CHHANGANI, J.—The question requiring determination in this reference is whether Shri Prithvisingh, Superintending Engineer, Rajasthan Electricity Board in the year 1962 and now Additional Chief Engineer or and Shri S.B. Chaurasiya, Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Officers of the Government of Rajasthan and functioning on deputation with the Rajasthan State Electricity Board, are public officers within the meaning of sec. 56 sub-sec. (2) of the Indian Electricity Act of 1910, and as such, cannot be prosecuted for an offence under the Electricity Act without the sanction of the Rajasthan State? 2. The facts leading to the reference may be stated at the outset:— It is comnion ground that on 12-1-62 Shri Prithvisingh and Shri S.B. Chau-rasiya (herein-after referred to as the accused) acting on behalf of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board discontinued the supply of electricity to the complainant Shri Nandlal. The accused non-petitioner entertained suspicion that the complainant had been committing theft of electrical energy and consequently, they discontinued the supply. It may also be mentioned that the Rajasthan State Electricity Board lodged information with the police to prosecute the complainant for an offence under sec. 379, I.P.C. On investigation however, a case of theft was not established against the complainant and the police filed a final report in the matter. Thereafter Shri Nandlal filed a complaint against the Chairman, Rajasthan State Electricity Board and the two accused non-petitioners, accusing them of an offence under sec. 42 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in the court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sikar. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate treated the Chairman, Rajasthan State Electricity Board as a public officer and did not issue any process against him. A case under sec. 42 of the Act was, however, registered against the accused and processes were issued against them. Before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate they raised an objection that their prosecution was barred in the absence of the sanction of the Rajasthan State in view of the provisions of sec. 56, sub-sec.(2) of the Act. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate held that in view of the provisions of sec. 81 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 read with sec. 5 of the Act the accused should be treated as public servants within the meaning of "sec. 21 of the Indian Penal Code. He also held that sec. 56 sub-sec. 56, sub-sec.(2) of the Act. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate held that in view of the provisions of sec. 81 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 read with sec. 5 of the Act the accused should be treated as public servants within the meaning of "sec. 21 of the Indian Penal Code. He also held that sec. 56 sub-sec. (2) of the Act is the most appropriate section for giving right of privilege granted by the legislature to the accused in this complaint." He repelled the arguments of the complainant that the accused could claim protection only on proof of their having acted in good faith. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, however, did not revoke the order taking cognizance against the accused but on the other hand, stopped proceedings under sec. 249 Indian Penal Code and directed the complainant to obtain sanction of the State Government for the prosecution of the accused. Shri Nandlal filed a revision in the court of the District Magistrate, Sikar. The District Magistrate recorded the following conclusions:— (1) A servant of the Board shall be entitled to be considered a public servant vide sec. 81 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, with regard to their functioning under the Indian Electricity (Supply) Act also (by virtue of link established by sec. 26 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. (2) Invoking sec. 2(17) Civil Procedure Code, defining "public officer" and making some arguments on logical considerations he held that the officers of the Board should be deemed to be public officers entitled to the protection of sec. 56, sub-sec.(2) of the Act. The District Magistrate further found fault with the initial order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate dated 8-3-1963 taking cognizance of the case against the accused. He also observed that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was not justified in invoking sec. 249 I.P.C. to the present complaint case and that an order stopping proceedings was not good in law. According to him, the Magistrate should have revoked his order taking cognizance against the accused. He has, therefore, made the present reference which, as stated above, raises the question formulated above. 3. Mr. Datta has appeared on behalf of the complainant and has opposed the reference. He contended that the officers and the employees of an autonomous body as the State Electricity Board cannot be treated as public officers. He has, therefore, made the present reference which, as stated above, raises the question formulated above. 3. Mr. Datta has appeared on behalf of the complainant and has opposed the reference. He contended that the officers and the employees of an autonomous body as the State Electricity Board cannot be treated as public officers. He also contended that the requirements of the accused having acted in good faith as contained in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 56 of the Act and sec. 82 of the Electricity (Supply) Act should be imported into the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of sec.56 of the Act and the accused should not be held entitled to an unqualified protection. 4. Mr. Bhandari for the accused supported the reference. He contended that in view of the nature of the functions and duties of the officers and the employees of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board they fall into the definition of "public officers" within the meaning of sec. 56, sub-sec. (2) of the Act. Alternatively, he contended that the two accused are officers of the Rajasthan State and they are only on deputation with the Rajasthan State Electricity Board. As officers of the State they are public officers in view of sub-clause h of sec. 2(17) of the Civil Procedure Code. He urged that the words "Public Officer" having not been defined in the Act, the definition in the Civil Procedure Code can be accepted as a guide on the principle of legislative practice in the absence of any indication to the contrary. 5. At the out set, it may be mentioned that sec. 65 of the Act initially did not contain the present provision contained in sub-sec. (2). The Act also does not define the expression "public officer". The expression "public officer" appears to refer to an officer who discharges functions or duties in relation to public and not in relation to private individuals. This may be accepted as a rough and general test for determining as to who should be treated as a public officer. All the same, it must be recognised that the expression "public officer" cannot be held to have a precise meaning. Consequently, in accordance with the well accepted principles of statutory interpretation the scope of the expression should be discovered by looking at the intention of the legislature as indicated by the statute. All the same, it must be recognised that the expression "public officer" cannot be held to have a precise meaning. Consequently, in accordance with the well accepted principles of statutory interpretation the scope of the expression should be discovered by looking at the intention of the legislature as indicated by the statute. Further, for the purposes of ascertaining intention, it will be quite permissible to take into consideration the general and legislative back-ground and the purpose of the provisions under consideration. 6. It may be mentioned that after the Act of 1910, India like most other countries realised the unique importance of the electricity as a source of power for the rapid industrial expansion, development of agriculture on modern and scientific lines and technological advances. It also felt the need of legislative measures to secure a co-ordinated system in which generation may be concentrated in the most efficient units, bulk supply of energy centralised under the direction and control of one authority so that the supply of the electricity may be rationalised in the national interests. It was in the wake of this realisation that the Electricity Supply Act of 1948 was enacted. This Act inter alia provided for the constitution of State Electricity Boards. The Act further conferred functions and duties of great public importance on State Electricity Boards and their representatives or officers. This will be clear from a survey of the important provisions of the Act. I however, deem it unnecessary to undertake a survey of these provisions since such a survey was made with sufficient elaboration in a Bench decision of this Court reported in D. B. Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 469 of 1963 : Mohan Lal vs. The State and 13 others, decided on May 14, 1965. The Bench in that case was considering the question whether the State Electricity Board fell within the purview of the expression "State" as defined in Art.12 of the Constitution and whether a claim of fundamental right can be made against the acts of the Board. After surveying the important provisions of the Act this Court came to the conclusion that it (the State Electricity Board) properly falls within the definition of "State" as given in Art.12 of the Constitution. After surveying the important provisions of the Act this Court came to the conclusion that it (the State Electricity Board) properly falls within the definition of "State" as given in Art.12 of the Constitution. The survey and the eventual conclusion arrived at by the Bench clearly brings out the public importance of the nature of the functions and duties of the Electricity Boards members and officers. I may add that it is in-keeping with the policy disclosed above that sec. 81 of the Act provided that all members, officers and servants of the Board shall be deemed, when acting or purporting to act in pursuance of any of the provisions of this Act, to be public servants within the meaning of sec. 21 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1960). After this Act, the Government recognised the need of further amendment of the Electricity Act of 1910. An Advisory Board was constituted in 1953 to suggest amendments. The Board consulted various State Governments and made recommendations in consequence of which the Electricity Amendment Act of 1959 (33 of 1959) was enacted. It was this Act which amended sec. 56. The original section was renumbered as sub-sec. (1) and sub-sec, (2) was newly added reading as follows:— "56(2)—No court shall take cognizance of an offence under this Act, by a public officer except with the sanction— (a) in the case of a person employed in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government; and (b) in any other case, of the State Government." The newly added sub-section used the expression "public officer" but the amending Act did not define the expression. It appears reasonable to infer that the legislature had in its mind (i) the provisions of sec. 81 of the Electricity (Supply) Act—declaring that all members, officers and servants of the Board shall be deemed, when acting or purporting to act in pursuance of any of the provisions of the Act to be public servants within the meaning of sec. 21 of the Indian Penal Code (ii) the provision of sec. 2(17) of the Civil Procedure Code defining "public officers" in terms more or less similar to those in which the expression "public servant" has been defined in sec. 21 of the Act. 7. 21 of the Indian Penal Code (ii) the provision of sec. 2(17) of the Civil Procedure Code defining "public officers" in terms more or less similar to those in which the expression "public servant" has been defined in sec. 21 of the Act. 7. The definitions of both terms are quite comprehensive and wide and include all Government servants and other officers concerned in the performance of duties of a public nature. In this legislative and general back ground considering the public importance of the nature of the functions and duties of the officers and servants of the State Electricity Board and taking guidance from the definitions of "public officer" in sec. 2(17) of Civil Procedure Code and public servants in sec. 21 of the Indian Penal Code and the provisions of sec. 81 of the Electricity (Supply) Act it appears quite reasonable to hold that the employees and officers of the State Electricity Board which has been held to be a "State" as defined in Art. 12 of the Constitution, are public officers within the meaning of sec. 56, sub-sec. (2) of the Act. They certainly discharge functions and duties in relation to public and not in relation to private individuals. 8. Apart from this, I find considerable force in the alternative line of reasoning relied upon by Mr. Bhandari which also leads to the same conclusion. Sec.2(17) of the Civil Procedure Code defines a public officer and under clause h a Government servant is a public officer. The words "public officer" having been defined by the Indian legislature in the Civil Procedure Code and the same legislature having omitted to define the expression in the Electricity Act there can be no serious objection in holding that the definition of the public officer in the Civil Procedure Code can be looked at as a guide in interpreting the words "public officer" in the State Electricity Act on what has been described the principle of legislative practice. Certainly there are no indications in the context or setting of the Act which may warrant that the expression "public officer" should be given a meaning different from the one given to the expression by sec.2(17) of the Civil Procedure Code. Now, there is no controversy that the accused are still employees of the Rajasthan State. They are merely on deputation with the State Electricity Board. Now, there is no controversy that the accused are still employees of the Rajasthan State. They are merely on deputation with the State Electricity Board. There is an authority for the proposition that a person in the service of the Government of India does not cease to be a public officer merely on the ground that his services were lent to a private institution. Vishnu Vasudeo Joshi vs. T.L.H. Smith Pearse(l) may be referred to in this connection.!The two accused being the members of the Rajasthan State do not cease to be public officers simply because they are functioning on deputation with the State Electricity Board. So, on this line of reasoning also they are entitled to be treated as public officers within the meaning of sec.56 sub-sec. (2) of the Act. 9. I now take up the contention of Mr. Datta that on a proper interpretation of sec. 56, sub-sec. (2) of the Act the accused non-petitioners can claim protection only on proof of something done by them under the Act or anything in good faith purported to be done by them under this Act. It will be convenient at this stage to read sub-sec. (1) of sec. 56, sub-sec. (2) of sec. 56 of the Act and sec. 82 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 together, They read as under:— 56. Protection for acts done in good faith— (1) No suit, prosecution or other proceeding shall lie against any public officer, or any servant of a local authority, for anything done, or in good faith purporting to be done under this Act. (2) No court shall take cognizance of an offence under this Act, by a public officer except with the sanction— (a) in the case of a person employed in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government; and (b) in any other case, of the State Government." "82. Protection to persons acting under this Act—No suit, prosecution or other legal pro ceeding shall lie against any person for anything which is done in good faith or intended to be done under this Act." Now, the legislature in its wisdom thought it proper to provide in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 56 and sec. 62 of the Electricity (Supply) Act that protection can be claimed for something done under the Act or something in good faith purported to have been done under the Act. (1) of sec. 56 and sec. 62 of the Electricity (Supply) Act that protection can be claimed for something done under the Act or something in good faith purported to have been done under the Act. When sub-sec. (2) was introduced in the year 1959 the legislature did not think it proper to word sub-sec. (2) in the language of sub-sec. (1) or sec. 82 of the Electricity (Supply) Act. On the other hand, sub-sec. (2) was worded so as to prevent a court from taking cognizance of an offence under the Act by a public officer except with the sanction in case of persons employed in connection with the affairs of the Union of the Central Government and in other case of the State Government. The obvious difference in the language of the other two provisions and sub-sec. 2 of sec. 56 clearly indicates that the intention of the Indian legislature was to provide unqualified protection to the public officers from prosecution for offences under the Electricity Act except with the sanction of Union Government in some case and the State Government in other cases. It may also be mentioned that the Act provides for special treatment of the offences committed under the Act. Sec. 50 of the Act generally provides that no prosecution shall be instituted against any person for any offence against this Act or any rule, licence or order there under, except at the instance of the Government or an Electrical Inspector, or of a person aggrieved by the same. It appears that the principle behind this section has been adopted in an amplified measure in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 56 and it was considered proper to provide that the public officers cannot be prosecuted for offences under the Act except with the sanction of the Central Government or the State Government. On a proper appreciation of the scheme of the Act the offences under the Act appear to have been differentiated from civil wrongs and offences against other Acts. Sub-sec. (1) and sec, 82 provide for other civil wrongs and offences under other Acts and grant protection under certain conditions. The sub-section provides for offences under the Act and grant unqualified protection from prosecution except with the sanction of the Central or the State Government. It is in this manner that the obvious provisions can be adequately explained. Sub-sec. (1) and sec, 82 provide for other civil wrongs and offences under other Acts and grant protection under certain conditions. The sub-section provides for offences under the Act and grant unqualified protection from prosecution except with the sanction of the Central or the State Government. It is in this manner that the obvious provisions can be adequately explained. Having given the matter my most careful consideration I do not feel persuaded to read in sub-sec. (2) the limitations expressly introduced in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 56 of the Act and sec. 81 of the Electricity (Supply) Act. The protection under sub-sec. (2) for offences under the Act except with the sanction of the Government is unqualified. The contention of Mr. Datta is without force and cannot be accepted. 10. In the light of the above discussions, I hold that the two accused are public officers within the meaning of sec. 56 sub-sec. (2) of the Act and fall in category (b) and cannot be prosecuted for offences under the Act except with the sanction of the Rajasthan State. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate therefore, went wrong in taking cognizance against them in the absence of the sanction of the Rajasthan Government. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate was also wrong in merely stopping the proceedings and not revoking his order taking cognizance against the accused-non-petitioners. The reference of the District Magistrate is reasonable and deserves to be accepted. 11. The reference is accepted. The order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate dated 8-3-1963 and 31-8-1963 are set aside. The proceedings against the accused non-petitioners are quashed and they stand discharged.