ORDER Pandey, J. 1. This order shall dispose of First Appeals Nos. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 of 1963 also. These are appeals under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, arising out of proceedings taken for acquiring, at the instance of the Director of Agriculture (respondent), several plots of land of village Lalbag and Muhammadpura which were required for a seed multiplication farm to be established in the vicinity of Burhanpur. The respondent moved the Collector who, in due course, gave his award under section 11 of the Act on 30 June 1960. The claimants, who are the 'appellants before us, were not satisfied with the award and moved the Collector under section 18 of the Act for making references to the Court. Instead of making such references, giving the particulars specified in section 19 of the Act, the Collector appears to have forwarded to the Court these applications under section 18. In its turn, the Court issued notices to the Director of Agriculture and sent only intimation to the Collector. In all these references, the Director of Agriculture filed his written statements and contested the claims for enhanced compensation. The Court, by its award rendered on 20 September 1962, directed "the non-applicant", meaning the Director of Agriculture, to pay to the appellants certain sums over and above the amounts awarded to them by the Collector. As already indicated, the appellants have filed these appeals against the Court's award and impleaded the Director of Agriculture as the only respondent. 2. Having heard the counsel, we have formed the opinion that these proceedings were misconceived from the commencement. There is, in any of these cases, no reference such as is contemplated by section 19 of the Act which provides: "19 (1) In making the reference, the Collector shall state for the information of the Court, in writing under his hand- (a) the situation and extent of the land, with particulars of any trees buildings or standing crops thereon; (b) the names of the persons whom he has reason to think interested in such land; (c) the amount awarded for damages and paid or tendered under sections 5 and 17, or either of them, and the amount of compensation awarded under section 11; and (d) if the objection be to the amount of the compensation, the grounds on which the amount of compensation was determined. (2) To the said statement shall be attached a schedule giving the particulars of the notices served upon, and of the statements in writing made or delivered by the parties interested respectively." In our view, the condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court is the existence of a valid reference under section 18 of the Act. In Nusserwanjee Pestonjee Vs. Meer Mynoodeen Khan [(1855) 6 MIA 135] the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council observed: "Wherever jurisdiction is given to a Court by an Act of Parliament, or by a Regulation in India (which has the same effect as an Act of Parliament); and such jurisdiction is only given upon certain specified terms contained in the Regulation itself if is a universal principle that these terms must be complied with, in order to create and raise the jurisdiction; for if they be not complied with, the jurisdiction does not arise." [Page 155] Again, as pointed out by the Privy Council in Pramatha Nath Mullick Vs. Secretary of State for India [57 IA 100], the jurisdiction of the Court under the provisions of the Act is a special one and is not only limited by the terms of sections 18, 20 and 21 of the Act but is also confined to a consideration of the specific objections stated in the reference. That being so, since no valid reference was made in any of these cases the Court could not proceed to determine the objections raised by the appellants or make any award under section 26 of the Act. 3. There is in these proceedings another infirmity, namely, non-joinder of a necessary party, which we think vitiates them. By section 3 of the Act, the expression "person interested" is defined as follows: "In this Act, unless there is something repugnant to the subject or context,- (b) the expression 'person interested' includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under this Act; and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land; This inclusive definition of the expression "person interested" is not exhaustive. The expression has been used in several sections of the Act and we do not consider that the statutory meaning has to be substituted in all circumstances, even in disregard of the context. The expression has been used in several sections of the Act and we do not consider that the statutory meaning has to be substituted in all circumstances, even in disregard of the context. Craies states in his Statute Law, Sixth Edition, page 215, as follows: "Another important rule with regard to the effect of an interpretation clause is that an interpretation clause is not to be taken as substituting one set of words for another, or as strictly defining what the meaning of a term must be under all circumstances, but rather as declaring what may be comprehended within the term when the circumstances require that it should be so comprehended." Section 20 of the Act, which is material, reads: "The Court shall thereupon cause a notice specifying the day on which the Court will proceed to determine the objections, and directing their appearance before the Court on that day, to be served on the following persons, namely:- (a) The applicant; (b) all persons interested in the objection, except such (if any) of them as have consented without protest to receive payment of the compensation awarded; and (c) if the objection is in regard to the area of the land or to the amount of the compensation, the Collector." In our view, the words "persons interested" in the expression "all persons interested in the objection" occurring in clause (b) mean, in the context of any objection relating to compensation, any person who would be affected by the decision on that objection. We think the State Government is a "person" within the meaning of this clause because it would be affected if the objection relating to compensation being inadequate is allowed and the compensation is enhanced. This perhaps explains why it has been repeatedly held, as we would show in the following paragraphs, that in all such proceedings the State Government is a necessary party. 4. In the Municipal Corporation of Pabna Vs. Jogendra Narain Rajkut [(1908) 13 CWN 116], the Calcutta High Court observed: "The references would be under section 18 of the Act, and in a proceeding for the ascertainment of compensation on a reference under section 18 the claimant is to be regarded as the plaintiff and the Government as defendant. 'This' in the words of the learned judges who decided the case of Ezra Vs. The Secretary of State for India in Council [ILR 30 Cal. 'This' in the words of the learned judges who decided the case of Ezra Vs. The Secretary of State for India in Council [ILR 30 Cal. 36 at p. 89], 'is the invariable practice and the duty of the Collector in such cases is pointed out in clear tams in Rule 45 of the Board's rules'. A company or corporation 'for whose benefit any land may be acquired by the Collector is not a necessary party in the proceeding and there can be no doubt that no proceeding can properly go on in the absence of the Secretary of State for India in Council...But the appeal of the Corporation cannot be allowed and the proceedings must be set aside on account of the absence of the person directly interested in the ascertainment of the amount of compensation, namely, the Secretary of State for India in Council." In Fakir Chand Vs. Municipal Committee of Hazro [(1913) 18 IC 37], a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court held: that there was no right of appeal against a municipal. Committee for whose benefit the land was acquired and that, in a case involving any question as to the amount of compensation, the only person who could be impleaded as the respondent was the Secretary of State for India in Council and that, if he was not so, impleaded, there was in fact and in law no appeal at all. In Collector, of Akola Vs. Anand Rao [4 MPLC 310=7 NLR 88], Skinner A.J.C. stated : "This reasoning has my entire concurrence, and it accords with the opinion I have already expressed that the real party to the case is the Government, and not the Collector, and with the fact that the applicant has made no attemot to join as a party the actual Collector, who made the award, and who, I understand, is dead, or his representatives." 5. In Collector and Chairman, District Board, Gujranwala Vs. Hira Nand [ILR 9 Lah 667], a Division Bench of the, Lahore High Court held that an appeal against an a ward under section 18 of the Act could be filed only on behalf of the Secretary of State for India in Council because the land had been acquired by the Local Government. In Nihal Chand Vs. District Board Mianwali [AIR 1936 Lah. In Nihal Chand Vs. District Board Mianwali [AIR 1936 Lah. 564], the same High Court held that, to an appeal of that kind and to the proceedings before the Court where the question was as to the amount of compensation or of the area involved in the acquisition, the only other party was the Secretary of State through the Collector. Dalip Singh J. who spoke for the Court, stated: “It now becomes clear, therefore, that not only was the appeal not properly constituted here but the award itself of the learned District Judge in which the Secretary of State through the Collector was not shown as a party at all was a bad award. The case, therefore, differs from Fakirchand Vs. Municipal Committee. Hazro [59 PR 1913 (1913) 18 IC 37], and is more analogous to the case reported in Municipal Corporation of Pabna Vs. Jogendra Narain [13 CWN 116], in that notice was duly served on the Collector who did not choose to appear. There was however no order directing that proceedings should be ex-parte against the Secretary of State through the Collector. Thus the award which is both the judgment and the decree in the case was, therefore, against a wrong party. Following-, therefore, the rule as laid down in Municipal Corporation of Pabna Vs. Jogendra Narain [13 CWN 116], it would appear that the proper course is to send the case back: to the learned District Judge for correcting his award, that is to say its heading and making the Secretary of State through the Collector, the sole party defending the claim After this is done the appellants, if dissatisfied with the award, can appeal again to this Court." 6. In R.S. Deoji Dharsi & Sons Vs. Ghisulal [ILR 1952 Nag. 623], the question related to compensation. Referring with approval to the Calcutta case and the three cases of the Lahore High Court mentioned above, a Division Bench of this Court held that the Collector or the Provincial Government was a necessary party to the appeal and that such party not having been impleaded the appeal was incompetent and the position was as if the appeal was not filed at all. The question was raised in Collector, Raigarh Vs. Chaturbhuj [ 1964 JLJ 288 =1964 MPLJ 220= AIR 1964 MP 196 ], also. The question was raised in Collector, Raigarh Vs. Chaturbhuj [ 1964 JLJ 288 =1964 MPLJ 220= AIR 1964 MP 196 ], also. It does not appear that their Lordships pronounced on that question any concluded opinion, for they referred to the practice which had been in existence for along time and observed that they did not think that it was necessary to file the appeal formally in the name of the State Government. In the course of arguments, the counsel cited In re Jerbai [ AIR 1950 Bom. 243 ] where Tendolkar J. held that only the Collector was entitled to appear in a reference relating to compensation and that the State Government had no locus standi. We do not see how that case can help the appellants when the Collector was not made a party to these proceedings. That apart, we do not, with respect, share the opinion of Tendolkar J. because we think that the considerations which weighed with him are not conclusive of the matter. As we have already indicated, our opinion is that the State Government is a necessary party to these proceedings in which the amount of compensation is in question. 7. In the view we have taken, these cases must be sent back to the Additional District Judge. According by we set aside his award dated 20 September 1962, remit the cases to the Additional District Judge with a direction that he shall, with advertence to the observations we have made in this order, obtain proper references from the Collector and then dispose them of in accordance with law. Costs here shall be costs in those references. Hearing fee in each case Rs.50/-.