middle of the forehead. (iii) One incised looking wound l1/2" x 1/2" bone deep on the forehead above the injury No. 2 situated near the hair margin on the head directed transversely. (iv) One incised looking wound 2" x 1/2" skin deep on, the right side of the head under cover of the hairs directed anterio-posteriorly. (v) One incised looking wound on the left side of the upper lip 11/2" x 1/2"-mouth cavity. (vi) The upper incisor teeth were dislocated from their sockets. The lower incisor teeth were also dislocated from their sockets. Further he also deposed that On dissection the left maxilla was found fractured irregularly corresponding to external injury No. 4. Squamous part of the frontal bone was found fractured on its right side corresponding to injury No. 4. But the fracture has been extended to the right orbital plate, which bad also been fractured from before backwards. All the injuries were ante-mortem in nature. Injury Nos. 3 to 6 could be caused by a hard and blunt weapon like a heavy stone. Injury Nos. 1 and 2 might have been caused by a sharp cutting weapon like this knife (M.O.I). Injury No. 4 with its corresponding internal injury is sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death. 3. All this ultimately led to the trial of the Appellant along with his cousin Sanatan for having committed the murder of Sudarsan. 4. In regard to Sanatan the learned Sessions Judge found that the circumstantial evidence appearing against him does not conclusively establish his guilt. Accordingly he was given the benefit of doubt and acquitted of the charge. 3. All this ultimately led to the trial of the Appellant along with his cousin Sanatan for having committed the murder of Sudarsan. 4. In regard to Sanatan the learned Sessions Judge found that the circumstantial evidence appearing against him does not conclusively establish his guilt. Accordingly he was given the benefit of doubt and acquitted of the charge. But the Appellant Hrushi was found guilty u/s 302, Indian Penal Code and sentenced to transportation for life. 5. The only eye-witness examined in the case is Maheswar (p.w.1). The statement made before the Committing Magistrate on 28-4-1964 by this witnesses was consistent with his earlier statements made first before the Police on 25-2-1964 and thereafter before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate u/s 164, Code of Criminal Procedure on 1-3-1964. But at the trial he went back to the statement made by him before the Committing Court and stated that: I have not seen the assault. The accused persons had no quarrel with Sudarsan. I did not see Sudarsan Dibar that day. He was therefore allowed to be cross-examined by the prosecution. In the course of that cross-examination, he admitted to have made the earlier statement but added that they were made at the instigation of the thana officer. In the committing Court, as to the incident at the liquor shop p.w.1 fully supported p.w.3 and further added that when the deceased left for the jungle his father and his uncle Sanatan followed the deceased and he went along with them. What thereafter happened at the place of occurrence was described by him in these words: My father dealt a blow with the lathi to the deceased and also dealt a kick. The deceased fell down and my uncle caught hold of him and when my father stabbed him on the face, my uncle also brought a stone and dealt a blow with it on the deceased's face. I was standing a little apart near a Dhata tree. Then my father and uncle ran away through a jungle leaving me behind and I came back with two passersby who also have seen my father and uncle running away. Rightly therefore in the face of his contradictory statements, as observed by the learned Sessions Judge the conviction of the Appellant cannot be sustained on his solitary testimony. Then my father and uncle ran away through a jungle leaving me behind and I came back with two passersby who also have seen my father and uncle running away. Rightly therefore in the face of his contradictory statements, as observed by the learned Sessions Judge the conviction of the Appellant cannot be sustained on his solitary testimony. It is true that there is no legal bar against it, but the rule of prudence demands that such evidence should not be acted upon unless found corroborated by independent evidence. 6. In Shernappa Mutyappa Balke v. The State of Maharastra 1964 S.C.D. 305, 311, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in agreement with the view expressed in AIR 1949 257 (Privy Council), have observed: Where a person has made two contradictory statements on oath, it is plainly unsafe to rely implicitly on his evidence. In other words before one decides to accept the evidence brought in u/s 288 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as true and reliable, one has to be satisfied that this is really so. How can that satisfaction be reached? In most cases the satisfaction can come only if there is such support in extrinsic evidence as to give a reasonable indication that not only what is said about the occurrence in general, but also what is said against the particular accused sought to be implicated in the crime is true. If there be a case-and there is such infinite variety in facts and circumstances the cases coming before the Courts that it cannot be dogmatically said that there can never be such a case-where even without such extrinsic support the Judge of facts, after bearing in mind the intrinsic weakness of the evidence in that two different statements on oath have been made, is satisfied that the evidence is true and can be safely relied upon, the Judge will be failing in his duty not to do so. 7. But the present case is not such as may be attracted by the latter part of this observation. 8. P.W.1 is after all boy aged ten years only. Secondly in his cross-examination he has admitted that I did not take liquor on any other occasion prior to the date of occurrence. 7. But the present case is not such as may be attracted by the latter part of this observation. 8. P.W.1 is after all boy aged ten years only. Secondly in his cross-examination he has admitted that I did not take liquor on any other occasion prior to the date of occurrence. This therefore makes one wonder as to why he on that particular day for the first time went to the liquor shop and that too the purpose of drinking along with his father and uncle. This story is not free from improbability. Thirdly, there are two broad patent contradictions to be found in the statement made by him before the committing Court. The first relates to the question as to whether it was the Appellant who had hit the deceased with a piece of stone or whether it was Sanatan. In the committing Court this act was attributed by him to the Appellant but in his earlier statements made by him before the Police and before the Magistrate u/s 164, Criminal Procedure Code it was said to have been done by Sanatan. The second contradiction is about the time when his father and uncle(sanatan) left their house on their return after the occurrence, as pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge. 9. Therefore, apart from the fact that the statement made in the committing Court was subsequently gone back at the trial, his evidence even on merit is neither cogent nor convincing. That therefore, all the more makes it obligatory on the Court, as the learned Sessions Judge has rightly pointed out, that his evidence in the circumstances of this case should not be acted upon unless that is found corroborated in material particulars by other independent materials on record and that too, not only in respect of the general story, but more particularly in respect of what is alleged to have been done by the Appellant. In fact this much has not been controverted even by the learned Government Advocate. On the contrary, the learned Advocate has, with his usual frankness, conceded that his evidence as it stands is not all free from unnaturalness and improbabilities. In fact this much has not been controverted even by the learned Government Advocate. On the contrary, the learned Advocate has, with his usual frankness, conceded that his evidence as it stands is not all free from unnaturalness and improbabilities. The controversy, therefore, here has been confined mainly to the question whether the corroborating circumstances which have been relied upon by the learned Sessions Judge in support of the evidence of p.w.1 for holding the Appellant guilty are worthy of reliance and they, along with the evidence of p.w.1 are conclusive to prove the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 10. These circumstances are three in number: (i) The evidence of p. ws. 3 and 4 as to the previous alleged occurrence at the liquor shop; (ii) The production of the knife (M.O.I) by p.w.1 and (iii) The evidence of p.w.2 as to what he did and how he behaved on his return on that day to the house from the liquor shop. 11. Now, so far as the story of the previous occurrence at the liquor shop is concerned that may at best suggest the origin of the dispute but is not very much connected with the transaction which ultimately thereafter occurred, resulting in the death of Sanatan Dibar. Further, even on merit neither the evidence of p.w.3 nor that of p.w.4 can be safely relied upon as trustworthy. It is admitted by p.w.3 that he is not a licensed vendor of liquor, and that now after the occurrence the liquor shop has been closed. Then it is also admitted by him that he was once convicted in an excise case. As to that the suggestion of the defence is that it was brought about at the instance of the Appellant who was then the chonkidar of the village. It is true that there is no direct evidence to prove this fact, but in the circumstances as stated above, it cannot be ruled out as altogether baseless. Therefore, no reliance can be placed on the evidence of such a witness. 12. The same, if not worse, is the position of p.w.4. According to him he had gone to the liquor shop at about 1 p.m. and though he had finished drinking long before the alleged brawl in the shop he was stilling in the shop and taking rest. This is rather hard to believe. 12. The same, if not worse, is the position of p.w.4. According to him he had gone to the liquor shop at about 1 p.m. and though he had finished drinking long before the alleged brawl in the shop he was stilling in the shop and taking rest. This is rather hard to believe. Secondly, he admits that though that evening he halted in village Dhanurjoypur, but he did not tell anybody about it. Lastly, his evidence is completely silent on the question whether p.w.1 was present at the shop or not. If in fact, p.w.1 was present at the shop at the time of the occurrence and p.w.4 was a witness to it, he could not have failed to notice his presence there. His silence therefore on the point of the presence of p.w.1 is more indicative of the fact that in any case at least p.w.1 had, on that day, not gone to the liquor shop. So, on that crucial point he belies the claim of p.w.1. Lastly, the evidence of p.ws.2 and 3 read as a whole, does not seem to be very consistent with what has been stated by p.w.1. According to them, the assault by the Appellant at the liquor shop was initially open with a lathi which the Appellant originally had in his hand, but that is said to have been subsequently snatched away then and there from his band by p.w.3. And there is no evidence on record to show that the same was ever thereafter when the Appellant was leaving the place, returned him. In that state of evidence, therefore, the statement made by p.w.1 that the deceased was at the place of murder, hit first with a lathi by the Appellant, is in a way contradicted by the evidence of p.ws.3 and 4 13. Next in importance is the story about the knife (M.O.I). No doubt, much in this case seems to have been made out of this part of the prosecution case. But on a closer scrutiny, the story as stated in Court does not inspire confidence either of its being true or natural. Next in importance is the story about the knife (M.O.I). No doubt, much in this case seems to have been made out of this part of the prosecution case. But on a closer scrutiny, the story as stated in Court does not inspire confidence either of its being true or natural. It was this knife which was, as claimed by the prosecution, taken to the liquor shop by Sanatan and there used by the Appellant in whipping it out at the deceased was again this knife which is said to have been used by the Appellant in ultimately stabbing the deceased thereafter at the place of occurrence and subsequently taken to the house by Sanatan in his pocket and finally concealed after its being washed, in the house of Desra Patra-where-from on the next day it was brought out by p.w.1 and produced before the Police. Now let us examine its various links at different stages. The admitted first link in the chain is that this knife was originally carried to the liquor shop by Sanatan, but there is no evidence on the record to prove that the Appellant had any knowledge about this fact, or had seen it with him. Therefore, how did the Appellant ask him for any knife. Secondly, even if, for the sake of argument it be conceded that p.w.3 had seen this knife as claimed by him, with the Appellant when he attempted to threaten the deceased with it can it be said that it was so peculiar and different from the class that p.w.3 could be sure to identify it at the time when it was shown to him at the trial, specially when; as admitted by him it bad no special identification mark. Further, in this connection it has to be noted that at no stage there was any test identification parade held in respect of this knife. In these circumstances it cannot be accepted with any amount of confidence that the knife which p.w.3 saw in the hand of the Appellant, if at all, was the same which was subsequently produced by p.w.1 before the Police. 14. Then comes the story as to what happened about the knife when it was carried back to the house by Sanatan. As to this part of the case, the claim made by p.w.1 in. 14. Then comes the story as to what happened about the knife when it was carried back to the house by Sanatan. As to this part of the case, the claim made by p.w.1 in. his statement made before the committing Court is that- My aunt also washed the clothes of my father and uncle in the night and my uncle cleansed his knife and kept it in the house of Desra Patra, another uncle of mine. Therefore it is said that when the Police came for enquiry p.w.1 brought it out from the house of Desra Patra and produced it before them. This claim made by p.w.1 on the very face of it seems, to be not convincing. If in fact this was the knife used by the Appellant for assaulting the deceased he would have tried to conceal it himself and would not have left it to be done by his cousin Desra Patra. No doubt what p.w.2 stated in the committing court seems to lend some support to the claim of p.w.1 made about it. But that evidence, too, is not free from inherent weaknesses. Firstly, p.w.2 also like p.w.1 went back at the trial to what she had stated in the committing Court. Secondly her statement is that when the Appellant and his cousin Sanatan, came to the house that knife was seen protruding from the pocket of Sanatan and not from the pocket of the Appellant. Thirdly, it is stated that when p.w.2 asked him as to what he had in his pocket Sanatan replied that he did not have anything in his pocket and ran into a room. Thereupon, it is said p.w.2 told him that he had a knife in his pocket. At this the Appellant was said to have raised a lathi towards her, whereupon she ran away to the house of a friend of hers and slept there for the night. This part of the story if at all true shows that at that the Appellant and his cousin were, rather careful to see that none in the family should know anything about the knife or about the occurrence. But the claim made by p.w.1 suggests as if on return to the house the Appellant and his cousin were trying to take it known to all the members of the family. But the claim made by p.w.1 suggests as if on return to the house the Appellant and his cousin were trying to take it known to all the members of the family. This is neither consistent with the normal course of conduct of any reasonable man, nor with what p.w.2 stated about it. Lastly if in fact this knife was kept concealed in the house of Desra Patra and was hereafter taken out from there by p.w.1, this fact must have been known to the inmates of the house of Desra Parta, but none of them has been examined in support of this part of the prosecution case. In these circumstances, no reliance can be placed either on the evidence of p.w.2 what has been Claimed by the prosecution about the knife. In the result therefore the evidence of p.w.1 as deposed in the committing Court is left without any corroboration by any independent and reliable evidence on the record. 15. The evidence brought out on the record may at best lead to some suspicion against the Appellant or even against cousin Sanatan (who as already stated has been acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge), but that suspicion alone call be no ground for holding that what has been alleged against the Appellant in this case has been fully proved. I therefore hold that the Appellant Hrushi also, as has been held by the learned Sessions Judge in the 'case about Sanatan-is entitled to benefit of doubt. Accordingly the appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentence imposed on the Appellant are Bet aside, and he, is directed to be released forthwith. Misra, J. 16. I agree. Appeal allowed. Final Result : Allowed