JUDGMENT : Ahmad, C.J. - Appellant, No. 1, the brother of Appellant No. 2 and the nephew of Appellants 3 and 4 was married on 1-5-1958 while Bimala, daughter of Plaintiff No. 2, was married about a year after sometime in 1959. But it is the admitted case of the parties that before their marriage there was already an agreement made between the Plaintiffs on one side and the Defendants on the other for the marriage of Bimala with Defendant No. 1 and there was also in pursuance of this agreement a betrothal ceremony held sometime in June or July 1953. It was however agreed at the time of the said ceremony that the Plaintiffs would bear partly the educational expenses of Defendant No. 1 for his higher study at Cuttack in M. A and that the marriage would be celebrated after Defendant No. 1 had passed M.A. examination. Defendant No. 1 passed M.A. examination sometime in September, 1955. The grievance made by the Plaintiffs is that though in pursuance of the contract arrived at between the parties they did advance in all a sum of Rs. 508.941 in between 18-8-1954 and 9-1-1956 to Defendant No. 1 for his higher study at Cuttack in M.A., but Defendant No. 1 after passing the M.A. examination went back upon the contract of marriage already arrived at between the parties and in spite of repeated demands for it he married another girl on 1-5-1958. Thereafter the Plaintiffs bad no option but to marry the girl Bimala with some other boy which was done as already stated sometime in 1959. Accordingly the Plaintiffs brought the suit giving rise to this appeal for realisation of Rs. 200- as compensation money and for refund of Rs 508. 94 which it is not denied was advanced by them to Defendant No. 1 for his study. The trial court refused the claim for compensation as prayed in the plaint and decreed the suit only for the refund of Rs. 508-94. Against that decree the Defendants came in appeal to the lower appellate court. In the lower appellate court, as it appears from the judgment under appeal, the only point pressed was one of limitation. According to the Plaintiffs, as canvassed in the court below, the article of limitation which was applicable to the case was one as given in Article 115. In the lower appellate court, as it appears from the judgment under appeal, the only point pressed was one of limitation. According to the Plaintiffs, as canvassed in the court below, the article of limitation which was applicable to the case was one as given in Article 115. But according to the Defendants the article which applied was Article 65. The lower appellate court has accepted the Plaintiffs' case and has decreed the suit in terms of Article 115 of the Limitation Act for the refund of Rs 508. 94. In other words, the judgment given by the trial court has been affirmed by the lower appellate court. Now therefore the Defendants have come in Second Appeal and this Court. 2. In this Court too the only point raised by Mr. Mohanty appearing for the Appellants is one of limitation. No doubt the learned Counsel has also feebly argued that in fact the article which applies to the facts of the present case is one given in Article 65, but mainly the submission made by the learned Counsel is that even if Article 115 is found to be applicable to the facts of the present case, the starting point of limitation thereunder should be the date of passing the M.A. examination that means, September 1955 or sometime near about it, but not the date of marriage, namely, 1-5-1958. In support of this contention reliance has been placed by Mr. Mohanty on the facts stated or on the case as made out in the plaint. According to the learned Counsel the contract was that the marriage would be performed only if the boy passed M.A. examination. Therefore if he passed M.A. examination in. September, 1955 and even thereafter he did not marry the girl that should be taken as the starting point for limitation as provided in Article 115 of the Limitation Act. In my opinion there is no substance in this contention. Therefore if he passed M.A. examination in. September, 1955 and even thereafter he did not marry the girl that should be taken as the starting point for limitation as provided in Article 115 of the Limitation Act. In my opinion there is no substance in this contention. The lower appellate court has clearly found (1) that there was a contract at the time of Nirbandha ceremony that the Plaintiffs would help Defendant No. 1 in prosecuting his studies at Cuttack and marriage would be performed after the bridegroom passed the M.A. examination, and (2) that the girl waited till the duty when she came to know that her proposed husband had married elsewhere; and therefore it cannot be said that the marriage broke due to the fault of the Plaintiffs. In rather words the view taken by the lower, appellate Court is that it was after the marriage of Defendant No. 1 which took place on 1-5-1958 that the Plaintiffs came to know that there was no chance of the contract being fulfilled and that thereafter the same stood broken. It is true that in the plaint there may be some statement of facts which can be said to be susceptible to certain interpretation as submitted by Mr. Mohanty. But in substance it cannot be denied to mean that in fact what the parties agreed to was the marriage of Defendant No. 1 with Bimala, daughter of Plaintiff No. 2. So far as the date of marriage was concerned that was mostly a question of convenience or a question relating to the interests of the parties. Therefore the date as to when the boy passed the M.A. examination may have been substantial for the interest of the parties, but not a condition precedent for the marriage. The refusal it seems as found by the lower appellate Court was finally talked to be made where the boy-had his marriage completed on 1-5-1958. That being so,(Article 115 is applicable to the facts of the present case as it should be, the suit as constituted is not barred by time. There is no controversy that it was instituted on 14-4-1961 and that date clearly falls within three years from the date of marriage, namely, 1-5-1958. I therefore hold that the submission made on behalf of the Plaintiffs is without substance. There is no controversy that it was instituted on 14-4-1961 and that date clearly falls within three years from the date of marriage, namely, 1-5-1958. I therefore hold that the submission made on behalf of the Plaintiffs is without substance. It may however be mentioned here that the Respondents at the end have also in the alternative advanced the contention that in any case if not Article 115, what is applicable to the facts of the case is Article 97 and as such also the suit cannot be held to have been filed beyond time. In my opinion, in view of what I have already held this question does not arise for consideration. In the result, therefore, the appeal is dismissed. But in the circumstances of the case there will be no order for costs. Final Result : Dismissed