Judgment :- 1. The respondent obtained a decree on the 7th February, 1956, against the appellant, for redemption of a mortgage. The decree prescribed as a condition precedent to the execution, that the respondent shall pay court fee on the sum of Rs. 400. Without fulfilling the condition, the respondent filed a petition for execution on the 2nd February, 1959, and it was dismissed on the 11th February. He filed another petition on the 1st December, 1959, outside the period of three years from the date of the decree and complied with the direction by paying the court fee on the 16th December. Objection was then taken by the appellant, that the execution of the decree was barred by limitation, as the previous petition was not in accordance with law, no court fee having been paid, and the date of that petition cannot be reckoned as a starting point. The objection prevailed with the execution court, but on appeal it was over-ruled. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant contended on the authority of the decision of the Supreme Court in Yeshwant Deorao v. Walchand Ramchand AIR. 1951 SC. 16, that the starting point of limitation for the execution of the decree, notwithstanding the condition prescribed, is the date of the decree and not the date of performance of the condition. The Supreme Court observed: "The decree was not a conditional one in the sense that some extraneous event was to happen on the fulfilment of which alone it could be executed. The payment of court-fees on the amount found due was entirely in the power of the decree-holder and there was nothing to prevent him from paying it then and there; it was a decree capable of execution from the very date it was passed." But the question is, whether the previous execution petition filed without paying the court fee is in accordance with law or not. There is here no question as to the abstract competency of the court to execute the decree for redemption, the only hindrance to execution, being the non-performance of the condition. In Nathubhai Kasandas v. Pranjivan Lalchand, ILR. There is here no question as to the abstract competency of the court to execute the decree for redemption, the only hindrance to execution, being the non-performance of the condition. In Nathubhai Kasandas v. Pranjivan Lalchand, ILR. 34 Bombay 189, Chandravarkar, J., dealing with the competency of the court in which the execution petition was filed, said that "an application for execution of a decree to be in accordance with law must ask for something within the decree and not outside it." In that case also there was a condition in the decree, that it shall not be executed until court fee was paid. The learned judge construed the decree as follows: "There was nothing in the decree to prevent the plaintiff from applying for execution on one day and paying the court fee on any day subsequent before the disposal of the application by the court. The application itself cannot be said to have been not in accordance with law merely because it was not accompanied by a payment of the court fee.", and he relied on Narayan Govind v. Anandram Kojiram ILR. 16 Bombay 480 & Syed Hussain Saib Rowthen v. Rajagopala Mudaliar ILR. 30 Madras 28. In the latter case, the decree was to recover possession on paying a certain amount to the third defendant. This was held to be a condition precedent to the making of an order for delivery of possession of the property, but not a condition precedent to the making of the application for execution. In Alagirisami Naidu v. Venkatachalapathi Iyer ILR. 31 Madras 77, the decree provided that it shall not be executed till a hypothecation debt was discharged. This was held to be a condition precedent to the realisation of the money in execution, but not to an execution petition being filed. 3. In Basamma v. Shivamma AIR. 1963 Mysore 323 and Yella Appa Rao v. Nagam Veerraju AIR. 31 Madras 77, the decree provided that it shall not be executed till a hypothecation debt was discharged. This was held to be a condition precedent to the realisation of the money in execution, but not to an execution petition being filed. 3. In Basamma v. Shivamma AIR. 1963 Mysore 323 and Yella Appa Rao v. Nagam Veerraju AIR. 1962 Andhra Pradesh 385 relied on for the appellant, the former relating to a final decree for partition and the latter to a final decree for the dissolution of partnership and accounts for the execution of which, additional court fee had to be paid under S.11 of the Court Fees Act corresponding to S.8 of the Travancore-Cochin Court Fees Act, apart from holding that the starting point of limitation was the date of the decree and not the date on which court fee was paid, the courts also held, that the previous execution petitions filed before the partition decree was duly stamped or before paying the prescribed court fee on the decree for accounts, were not in accordance with law. This was on the principle, that without the decree being stamped or without payment of the fee as prescribed by the Court Fees Act, the decree was inexecutable and therefore a petition did not lie to execute what was inexecutable. Just as in the passage quoted, the Supreme Court excluded conditional decrees, in the Andhra case, Chandra Reddy, C.J. also made the distinction in the following terms: "There is a long series of decisions which have enunciated the principle that limitation commences on the date of the final decree and the non-supply of non judicial stamps for the purpose of drafting the final decree does not arrest the running of limitation. A final decree like the present cannot be equated to a conditional decree which could be executed only on the happening of a particular event. In the case of final decrees in partition suits or partnership actions, there is no obstacle in the way of the decree-holder proceeding with the execution of the decree after supplying non judicial stamps for drafting the decrees or after paying the court fee as required by S.11 of the Court Fees Act. They are not cases where certain conditions have to be performed before execution could be levied." It was apparently for this reason, that Nathubhai Kasandas v. Pranjivan Lalchand ILR. They are not cases where certain conditions have to be performed before execution could be levied." It was apparently for this reason, that Nathubhai Kasandas v. Pranjivan Lalchand ILR. 34 Bombay 189 and others in that line, were not adverted to or considered by the Andhra and the Mysore High Courts in the two cases cited. Yeshwant Deorao v. Walchand Ramchand AIR. 1951 SC. 16, Lakshmichand Chandamal v. Firm Gokaldas Ranchoradas AIR, 1937 Sind 108, Virupaksha Reddi v. Chanalal Siva Reddi AIR. 1943 Mad. 652, Yella Appa Rao v. Nagam Veerraju AIR. 1962 Andhra Pradesh 385 and Basamma v. Shivamma AIR. 1963 Mysore 323, which were relied on for the appellant are all cases, falling within the purview of S.11 of the Court Fees Act referred to above, being cases of final decrees either in suits for partition or in suits for dissolution of partnerships and accounts, their ratio being, as I take it, that in view of the mandatory provision in the section that such a decree shall not be executed unless court fee is made good, the decree is inexecutable. 4. Here, even if the present suit for redemption of a mortgage is equated to a suit for immovable property and mesne profits, S.8 of the Travancore-Cochin Court fees Act, has no application, because court fee was ordered to be paid not because, as contemplated by S.8, anything in excess of what was claimed by the respondent has been decreed to him, but because a deficiency in the initial payment of court fee was detected and was to be made good. The case is outside the scope of S.8 and depends entirely on the construction of the conditional decree, such as it is. Following the other line of cases referred to, I hold that the condition in the decree under execution, was a condition precedent to the execution of the decree by recovering property and realising the amount, but not to the making of the execution petition itself. Therefore the previous petition was in accordance with law and the later execution petition was not barred by limitation. 5. For the reasons stated, the order passed by the Subordinate Judge is affirmed and this second appeal dismissed with costs. Dismissed.