JUDGMENT Oak, J. - This is a Plaintiffs' second appeal arising out of a suit for perpetual injunction. The suit was brought by Mohammad Naqi and three others against the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Gram Sabha of village Jeanpur and Gram Samaj of village Jeanpur on these allegations: The four Plaintiffs are residents of village Jeanpur in Distt. Azamgarh. In this village there is one plot with an area of 304 links. The plot has been a graveyard since time immemorial. There are a number of trees standing in this plot. The plot and the trees are dedicated property. The Muslims of the locality have the right to bury dead bodies in this plot. But the Pradhan of the Gram Samaj has been interfering with the Muslims' rights in this plot. The Pradhan has been disposing of the trees in:his plot on the footing that the trees have vested in the Gram Samaj. The Plaintiffs, therefore, filed the suit to restrain the Defendants from interfering with the right of Muslim residents in the graveyard and the trees standing on the plot. 2. The Plaintiffs' claim was resisted by the Defendants. They conceded that Muslim residents of the village have right of burial in the plot. But the Defendants denied that the trees also constituted dedicated property. The learned Second Additional Munsif, Azamgarh, who tried the suit, accepted the Plaintiffs' claim. He found that both the grave yard and the trees are dedicated property. He, therefore, passed a decree in Plaintiffs' favour for permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from interfering with the rights of the Plaintiffs and other Muslim residents of this village in the plot and the trees. The Defendants appealed. The appeal was allowed by the learned 2nd Additional Civil Judge of Azamgarh. He held that dedication of the plot has not been established. The trees vested in the State and in the Gram Samaj The Plaintiffs' suit was, therefore, dismissed. The Plaintiffs have, therefore, come up in second appeal. 3. When the second appeal was heard by a learned single Judge of this Court, he was of the opinion that the question whether a Muslim grave yard vests in the State under the provisions of UPZN and LK Act, (UP Act No. I of 1951), hereafter referred to as the Act, is of considerable importance. He, therefore, referred the entire appeal to a larger Bench. 4. He, therefore, referred the entire appeal to a larger Bench. 4. The first question for consideration is whether the plot in dispute was ever dedicated. On this point, the learned Civil Judge remarked that it has not been proved that the grave yard was dedicated to God. This view of the learned Civil Judge appears to be incorrect. In Lakshmidhar Misra v. Rangalal (1) (AIR 1950 PC 36) it was held that a claim by the inhabitants of a village to the use of certain area as a cremation ground can only be supported on ground of custom, and not on the basis of dedication or lost grant. In the present case we are dealing with a Muslim gave yard, and not with a piece of land used by Hindus for purposes of cremation. In the Courts of Wards v. Ilahi Baksh. (2) (11 ALJR 265) the circumstances were somewhat similar to those in the present case, and it was held that the land in suit formed part of a grave yard set apart for the Musulman community. The land was wakf by user, if not by dedication. In Nazira v. Sukhdarshan Lal (3) (1936 AWR 365) a grave of a Mohammedan existed on a piece of land. It was held that the presumption is that, that part of the site on which the dead body is buried is dedicated with the consent of the owners of the land and becomes sacred and ceased to be the private property of the former owners and should be considered as wakf land in which the members of the Mohammedan community would be interested and to which they would be entitled to have access. In the present case it was stated in para. 2 of the plaint that the plot in question has been used as a grave yard from time immemorial. Muslim residents of the village have been burying dead bodies in the plot for generations. This allegation was admitted in the written statement. It was conceded that even now Muslim residents have the right of burial in this plot. 5. We thus find that from immemorial time Muslim residents of Jeanpur have been burying their dead bodies in this plot. This right is being recognised by the Defendants even after the passing of the Act. This allegation was admitted in the written statement. It was conceded that even now Muslim residents have the right of burial in this plot. 5. We thus find that from immemorial time Muslim residents of Jeanpur have been burying their dead bodies in this plot. This right is being recognised by the Defendants even after the passing of the Act. From these circumstances, one may safely presume that the plot was dedicated by the original owners of the land for use as a graveyard. By such dedication, the plot became wakf property. That was the position, which obtained before the passing of the Act. We have to examine whether that position was altered as a consequence of the Act. Mr. Iqbal Ahmad appearing for the Appellant contended that the land did not vest in the State under the provisions of the Act. On the other hand, Mr. Gopi Nath appearing for the Respondents contended that the land did vest in the State. 6. Section 4 of the Act provides for vesting of estates in the State. The question, therefore, arises whether the plot in dispute ever formed an estate as defined by the Act. For this purpose, we have to turn to the definition of estate contained in Clause (8) of Section 3 of the Act. "estate'' means and shall be deemed to have always meant the area included under one entry in any of the registers described in Clauses (a), (b), (c) or (d) of Section 32 of the UP Land Revenue Act, 1901," Section 32 of the Land Revenue Act provided for the record of rights. A number of registers were prescribed by Section 32, Land Revenue Act. Clause (a) of Section 32, Land Revenue Act prescribed a register of all the proprietors in the mahal including the proprietors of specific areas. There is on the. record an extract of the khasra for village Jeanpur. In this extract plot No. 28 with an area of 301 links was recorded as grave yard. There is also reference to Khata No. 149. Neither party has filed any extract from the khewat or the khatauni. It may safely be assumed that this plot must have been comprised in some khewat khata. In this extract plot No. 28 with an area of 301 links was recorded as grave yard. There is also reference to Khata No. 149. Neither party has filed any extract from the khewat or the khatauni. It may safely be assumed that this plot must have been comprised in some khewat khata. The learned Civil Judge remarked: It was not asserted before me that the land was not situated within an estate and as such I shall presume that it was situated within an estate. In the grounds specified in the second appeal there is no specific ground that the learned Civil Judge was wrong in making that presumption. We have found that the plot in question was at one time wakf property. It meant that the property vested in God. That would not preclude an entry in the register prescribed by Clause (a) of Section 32 of the Land Revenue Act. Whether land belonged to a private person or vested in the Almighty, the land had to be mentioned in the register of proprietors. So, even wakf land will be covered by the definition of 'estate' given in Clause (8) of Section 3 of the Act. 7. Chapter IV of the Act provides for payment of compensation for loss of rights of intermediaries. Section 69 provides for payment of compensation to wakf, trust or endowment. Section 69 gives an indication that even wakf lost rights under the provisions of the Act. Considering the definition of the term 'estate' given in Section 3 of the Act and the liability of the State Government to pay compensation for wakf, it appears that even wakf property vested in the State u/s 4 of the Act. In The State of Bihar Vs. Sir Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1952 SC 252 it was pointed out that, a charity created by a private individual is not immune from the sovereign's power to compulsorily acquire that property for public purposes. It is incorrect to say that the vesting of these properties in the State under the provisions of the Act in any way affects the charity adversely because the net income that the institutions are deriving from the property has been made the basis of compensation awarded to them. 8. There is no indication in the Act that wakf property is exempted from the operation of Section 4 of the Act. 8. There is no indication in the Act that wakf property is exempted from the operation of Section 4 of the Act. On the contrary, there is specific provision for payment of compensation for wakf property. It, therefore, appears that Section 4 of the Act operates as regards wakf property also. So, although the plot at one time vested in the Almighty, the plot vested in the State u/s 4 of UP Act No. 1 of 1951. Inspite of the vesting of the land, the Defendants have recognised the right of Muslim residents of the village to bury dead bodies in the plot. The Plaintiffs should have, therefore, no grievance on this ground. 9. Now we have to consider the question of ownership of the trees. Section 6 of the Act describes the consequences of vesting of an estate in the State. Various rights of all intermediaries vest in the State. According to sub Clause (l)of Clause (a) of Section 6 of the Act, trees other than trees in village abadi, holding or groves vest in the State. In the present case we are dealing with trees standing on graveyard. This is not abadi, holding or a grove. So, u/s 6 of the Act, all these trees vested in the State. 10. Section 117 of the Act provides for vesting of certain property in Gram Samaj. The property so vesting in Gram Samaj includes all trees other than trees in a holding or on the boundry thereof or a grove or abadi. The present case does not fall within the exceptions given in Clause (3) of Section 117 of the Act. The combined effect of Sections 4, 6 and 117 of the Act is that the trees in dispute now vest in the Gram Samaj. The Gram Samaj is competent to dispose of the trees. The Plaintiffs cannot claim any injunction with respect to the trees. 11. The Defendants conceded the Plaintiff's right of burial. The Plaintiffs' title to the trees has not been established. The learned Civil Judge was, therefore, justified in dismissing the Plaintiffs' suit. 12. The second appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.