JUDGMENT Krishnan, J. 1. The main appeal is by the two joint purchasers of a house from respondent (acting on his own) by a sale-deed dated 1-12-1953. A suit by the vendor now appearing through his wife as his next friend praying for the cancellation of the sale on the ground of his insanity at that time; has been allowed; So the purchasers-appellants have come up in appeal repeating their averments that the vendor was at that time in full possession of his mental powers, and understood what he was doing, and further that he had received the full consideration of Rs. 8,800 which according to the defendants appellants was the proper price by satisfaction of two old pronotes, and the payment in cash of the small marginal amount of Rs. 75. There is also an order that the defendants should restore certain movable properties enlisted in the plaint and found to have been left in the house and taken over by the purchasers on the night of 1-12-1953 or to pay their price found by the trial Court. Further, there is a direction regarding the payment of mesne profits for a period of three years immediately before the suit and for the later period till delivery of possession is given to the plaintiff. These have been challenged by the appellants. The plaintiff has for his part filed a cross-objection praying that the mesne profits should have been calculated at a rate higher than what has been allowed. As it was, this cross-objection has been filed in forma pauperis which prayer has been treated as a separate miscallaneous civil case. This, it may be noted even here, has not been seriously pressed. 2. The crucial issue in this case is whether at the time of the sale, that is, on the evening or early night of 1st December 1953 at the house of an advocate named Sitaram Verma (D.W. 6) where the Sub-Registrar was called on commission, (he vendor, Hut is the present plaintiff-respondent Ganpat son of Kuvarji, was mentally sound or was insane and incapable of understanding the nature of the act. This at all events is a question of fact, though from time to time Courts have laid down in different rulings principles for; our guidance in solving a problem of this nature. This at all events is a question of fact, though from time to time Courts have laid down in different rulings principles for; our guidance in solving a problem of this nature. Such principles are in essence rules of prudence and not of law strictly speaking, but still important because the problem of mental soundness on a past date is always difficult and complicated one. The peculiar situation here is that the plaintiff has, in addition to adducing laymen evidence en the question of his mental soundness, tried to strengthen it by bringing on record several un• usual circumstances in the preparation and the registration of the sale-deed and also in regard to the alleged consideration. It is just as if the position taken by the plaintiff is that besides the findings about the mental condition which frankly is based on laymen evidence alone, there are in the circumstances of the sale such features that nobody except a completely miad person could have been the executant of the deed. 3. The defendants for their part have taken their stand on the formality of the transaction, the delay in the filing of the suit and the absence of medical evidence and in fact the failure on the part of the plaintiff's wife and brother to send him for treatment in any modern mental hospital. In addition, they have urged that it would not be proper to bring into the argument on the side of the plaintiff the circumstances of the sale and the background of the alleged consideration because that would be to confuse between mental incompetency on the one hand and on the other, unconnected matters like alleged absence of consideration and influence. Apart from it, the defendants have urged that the sale was a proper one and there was consideration that the house bad not been undervalued; and that they did nut take possession of the movables. Besides they have urged that the plaintiff and his best friend had acquiesced by looking on when the defendants made improvements and were therefore not competent to challenge the sale. They have also given a resume of what they considered to be the general principles applicable to such a problem and have urged that the evidence adduced here does not come upto the mark. 4. They have also given a resume of what they considered to be the general principles applicable to such a problem and have urged that the evidence adduced here does not come upto the mark. 4. A preliminary procedural point is also raised, namely, that the suit itself should be deemed to be incompetent because the trial Court did not go through the preliminary procedure appropriate for a suit by the next friend on behalf of a mentally unsound person in the manner provided in Order 32 Civil Procedure Code. The trial Court had not given attention to the preliminary procedural point which has, however, been remedied by a remand at the appellate state for that limited purpose and an inquiry by the trial Court and a finding that the next friend was competent. That of course has no bearing on the main issue in the suit. On that the trial Court concluded from the examination of the laymen evidence about the plaintiff's mental condition and also the circumstances attending upon the sale itself that he was unsound and that there was no consideration. It therefore set aside the sale; it did not find any substance in the plea that there was ac• quiescence and consequent estoppel. It also found that the purchasers had taken certain movable properties. On the mesne profits it held in favour of the plaintiff, in principle, but the rate was lower. Hence the cross-objection. 5. The questions that arise for decision may be enumerated thus; (1) The effect, if any at all, of the evidence recorded in the inquiry on remand regarding the competency of a suit through the next friend. (2) The effect of the evidence of the .witnesses Nos. 1 to 6 regarding the mental condition of the plaintiff on the date of the execution of the sale-deed. (3) The effect of the absence of medical evidence regarding the mental condition at or nearabout the date of the sale, (4) The effect of the general circumstances in which the sale was concluded, the deed drafted and registered. (5) The nature of the consideration, if any at all, and the reality or otherwise of the two pro-notes mentioned in the sale-deed. (6) The circumstances in which the purchasers obtained possession and the probability of the movables being there and being appropriated by the defendants. (5) The nature of the consideration, if any at all, and the reality or otherwise of the two pro-notes mentioned in the sale-deed. (6) The circumstances in which the purchasers obtained possession and the probability of the movables being there and being appropriated by the defendants. (7) The allegation of the plaintiff and his next friend looking on and thereby according to the defendants being estopped from challeng the sale. (8) The value of the improvements, if any, and the right of the defendants to be recouped for the same. (9) The value of the movable property. (10) The mesne profits. (11) Finally, the cross-objection. 6. All these questions are essentially ones of fact though a good deal of case-law has been cited; this, I suppose is meant to help us the appreciation of the evidence in regard to the different issues stated above. Before examining them in details it will be convenient to give a short account of the course of events as they shaped themselves. The plaintiff is one of the two sons of an Ahir staying at Indore and doing the business of his caste, namely, collecting and selling milk. This had been the livelihood of the family even from the father's life time. Thoug the age of the plaintiff has been differently estimated even by his brother and wife who are near illiterate, the general picture is that the was born in the early twenties and was married to P. W. 6 the wife-next friend in the early forties. From his boyhood itself he seems to have shown some signs of mental aberration though it is not clear in the beginning whether it was merely a case of eccentricity or of real insanity. His father in his life-time used to give out that the boy was possessed by a spirit; he did not seem to give it any special importance though it is not clear whether he was doing it because of certain superstitious beliefs or because, knowing that the boy was insane, he wanted to conceal it. Be that as it may, during the father's life-time no treatment in any mental hospital or under any psychiatrist was thought of. In the early forties round about 1943, the plaintiff was married and the wife soon found that the husband was not quite sane. There was nothing very unusual till 1946 when the father died. Be that as it may, during the father's life-time no treatment in any mental hospital or under any psychiatrist was thought of. In the early forties round about 1943, the plaintiff was married and the wife soon found that the husband was not quite sane. There was nothing very unusual till 1946 when the father died. The business was going on and the two sons, that is the plaintiff himself and his younger brother Bachchulal (P.W. 8) seen to have assisted in the business in the usual manner. Afterwards the plaintiff's condition became worse by stage. In 1948 there was a partition, the house which is the subject-matter of this suit, failing to the plaintiff's share and another property just across the street falling to that of his brother. Till 1950 the plaintiff seemed to continue doing some business owning some animals and collecting milk from outside. By then various signs of serious mental aberrations were noted by the neighbours whose evidence we will examine at length later on but after 1950 the thing became worse and for an year or two immediately preceding the sale, towards the end of 1953, the plaintiff did no business whatsoever. By that time he exhibited unmistakable signs of madness; he used to tear his clothes in public and would abuse and threaten to beat his relations and strangers. He wed to talk irrelevantly and occasionally sink into fits of apathy or even moments of unconciousness the description in regard to the last suggesting epileptic fits. 7. The parties live at Indore which, as places go in our country had some amenities for treatment of the mentally unsound in what has been called a local mental hospital. However, t1either the brother, nor the wife, (nor of course the father in his life-time) placed the plaintiff for treatment in that institution We cannot have the father's explanation; but if he had been asked he would have given what in another connection he had described to his neighbours, the boy was possessed by a spirit and was therefore incapable of being treated. The two others, in whose time the plaintiff had become definitely insane, are witnesses (P. Ws. 5 and 6) and have given their explanation which will be considered in time. The two others, in whose time the plaintiff had become definitely insane, are witnesses (P. Ws. 5 and 6) and have given their explanation which will be considered in time. The quest ion for our purposes is, whether the absence of medical evidence completely bars a Court from investigating the problems of mental unsoundness or whether it is only one piece of evidence, may be a very valuable one, in the absence of which it is still our duty to consider the other evidence in this respect for what it is worth and arrive at a conclusion, In other words, whether the production of medical evidence is a mandatory requirement of law, or it is only a measure of prudence. 8. During this period, that is the year or two immediately preceding the execution of the sale deed husband and wife used to live together in this house while the brother was Jiving in a separate one in the neighbourhood just rendering such assistance as might be deemed necessary. The wife's own people live at Ujjain and she used to go at times when visits became necessary. How frequent or rare those occassions were is not clear from the evidence; but this is of course common ground that on the dale of the sale and for some time before and after the wife was away and the husband was left much to himself and practically alone in the house. 9. The two defendants- purchasers who have been examined respectively as P.Ws 4 and 5 are really new comers to Indore. Defendant Kartarsing seems to have arrived here a short time earlier than Jagatsingh; but their acquaintance or intimacy with the plaintiff started in the middle of 1952 when they rented a piece of open land included in this house for the purpose of a godown and shop for the sale of coal and fuel-wood. The rent they had agreed upon was Rs 35 p.m. In course of this relationship the defendants used to meet the plaintiff from time to time. They also obtained receipts for the payments some of which in fact have been filed to indicate that the plaintiff was not mad, and could at any rate know what things were in connection with those rent-payments. They also obtained receipts for the payments some of which in fact have been filed to indicate that the plaintiff was not mad, and could at any rate know what things were in connection with those rent-payments. On 1-12-1953 that is, after about one and half or two years of their acquaintance with the plaintiff a sale-deed was written and registered regarding this home. The consideration mentioned was Rs. 8,800. The deed was drafted by a lawyer-Sitaram Verma who had also appeared for Kartarsingh in some litigation (D.W. 6). The consideration was not paid in cash but for the most part, that is, Rs. 8,725 out of Rs. 8,800 was ostentsibly adjusted towards two pro-notes, one for Rs. 3,000 dated 9-2-1953 and another for Rs. 5,000 dated 31-10-1953. An amount of Rs. 725 was mentioned as interest on the two loans, leaving a net balance of Rs. 75 only which seems to have been paid in cash. This would be all that the vendor got, if the examination of the evidence shows that the two earlier loans were non-existent. 10. Though it is averred in the written statement that the sale-deed was registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar, evidence has brought out which is also the position taken by the defendants during the trial, that one of the parties prayed that the Sub• Registrar should go on commission to the place of the advocate-Sitaram Verma for the registration which he accordingly dirt well after the Court hours at about 7-0 P.M. in the evening, the most significant feature being that this was not the home of the vendor, but of a third party and further the circumstances which we shall examine, later on, were most extraordinary. The evidence is that the Sub-Registrar put certain questions to the vendor which he assented to by "yes" ('haan') and the registration was completed; After the registration at about 9.0 P.M. the purchasers took possession, there being some vagueness as to whether they got the house opened by the plaintiff and entered or they took the key from him. One important question is whether the plaintiff had taken away the movables which were certainly within the house in course of the day preceding the registration or they were still there and were appropriated by the defendants. One important question is whether the plaintiff had taken away the movables which were certainly within the house in course of the day preceding the registration or they were still there and were appropriated by the defendants. There is also a certain amount of cross-examination of the defendants about the reality or otherwise of the two debts towards which the sale price was ostensibly adjusted. the defendants' account is that they bad been executed by the plaintiff in presence of his brother, though strangely enough nothing about it has been put to the latter who has come as his brother's witness and who has been cross-examined. Three days after the sale the plaintiff gave the defendants a written cancellation of the Kirayanama in respect of the part of the house which they had been occupying on a rent of Rs. 35 per month in course of which he writes : “I have sold the entire house to you and given you the possession; but at present I have nowhere to live and accordingly I live in part of the ‘Tall’ (godown) which is in your possession and I am using it only for my cooking and bathing in return for which I am serving you by watching as far as it lies in my power. I am taking steps to find anther residence and I shall give up this place as soon as I find it.” 11. By the time the wife returned some days after lids, the house was in the possession of the defendants and she had a dispute with them. The police took charge of the matter to begin with but within a few months' it was found that it was really a case of civil dispute rather than a criminal offience. Accordingly the plaintiff did not get any assistance from the police authorities. 12. In May, that is about five months after the sale the next-friend acting in consultation with her brother-in-law, that is the plaintiff's brother, had decided to take legal action in the civil Court. Accordingly the plaintiff did not get any assistance from the police authorities. 12. In May, that is about five months after the sale the next-friend acting in consultation with her brother-in-law, that is the plaintiff's brother, had decided to take legal action in the civil Court. Accordingly in May 1954 a lawyer's notice was served by the next-friend alleging that her husband had been of unsound mind for 3 or 4 years before that date, and the defendants had dishonestly taken advantage of this weakness and got him to write pro-notes and ultimately got a sale written of this house for which he got no consideration. All this had been done without the next-friend's knowledge and in the name of her husband who was mentally unsound. On the strength of this sale they had taken possession of the house and dishonestly appropriated movable proper ties worth Rs. 4,000, the properties having been kept there in due course of household residence and management. The same notice pointed out that the ostensible consideration of Rs. 4,000 was only a fraction of the real value which was Ks. 25,000. Accordingly, the so-called sale-deed was a fraud and having been taken from a mentally unsound person, void. The noticer called upon the defendants to give back the possession of the house and to return the movable properties and in the event of failure threatened legal action. 13. It is worth noting that the decision to challenge the sale and to move to get it set aside and also to recover the movables or their value was made by the next friend within a few months after the sale. Even that interval is accounted for by the period she must have taken to come from Ujjain and also the steps before the police authorities which from the plaintiff's view point were infructuous, However, .the suit itself was brought about five years latter on 4-2-1959, a delay which has to be examined as an important circumstance but which has nothing to do with the nature of the suit, which was in contemplation even in May 1954 substantially in the same pattern as was envisaged in the notice. 14. For reasons which the plaintiff next friend and her brother-in-law have tried to explain the suit was very much delayed. 14. For reasons which the plaintiff next friend and her brother-in-law have tried to explain the suit was very much delayed. Further during the interval they did not take the plaintiff to any psychiatrist either for treatment or even for observation although they must have known that for one thing medical help might have reduced the plaintiff's sufferings, and for another form and important piece of evidence when the controversy opened in the Courts. During this interval the defendants have alleged that they made some improvements and have produced a number of bills to show their expenses. Whether the improvements were of the order of Rs. 6,000 or of Rs. 2,000 or of Rs 2.500 is only a question of detail not of great significance. What is important is, whether in the event of the suit being allowed and the house and the movables being returned the defendants could be entitled to anything by way of compensation for the improvement. 15. As already noted, the trial Court bas allowed the suit, declared the sale-deed null and void, directed its restoration, granted a decree for the value of the movables and further made an order for mesne profits, though at a rate less than what is claimed by the plaintiff. This last has been challenged by a cross-objection. 16. Ground No. 1 -The evidence recorded during the inquiry on remand:- This evidence consists for the most part of the observation of laymen. To be sure, the report of a psychiatrist has been exhibited; but he himself not having been examined and his data not being brought out, the report may not be looked into. Similarly, there is a medical witness, a general practitioner who, as witnesses go, is educated and intelligent, but all the same incompetent to give expert evidence on the matter of mental unsoundness. The trial Court has formed its own opinion but all these, as far as the remand proceedings go, relate to some time in 1964 i.e. more than ten years after crucial date by the end of 1953. A study of the authoritative literature of the subject shows that from the observations about the mental condition made at a particular point of time, it is possible to relate it backwards during a short period but the farther back we go, the more unreliable the inferences become with reference to the state of affairs in the past. A study of the authoritative literature of the subject shows that from the observations about the mental condition made at a particular point of time, it is possible to relate it backwards during a short period but the farther back we go, the more unreliable the inferences become with reference to the state of affairs in the past. Thus we would not take into account for the assessment of the mental condition of the plaintiff at the time of the alleged sale of the house, the evidence recorded during the remand proceeding. That was only for the limited purpose of remedying the omission committed by the trial Court during the hearing. Once that is served, the evidence during the remanded hearing is of no assistance to either party in regard to the main controversy. 17. Ground No. 2:- For knowing how far the plaintiff was aware of the nature and the consequences of the sale transaction, we have to examine the evidence adduced with reference to his mental condition in 1953 and immediately before. On this, we have no expert's evidence but six laymen out of whom Mishribai (P.W. 6) is the wife and next friend and Bachhulal (P.W. 5.) is the brother who has been separated since 1948 but who, all the same, bas been living next door and generally speaking is well disposed the plaintiff. In a sense, these two are the most competent because they know the plaintiff most intimately; but on the other hand, they might be anxious to exaggerate the appearances. The best course therefore is to check up on every material part of their evidence by referring to the statements of four others i.e. P.W. 1 to P.W. 4 who are all respectable neighbours. One of them is an advocate, who has however no personal interest or connection with the parties. The others are business men also without any stake in this controversy. All give the appearance of intelligent and shrewd observers. Their being laymen without any special training in observing and understanding the symptoms of mental aberration is a disadvantage. But, balancing it is the fact that they had been closely observing the conduct of the plaintiff over a course of years. They have also been noting the progressive deterioration in his mental condition. Their account is broadely unanimous, and is to the following effect. But, balancing it is the fact that they had been closely observing the conduct of the plaintiff over a course of years. They have also been noting the progressive deterioration in his mental condition. Their account is broadely unanimous, and is to the following effect. In the time of plaintiff's father his, behavour was unusual and eccentric and did attract wide attention and provoked questions and comments from the neighbours. But it had not come to the level of sheer inability to understand what he was doing or looking after his affairs with some sort of understanding. Between 1946 and 1950, the plaintiff was setting worse, roaming about in the streets, eating anywhere, talking irrelevantly, abusing people and showing carelessness about dress. Still he seems to be keeping some sort of business in the family-line, namely of collecting and selling milk. After about 1950, he became worse and was not doing any business, the picture is that he could not, and had too far gone to do any. 18. There is the usual vagueness in the statement of these witnesses about dates; but the foregoing is the sequence that emerges from their evinence. The significant point is that they do not seem inclined to exaggerate matters and what they state is in substantial corroboration of what the wife and the brother of the plaintiff state. The total results of the evidence of these six witnesses is that after 1950, the plaintiff's behaviour was such that everybody observed that he was mentally unsound and not capable of fully understanding the nature of his acts. Nor was it a sudden appearance; for years be had been descending towards it. 19. Ground No. 3:- The weakest feature in the evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiff is that there are no medical data properly so called coming from either a private Psychiatrist or the Superintendent of mental hospital. There is no doubt. had the plaintiff's people i.e. his father, brother or wife really wanted to get him the kind of treatment available in mental hospitals, it should not at all have been difficult for them to arrange for what passed for such over the larger part of our country. There is no doubt. had the plaintiff's people i.e. his father, brother or wife really wanted to get him the kind of treatment available in mental hospitals, it should not at all have been difficult for them to arrange for what passed for such over the larger part of our country. The father himself never seems to have thought of it, may be in his time i.e. before 1946, the plaintiff had not become so mad as to call for this step; may be he was quite serious in his story of possession by a spirit. After his death, neither the brother nor the wife thought of putting him for treatment or observation. Though within a few months after the sale they had decided that they should bring a suit for the avoidance of the sale on the ground of the plaintiff's mental unsoundness, still they did not, during five years intervening between the sale and the suit, take him to a mental hospital. Upon this a two fold argument has been built on behalf of the defendants-appellants. Firstly, that the entire story of mental unsoundness is false and has been propounded by the relations with the sole purpose of avoiding the salt; and secondly, as a point of law, it is urged that no plea of mental unsoundness can succeed unless there is evidence of a competent and Impartial doctor. The first we shall examine generally; the second calls for special notice. 20. Since this is an important plank in 'the appellant's case here as well as in the lower Court, it is worth examining the problem at some length. The observations of a qualified and competent psychiatrist form no doubt a valuable piece of evidence. In certain circumstances their value may exceed that of all the rest of the evidence put together. But we are not prepared to go to the other extreme and assert that in all mental conditions, the psychiatrist's observations are the only possible, evidence, and that no other evidence can be looked into. On behalf of the appellants the case reported in Kanhaiyalal Vs. Harising, 30 MPLC 185=ILR 1944 Nag. 698 has been referred to. But we are not prepared to go to the other extreme and assert that in all mental conditions, the psychiatrist's observations are the only possible, evidence, and that no other evidence can be looked into. On behalf of the appellants the case reported in Kanhaiyalal Vs. Harising, 30 MPLC 185=ILR 1944 Nag. 698 has been referred to. After setting out the exact purport of the terms "lunatic", "idiot" and "menally unsound", the Court examined the evidence and came to the conclusion :- "In the absence of any medical evidence, it seems to me doubtful whether it can be held that M was, by reason of unsoundness of mind, incapable of entering into the contract........" We do not find in this any general principle of law or even of prudence that in every case a plea of mental unsoundness should be rejected unless there is medical evidence. Such evidence may be important, and may even become crucial, but to say that there can be no other evidence at all worth a Court's consideration is to go too far. There is nothing in this judgment to justify such an extreme theory. We will also examine whether the failure of the relations to get a psychiatrist's assistance to the plaintiff is a device itself indicating the hollowness of their case. In the case referred to, the Court was not prepared to accept the rest of the evidence, whatever it was, as being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt that M was mentally unsound. But this has not been laid down as a principle of general application; the question is essentially one of fact, and the position in this regard naturally differs from case to case. For example in Chunnilal Vs Amarendra, AIR 1953 Assam 940, it has been ruled, following an old Lahore case : "The question whether a person is of unsound mind at the time of the execution of a document, is a question of fact; but the question does not depend merely upon the belief or disbelief of witnesses before the Court. It would depend on inference to be drawn from the evidence." This Court has cited Kanhiyalal Vs. Harisingh, 30 MPLC 185=ILR 1944 Nag. 698, but there is nothing in these judgments to suggest that it was being accepted as a general principle. 21. It would depend on inference to be drawn from the evidence." This Court has cited Kanhiyalal Vs. Harisingh, 30 MPLC 185=ILR 1944 Nag. 698, but there is nothing in these judgments to suggest that it was being accepted as a general principle. 21. All that can be said in this connection is that without expert psychiatrical evidence, the problem becomes more difficult for the party pleading mental unsoundness and naturally burdened, at the first instance, with having to prove it, In case it chooses not to adduce medical evidence, the other evidence will have to be scrutinised more critically than otherwise. It is our duty to consider all the evidences and arrive at their total result, there is nothing in these rulings to justify a theory that a Court should, in principle, refuse to accept a plea of mental unsoundness in the absence of medical evidence. 22. Now we have to see whether there is anything ulterior in the failure of the plaintiff's relations to take him to a mental expert. Private mental experts being practically non-available in these parts, psychiatrical examination means lodging a patient in a mental hospital. To educated persons there seems nothing wrong in admitting their brother or husband in such an institution; but it is not the way in which the less educated and superstitious people look at it, In this case, it is on record that the father was of the opinion that spirit has possessed the plaintiff; nothing else could be expected of an uneducated (may be illiterate) cow-herd, The wife and brother do not seem to be better educated or broader minded than the father and continued to be ignorant cow-herds with the superstitious beliefs generally in that class. They state that on one occasion, they did think of placing the plaintiff into a mental hospital; but as they went and actually saw the way in which the patients were being treated there, they were so shocked that they did not have the heart to do so. This has a ring of truth, Again, treatment in a mental hospital, like other forms of medical treatment, means expense. This has a ring of truth, Again, treatment in a mental hospital, like other forms of medical treatment, means expense. We have it in this case itself that though the defendants had taken possession of the property in December 1953 itself; though with four or five months the plaintiff's next friend had decided that the sale should be challenged, the suit itself had to be filed five years later. It is not a case in which the decision to sue is itself taken after some lapse of time; it is no doubt taken immediately. Even the four or five months between the sale and the lawyer's notice are spent on proceedings on the criminal side to get back possession. We are not, by this, saying anything about the relative value of the evidence on either side, but we only note that though the next friend and the brother were undoubtedly keen in May 1954 itself to bring a suit, they had to wait for nearly five years. The reason is not far to seek. Going to the law Courts means collecting sufficient means for the various expenses some of which can only be vaguely foreseen. Even If it is possible to get leave to sue in forma pauperis, still there are considerable items of expenses which have to be met in any event. Thus money is a serious problem. When the relations are already superstitious and not overbiased in favour of the manner of treatment given to the patients in the mental hospital, their failure to admit their relation is understandable. No doubt it has been unwise and the plaintiff should take the consequences of his having one important heading of evidence lost; but we cannot refuse to evaluate the evidence they have actually produced. 23. We have in this in support of the plaintiff's contention of mental unsoundness, the evidence of these six witnesses four out of whom are close neighbours with a full opportunity for observation. They are intelligent persons who have seen the plaintiff over a course of years during a period when there was no controversy. The other two, the brother and the wire, are of course relations with a rersonal interest in the present litigation; but whatever they have stated is independently corroborated by the other witnesses. They are intelligent persons who have seen the plaintiff over a course of years during a period when there was no controversy. The other two, the brother and the wire, are of course relations with a rersonal interest in the present litigation; but whatever they have stated is independently corroborated by the other witnesses. The absence of medical evidence is certainly a disability because that would have given us at least an approximate understanding of technical elements in that mental illness; but even without it we have in this case a sufficiently clear picture. We have also found that the failure on the part of the relations to take medical assistance for the plaintiff was not a device but was a result of their want of education and possibly their want of means. 24. The defendants were not bound to adduce evidence about the sanity or the mental soundness of the plaintiff; but they have tried to counter the plaintiff's evidence by evidence from their side, which may be briefly noted. There is the oral evidence of the two defendants. Apart from the fact that they are keenly interested, they knew the plaintiff only just over a year i.e. during the later half of 1952 and 1953. They make general statements which are not impressive. As will be pointed out later on in examining the nature of the consideration for the sale and the taking of possession the defendants themeselves were aware that their dealings with the plaintiff would be suspect, and accordingly claim to have taken the plaintiff's own brother into confidence on some occasions; with what truth we shall examine in time. 25. Apart from the defendants, we have D.W. 1 whose statement shows that he really knows very little of the plaintiff. He had occupied a part of the house not directly under the plaintiff but under a tenant Guru Bux Rai with whom alone he had been dealing Even that was for less than one year. The most he claims is to have seen the plaintiff on a few occasions always at night. Then be made up his mind that there was nothing wrong about him. In addition, we have Mulchand (D.W. 3) one of the attesting witnesses and Sitaram Verma Advocate (D.W. 6). The most he claims is to have seen the plaintiff on a few occasions always at night. Then be made up his mind that there was nothing wrong about him. In addition, we have Mulchand (D.W. 3) one of the attesting witnesses and Sitaram Verma Advocate (D.W. 6). They make general statements that at the time of the execution of the sale the plaintiff appeared sane enough; This calls for examination separately from the evidence in regard to the general mental soundness during a period immediately preceding the transaction concerned. Nothing, that the defendants have adduced in this regard, has succeeded in neutralising the effect of the plaintiff's evidence that, immediately preceding the date of the sale, the plaintiff had not been in full possession of his mental powers. Some documents like rent receipts have been produced by the defendants ostensibly signed by the plaintiff in 1952 and 1953. From this we are called upon to hold that he was mentally sound and could understand what he was doing. There are two difficulties. We cannot be quite sure, in the absence of better evidence, that the plaintiff had indeed put his signature on these documents; but assuming that be bad put his signature, that cannot show that he understood their nature. The sale-deed itself has been signed by him but from that it is not safe to conclude that he was sane at that time; became an examination of these circumstances, which will be done presently, will show that it is by no means difficult to get the signature without the signatory's fully apprehending the implications and the contents of the document to which he affixes it. Ground No. 4:- The general circumstances and the manner in which the sale was concluded and the deed was registered:- Ultimately we are concerned with the ascertainable state of mind of the vendor at the time of his admitting the execution and putting his signature or mark on the sale-deed. The plaintiff's contentions in this regard are clear. The defendants entered into an elaborate device by which the registration was done not at the office of the Sub-Registrar nor at the place or the home of the vendor nor even at the residence of the purchasers but at the place of the lawyer who had usually been advising the purchasers, a commission having been taken out for the Sub-Registrar in mysterious, circumstances. It was not during office hours or even day time but at night at about 7 or 8 in December. The attesting witnesses were brought from a distance and the lawyer who had allowed his name and house to be used for this purpose, has avoided to state anything really helpful either way on the question of the mental condition of the vendor, or the consideration or the like. Possession was taken immediately on the same night. The consideration noted was Rs. 8,800 though the house was worth three or four times as much; but the point of the plaintiff's case is that even this amount of Rs, 8,800 was not paid All that was paid was Rs. 75 and it was made out that the rest had gone towards the satisfaction of two pro-notes the first for Rs. 3,000 executed by the plaintiff in February 1953 and the second for an additional Rs. 5,000 executed in October and Rs 725 going towards interest. The entire performance in the most extraordinary circumstances which by themselves indicate that the defendants know of the plaintiff's mental unsoundness and has planned to take advantage of it and had arranged for these devices. It is necessary, therefore, to examine these unusual features. 27. In this connection, the defendants-respondents urge that the suit is based on a straight allegation of mental unsoundness of the vendor and his inability to understand the nature of the transaction in which he was seemingly playing a part. It would not be proper to mix up with this, allegations of a basically different kind, such a, false representation, inadequacy of absence of consideration, and the like. This is certainly correct; a case of mental unsoundness should not be confused with other grounds which, by themselves might justify the avoidance of a contract or a sale. But the circumstances surrounding a transaction might by themselves indicate that one of the parties had been from before planning for secrecy some of the elements in the transactions might show that the person executing the sale or agreement was acting in a manner which no person of minimum sanity & commonsense could possibly have followed. In other words tile circumstances may, whether or not by each of them by itself would justify the avoidance of the transaction, illustrate the basic contention that the person concerned could not possibly have been mentally sound. In other words tile circumstances may, whether or not by each of them by itself would justify the avoidance of the transaction, illustrate the basic contention that the person concerned could not possibly have been mentally sound. They may even show that the other party was aware of the possibility of a future challenge on the ground of mental unfitness and was, even from before devising so as, in time, to blunt the edge of the possible challenge. 28. In this case the peculiar features can be grouped under three headings:- (a) The place, time and manner of registration. (b) The story of the two earlier pro-notes, and (c) The taking of possession during the same night immediately after the registration. 29. Ground No.4 (a) : The averment in the defendants' written statement that "the plaintiff was sane and, of his own accord and with a full understanding, executed the sale in favour of the defendants. He went to the Court of the Registrar and there registered it according to law after receiving full consideration." is not quite correct. We have considered a bout sanity and we shall separately investigate the consideration. But the registration did not take place at the office of the Sub-Registar. An important plank in the defendant's case is that when a formal deed of sale is executed and registered before the appropriate authority, there is a certain amount of presumption attached to it, and it would be for the party assailing it on this or that ground to rebut the presumption with very good evidence. Case-law has been cited, it is unnecessary to set it out because this proposition is undoubtedly a sound one; but the presumption that attaches to the regularity of a transaction is considerably weakened if the transaction takes place in unusual circumstances. Here for example, the plaintiff did not go to the Registrar's office. Had he done so and had the registration been made there, there would at least have been a certain amount of publicity deferring designing persons from taking advantage of his mental unsoundness. It is by no means unknown for certain executants of formal deed to get the Sub-Registrar on commission to their residence or even a hospital in the case of their illness. It is by no means unknown for certain executants of formal deed to get the Sub-Registrar on commission to their residence or even a hospital in the case of their illness. Old men and some persons with a notion that it is unbcoming for them to go and stand before the Sub-Registrar are all known to ask for commissions, but invaribly to their residence. Here, the Commission was taken out for the registration of this deed by the plaintiff not at his residence nor, as for that matter, of any of his friends or a hospital, but of all places the office of an advocate. How and why this happened, nobody is able to explain, not even the advocate Shri Sitaram Verma (D.W. 6) who has allowed his name and house to be used in connection with a transaction at least with several unexplained features. It appears that Shri Varma had been on occasions the legal adviser of the defendants; he states that he drafted the sale-deed both of which are absolutely unexceptionable. It does not appear that at any time Shri Varma had been the plaintiff's lawyer. In fact he did not know him before this event. Even this, one can understand, because he might be drafting the deed on behalf of the buyers. If the plaintiff ",as unwilling or incapable of at lending the Sub-Registrars office, during the office hours, it is understandable that he asked for a commission to his house; but it is unthinkable that the commission would go to the place of a lawyer unless somebody was anxious to give a spurious colour of respectability to a transaction that was really shady. We are nut told what exactly was the reason given in the petition asking for the commission. Mr. Varma himself is unhelpful in regard to the whole affair except to admit his having drafted the deed and having Seen the plaintiff on two occasions, the first, while making the draft and the second, while he said "Yes"( gkaW ) to the Sub-Registrar. It is unfortunate that he should have let his house and name be used without knowing why. 30. The unusualness of the hour is only less puzzling than that of the place. It was between 7 and 8 P.M. in December, of course, well after office hours. 31. It is unfortunate that he should have let his house and name be used without knowing why. 30. The unusualness of the hour is only less puzzling than that of the place. It was between 7 and 8 P.M. in December, of course, well after office hours. 31. Not only do these circumstances neutralise the presumption attached to formal acts admitted before a public authority, but also do these by themselves throw a dark cloud over the whole transaction making it clear that there was some party anxious to keep the light from falling on the preparation of the deed, its execution and registration. Of all witnesses that have spoken of this, Shri Sitaram Varma Advocate is the best educated and most respectable. Advising the purchasers and preparing the draft sale-deed were certainly part of his professional duties; but one cannot be equally certain that arranging for the arrival of the Sub-Registrar at his house, and letting it be used for the unusual kind of drama which undoubtedly took place on that evening, were also part of his professional duties as a lawyer. But having invited interested persons to make this use of his name and residence, he was under a moral responsibility to see that nothing shady was done under his roof. It is not merely a case of an advocate preparing the draft-deed and very properly using all his interest in the matter; it was of an advocate closely associating himself with the subsequent happening and, as it were by implication guaranteeing their legality and straightforwardness. Unfortunately, Mr. Varma is unable to enlighten us on all the crucial facts that would go to make out all the difference between an honest though an unusual transaction and a dishonest device. [32-37. In these six paragraphs His Lordship discussed the evidence relating to the registration, consideration and delivery of possession and then proceeded-] 38. In conclusion we note that the evidence generally is that the plaintiff was mentally unsound at the time when the sale-deed was brought into existence. Further, the very manner in which the preparation and registration of the sale-deed had been arranged, also show that the plaintiff could not possibly have understood the nature of the transaction and was being exploited in view of his mental unsoundness by the defendants. Further, the very manner in which the preparation and registration of the sale-deed had been arranged, also show that the plaintiff could not possibly have understood the nature of the transaction and was being exploited in view of his mental unsoundness by the defendants. The possession was taken not in course of any arrangement the plaintiff made with them with real understanding of what he was doing, but it was just a case of seizing possession and the plaintiff suffering it because of his inability to understand what was happening. 39. Grounds No.7 & 8.- It is seriously urged that the plaintiff is estopped because be looked on while the defendants occupied the house and made improvements; but we find altogether no material to support this theory. Very soon after the sale and taking possession, the plaintiff's wife, who is his next friend in this litigation, bad been objecting. At first she tried to take back the property by the intervention of the police; but in face of the registered deed, the police and the criminal Courts were obviously helpless. Within a few months, the plaintiff acting through this next friend, made it clear by lawyer's notice that be was going to sue the defendants for the cancellation of the sale and recovery of the property and for other reliefs as well. That certainly does not show that the plaintiff was looking on. No doubt, the suit was actually tiled more than five years after the lawyer's notice; but neither the plaintiff nor his next friend had done anything during this interval to acquiescence in the doings of the defendants. Mere delay, unless it attracts limitation, is of no consequence if the plaintiff has at the very beginning made it clear that he was not accepting the title get up by defendants. Such delays usually happen were the plaintiff has not got the means and has to raise it sometimes by very small savings during a course of years. There was thus no looking on or acquiescence. 40. As for the improvements, it is clear that the defendants have done something on the house One witness has been called by them to speak of their purchase of some building material. The defendants evaluated the same at Rs. 6,000 On consideration of the evidence the trial Court assesses it at Rs 2,700. 40. As for the improvements, it is clear that the defendants have done something on the house One witness has been called by them to speak of their purchase of some building material. The defendants evaluated the same at Rs. 6,000 On consideration of the evidence the trial Court assesses it at Rs 2,700. Whatever the figure, the defendants are not entitled to any compensation on this account. The situations in which a defendants can get the value of the improvements are well-known and beyond controversy. Firstly, this should be done in good faith in course of management of the property in the manner of a prudent person. If one merely polishes and improves upon stolen property, he cannot get any compensation for improvement. The stolen property must be returned, improvement and all. On the finding given above the house was taken into possession by the defendants by a dishonest device which they had planned and carried through with full knowledge of the mental aberration of the plaintiff and with a view to taking advantage of it. There it altogether no good faith. Secondly, there should be some pressure on the defendants as the occupants of the property, there being at the same time something like an obligation on the part of the plaintiff to maintain the property. Here there is no pressure on the defendants nor can it be contended that they in a general sense were the trustee for the plaintiff and they were making improvements meaning them ultimately for the plaintiff's benefit. Such a situation usually arises when a tenant or licensee makes improvements with the knowledge of the landlord or licensor. Thus, whatever the value of the improvements, the defendants are not entitled to anything. 41. Ground No.9- The value of the movable properties:- The foregoing discussion under grounds No.4 (a) and (5) shows that taking advantage of the plaintiff's mental unsoundness, the defendants took possession of the house with whatever movable properties happened to be kept there. That there ware movable properties in the house is admitted. The story of their removal by the plaintiff with a certain amount of publicity and verification as set out by the defendants has been disbelieved. Once we come to this conclusion, the details given by the plaintiff go, as it were unchallenged and have to be assessed only on the ground of plausibility. The story of their removal by the plaintiff with a certain amount of publicity and verification as set out by the defendants has been disbelieved. Once we come to this conclusion, the details given by the plaintiff go, as it were unchallenged and have to be assessed only on the ground of plausibility. The most valuable items naturally are the ornaments belonging to the plaintiff's wife who is not the next friend in this litigation. Then there are a few more house-hold things which in a way are not of much value. Against it, the defendants have, by the very nature of the defence they have taken, no point-to-point answer. There is of couse the general denial which is palpably false. All that the trial Court could do in such a situation was to examine the details given by the plaintiff on the ground of plausibility and rigorously exclude any of the items that, considering the plaintiff's station in life and ways of living, may not have been there. This is exactly what the Court has done. Thus we find that the value of the plaintiff's movables worked out by the trial Court does not call for any reduction. 42. Ground No. 10.- Mesne profits-The trial Court has taken into account for the conclusion of mesne profits, the monthly rent actually realised at any time. The minimum monthly rent on this basis was Rs. 170 gross. The Court makes deductions for taxes and maintenance and arrives at the figure of Rs. 5,660 for the mesne profits for the three years' period immediately preceding the suit. This is over and above the Rs. 3,833 for the movables. The defendants at any rate can have no grieavance about the manner in which the mesne profits have been worked out because the tendency in this case has been towards the lower rather than the higher side. 43. Ground No. 11:- The plaintiff has filed a cross objection in regard to the movable properties and the mesne profits. While it does appear that the trial Court has been quite cautious in calculating compensation for the movable properties, no data have been supplied on behalf of the plaintiff to enable this Court to grant anything more than what the trial Court has done. 44. The result of the discussion is that the appeal is dismissed. While it does appear that the trial Court has been quite cautious in calculating compensation for the movable properties, no data have been supplied on behalf of the plaintiff to enable this Court to grant anything more than what the trial Court has done. 44. The result of the discussion is that the appeal is dismissed. Cost and pleader's fee according to rules payable by the defendants-appellants to the plaintiff-respondent. In the cross objection there will be no order regarding costs.