JUDGMENT D.S. Mathur, J. - This is a revision under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code by Oin Prakash against the order elated 8-1-1964,of the Ist Munsif of Bulandshahr - deciding issue No. 2 against him and at the same time directing him to :amend the plaint by having unnecessary pleas and reliefs deleted therefrom. 2. Om Prakash claims to be the adopted son of Smt. Janki, opposite party No. 1 widow of Lachhman Prasad, though she is not admitting this fact. However, there was litigation between them and by virtue of the compromise decree passed in that suit Om Prakash can claim to be the adopted son of Smt. Janki. Smt. Janki had inherited from her husband properties including agricultural land. Consolidation operations started in the village after the passing of the above compromise decree, but Om Prakash slid not make an objection under Sec, 9 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act to be referred hereinafter as the Act), as amended in 1958, within the period prescribed. He tiled an objection after the expiry of the period, but the consolidation authorities did not condone the delay with the result that the objection was rejected on the ground of limitation. The consolidation authorities, therefore, allotted a chak to Smt. Janki. 3. It was after the issue of the notification under Section 52 of the Act that Om Prakash instituted the present suit for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants opposite parties, namely, Smt. Janki and others, from transferring or in any way damaging the properties detailed at the bottom of the plaint, which belonged to Lachhman Prasad deceased and which are according to the plaintiff, in his possession as the adopted son of Lachhman Prasad and of which he is the owner as such. The properties in dispute consisted of two houses, one Gher and Bhumidhari plots. 4. The defendants contested the suit and denied the rights of the plaintiff, his being the adopted son of Lachhman Prasad and Smt. Janki and of his having any right in the properties in dispute. It was further pleaded that Section 49 of the Act as a bar to the maintainability of the suit as far as the Bhumidhari land was concerned. It was further pleaded that Section 49 of the Act as a bar to the maintainability of the suit as far as the Bhumidhari land was concerned. The Munsif framed issue No. 2 as below: "Whether the suit is barred by Section 49 C. H. Act ?" and as already mentioned above, has decided this issue against the plain tiff, in other words, he recorded the finding that the present suit with regard to Bhumidhari and was not maintainable and the plaint deserved to be struck off to this extent. It was for this reason that an opportunity was given to the plaintiff to have the plaint suitably amended by deleting unnecessary pleas and reliefs. 5. Three points have been urged before me: firstly, Section 49 of the Act places a bar on the entertainment of a suit till the issue of the notification under Section 32 of the Act, and not to a suit instituted after the issue of such a notification; secondly, the proceedings conducted by the consolidation authorities are of the nature of mutation proceedings governed by the provisions of the U. P. Land Revenue Act, and consequently Section 49 is no bar to the maintenance of the present suit; and thirdly the compromise decree was binding upon Smt. Janki and also upon her transferees and the effect of this decree could not be taken away with the result that whatever the decision of the consolidation operations may be the plaintiff could assert his rights on the basis of that decree. 6. In this connection it was also mentioned that the plaintiff was not trying to disturb the chak allotted to Smt. Janki. What he wanted was that she may remain in possession of the land during her life-time, but should not transfer the land to anyone. 7. The present suit was instituted prior to the amendment of the Act under the Amending Act of 1963. Reference shall, therefore, be made to the Act as in force in 1962; The material part of Section 49 runs as below: "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure holders in respect of land lying in an area, for which a declaration has been issued under Section 4, . . . . . . . shall be done in accordance with the provisions of this Act and no civil or revenue court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act." 8. A notification under Sec 4 of the Act is issued whenever the State Government decides to start consolidation operations in a district or part thereof. It was, therefore, contended that the land with regard to which the bar is imposed by Section 49 of the Act continues to be such land only for the period the declaration under Section 4 remains in force, and not after the close of consolidation operations, that is, after the issue of the notification under Section 52 of the Act. If a narrow view, as suggested by the learned Advocate for the applicant, is accepted, it would mean that the bar imposed by Section 49 shall be for a very short period, and not for the total period ending with the issue of the notification under Section 52 of the Act. The declaration under Section 4 is made whenever the State Government decides to start consolidation operations. Once the consolidation operations have started, it cannot be said that at subsequent stages the consolidation operations, are still at the starting stage. Starting stage is when steps for the preparation of village maps and records are taken, and not after the village records have been revised and objections invited under Section 9. If the contention of the learned Advocate is accepted, Section 49 shall become ineffective and such could not be the intention of the legislature. It is true that what the learned Advocate has contended is that the bar of Section 49 remains up to the issue of the notification under Section 52 of the Act, but if this contention could be accepted, it would mean that the bar remains at the starting stage only which could not include the subsequent stages of consolidation operations ending With the issue of the notification under Section 52. 9. The wording of Section 49 of the Act makes it clear that the words for which a declaration has been issued tinder Section 4" qualify the area and hence the land contemplated by Section 49. 9. The wording of Section 49 of the Act makes it clear that the words for which a declaration has been issued tinder Section 4" qualify the area and hence the land contemplated by Section 49. Once the declaration under Section 4 has been issued, the area for which the declaration has been made becomes the area to which the bar of Sec 49 shall apply. In case the intention of the legislature was to place a bar to the jurisdiction of the civil and revenue courts for the period ending with the close of consolidation operations, Section 49 would have been worded differently. It shall be found that Section 49 has been worded generally to govern all the suits whether instituted before the close of consolidation operations or thereafter. Further, as already mentioned above, reference to the declaration under Section 4 was made not for laying down the period for which the bar placed by section shall remain in force but to define the land to which the bar shall be applicable. 10. The. bar imposed by Section -19 of the Act shall thus apply to suits with respect to rights in such land (as observed in the full Bench case of Dalel v. Baroo, 1963 A.L.J. 265 to suits involving the question of title) irrespective of whether the suit was instituted before or after the close of consolidation operations, that is, the issue of the notification under Section 52 of the Act. No relief of injunction can be granted to a party having no right or title to the property. Consequently the present suit was, in substance, for declaration of rights also. By merely asking for injunction the plaintiff cannot get over the provisions of the law. When a suit for declaration is not maintainable, no injunction can be granted; and hence no shit for injunction shall be maintainable, and even if entertained, no injunction shall be granted. 11. The contention of the learned Advocate for the applicant on the second point is based upon the assumption that the proceedings under Sees. 7 to 11-B of the Act arc akin to mutation proceedings under the U. P. Land Revenue Act, and are not for adjudication of the rights and title of the parties. 11. The contention of the learned Advocate for the applicant on the second point is based upon the assumption that the proceedings under Sees. 7 to 11-B of the Act arc akin to mutation proceedings under the U. P. Land Revenue Act, and are not for adjudication of the rights and title of the parties. In case the rights and title of the parties were not adjudicated upon during the consolidation operations, they could be decided in a regular suit or proceeding during or after the console elation operations and Sec, 49 of the Act would not. bar the maintainability of a suit for declaration, possession or injunction. However, a consideration of Section 9 of the Act shall make it clear that objections invited under Section 9(1) are not only to challenge the entry of possession but also the right or title as entered in the revised village records. The objection under Section 9 thus takes the place of not only a mutation proceeding but also a regular suit under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. When the rights of the parties are also adjudicated upon during the consolidation operations, a similar question cannot be raised in a suit instituted before the regular courts and Section 49 would be a bar to the maintainability of such a suit or proceeding. 12. For the due interpretation of the provisions of the Act as amended in 1958 we shall have to determine what the law was before the amendment, which mischiefs were sought to be remedied, how the mischiefs were remedied, and what are the provisions of the amended Act? The Act was amended in 1958 chiefly because the Bhumidhari. question ceased to be a question of title and disputes with regard to Bhumidhari land could, thereafter, be decided by the revenue courts and such suits were taken away from the jurisdiction of the civil courts. Prior to the amendments made in 1958 disputes pertaining to Bhumidhari rights were referred to the Civil Judge for decision in accordance with the law. The revision of village records could not be kept pending till the decision of the Civil Court. Prior to the amendments made in 1958 disputes pertaining to Bhumidhari rights were referred to the Civil Judge for decision in accordance with the law. The revision of village records could not be kept pending till the decision of the Civil Court. This is why the proceedings under Sections 8 and 9 of the then Act were akin to mutation proceedings under the U. P. Land Revenue Act while the proceeding tinder Sec, 12 akin to regular suits under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Under the then Section 7, the Assistant Consolidation Officer had to examine and test the accuracy of the village map, khasra and the current annual Registers by making a Portal. Thereafter he had to submit a report under the then Section 8(l) to the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in the form and manner prescribed, regarding correctness of the existing maps and records and the necessity, if any, of revision of such maps and records. On receipt of the orders of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation), it was necessary for the Assistant Consolidation Officer to correct the map or the entries in the Annual Register in accordance with the procedure to be prescribed. This was done tinder sub-Sec. (3) of Sec, 8. Any person aggrieved by the order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer under sub-Sec. (3) could, within 21 clays of the order, appeal to the consolidation Officer whose decision was except as otherwise provided by or under the Act, final. The appeal at this stage was thus regarding the correctness of the existing maps and records. 13. The Statement prepared under the then Section 11 of the Act was to contain the particulars prescribed therein, and it was to be published in the village along with a notice calling upon all persons interested to file objections, if any, disputing the correctness or nature of the entry in the statement or pointing out any omission therefrom. An objection disputing the nature of the entry could thus be filed under the then Section 12 (1) of the Act, though such a question could not be raised in the appeal under the then Section 8 (4) of the Act. 14. An objection disputing the nature of the entry could thus be filed under the then Section 12 (1) of the Act, though such a question could not be raised in the appeal under the then Section 8 (4) of the Act. 14. To avoid repetition it may here be mentioned that an objection which could be filed under Sec 9 of the Act as amended in 19558 pertains to the correctness or the nature of the entries in the extracts and point-in-out any omission therefrom. The objection under Section 9 could therefore pertain to all the points which could be raised in an appeal udder the old Section 8 (4) and in the objection under old Section 12 (1) of the Act. 15. The other provisions of the Act as they existed prior to the amendments made in 1958 also make it clear that the question of title was at every stage decided by the Civil Judge, though after reference to the arbitrator, and other questions not amounting to a question of title, by the consolidation authorities. This can be summarised by saying that matters which were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil court were to be decided by the Civil Judge, and the others by the consolidation authorities. 16. After the amendment of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Re. forms Act in 1958, all the disputes with regard to agricultural land were taken away from the jurisdiction of the Civil court and thereafter suits pertaining to Bhumidhari land, or where the status of a Bhumidhari was claimed, fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the revenue court. When Bhumidhari question could be decided by the revenue court and not by the civil Court, it naturally became necessary to amend the Act. When it was not necessary to refer the question of Bhumidhari to the Civil Judge, the legislature could make a provision that disputes with regard to possession and also title shall be decided together so that there may be no unusual delay in the completion of the consolidation operations. This is why Section 9 was so drafted that objections which could be raised at two stage under old Section 8 (4) and 12 (1) could thereafter be raised together at the stage of Section 9 of the Act as amended in 1958. 17. This is why Section 9 was so drafted that objections which could be raised at two stage under old Section 8 (4) and 12 (1) could thereafter be raised together at the stage of Section 9 of the Act as amended in 1958. 17. Prior to the amendment of the Act in 1958 the consolidation authorities were adjudicating upon the rights and title (other than question of title) of the parties. It never became necessary to take away this power from the consolidation authorities. The provisions of the amended Act also make it clear that questions pertaining to title could continue to be decided by the consolidation authorities. In this view of the matter also, Section 9, which has been drafted on the lines of old Sections 0, 11 and 12, can be given a similar meaning, namely, that an objection pertaining to right and title can also be raised in the objection under Section 9 of the Act as amended in 1958. 18. In other words, the proceeding under Section 9 of the Act is not a pure and simple mutation proceeding under the U. P. Land Revenue Act. It is, in substance, and for all practical purposes a regular proceeding under the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. If a trespasser or a person having no right or title is found in possession, he can at the appropriate stage be dispossessed from such land.' In this view of the matter, Section 49 of the Act shall be a bar to the maintainability of a regular suit for declaration and possession unless the cause of action had accrued at a time when no action could be taken by the aggrieved party under the provisions of the Act. Similarly a suit for injunction shall not be maintainable, and even if entertained, no injunction can be granted. 19. It is a settled law that a finding recorded in a suit between the parties loses its binding character in case in. a subsequent suit no plea of res judicata is raised and the Courts of law record a contrary finding. Thereafter it is the subsequent decision which is binding on the parties and the previous finding becomes a waste paper. a subsequent suit no plea of res judicata is raised and the Courts of law record a contrary finding. Thereafter it is the subsequent decision which is binding on the parties and the previous finding becomes a waste paper. The same can be said of a compromise decree obtained before the consolidation operations: this decree ceased to be effective as a result of the applicant not preferring an objection under Section 9 of the Act within the period prescribed. In the instant case, the plaintiff has not applied for the execution of the compromise decree. Instead, he has instituted a regular suit which is barred by the provisions of Section 49 of the Act. On this ground the case of Smt. Rama Kuar v. Jangi, 1964 A.L.J. 718 can be distinguished. The matter can naturally be reconsidered if the plaintiff ever applies for the execution of the compromise decree. 20. A relief for injunction cannot be granted to a party out of possession. The plaintiff had pleaded in the plaint to be in possession of the agricultural land, but what was mentioned before this court was that he (plaintiff) did not wish to disturb the chak of Smt. Janki, which would mean her possession. 21. The Courts of law cannot be unduly guided by the motive of the plaintiff. His intention may be to safe-guard the property so that he may get it on the death of his adoptive mother; but a suit has to be decided in accordance with the law and if a part of the suit is not maintainable, this part shall have to be disregarded in spite of the pious or laudable intention of the plaintiff. 22. To sum of, the present suit with regard to the agricultural land was not maintainable and even if maintainable, could not be decreed. In the circumstances, this court can refuse to exercise the revisional jurisdiction. 23. The revision is hereby dismissed with costs. Stay order is vacated.