JUDGMENT V.P. Gopalan Nambiar, J. 1. The petitioner seeks to quash an order Ex. P-2, passed by the 2nd respondent, the Appellate Controller of Estate Duty, dismissing the appeal preferred by the petitioner as time-barred. The facts and circumstances which resulted in this order are as follows: 2. On the death of the petitioner's father, his estate was assessed to estate duty for a sum of Rs. 41,183. The petitioner's share out of this amount was fixed at Rs. 3,581 and a demand notice to pay up the said amount was issued to the petitioner on 14th November 1962. Against this notice of demand, the petitioner filed an appeal to the 2nd respondent on 11th February 1963. It is admitted that the appeal was out of time, having been filed more than 30 days from the date of receipt of the demand notice. The appeal was accompanied by a petition for condonation of delay and also a medical certificate from the Assistant Surgeon, Palghat. The appeal was disposed of by Ex. P-2 order which runs as follows: " Appellate order The appeal appears to be out of time for more than 2 months. The delay is attributed to the illness of the accountable person. I do not think that this can be considered as a valid reason for inordinate delay in the submission of the appeal petition. I am therefore, unable to condone the delay in the submission of the appeal petition which is rejected accordingly. 2. In the result the appeal is dismissed as time-barred (Sd.) P.K.SINHA, Appellate Controller of Estate Duty, New Delhi (Camp Calcutta) A perusal of Ex. P-2 is sufficient to show that the 2nd respondent has not exercised his discretion at all in considering and dismissing the appeal. That illness is not a ground to excuse delay, is a proposition which cannot be sustained, and counsel for the respondents has not sought to sustain the same. It was incumbent upon the 2nd respondent to consider the grounds urged in the application to excuse delay, supported as it was by a medical certificate. The 2nd respondent ought to have dealt with the case put forward by the petitioner for excusing delay on its merits and should have expressed his opinion thereon. Not having done so, there has been no exercise of discretion at all by the 2nd respondent, and I am obliged to quash Ex. P-2. The 2nd respondent ought to have dealt with the case put forward by the petitioner for excusing delay on its merits and should have expressed his opinion thereon. Not having done so, there has been no exercise of discretion at all by the 2nd respondent, and I am obliged to quash Ex. P-2. I do so. 3. In the counter-affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent it is stated that he was satisfied on the merits that there were no grounds to excuse delay. No value at all, can be attached to the same, as the deponent of the counter-affidavit is not the same as the one who passed the order Ex. P-2. 4. It is argued by counsel for respondent that against the order evidenced by Ex. P-2 there is a right of appeal to the petitioner under section 63, sub-section (1) of the Estate Duty Act, and that therefore this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained. Apart from the fact that this objection is not raised in the counter-affidavit, I am not disposed to entertain it. In the first place, the existence of an adequate alternative remedy need not always be a bar to proceedings under Article 226. In this particular case, as the 2nd respondent has totally failed to exercise his discretion in dealing with the appeal and the petition for condonation of delay, I am inclined to take the view that this petition under Article 226 is maintainable. 5. Again, it is somewhat doubtful whether against the order evidenced by Ex. P-2, the petitioner can be really said to have a right of appeal. Section 62, subsection (2) of the Estate Duty Act refers to the admission of an appeal which is presented beyond time. Then follows sub-clauses (3) and (4) which prescribe procedure for hearing of the appeal and the powers of the Appellate Controller in hearing the appeal. This is followed by sub­-clause (5) which refers to the order to be passed by the Appellate Controller on the appeal. 6. It is arguable that it is only an order passed after admission of the appeal that is appealable under section 63 (1). I do no express any final opinion on this point. But, it seems to me that this has to be taken into account in judging whether the petitioner could be said to have an adequate alternative remedy. 6. It is arguable that it is only an order passed after admission of the appeal that is appealable under section 63 (1). I do no express any final opinion on this point. But, it seems to me that this has to be taken into account in judging whether the petitioner could be said to have an adequate alternative remedy. I am not satisfied that he has. Even if he has, in the circumstances, I do not think that this petition under Article 226 is barred. 7. I therefore quash Ex. P-2 and direct the 2nd respondent to re-hear the appeal preferred to it by the petitioner on 11th February 1963 and the application for condonation of delay on their merits and pass appropriate orders. 8. The O.P. is allowed as above. There will be no order as to costs.