JUDGMENT TARKUNDE J.-This petition has been filed under 8.491 of the Criminal Procedure Code and art. 226 of the Constitution to challenge an order of detention passed against the petitioner on November 25, 1964, under r. 30 (1) (b) of the Defence of India Rules. The order was passed by the District Magistrate of Poona who stated therein that he was satisfied that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India, public safety and the maintenance of public order. The detention order was confirmed by the Government of Maharashtra on the recommendation of the reviewing authority. 2. In his petition the petitioner stated that he had participated in the movement for Indias freedom, that he was sentenced for a term of two and half years for taking part in the Satyagraha movement in 1932, that he was for some days an active member of the Hindu Maha Sabha in Poona City, and that he is at present an ordinary member and a sympathiser of that body. The petitioner further stated that he has been conducting Hindi language classes for more than 25 year8 and has written and published several books in Hindi. According to him, the reason why he was detained was that he attended two functions which were held in Poona on November 12 and 15, 1964. The function which was held on November 12, 1964, was a Satyanarayan Puja performed for religious thanks-giving on the occasion of the release of Gopal Godse and Karkare who were convicts in the Gandhi murder trial. The function which was held on November 15, 1964, was a Shradha ceremony performed on the occasion of the death anniversary of Nathuram Godse who was sentenced to death in the said trial and was executed. The petitioner stated that he merely attended these functions and did not take part therein in any other way. The petitioner affirmed that he was not engaged in any prejudicial activity- He referred in the petition to three criminal applications filed by persons who had participated in the Sat,yanarayan Puja and whose detention orders were set aside by this Court. The petitioner claimed that on the same grounds the detention order passed against him should also be set aside. The petitioner affirmed that he was not engaged in any prejudicial activity- He referred in the petition to three criminal applications filed by persons who had participated in the Sat,yanarayan Puja and whose detention orders were set aside by this Court. The petitioner claimed that on the same grounds the detention order passed against him should also be set aside. According to the petitioner, the order passed against him was mala fide, that it was punitive and not preventive, and that the District Magistrate "had no material before him which could indicate, much less satisfy him, that it was necessary that the petitioner should be arrested and be detained with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India, public safety and the maintenance of public order". 3. The main affidavit in reply to the petition was filed by the District Magistrate of Poona. He denied that the petitioner merely attended the two functions mentioned above and stated that the petitioner was “one of the active participants" in both the functions. The District Magistrate, however, did not say in what manner, according to his information, the petitioner actively participated in the two functions. In denying the petitioners claim that he was not involved in any prejudicial activity the District Magistrate stated that the functions of November 12 and 15, 1964, evoked considerable wrath among all the sections of people in the State of Maharashtra and outside, as speeches were made in the said functions eulogising Nathuram Godse and Apte, the assassins of Mahatma Gandhi. It was further stated in this affidavit. "Indignant articles appeared in many of the leading newspapers condemning the actions and the speeches of those who had arranged and who delivered speeches at the said functions of November 12 and 15th. Several public meetings were held to condemn the attempts to glorify Nathuram Godse and Apte, the assassins of Mahatma Gandhi, as martyrs. The whole atmosphere of Poona was surcharged with public wrath and a situation of extreme public tension was created. There was a grave danger of a repetition of the disturbances and riots that followed the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948. The whole atmosphere of Poona was surcharged with public wrath and a situation of extreme public tension was created. There was a grave danger of a repetition of the disturbances and riots that followed the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948. I received reports and other material relating to these and other activities of the petitioner and others and on a careful examination of the whole material that was thus placed before me, I was satisfied that it was necessary to detain the petitioner." The District Magistrate denied that there was no material which could satisfy him that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner. 4. After hearing the learned Additional Government Pleader, and after perusing a further affidavit of the District Magistrate to which we will presently refer, we are satisfied that this petition must be allowed as, in our view, the District Magistrate was not, and could not have been, satisfied that the petitioner was likely to act in a prejudicial manner and that it was necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from so acting. There are two reasons why we have come to the conclusion that the District Magistrate was not genuinely satisfied about the necessity of detaining the petitioner. In the first place, the activity of the petitioner which consisted of merely attending the two functions could not be regarded as prejudicial to the defence of India, public safety or the maintenance of public order, and no inference could possibly be drawn from such activity that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner. Secondly, supposing that the conduct of the petitioner in attending the two functions amounted to prejudicial activity, there was no likelihood of similar functions being held in the near future, and the District Magistrate could not, therefore, have been genuinely satisfied that it was necessary to subject the petitioner to preventive detention. 5. Before dealing more fully with the grounds on which the impugned order of detention is required to be set aside, it is necessary to mention that the learned Additional Government Pleader advanced two contentions in order to dissuade us from interfering with the order of detention. 5. Before dealing more fully with the grounds on which the impugned order of detention is required to be set aside, it is necessary to mention that the learned Additional Government Pleader advanced two contentions in order to dissuade us from interfering with the order of detention. He contended that an order of detention made under r. 30, sub.r. (1) (b), of the Defence of India Rules can be validly challenged only on the ground of mala fides in the restricted sense of its having been issued for some ulterior purpose, and that the order cannot be quashed if the petitioner fails to show that the detaining authority was actuated by some ulterior purpose in making the order. The learned Additional Government Pleader further argued that it is not permissible to the Court in such cases to ask for the particulars of the material which led to the satisfaction of the detaining authority about the necessity of detention, and that in the absence of particulars the statement of the detaining authority that he was so satisfied must be taken as correct. We do not find it possible to accept either of these contentions. We will deal with these contentions after considering the two grounds which led us to the conclusion that in the present case the District Magistrate was not genuinely satisfied that it was necessary to detain the petitioner in order to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner. 6. The first ground, as stated above, is that the conduct of the petitioner in merely attending the two functions cannot be regarded as a prejudicial activity, and that no inference could possibly be drawn from such conduct, that the petitioner was likely to act in a prejudicial manner. Orders of detention were passed against several persons who participated in various degrees in the two functions of Satyanarayan Puja and Shradha ceremony, and petitioner filed by them have been heard and disposed of by this Court. The first batch of these petitions came for hearing before a Bench consisting of Justice V. S. Desai, and my learned brother Justice Bal. One of these, being criminal application No. 367 of 1965, was filed by Gopal Godse. The Court rejected the main contention of the petitioner in that case that the order of detention was issued out of malice. One of these, being criminal application No. 367 of 1965, was filed by Gopal Godse. The Court rejected the main contention of the petitioner in that case that the order of detention was issued out of malice. The Court observed that the acts of the petitioner on November 12 and 15, 1964, gave rise to consequences which disturbed the public peace and order, and that the detaining authority was satisfied "that in order to prevent further indulgence in such activities by the petitioner it was necessary to detain him." In the affidavit of the District Magistrate in that case it had been alleged that the petitioner Gopal Godse was one of the speakers at the function held on November 15, 1964, and that in the course of his speech he praised his deceased brother Nathuram Godse for the assassination of Mahatma: Gandhi. Another petition filed by one Vaidya, being criminal application" No. 531 of 1965, was similarly dismissed by the same Bench. The petitioner in that case had attended the Satyanarayan Puja on November 12, 1964," and no question appears to have been raised in that case regarding the extent of the petitioners participation in that function. 7. The next batch of petitions came before a Bench consisting of Naik and Palekar JJ. Criminal application No. 588 of 1965 was filed by one Thatte who, according to the District Magistrate, was an organiser of the Satyanarayan Puja held on November 12, 1964: and was also an "active participant" in the Shradha ceremony which took place on November 15, 1964. Criminal application No. 675 of 1965 was filed by one Ghaisas in whose name printed invitations had been issued for the function arranged by November 12, 1964, and who, according to the District Magistrate, was the main organiser of the function. The Court held that the conduct of these petitioners (Thatte and Ghaisas) could not be regarded as prejudicial activity. They had not made any speeches commending the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi or eulogising the perpetrators of that crime. They could not have anticipated the nature of the speeches which were delivered at the functions and had no control over those speeches. The Court accordingly held that their conduct could not be considered as in any way prejudicial either to the defence of India or to public order. The orders of detention passed against them were accordingly set aside. They could not have anticipated the nature of the speeches which were delivered at the functions and had no control over those speeches. The Court accordingly held that their conduct could not be considered as in any way prejudicial either to the defence of India or to public order. The orders of detention passed against them were accordingly set aside. The same was the result of criminal application No. 870 of 1965 which was filed by one Bapat. According to the Distriot Magistrate, Bapat had taken active part in organizing the two functions and had delivered a short speech in the course of the first function It was, however, not suggested by the District Magistrate that there was anything objectionable in that speech. On the other hand the same Bench dismissed criminal application No. 614 of 1965 which had been filed by one Abhyankar who, according to the District Magistrate, had not only actively participated in the two functions but had made a speech paying tributes to Nathuram Godse and eulogising him for assassinating Mahatma Gandhi .. 8. In the present case the petitioner expressly stated that he merely attended the two functions and did not participate in those functions in any other way. The District Magistrate denied this averment in the course of his affidavit and vaguely alleged that the petitioner was "one of the active participants in both the functions." Previous orders of this Court in the petitions filed by Tha,tte, Ghaisas and Bapat (criminal applications Nos. 588, 675 and 870 of 1965) were specifically referred to in this petition, and yet the District Magistrate refrained from stating in his affidavit the manner in which the petitioner "actively" participated in the two functions. Hence, the failure of the District Magistrate to indicate the nature of the petitioners alleged participation in the two functions cannot be regarded as merely accidental. Moreover, we asked the learned Additional Government Pleader whether he could give us any idea about the nature of the petitioners alleged participation in the functions; and the learned Additional Government Pleader told us that he had no information in the matter. Moreover, we asked the learned Additional Government Pleader whether he could give us any idea about the nature of the petitioners alleged participation in the functions; and the learned Additional Government Pleader told us that he had no information in the matter. Under circumstances which will be presently explained, we asked the learned Additional Government Pleader whether he wanted a further opportunity to file an additional affidavit of the District Magistrate to clarify the vague statements which were found in this and a subsequent affidavit filed by the District Magistrate, and the learned Additional Government Pleader told us that no such opportunity was required. For these reasons, we must hold that the statement of the District Magistrate that the petitioner was an active participant in the two functions was not intended to be taken seriously, and that the petitioner was one of the persons who merely attended the two functions. This conduct of the petitioner cannot be regarded as being prejudicial to the defence of India, public safety and the maintenance of public order, and it cannot possibly be inferred from such conduct that it was necessary to detain the petitioner with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner. 9. In the above discussion we have assumed that the only conduct of the petitioner from which the District Magistrate was satisfied about the necessity of detaining him consisted of his alleged participation in the two functions. We must, however, take notice of another vague statement which was made by the District Magistrate in this connection. The District Magistrate stated in para. 7 of his first affidavit, "I received reports and other material relating to these and other activities of the petitioner and others and on a careful examination of the whole material that was thus placed before me, I was satisfied that it was necessary to detain the petitioner." Here again there is no indication what "other activities" of the petitioner were taken into consideration, and why activities of persons other than the petitioner were found to be relevant in deciding whether it was necessary to detain him. On this question also the learned Additional Government Pleader had no information and did not want any opportunity to furnish any information. On this question also the learned Additional Government Pleader had no information and did not want any opportunity to furnish any information. We are of the view that where a detenu has made out a prima facie case that his detention was ordered by an authority who was not genuinely satisfied about its necessity, any reluctance or refusal on the part of the detaining authority to show to the Court that he was in fact genuinely satisfied about the necessity of detention must result, in the absence of a claim of privilege, in an adverse inference being drawn against him. We must, therefore, conclude that the impugned order of detention in the present case was passed merely because the petitioner was one of the persons who attended the two functions. No inference could have been rationally drawn from that conduct that it was necessary to subject the petitioner to preventive detention. 10. The second ground why the impugned order of detention is required to be quashed is that there was no likelihood of the functions like those of Satyanarayan Puja and Shradha ceremony being repeated in the near future, and that the detaining authority could not, therefore, have been satisfied that the petitioner was likely to resort to prejudicial activity and had to be subjected to preventive detention. In considering this ground we will assume that the conduct of the petitioner in attending the two functions could somehow be regarded as being prejudicial to "the defence of India, public safety and the maintenance of public order". Even on that basis, a valid order of detention could have been passed against the petitioner only in order to prevent him from indulging in such activities in the future and not merely on account of his past conduct. The Satyanarayan Puja was held for the purpose of religious thanks-giving on the occasion of the rele3se of Gopal Godse and Karkare from imprisonment. In the normal course, such a Puja was not likely to be performed for the same purpose a second time. A Shradha ceremony can take place only once a year and not more often. It is, therefore, very difficult to believe that the detaining authority had a genuine apprehension that the petitioner would resort to attending such functions in the future and that it was necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from doing so. A Shradha ceremony can take place only once a year and not more often. It is, therefore, very difficult to believe that the detaining authority had a genuine apprehension that the petitioner would resort to attending such functions in the future and that it was necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from doing so. Moreover, the political affiliations of the petitioner are not such as to lead to any apprehension that he was likely to behave in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India, public safety and the maintenance of public order. The affidavit filed by the District Magistrate suggests that orders of detention were passed against the petitioner and others because "there was a grave danger of a repetition of the disturbances and riots that followed the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948". A detention order, however, can be passed in order to prevent the detenu from acting in a prejudicial manner, and not merely in order that other persons may not indulge in disturbances and riots. When the present petition came for hearing before us for the first time, we explained the above difficulties to the learned Additional Government Pleader, and told him that we did not find it easy to understand how the detaining authority could have felt any apprehension in the circumstances of the case that the petitioner was likely to behave in a prejudicial manner in the future and that his detention was, therefore, necessary. We asked the learned Additional Government Pleader whether he could say on behalf of the detaining authority that the authority had apprehended a particular type of prejudicial activity on the part of the petitioner, for the prevention of which his detention was felt to be necessary. At the request of the learned Additional Government Pleader we adjourned the further hearing of the petition in order that this question may be considered by the appropriate authorities and, if necessary, a further affidavit of the District Magistrate may be filed. At the request of the learned Additional Government Pleader we adjourned the further hearing of the petition in order that this question may be considered by the appropriate authorities and, if necessary, a further affidavit of the District Magistrate may be filed. A further affidavit of the District Magistrate was accordingly filed, and when the petition came up for hearing before us again we were surprised to find that this affidavit was even more vague than the earlier one, and gave no indication whatever of the type of activity which the District Magistrate had expected the petitioner to resort to, and for the prevention of which the impugned order of detention was passed. In this second affidavit the District Magistrate merely stated: “I was satisfied that the petitioner was likely to act in a prejudicial manner and after carefully considering the fact relating to the case of the detenu, I was fully satisfied that he wall in all probability likely in future also, to act in "manner prejudicial to the Defence of India, public safety and the maintenance of public order. I was also satisfied that in order to prevent him from so acting it was necessary to detain him." As this affidavit did not disclose whether the detaining authority had apprehended that the petitioner would participate in other functions like the two mentioned above or whether it was felt by the detaining authority that the petitioner was likely to resort to prejudicial conduct of some other type, we asked the learned Additional Government Pleader again whether he could give any such information on behalf of the detaining authority, and whether he wanted a further adjournment to file an additional affidavit. The learned Additional Government Pleader, however, did not have any information on the question, and he also did not want an opportunity to file a further affidavit. Under the circumstances, the only way in which we can discharge our responsibility of deciding this question is by holding that the detaining authority had no material on the basis of which he could have held that the petitioner was likely to resort to prejudicial activity, that the detaining authority was not genuinely satisfied that the detention of the petitioner was necessary in order to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner, and that the impugned order is, therefore, invalid and must be set aside. 11. 11. We will now turn to the two legal submissions which were made by the learned Additional Government Pleader to dissuade us from interfering with the impugned order of detention. 12. The learned Additional Government Pleader argued, in the first place, that an order of detention made under r. 30 (1) (b) of the Defence of India Rules can by lawfully challenged only if it is made mala fide (that is, for some ulterior purpose), that it is for the petitioner to prove that the order was so made, and that the p3tition must be dismissed on the petitioners failure to discharge that burden. If this view were correct, there can be nr) occasion for the Court to consider whether there was any material available to the detaining authority on the basis of which the authority could have been satisfied that it was necessary to detain the petitioner in order to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner. That was the view which the learned Additional Government Pleader wanted us to accept. 13. Considering the question without the aid of any authority, it is clear from the terms of r. 30 (1) (b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, that an order of detention can be validly made if one pre-condition is fulfilled, and the pre-condition is that the authority concerned must be satisfied that it was necessary to make the order of detention with a view to preventing the proposed detenu from acting in a prejudicial manner. The satisfaction of the detaining authority which is the pre-condition of a valid order of detention is a subjective satisfaction, and the Court cannot, therefore, examine whether the satisfaction was justified, that is to say, whether the material available to the detaining authority was sufficient for his subjective satisfaction. It is clear at the same time that the Court has to consider and decide whether in fact the pre-condition was fulfilled, i. e. whether the alleged satisfaction of the detaining authority was a genuine satisfaction, and whether the detaining authority was satisfied both on the likelihood of prejudicial activity on the part of the proposed detenu and on the necessity of detaining him for the purpose of preventing him from resorting to such activity. When an order of detention is made for an ulterior purpose, the alleged satisfaction of the detaining authority is a mere pretence and not a fact, and the order of detention is liable to be set aside on that ground. There are, however, other types of cases where the Court can and must come to the conclusion that the alleged satisfaction of the detaining authority was not genuine. In making a detention order the detaining authority may act carelessly and without applying his mind to the relevant material. In that case his satisfaction cannot be said to be genuine. Again the detaining authority may have no material before him on the basis of which it was rationally possible to reach the alleged satisfaction. In that case also the Court must hold that the alleged satisfaction was not genuine, because the satisfaction must be of a rational individual. In such a case the Court will consider, not whether the material available to the detaining authority was sufficient for his satisfaction, but whether there was material on the basis of which the satisfaction was rationally possible. 14. Turning to the cases cited before us, the learned Additional Government Pleader placed reliance on certain observations of the Supreme Court in Makhan Singh v. State of Punjab. 1 The Supreme Court pointed out in that case that even after the issue of the Presidential order under art. 359 (1) of the Constitution it was still open to the citizens to take certain pleas to challenge the legality or the propriety of orders of detention under s. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code or art. 226 of the Constitution. In that context the Supreme Court pointed out that a detenu may move the Court for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his detention has been ordered mala fide, and proceeded to observe (p. 400): “It is true that a mere allegation that the detention is mala fide would not be enough; the detenu will have to prove the mala fides. But if the mala fides are alleged, the detenu cannot be precluded from substantiating his plea on the ground of the bar created by Art. 359 (1) and the Presidential Order." It is obvious that these observations do not imply, and were not intended to imply, that the ground of mala fides is the only ground on which an order of detention can be challenged by a detenu. 15. Observations more germane to the question under discussion are found in the decision of the Privy Council in Ross-Clunis v. Papadopoullos.2 In that case the Privy Council were concerned with certain regulations validly issued by the Governor of Cyprus which had authorised the commissioner to impose collective fines on the inhabitants of certain areas. The regulations required that before issuing an order of collective fine the commissioner should make an enquiry, and that in holding such an enquiry the commissioner must "satisfy himself" that the inhabitants of the area were given adequate opportunity of understanding the subject-matter of the enquiry and making representations thereon. It was urged before the Privy Council that the commissioner had failed to discharge the duty cast upon him of satisfying himself that the inhabitants of the area concerned were given adequate opportunity of understanding the subject-matter of the enquiry and making representations thereon. In considering this argument the Privy Council stated (p. 32 ) : that even in cases where the order passed was a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 an appeal did not lie because the order passed was not such as came within the purview of section 104 or Order XLIII, rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The question whether when the order passed was one, which was appealable under section 104 or Order XLIII, rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code an appeal did not lie because the order was passed by a single Judge of the High Court in the exercise of the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the High Court and was not a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent, was not considered in any of those cases. It may be, says Mr. It may be, says Mr. Gupte, that in view of these decisions, orders passed by a single Judge of the High Court which are not appealable under the Civil Procedure Code may be appealable by reason of the special provisions contained in clause 15 of the Letters Patent, but where the appeals are provided against the orders under the Civil Procedure Code, the right of appeal cannot be denied because the order does not amount to a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The argument, in our opinion, is untenable because it assumes that the appeals provided under the Civil Procedure Code are also from orders passed by a single Judge of the High Court in the exercise of his ordinary civil jurisdiction. That assumption is not correct having regard to the view, which has been consistently taken by the different High Courts in the decisions, which have been referred to by us above. As has been held in those oases, the question whether an appeal lies from the decision or order passed by the single Judge of the High Court in the exercise of his ordinary civil jurisdiction must be determined not by reference to the provisions relating to appeals contained in the Code of Civil Procedure but by the provisions of clause 15 of the Letters Patent only. The argument, therefore, that the order passed being an order appealable under section 104 and Order XLIII, rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an appeal lies therefrom, cannot be accepted. 18. In our opinion, therefore, neither of the two replies, which Mr. Gupte has advanced in answer to the preliminary point raised by the learned counsel for the respondents is capable of being sustained and he result, therefore, is that the preliminary point must be accepted and the appeal held to be incompetent. 19. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. The respondents attorneys will be entitled to withdraw the deposit which has been made by them. The undertaking given by respondents Nos. 1 to 3 stands discharged. Notice of motion also is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed