Order. - This petition by a tenant is to quash an order of the 1st respondent dated 16th April, 1964, and made under section 29 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, exempting premises No. 128, South Avani Moola Street, Madurai, from the provisions of section 10 of the Act. The petitioner has been in occupation of the premises since June, 1952. There is no dispute that the premises belong to the 2nd respondent. At the time the premises were let out to the petitioner, the 2nd respondent was a minor. On his attainment of the age of majority and his marriage, he applied to the Government for exemption on the ground that he had no other house of his own at Madurai and was actually residing in a rented premises. After asking for the explanation of the petitioner, the Government made the impugned order being satisfied that this is a case which justified grant of exemption. Mr. Rajarama Ayyar for the petitioner contends that the Government in making the order was misled by its view that the premises were both residential and nonresidential and that in such a case no remedy was open to the petitioner under the provisions of the Act. Learned Counsel relies on Dakshinamoorthy v. Thulja Bai 1 and contends that where it is not shown that the purpose of the tenancy is predominantly for one or other purpose a petition for eviction would lie in any event. The penultimate paragraph of that judgment no doubt supports the contention. There is no finding by the Government in the instant case as to the predominant purpose of the tenancy. But, in my view, that does not in any way vitiate the impugned order. The power of the Government under section 29 of the Act is a very wide power and its exercise is not controlled by any other provision in the Act, as will be apparent from the opening words of the section. The purpose of this power is to soften the rigour or hardship in the working of the Act which is an emergency legislation. It follows, therefore, that the power may properly and justly be used for that purpose. Whether that purpose exists or not will be a matter for decision in each case in the light of the particular facts. The purpose of this power is to soften the rigour or hardship in the working of the Act which is an emergency legislation. It follows, therefore, that the power may properly and justly be used for that purpose. Whether that purpose exists or not will be a matter for decision in each case in the light of the particular facts. An exemption being in the very nature an exception to the general protection provided under the Act, it may prima facie be discriminatory and, therefore, each order under section 29 of the Act may call for examination. Ex facie the order therefore it must appear that it has been made for justifiable purposes. Summing up the nature of the power, this Court in Pannalal Jagannath Prasad Gupta v. State of Madras1observed: “ It should therefore be taken as well settled that bona fide requirements by landlord of a non-residential building for his own occupation is a ground well within the scope of section 13 of the Act and that, in particular circumstances, if the Government are satisfied that the justice of the cases including relieving hardship or unreasonable severity or rigour in the application of the provisions of the Act, requires it, they may legitimately and properly grant exemption on that ground.” I continue to hold the same view. Jagannath Prasad Gupta v. State of Madras has also concurred with it. In this case, the facts undoubtedly justify the order. Here is the 2nd respondent who became of age, got married, but was living in a rented house, owning no other house himself in Madurai and naturally he wanted to occupy his own house. That is certainly a legitimate purpose for which the Government could exercise its power under section 29 of the Act and relieve the hardship of the 2nd respondent. That is what the Government did. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel’s fee Rs. 100. R.M. ----- Petition dismissed.