JUDGMENT 1. ON the 31st day of March 1947 the said Pacific Bank was wound up. On the 10th day of March 1949 the Banking companies Act came into force. On the 3rd day of April 1951 an application was made inter alia, against Raghubar narayan Singh the Managing Director of the Company. In 1953 an act was passed amending the Banking Companies act, 1949. On the 23rd day of december 1955 Raghubar Narayan Singh was jointly and severally directed to pay a total sum of Rs. 4,97,000/ -. 2. ON or about 27th day of August 1957 an order was made under section 45-H (2) of the said Act for the attachment, of immovable properties of the respondent situate in Monghyr and the sheriff of Calcutta was directed to send the Writ of attachment to the court of the District Judge of Monghyr for examination against the said raghubar Narayan Singh. On or about the 12th day of April 1958, the immovable properties were attached. The attachment is still continuing. Thereafter, similar application for attachment of other properties was made and attachment was effected. On or about the 21st December 1960 an appeal filed by Mr, Singh was dismissed. He made an application for leave to appeal to Supreme Court of india without success. His application for special leave to the Supreme Court was also dismissed on 29th day of august 1961. 3. ON the 8th day of August 1962 this application was made to the winding up Court for an order for sale of the properties attached at Monghyr under section 45-H by the Sheriff of calcutta or alternatively direction be given to the District Judge, Monghyr for the sale of the properties or alternatively a receiver be appointed to sell the attached properties and other directions. 4. RAGHUBAR Narayan Singh in his affidavit in opposition resisted the application on inter alia the ground that the Banking Companies (Amendment)Act, 1955 which came into force on the 30th day of December 1953 had no retrospective effect, that the order dated 27th August 1959 under section 45-H was without jurisdiction for the same is not applicable and that this Court has no jurisdiction to direct the sale of the attached properties for they are not only situate outside the said jurisdiction but also in a different State. He also asserted that attached properties are the subject-matter of a trust created on the 7th day of January 1937. Raghubar Singh also opposed the application on the ground that there was no tabular statement and there was no notice under the rule 22 of order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code, 5. IN these circumstances, Mr. Siddhartha Ray and following him Mr. Mitra, his junior, submitted that this court has no jur. 'sdiction to direct or order the sale of the properties under attachment. In order to support this contention reliance was placed on several sections of the Banking companies Act, 1949, as amended, including section 45-T. On the other hand, it was strenuously urged by Mr. B. Das, learned counsel appearing for the Bank that in view of the provisions of section 45-B the High Court is competent to make the order for sale. 6. THERE are two well-defined stages in any proceeding in a Court of Law. An applicant or applicants who seek certain reliefs are more often resisted by an opposite party or parties. This calls for a decision or decisions by the Court. This decision is embodied either in a decree or an order. This jurisdiction of the Court to entertain, try and decide is defined generally by the Civil procedure Code. In the case of the High court it is controlled by the Letters patent. In some cases special jurisdictions are vested under Special Acts. It is at this point of time when an order is made that the first stage is complete. Once the decree or order is made, the second stage commences. The decree or order more often has to be enforced through the machinery of the court. The jurisdiction as to execution is governed generally by the Civil procedure Code. There may again be special Acts providing for Special modes and manner of execution. 7. SECTION 45a does not take away the jurisdiction of the other Courts, or divest them of their jurisdiction in all matters and confer exclusive jurisdiction to the High Court in all matters. It only provides that where there are provisions which are inconsistent with the provisions made in the Banking companies Act those provisions of the civil Procedure Code or Code of criminal Procedure or Companies Act, 1958 must yield to the same. It only provides that where there are provisions which are inconsistent with the provisions made in the Banking companies Act those provisions of the civil Procedure Code or Code of criminal Procedure or Companies Act, 1958 must yield to the same. Hence it does not take away the jurisdiction of all courts for all purposes. 8. SECTION 45b confers extensive exclusive jurisdiction to the High Court. Section 45b however is not ultimate in its scope. It must refer to a claim made by or against banking company. It however is not confined to claims only. It also includes question of priorities. It does not end there. It also refers to any other question whatsoever whether of law or fact. This subject-matter must however relate or arise in the course of winding up of a banking company or under section 391 of the companies Act, 1956. 9. ONCE these two conditions are satisfied, section 45b comes into play whether such claim or question has arisen or arises or the application has been or is made before or after the date of the order of winding up of the banking company or before or after the commencement of the Banking Companies act. 10. HENCE, it is crystal clear that claims, question of priorities or any other questions whatsoever whether of law or fact which arises before the stage of execution fall directly within its ambit. It is however debatable whether section 45b attracts claims or questions of priorities or any other question whatsoever whether of law or fact which arise at the stage of execution and or in execution of the order made under this Act. The language of section 45b does not put any limitation. Consequently, it suggests that the High court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide claims, questions of priorities and any other questions whether of law or fact whether they arise before the order is made pr after the order is made. In the case of (1) Sri ramnarayan v. S. B. and I. Company, reported in A. I. R. 1956 S. C. 614, this section came for consideration. In the case of (1) Sri ramnarayan v. S. B. and I. Company, reported in A. I. R. 1956 S. C. 614, this section came for consideration. His lordship Jagannath Das of the Supreme court who delivered the judgment after quoting section 45b observed as followa : -"there has been some faint argument before us that the questions that arise in execution in this case and particularly the question relating to attachment which has been effected by the Bombay High court, are not questions which fall within the scope of section 45b. In my opinion, this contention is so obviously untenable, in view of the very wide and comprehensive language of the section that it requires no more to be mentioned and rejected. " the next point for consideration is whether section 45b is wide enough to embrarce and include a simple application for execution. Section 45b does not divest the other courts of their jurisdiction to execute in a proper case the orders of the high Court, and does not confer exclusive jurisdiction to execute its orders-irrespective of. the ordinary manner of execution laid down in the Civil procedure Code and/or its rules. Hence, in the absence of any other provision in the Act itself execution will be governed by the Civil Procedure Code in cases where the controversies do not attract section 45b find if it does, the matters which are outside the ambit of section 45b will be governed by the Civil procedure Code. If that be the true position, as it is, in my opinion, the High court is incompetent to make an order for sale of the immovable properties situate outside original jurisdiction. 11. THERE are however special provisions in the Act itself which require consideration before a firm view is enforced. Clause 6 of section 45d, clause 1 of section 45t and clause 2 of section 45t are special provisions. Clause 6 of section 45d suggests that the order of the high Court is executable in courts other than the High Court. 11. THERE are however special provisions in the Act itself which require consideration before a firm view is enforced. Clause 6 of section 45d, clause 1 of section 45t and clause 2 of section 45t are special provisions. Clause 6 of section 45d suggests that the order of the high Court is executable in courts other than the High Court. Clause 1 of section 45t clearly suggests that the order made by the High Court in this act are enforceable in a proper case in courts other than the High Court, It is difficult to explain the presence of clause 6 of section 45d, clauses 1 and 2 of section 45t in the Act if the legislature meant to confer exclusive jurisdiction in execution to the High Court under section 45b of the Act. The last paragraph of section 45h which contains only the power of attachment also to my mind suggests that the Civil procedure Code is otherwise applicable in execution including proceeds for sale of the attached properties. Hence, the provisions of the Act support the conclusion already arrived at. 12. THIS question arose in 1951 before the amendment of 1953 in (2)Bharati Central Bank Limited v. Rathindra, 54 C. W. N. 975 where a bench of the high Court held that according to the rules of construction, section 45h (same as clause 1 of section 45t of the present Act) was an exception to sections 45a and 45b and section 11 (the forerunner of section 45c) and makes special provisions for the enforcement of the orders. Hence, according to this decision execution matters or jurisdiction relating to execution do hot fall within the ambit of section 45b. In (3)Dhakuria Banking Corporation Limited v. Surabala Debi, reported in 57 C. W. N. 445, Mukherji, J. expressed a discordant note by indicating that according to him section 45h is not an exception to sees. 45a, 45b and sec. 11 and does not make any special provisions for enforcement of the orders. He however held that section 45h which is the same as clause 1 of section 45t in the present act only lays down that modes of execution open to in the High Court, mr. Justice Bachawat in (4) re. 45a, 45b and sec. 11 and does not make any special provisions for enforcement of the orders. He however held that section 45h which is the same as clause 1 of section 45t in the present act only lays down that modes of execution open to in the High Court, mr. Justice Bachawat in (4) re. Dhakuria banking Corporation Ltd. 58 C. W. N 641 held inter alia that sections 45a and 45b of the Banking Companies Act, 1949 as amended by the Act of 1950 and section 11 of the Act of 1950 standing by themselves did not give the High Court exclusive powers to enforce its decree and orders. Also, in my view section 45h did not create an exception to section 45 and section 45b. Section 45h did not say how decrees passed under sections 45a and 45b were to be enforced. Section 45h merely provided that orders were to be executed in the same manner in which decrees could be enforced. If sections 45a and 45b vested in the High Court exclusive jurisdiction to enforce its decrees, sec. 45h could not vest in other courts jurisdiction enforce it and if the other courts had no jurisdiction to execute decrees passed under section 45a and section 45b section 45h could not give other coutrts jurisdiction to enforce its order passed under sections 45a and 45b. The comments of P. B. Mukharji, J. on that decision made by him in the matter of dharkuria Banking Corporation limited v. Surabala Debi and ors., (supra), are therefore, jusitified. But my learned brother in the last mentioned case also assumed that the jurisdiction of other courts to execute the decree had been taken away by section 45a and section 45b of the Act as it stood before 1953 (Amendment) Act. That assumption was based upon the observation in (2) Bharati Central Bank Limited v. Rathindra, reported in 54 C. W. N. 975 but I am unable to agree with this observation. " the decision in Bharati Central bank Limited, (supra) and the second decision in Dhakuria Banking corporation Limited, (supra), fortify my conclusion though the reasons are not identical. That assumption was based upon the observation in (2) Bharati Central Bank Limited v. Rathindra, reported in 54 C. W. N. 975 but I am unable to agree with this observation. " the decision in Bharati Central bank Limited, (supra) and the second decision in Dhakuria Banking corporation Limited, (supra), fortify my conclusion though the reasons are not identical. Hence, I have no hesitation in holding that though the High Court is the only court to decide the claim or claims, question of priorities and any other question of law and fact the High Court has not been conferred exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the orders in execution. Therefore, the High Court cannot entertain an application for a sale of immovable properties situate outside the jurisdiction and direct the sale of the same" whether it has been attached under section 45h or not. 13. IT was strenuously urged on behalf of the Official Liquidator, the applicant, that the word 'claims' in section 15b is wide enough to include a simple application in. execution for it is nothing but a claim by the holder of the order to execute the order against a property or a sum of money. 14. IN my opinion a claim ends and ripens into a legal enforceable right through the machinery of the Courts upon adjudication by the court. It is formally embodied in an order. In any event the provisions contained in 45d, clause (6) of 45h and in particular 45t militate against such an wide construction. Hence, the word 'claim' does not bear such an extensive meaning in this act. Mr. Ray secondly submitted that the High Court had no jurisdiction to attach on or about the 27th day of august 1957 the immovable properties of the respondent, under section 45h of the Banking Companies Act, which was incorporated by amendment in 1953 for in this matter the application under section 235 was made as far back as april 3, 1951. 15. THE Banking Companies Act, 1949 did not originally contain. Part 3a, that is to say sections 45a to 45x, the special provisions for the speedy disposal of the winding up proceedings. Part IIIA including sections 45a to 45x was incorporated in the Banking companies Act, 1949 by the amending act of 1953. 15. THE Banking Companies Act, 1949 did not originally contain. Part 3a, that is to say sections 45a to 45x, the special provisions for the speedy disposal of the winding up proceedings. Part IIIA including sections 45a to 45x was incorporated in the Banking companies Act, 1949 by the amending act of 1953. Therefore, it is clear from the facts that the application under section 235 was made in this case long before the relative provisions of the Banking companies Act, to wit sections 45a to 45x including section 45h had been enacted. Hence, the intention of the legislature would determine whether the banking Companies Act in particular section 45h is applicable to such a case or not. 16. IT is one of the established principles of construction that there is a presumption that no legislation regarding substantive right is retrospective unless the statute gives retrospective effect by express words or by necessary implication and further the retrospective operation even in such a case will be limited only to the extent to which it has been so made by express words or by necessary implication. It is equally established that in the case of the construction of the procedural or adjective law it is prima facie construed as retrospective. See Maxwell on Interpretation of statute, 9th edition, pages 223, 229 and 232, 2nd edition, 31 Halsburys Laws of england, page 516, article 71. (5)Suburban Bank v. Nisturan, 58 C. W. N. 676, (6) Mahadeolal v. Administrator general of West Bengal, A. I. R. 1960 cat 936. It is equally well-settled that curtailment or abridgment of the extent of the right of appeal is not procedural but affect substantive rights. (7) State of Bombay v. Messrs. S. G. Films Exhange, A. I. R. 1960 S. C. 980. In my opinion, the expansion or alteration of the rights of appeal is also not procedural for it affects vested rights of the respondent. 17. THEREFORE, keeping these principles in mind it is necessary to consider whether section 45h affected substantive law embodied in section 235 or affected only the procedural law. 18. SECTION 235 applied to past directors. Section 45h does not. Section 235 did not provide for joint and several liability of the delinquent directors and/or officers. Sec. 45h makes the liability of such persons joint and several. The right of appeal under section 235 was governed by the Civil procedure Code. 18. SECTION 235 applied to past directors. Section 45h does not. Section 235 did not provide for joint and several liability of the delinquent directors and/or officers. Sec. 45h makes the liability of such persons joint and several. The right of appeal under section 235 was governed by the Civil procedure Code. The right of appeal under section 45h is governed by the section 45w. Hence on these grounds section 45h clearly affected substantive rights. Section 235 requires the official Liquidator to prove the case, section 45h requires the Official liquidator to prove a prima facie case of the respondents who are liable unless they can displace the prima facie case. 19. SECTION 235 does not enable the High Court to attach properties outside the jurisdiction. Section 45 on the other hand empowers the High court to attach properties outside the jurisdiction at any stage of the proceedings before or after the order. Hence taking the most favourable of view these provisions they affect procedural law. Therefore section 45h affects both substantive and procedural law. 20. IN my opinion when both substantive rights as well as procedural rights are affected simultaneously by a section it should be considered as a whole prospective for the procedure is consequential to the altered substantive rights and are not independent of them. Hence, in this view of the matter there could not be any attachment under section 45h of the Act. 21. THERE is another way of gathering the intention of the legislature. 22. THE words 'is made' in the clause "when an application is made to the High Court" suggest that it has prospective effect. Therefore, it does not refer to the application pending at the material time in 1953 under section 235. There is still another way of looking at the matter. "in general, where the law is altered during the pendency of an action the rights of the parties are decided according to law as it existed when the action was begun, unless the new Statute shows clear intention to vary such rights". As per maxwell on Interpretation of Statute 9th edition, page 229. See also (8) Ramprosad Shib v. Sanatan Ghosh, reported in 95 C. L. J. 236. In my opinion in the present case the Statute does not show clear intention to vary such rights. 23. As per maxwell on Interpretation of Statute 9th edition, page 229. See also (8) Ramprosad Shib v. Sanatan Ghosh, reported in 95 C. L. J. 236. In my opinion in the present case the Statute does not show clear intention to vary such rights. 23. THEREFORE, on these considerations section 45h is not retrospective but prospective and consequently the high Court had no jurisdiction to levy attachment and cannot sell the same. The attachment and sale, if any made would be without jurisdiction and a nullity. In (4) re: Dhakuria Banking corpn. Ltd. 58 C. W. N. 641. 24. MR. Das, learned counsel appearing for the Official Liquidator in order to dissuade from arriving at the above conclusion relied strongly upon section 14 of this Banking Companies (Amendment) Act, 95 of 1956, section 14. The principal Act shall be further amended in the manner specfied in the Schedule, provided that the amendments specified in the schedule relating to section 2 and to the sections contained in Part III and Part IIIA of he principal Act shall not apply to banking company the winding up of which commenced before the 1st day of April 1956 and the proivsions of the principal Act shall apply to such banking company as of the amendments aforesaid had not been made, Section 14 of the Amending act 01 1956 does not, keeping in view the same rules of construction expressly or by necessary implication do what the Legislature had not done by the amending Act of 1953 that is to say doe not for the first time give retrospective effect of the amendments made in 1953 to an application made before the amendment of 1953. Section 14 is directed against orders made under section 235 after the amendment of 1953. 25. IN this case, the application was filed long before 1953. Section 14 cannot make any difference to the legal position. The change in the procedural law as to burder. of proof is a consequential adjunct of the change in the visited rights brought about by section 45h Consequently, in my opinion, attachment made under section 45h was void in this particular case. 26. MR. Siddharta Roy, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the immovable properties are not liable to attachment or sale for the properties are trust properties. This was controverted on behalf of the official Liquidator. 26. MR. Siddharta Roy, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the immovable properties are not liable to attachment or sale for the properties are trust properties. This was controverted on behalf of the official Liquidator. Hence in my opinion, a claim arose in execution which this Court and this Court only can decide. It will be noticed thai the trustees are not parties in this application. It is, however, necessary to go into the question of facts on the materials before me. On the materials before me, it appears that on 7th January 1937, Rai bahadur Dilip Singh and his son the respondent executed a deed of trust in respect of certain immovable properties and securities and appointed Rai bahadur Dilip Singh as a trustee thereof. In 1948 there was a family arrangement and or deed of partition by which or under which the joint family properties including the properties which was the subject-matter of the said trust dated 7th January 1937 were dealt with. On the 22nd December 1958 in Title suit Nos. 24 of 1958 and 36 of 1958 it was declared by a competent Court that the family arrangement did not affect the said trust dated 7th January 1937 and the said trust subsisted. Hence, on these facts prima facie the said immovable properties are not liable to attachment. It was however contended on behalf of the applicant that no particulars of the said mortgage deed and/or the properties covered by it are given in the petition and the terms of the said deed of trust have not been set out. The trust deed has not been annexed in the petition nor did the respondent crave leave to refer to the same in the affidavit-in-opposition. Moreover, they did not annex the copy of the said decree declaring the validity of the trust deed in December 1958 and even did not claim reference to the same. Moreover, the respondent in his public examination had admitted that the trust deed had been revoked. In the decree made in December 1958 the Official liquidator was not a party. The said suit was filed by one of the wives of the respondents after an order under section 235 had been made for payment of a sum of over rupees four lakhs against the respondents. In the decree made in December 1958 the Official liquidator was not a party. The said suit was filed by one of the wives of the respondents after an order under section 235 had been made for payment of a sum of over rupees four lakhs against the respondents. Hence, the onus of proving that the properties are trust properties has not been in my opinion discharged and consequently respondent fails on this ground. 27. MR. Siddharta Roy further submitted in the alternative that in the case it is held that the properties are not trust properties, it is obvious that the interest of the respondent who is a member of an undivided Hindu joint family governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law cannot be attached in execution. 28. IT will be noticed firstly that there is no averment that the properties were governed by the Mitakshara school of Hindu Law. It again does not appear from the petition whether the properties were joint family properties or they were the separate properties in distinct share of Rai Bahadur dilip Singh and his son the respondent. Hence, this plea should not be allowed to be taken at this stage when it had not been indicated in the opposition. Assuming however, that the properties belonged to a Hindu joint family governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law, it is to be considered whether such properties can be attached. It seems from the decision that the High Court of calcutta has held that such undivided interest cannot be attached in execution of a decree against him. This is binding on me. It may, however, be noted that the Madras High Court has held in the case of (9) Shummugam v. Raylee Ayyar, reported in A. I. R. 1942 madras 97 that the prorata intertest of a member of Hindu joint family governed by Mitakshara School in the properties of the joint fmaily is liable to be attached. In the result, in my opinion, no order can be passed for the sale of the attached properties by the High Court for reasons already given. The application is dismissed. I do not express any view on the two questions relating to procedure raised on the assumption that the High court has jurisdiction to direct the sale of the attached properties. Certified for two Counsel. The application is dismissed. I do not express any view on the two questions relating to procedure raised on the assumption that the High court has jurisdiction to direct the sale of the attached properties. Certified for two Counsel. The Official Liquidator will retain the costs out of the assets in his hands.