S. K. Kapur ( 1 ) THE present appeal is directed against the order of the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks dated the 21st November 1963. ( 2 ) MESSRS Great Electrical Engineering Work, Meerut City applied for registration of trade mark GEEW, to the Registrar of Trade Marks Under application No. 190,766 dated 17th June 1959. Gupta Engineering Works the appellant in this appeal filed an opposition under No. DEL 147 on the 24th July 1962. When the matter came up for hearing before the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks on the 21st November, 1963, Mr. K. G. Bansal, learned counsel for the appellant withdraw the opposition and the Assistant Registrar ordered that the Said opposition be treated as withdrawn and the said application be proceeded to registeration. " The appeal came up for hearings before Bedi, J. on the 27th November, 1964, and his Lordships passed the following order : "this case was called a few time, but no one has turned up for the appellant. It is therefore dismissed in default. "an application was made for restoration of the appeal and Mr. N. K. Annand, learned counsel for the respondents did not oppose the restoration though he did maintain that no case for restoration had been made out in the application. The appeal was restored by my order dated the 4th of March 1965 and I directed this appeal to be set down for hearing today. ( 3 ) MR. Brijbans Kishore learned counsel for the appellant submits that Mr. K. G. Bansal, Advocate, acted without authority in withdrawing the opposition and consequently the order of the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks is based on unauthorised withdrawal of opposition on behalf of the appellant. The appellant also moved an application under Section 97 (c) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act before the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, Delhi and one of the grounds taken in support of the application for review was that Mr. Bansal had no authority to withdraw the opposition. It is rather amazing that having made the application for review no one appeared on behalf of the appellant in support on behalf of the appellant in support of the application on the 16th of January 1965, the date fixed for hearing. Bansal had no authority to withdraw the opposition. It is rather amazing that having made the application for review no one appeared on behalf of the appellant in support on behalf of the appellant in support of the application on the 16th of January 1965, the date fixed for hearing. It is pointed outthat a request was made on behalf of the appellants counsel on the 15th of January 1965 for adjournment of the matter but since the request was declined no one appeared on that date without going into the merits of the question whether or not the request was properly declined by the Assistant Registrar. I must say that the appellant acted with extreme negligence in the matter. In dismissing the said application for review the learned Assistant Registrar of trade Marks observed that in the opposition proceedings the petitioners (opponants) were represented by Mr. K. G. Bansal, Advocate on the strength of the power of attorney duly executed in his favour. Such power of attorney authories and an advocate to become petitioner s agent for taking proceedings, and withdrawal of opposition, in my opinion, is one of the functions covered by this authorization. Accordingly Shri K. G. Bansall in withdrawing the opposition acted within the scope of authorization granted to him. If the Petitioner had given instructions to the Advocate not to withdraw the opposition he should have incorporated the same in the power of authorisation or specifically written about it to the Registry. ( 4 ) IN an opposition proceeding if a counsel acting on behalf of the opponent expresses a desire to withdraw the opposition the Tribunal in my view would be justified in treating the opposition as withdraw" Mr. Brijbans Kishore submits that the power delegated to a counsel to take opposition proceedings would not include the power either to withdraw the opposition or to compromise. Mr. Anand on the other hand points out that under section 123 of the Act any act required to be done before the Registrar by any person, may subject to the rules made in this behalf, be done instead of by that person himself by a person duly authorised in the prescribed manner (a) as legal practitioner, or (b) a person registered in the prescribed manner as a trade marks agent, or (e) a person in the sole and regular employment of the principal. Mr. Mr. Anand then draws my attention to rule 21 of the rules framed under the Act and points out that the authorisation of an agent for the purpose of section 123 of the Act is required to be in form T. M. 48. Mr. Bansal was authorised as has been pointed out by the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks in his order disposing of the review application, to take opposition proceedings. In my view the Assistant Registrar was right in holding that the power to take opposition praceedings would include the power to enter settlement er compromise by withdrawing the opposition proceedings. My attention has been invited to Mst. Bachni v. Kartar Singh where a number of authorities on the subject were discussed and it was held that even where there is a written authority given to a counsel in any cause or matter a power to the compromise can be implied even though not expressed in the written authority and that unless there is an authority to compromise is always there. In Boustead on agency 12th edition at page 65 it is stated.- "where counsel is employed to conduct a case, he has implied authority (1) to consent to a non-suit or to the withdrawal of authority; (2) to compromise or abandon the claims of his client, or give on under taking on his behalf, in respect of all matters within the scope of the suit or matter, but not in respect of anything beyond the scope thereof; (3) (4) To consent to an order; (5) Generally, to do all other things appertaining to the conduct of the Case according to his absolute discreation. Whether the withdrawal of opposition be treated as a compromise or as abandoning the claim of his client it would be, in my opinion, within the authority of the counsel. Mr. Anand, further points out that under section 23 of the Act where the application for registration has not been opposed and the time for notice of opposition has expired or where the application has been opposed and opposition has been decided in favour of the applicant the Registrar is bound unless Central Government otherwise directs to register the said trade mark in part (A) or part (B) of the register, as the case may be. Mr. Anand also points out that Mr. . Mr. Anand also points out that Mr. . Bansal not only withdraw the opposition but also withdraw the various documents filed with the Assistant Registrar. This statement of Mr. Anand has not been controverted at the bar. In the circumstances I am of the view that the Registrar was perfectly justified in passing the order he did. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.