Judgment :- 1. These appeals arise out of suits withdrawn to this Court under Art.228 of the Constitution, as they involved the interpretation of some provisions of the Constitution, and disposed of by a learned judge of this Court. The constitutional question was whether Art.14,19 and 31 of the Constitution stood in the way of the validity of S.53 of the Malabar Tenancy Act. Madhavan Nair, J. held that Art.31A of the Constitution applied and therefore Art.14,19 and 31 did not apply. 2. Under S.53 of the Malabar Tenancy Act, which provision was added to the Act by Act VII of 1954, it is provided that any document executed by a cultivating verumpattomdar after the 28th of July 1950 (the date of publication of Act XXXIII of 1951) & before 20th March 1954 (the date of commencement of Act VII of 1954) purporting to affect his rights or status as tenant shall be voidable at the option of the cultivating verumpattomdar. The tenants who surrendered their tenancy rights by documents executed during the relevant period have filed the suits for avoiding the surrenders. It is the validity of S.53 that is being challenged. 3. The first argument advanced before us is that there was no landlord and tenant relationship at the time of the suits; that is, the appellants were not landlords and the respondents were not verumpattomdars at that time. This contention is based on the wording of S.53(1); but if the sub-section is properly scrutinised, it will emerge that the contention is the result of a superficial reading of the provision. The sub-section enacts that any document executed by "a cultivating verumpattomdar" between the relevant dates purporting to affect his rights or status as tenant shall be voidable at the option of "the cultivating verumpattomdar". Evidently, the right conferred is on that cultivating verumpattomdar who surrendered his tenancy right between the relevant dates; and the fact that he was not a cultivating verumpattomdar at the time of the commencement of Act VII of 1954 is of on consequence. 4. The next contention is that Art.31A of the Constitution does not apply. Art.31A (1) enacts that no law providing for the extinguishment or modification of any rights in an estate shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Art.14,19 or 31. 4. The next contention is that Art.31A of the Constitution does not apply. Art.31A (1) enacts that no law providing for the extinguishment or modification of any rights in an estate shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Art.14,19 or 31. In Clause.2 of the Article the expression "estate" is defined; and the inclusive portion of the definition states that in Kerala the jenmam right is an estate. The expression "rights" in relation to an estate is also defined as to include any rights vesting in a proprietor, sub-proprietor, under-proprietor, tenure-holder, raiyat, under-raiyat or other intermediary. Thus, the jenm right is an estate; and this right in Kerala is admittedly a freehold interest in property. The holder of a jenm right, the jenmi, can create several under-tenures in the jenm right like kanom, kuzhikanom, verumpattom, melkanom, etc. All these under tenures are defined rights in the jenm right: and the kanom right is also such a right in the jenm right, which itself is an estate; (vide Para.16 of Kavalaappara Kottarathil Kochunni alias Moopil Nayar v. The States of Madras and Kerala: AIR. 1960 S.C.1080). It may be noted in this connection that the appellants in these cases are kanom-holders. S.53 of the Tenancy Act is a provision intended for agrarian reform modifying the rights of a kanom-holder, the kanom right being a right in an estate. It is thus evident that Art.31A of the Constitution applies to this provision. 5. But it is argued that Art.31A can apply only to a provision which modifies or extinguishes the landlord's right. The argument proceeds that S.53 of the Tenancy Act does not extinguish or modify the kanom-holder's right to receive rent from the verumpattomdar, which alone is the landlord's right. In other words, even after the delivery of possession of the properties as contemplated by S.53 to the respondents, the appellants will retain their right to receive rent; and that right, which is the landlord's right, is not modified or extinguished by S.53. This argument is based on an observation of the Supreme Court in Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay (A.I.R.1959 S.C. 459). This argument is based on an observation of the Supreme Court in Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay (A.I.R.1959 S.C. 459). Bhagwati, J. observes in Para.39 of the judgment that the question for consideration was whether the relevant provisions of the impugned Act were designed to bring about an extinguishment or modification of the landlord's rights in "estates"; and the learned judge continues to discuss that question in the subsequent paragraphs. In that case the Supreme Court was considering the modification or extinguishment of the landlord's rights. But, that does not mean that Art.31A applies only to such cases. The real question under Art.31A is whether the legislation extinguishes or modifies rights in "estates". The kanom right is a right in an estate; and that right consists of the kanom-holder's right to create under-tenures like mortgages, verumpattoms, etc. and also the right to cultivate the property himself. S.53 extinguishes the right of the kanom-holder to such direct cultivation. 6. The fallacy of this argument will be further exposed if we give an illustration. Suppose a legislation is passed conferring fixity of tenure on verumpattomdars under kanom-holders, thereby extinguishing the right of the kanom-holders to recover possession from the tenants. Such legislation does not do away with the right of the kanom-holders to receive rent from their tenants. Can it be said that, because the legislation does not affect the right of the kanom-holders to get rent from their tenants, it will not come within Art.31A of the Constitution? Obviously not. The kanom-holder's rights include the right to recover possession and to be in direct possession, which right is extinguished or modified by the legislation; and this will be a legislation modifying the rights of a kanom-holder, to which Art.31A will apply. 7. The counsel of the respondents draws our attention to the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution. He points out that the expression "estate" is now widened in scope and lands held under ryotwari settlement are also brought within its definition. So that, the counsel argues, after the Seventeenth Amendment there is no scope for contending that S.53 does not modify or extinguish the rights in an estate. We think that this argument has also considerable force. 8. So that, the counsel argues, after the Seventeenth Amendment there is no scope for contending that S.53 does not modify or extinguish the rights in an estate. We think that this argument has also considerable force. 8. It is again contended by the respondents' counsel that by the Seventeenth Amendment the Kerala Land Reforms Act (Kerala Act 1 of 1964) is included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution. He contends further that by S.132 of that Act the Malabar Tenancy Act is repealed; but, any pending suit under S.53 thereof is to be disposed of under the same provision as if the Tenancy Act is not repealed. From these the counsel argues that S.53 of the Malabar Tenancy Act is kept alive as if it were a provision of Act 1 of 1964, which latter Act is itself included in the Ninth Schedule. We do not think that this argument has any substance. What S.132 of Act 1 of 1964 does is only to keep alive S.53 of the Tenancy Act for the pending suits; and it does not incorporate that section into Act 1 of 1964 itself so as to make it one of its provisions. 9. In the result we confirm the decisions of Madhavan Nair, J. and dismiss appeals with costs. Dismissed.