Judgment.- The short question for determination in this Second Appeal is whether the document Exhibit B-1 was an outright sale with an agreement to reconey, or a mortgage by conditional sale as defined in section 58 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act. The view of the Courts below was that it was a mortgage by conditional sale ; hence the defendant, the aggrieved party, has filed this Second Appeal. The plaintiffs’ case was briefly the following. The suit properties are situated within the municipal limits of Thanjavur, and belonged to one Kaliaperumal- Pillai, the undivided father of the plaintiffs, and his younger brother Krishnaswami. They borrowed amounts from one Janaki Ammal and in settlement of these debts the suit document, Exhibit B-1, dated 18th April, 1939, was executed, ostensibly as a sale deed, but, in essence, it was only a mortgage. Janaki Animal died shortly before the suit, and before her death, she appointed the defendant as her executor, to manage her estate, and the defendant is in management of the suit properties. The plaintiffs’ father died fifteen years ago, and the plaintiffs have succeeded to his estate by survivorship. The plaintiffs filed the suit for redemption of the mortgage, Exhibit B-1. The defendants pleaded that the document was an out-right sale with a covenant for repurchase. They also denied the plaintiffs’ right to the benefits of section 9-A of Act IV of 1938. The document is in Tamil and can be rendered thus in English: " We have today executed the sale deed in your favour of the under-mentioned property and the consideration therefor of Rs. 2,550 is made up in the following manner: (1) by discharge of a prior simple mortgage, dated 20th July, 1924 for Rs. 2,000 over item No. 1 — amount received Rs. 1,850 ; (2) by discharge of a mortgage, dated 12th July, 1937 for Rs. 600 over item No. 2 and other items after scaling down the interest under Act IV of 1938 — Rs. 450 ; (3) amount due towards principal and interest on a promissory note, dated 12th July, 1937, for Rs. 250 — total Rs. 2,250. We have given you the abovesaid property with absolute rights to it. Excepting the two mortgages aforementioned, there are no other encumbrances on this property. Out of the consideration of Rs. 2,550 for this sale deed, if we pay you Rs. 250 — total Rs. 2,250. We have given you the abovesaid property with absolute rights to it. Excepting the two mortgages aforementioned, there are no other encumbrances on this property. Out of the consideration of Rs. 2,550 for this sale deed, if we pay you Rs. 2,050 within three years from today, you shall reconvey the properties to us. Subject to this condition this deed of sale is executed. " The main circumstances to be borne in mind in regard to this transaction are the following: For the entire amount of consideration of Rs. 2,550 no amount by way of cash was paid. The entire amount represented prior debts under two simple mortgages and a promissory note. An effort was made deliberately to show in the document that the amount of consideration represented the amount of the prior debts after adjusting amounts already paid or after scaling down amounts by way of interest under Act IV of 1938. A conscious intention to show that the relationship of debtor and creditor subsisted between the two parties up to the time of the execution of the document is thus apparent. In 1924 item No. 1 property was capable of raising Rs. 2,000 by way of simple mortgage. In 1939 item No. 1 property supplemented by three more items, which include four mahs or 11 /3 acre of cultivable land, a garden land containing topes and gardens and another garden land containing bamboo clusters, were all sold for Rs. 2,550. No attempt was made in the lower Courts to show how the price of the property varied in the locality between 1924 and 1939, whether there was an upward trend or a downward trend. The lower appellate Court, however, was prepared to consider that from the recital of the document alone, it would appear that the property covered by Exhibit B-1 was worth on the date of Exhibit B-1 much more than Rs. 2,550. This is a finding of fact and I am not prepared to interfere with it, though it would have been a better if the lower appellate Court had supplemented its observation, by reference as to how the trend of the prices of property had varied from 1924 to 1939. A further point is that the consideration for the reconveyance, Rs. 2,050, is Rs. 500 less than the consideration for the sale. A further point is that the consideration for the reconveyance, Rs. 2,050, is Rs. 500 less than the consideration for the sale. This must be viewed as a very unusal feature in such a transaction. Learned Counsel, Sri R. Gopalaswami Iyengar, appearing for the appellant, urged that this should be taken as a crucial test to show that the transaction was a sale rather than a mortgage. On the other hand, learned "Counsel for the respondents Sri K.S. Desikan urged that the reason for the reduction of Rs. 500, was that the parties still sought to maintain the relationship of creditor and debtors, that they expected that the enjoyment of the property by the creditors for three years from 1939, would give them by way of profits, much more than the interest which would accrue on the debts during that period and that it was to provide for this circumstance, that they gave a reduction of Rs. 500 in the amount stipulated for obtaining a reconveyance. It does seem very unusual that a person buying property in 1939 would have anticipated that three years later the property would be worth Rs. 500 less. Even assuming that there was a retrograde trend in prices up to 1939, no reasonable person would anticipate a further fall, and try to provide for it by fixing a lesser amount for obtaining a reconveyance three years later. In the above circumstances the explanation given by the learned Counsel for the respondents, appears to be more reasonable, for the deliberate reduction in the amount fixed for the reconveyance of the property three years later. One other circumstance appears to be relevant. At the conclusion of the document the parties specifically described the term for reconveyance as a condition of the sale. Therefore they intended that the term for reconveyance should be a condition attached to the original transfer of the property: this is a circumstance more consistent with a mortgage than sale. Several decisions were cited before me by both sides. At the conclusion of the document the parties specifically described the term for reconveyance as a condition of the sale. Therefore they intended that the term for reconveyance should be a condition attached to the original transfer of the property: this is a circumstance more consistent with a mortgage than sale. Several decisions were cited before me by both sides. In Ramachandrayya v. Laxminarayana Rao1, Krishnaswamy Nayudu, J., observed: “ Where it is found that there was a prior relationship of debtor and creditor between the parties, that the stamp papers for the document were purchased in the name of the transferor, that the price fixed was not the result of bargaining, but represented the exact amount of the pre-existing debt due by the vendor to the vendee, and the price too was not a fair or proper price, there can be no room, for any doubt that the transaction is and intended to be only a mortgage by conditional sale.” In 1956 Ramaswami, J., had to consider two different types of cases. In the decision reported in Kulathu Iyer v. Manickavasagam Pillai2, there was evidence to show that the amount at which the price was settled was much lower than the amount due under the earlier debts. The parties described the document as “ vayida crayam ” in contradiction to the usual phrase “ suddha crayam ”. The sale price given in round figures was also the price to be given by the vendor after a stipulated period. There was nothing to show that any interest was payable. But, as mentioned already, in this case, the document recites that the amount of the sale price was the amount arrived at after calculation, of the amount due under the prior debts less adjustment for repayment or scaling down and the price for the reconveyance is less than the price for the sale. In B. A. Khan v. Nawaz Khan3, the learned Judge had to consider a different type of transaction, where he catalogued five tests to be applied in similar cases. But it appears to me that the facts of each case have to be considered independently and that any prescription of standardised tests may not be sufficient to meet all situations. In B. A. Khan v. Nawaz Khan3, the learned Judge had to consider a different type of transaction, where he catalogued five tests to be applied in similar cases. But it appears to me that the facts of each case have to be considered independently and that any prescription of standardised tests may not be sufficient to meet all situations. In Bhaskar Woman Joshi v. Shri Narayan Rambilas Agarwal4, the Supreme Court observed that: “the question in each case was one of determination of the real character of the transaction, to be ascertained from the contents of the deed, viewed in the light of surrounding circumstances. The circumstance that the condition (of reconveyance) is indicated in the sale deed has urdoubtedly to be taken into account, but the value to be attached thereto must vary with the degree of formality attending upon the transaction.” In my opinion, the circumstances of this case are more consistent with the transaction being one of a mortgage by conditional sale, than an outright sale, with an agreement for reconveyance. In this view, I confirm the decision of the lower appellate Court, and dismiss the Second Appeal. There shall be no order as to costs in the Second Appeal. No leave. V.S. ------ Appeal dismissed.