JUDGMENT Gyanendra Kumar, J. - The applicant was a tenant of a portion of the house in question of which Smt. Ram Sumerni was the landlady. The complainant Bhagwat Saran is the son of Smt. Ram Sumerni afore said. The landlady obtained decree No. 540 of 1955 against the applicant from the court of the Munsif for his ejectment from the house. An appeal filed by the applicant in the court of the District Judge against the decree of the Munsif was also dismissed. The prosecution case is that in execution of the decree, the Court Amin P. W. 5 Uma Shanker delivered actual possession of the disputed premises to the complainant on 30-11-57 at about 11 A.M., with the aid of the Police. The complainant then put his lock on the house and went away. At about 4 P. M. that day the complainant learnt that the applicant had broken open his lock and had unlawfully trespassed into the house. Hence he went to the premises at about 5 P. M. and found the applicant and the members of his family actually in possession of the disputed portion of the house. The prosecution case further is that on a protest by the complainant the applicant threatened to assault him. 2. Inter alia, the main defence of the applicant was that actual delivery of possession had not been effected by the Amin nor was he evicted from the disputed premises; so there was no question of his reentry into the house, and the so-called delivery of possession of the house by the Civil Court Amin in execution of a Civil Court's decree was a mere paper transaction. 3. The Magistrate found the case under Section 448, I. P. C. fully established against the applicant, and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 150/- and in default to undergo one month's simple imprisonment. He further ordered that the property shall be redelivered to the complainant as provided by Section 522 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Feeling aggrieved against the above judgment and order the applicant went up in appeal before the Sessions Judge, who dismissed the same by his judgment dated 18-9-1964; hence this revision. 4. He further ordered that the property shall be redelivered to the complainant as provided by Section 522 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Feeling aggrieved against the above judgment and order the applicant went up in appeal before the Sessions Judge, who dismissed the same by his judgment dated 18-9-1964; hence this revision. 4. It is the admitted case of the parties now that the very next day of the dismissal of the appeal, i.e. on 19-9-64 Smt. Ram Sumerni had sold away the disputed premises to liar Piari Devi and three others, who are not parties to the present revision. 5. Sri R. K. Kakkar, learned counsel for the applicant, has vehemently argued that the proceedings for the so-called delivery of possession by the court Amin were mere paper transactions and the complainant had never taken actual possession nor had he put his lock on the house in question. Therefore the first thing that we have to determine is whether actual physical possession had been delivered by the Amin to the complainant or was it merely a formal or paper transaction as alleged by the applicant ? 6. On the record there are authentic documents to show that the proceedings relating to the delivery of possession of the house to the complainant in execution of the civil court decree were not a mere paper transaction or a formal affair. Ext. Ka. 3 is the certified copy of the dakhalnama executed by the complainant on 30-11-57, showing that he had acquired actual physical possession over the disputed house. Ext. Ka. 4 is the certified copy of the Amin's report about having delivered actual possession to the complainant. Ext. Ka. 2 is the copy of the Supurdnama executed by Brij Lal, uncle of the accused-applicant, evidencing that the house-hold chattels of the applicant had been entrusted to him (Brij Lal) when the house was got vacated by the court Amin. The original Supurrdnama was also thumb marked by the applicant's wife. Thus the documentary evidence is by itself sufficient to show that on 30-11-57 the Amin had actually delivered vacant possession of the premises to the complainant. 7. The original Supurrdnama was also thumb marked by the applicant's wife. Thus the documentary evidence is by itself sufficient to show that on 30-11-57 the Amin had actually delivered vacant possession of the premises to the complainant. 7. The oral evidence adduced by the complainant in support of his case consists of his own deposition and the statements of P. W. 2 Mool Chand, P. W. 3 Rameshwar Prasad (who lives in the close proximity of the disputed house) and P. W. 5 Ulna Shanker, Court Amin. P. Ws. 2, 3 and 5 aforesaid are independent and natural witnesses of the occurrence and there is no room to doubt their sworn testimony that there was not only actual physical delivery of possession effected by the Amin in favour of the complainant, but that the latter had also put his lock on the premises in question. It is true that in his cross-examination P. W. 2 Mool Chand had stated that nobody had placed any lock in his presence, although he had categorically stated in his examination-in chief that after taking possession through the Amin, the complainant had placed his lock on the house. The incident in question had occurred on 30-11-57, while the statement of Mool Chand was recorded about 3 years later. It might very well be that some of the facts and particulars of the,incident had been bedimmed by lapse of time. I t may also be that the actual placing of the lock by the complainant on the premises might not have happened in his presence. But he is quite certain that actual physical possession of the house had been delivered by the Amin to the complainant by removal of household goods therefrom. So far as P. W. 3 Rameshwar Prasad is concerned, he definitely states that the complainant had placed a lock on the vacant premises in question, after taking possession thereof from the Amin. As already observed above, this witness is a close neighbour and had every reason to be near the premises to watch and remember these details. The Court Amin also fully supports the prosecution case. 8. As already observed above, this witness is a close neighbour and had every reason to be near the premises to watch and remember these details. The Court Amin also fully supports the prosecution case. 8. On behalf of the defence, two witnesses D. W. 1 Satya Dev and D. W. 2 Kanhai Lal were produced to depose that it was Brij Lal and not the complainant, who was in actual possession of the disputed house as a tenant, and that the complainant had never acquired actual possession over the house in execution of the civil court's decree. But the courts below had rejected the defence evidence and very rightly, inasmuch as it was inconsistent with the authentic documentary evidence on record as well as the clear and convincing testimony of the prosecution witnesses and the over-all circumstances of the case. It may not be out of place to mention here that the aforesaid Brij Lal had himself instituted a suit for declaration that he was the real tenant in possession of the house in question. In that suit the landlady and the applicant were also arrayed as defendants. The suit was dismissed and it was held that Brij Lal was not the real tenant of the house, but it was the applicant who was the tenant thereof. In suit No. 540 of 1955 as well it had been clearly found that it was the applicant, who was the tenant in possession of the disputed house. 'Therefore there can be no speck of doubt that the complainant had been duly put in into actual physical possession of the premises in question, by the Amin in execution of the civil court decree on 30-11-57. 9. It is the complainant's own case that the applicant had forcibly reentered the premises later on, when the complainant was not present on the spot. Therefore the main question for decision in this revision is whether the applicant could be found guilty of an offence under Section 448, I, P. C. when he had entered the premises in the absence of the complainant, inasmuch as the same could not have been with the intent to intimidate, insult or annoy the absent complainant or his mother Smt. Ram Sumerni, who was the owner of the house. In support of his contention Mr. In support of his contention Mr. Kakker has placed reliance on the following cases: (1) Moti Lal v. Emperor through Kanhaiya Lal, 1925 A.L.J. 679 : AIR 1925 Allahabad 540, (2) Abdul Salam v. Rex, I.L.R. 1950 Alld. 163. 10. The facts of the first case were entirely different. The house belonged to a lady. On her death, it was claimed by K, a cousin of her late husband and by the accused to that case, who claimed to be their adopted son. The property was in occupation of a tenant, who after some litigation left the premises on 2-10-1924. Thereupon the accused had occupied and locked the house the same day in assertion of his title to the property. While setting aside the conviction of the accused, this Court had observed: "On the facts we have no doubt whatever that Motilal's (accused's) intention in doing the act complained of was to assert his title and gain and hold possession of the premises as against K." It was accordingly held that the object of the accused's entry into the premises could not be considered as being with intent to intimidate, insult or annoy the rival claimant K. but to assert his right and title to the property. Whereas, in the instant case, the right, title and interest of the parties had been finally determined in the two suits, the one instituted by the landlady and the other instituted by Brijlal, uncle of the accused-applicant. Thus there was no semblance of any right or claim left in the accused qua this house after the decree for ejectment had been passed by a competent civil court, which had been upheld by the District Judge in appeal. I have already held above that the actual physical possession of the premises had been lawfully delivered by the court Amin to the complainant, Therefore, the only object with which the applicant could have reentered the premises was to intimidate, insult or annoy the complainant and his mother Smt. Ram Sumerni, though they were not actually present on the spot at the time of re-entry. 11. In the second case cited above, M B. was the owner of the house, which she let out to A, who in his turn had sublet it to M, with the consent of the owner. 11. In the second case cited above, M B. was the owner of the house, which she let out to A, who in his turn had sublet it to M, with the consent of the owner. A and M subsequently vacated the house and went away to Pakistan, whereupon the house was locked up by the owner's Manager. The accused of that case then broke open the lock and entered into possession of the house. The arguments in that case were that the very fact that the accused had entered into the house after breaking open the owner's lock, he should be deemed to have intended to annoy the owner. Thereupon Mootham, J. (as he then was) observed: "It is unnecessary for me to answer this question, and I do not propose to do so. I desire only to accord myself from being understood to accept the view that has been ex pressed in certain cases, that because an accused person in a case under Section 941 must have known that the inevitable consequence of his act would be to cause annoyance to the person in possession it necessarily followed that he entered into possession with that intent." 12. In support of the above view, Mootham, J. had relied upon Motilal's case', which I have already held to be wholly distinguishable from the instant case. It may further be pointed out that Mootham, J. had himself observed, as quoted above, that it was unnecessary to answer the question posed before him. Therefore what followed thereafter was a mere obiter dicta. At any rate, Motilal's case' relied upon by Mootham, had entirely different facts and the question involved therein was also altogether different. Moreover, the authorities incorporated in Motilal's case' were explained and Abdul Salam's case was disapproved in subsequent decisions of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court. In this connection, reference may be made to the case of Smt. Subhag v. State through Hashmat Ali 1953 A.L.J. 673 : A.I.R. 1954 Alld. 193, in which a Division Bench of this Court referring to the 1950 case of Abdul Salanm expressed itself as under : "With great respect, we find it difficult to subscribe to that vies (taken by Mootham, J.). So long as the tenants were in occupation of the house, Mehr Bano was no doubt in constructive possession of the house through her tenants. So long as the tenants were in occupation of the house, Mehr Bano was no doubt in constructive possession of the house through her tenants. "But the moment the tenants left the house, and Mehr Bano's Manager put a lock on the house, the actual possession was with Mehr Bano. The fact that Mehr Bano did not actually come to live in the house will not matter. It was not necessary. The putting of a lock on the house was sufficient to show that she had full control of the house so as to attract provisions of Section 441 Penal Code. In deciding the above case Mootham, J. relied upon the case of Motilal reported in 'Motilal v. Emperor' . If we may say so with great respect the facts in Motilal's case' differed materially with the facts of the case of Abdul Salam." In Mathuri v. The State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 986, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed: "In order to establish that the entry on the property was with the intent to annoy, intimidate or insult, it is necessary for the Court to be satisfied that causing such annoyance, intimidation or insult was the aim of the entry; that it is not sufficient for that purpose to show merely that the natural consequence of the entry was likely to be annoyance, intimidation or insult, and that this likely consequence was known to the persons entering; that in deciding whether the aim of the entry was the causing of such annoyance, intimidation or insult, the, Court has to consider all the relevant circumstances including the presence of knowledge that its natural consequence would be such annoyance, intimidation or insult and including also the probability of some thing else than the causing of such intimidation, insult or annoyance being the dominant intention which prompted the entry." 13. The relevant facts in Mathuri's case were that the accused persons were armed with the warrant of execution for delivery of possession of certain immovable property, though the date for execution of the warrant had expired. The relevant facts in Mathuri's case were that the accused persons were armed with the warrant of execution for delivery of possession of certain immovable property, though the date for execution of the warrant had expired. Under the circumstances it might have been that the accused knew that annoyance would result when they went on land for taking possession; still it was reasonable to think that the intention which prompted and dominated their action was to execute the warrant, particularly when the accused could not be reasonably expected to know that the warrant had ceased to be executable in law. It was in those special circumstances that the Supreme Court held that criminal trespass was not committed or apprehended from the acts of the accused, inasmuch as they had entered the premises with a view to execute the warrant for delivery of possession, which was the dominant object, even though in its turn, it may have caused certain annoyance t the other party. In other words, the primary object was not to cause intimidation, insult or annoyance but was in fug the rance of any other object, such as, rival, claim or execution of an ostensible legal process. It cannot, therefore, be said in such a case that the entry was with the intent to cause annoyance, intimidation or insult within the meaning of Section 441 Penal Code. In the instant case the position was just the reverse. 14. There is yet another aspect of the matter. It has been established from the prosecution evidence that after the accused had broken open into the house, the complainant had gone there to lodge a protest with the c accused at about 5 P.M. At that time the accused had threatened to give beating to the complainant. Therefore an offence under Section 448, I. P. C. had been committed by the applicant; because the second part of Sec 441 provides that even if a person lawfully enters into or upon such property, but unlawfully remains there with the intent to intimidate, insult or annoy any other person, the former would be guilty of criminal trespass. There is a string of authorities on this point not only c this Court but of various other High Courts. By way of example, reference may be made to a Division Bench case of Mahabir v. Rex through Shaindhar, A.I.R. 1949 Alld. There is a string of authorities on this point not only c this Court but of various other High Courts. By way of example, reference may be made to a Division Bench case of Mahabir v. Rex through Shaindhar, A.I.R. 1949 Alld. 228, wherein it was observed: "Criminal intimidation connotes a threat of use of force to another person . . . . . We think if the accused or his accomplices having entered upon the land do not quit the land when the true owner protests against such unauthorised entry and are ready to fight, the offence can be said to have been attended by 'show of force.' Show of force may consist in the physical presence of the accused, his servants or companions in such a way that the true owner is put to the fear that if he tried to regain possession by force he will be met by force. In such a case the dispossession of the true owner is not complete till he appears on the scene, protests and has to go away." Therefore, at any rate, when the complainant went to the house at about 5 P.M. on the date of the occurrence and was threatened and driven away by the accused and his companions, who had unlawfully trespassed into the house after its possession had been duly delivered to the complainant through the court Amin, had clearly committed an offence contemplated by Section 448 read with the second part of Section 441 of the Indian Penal Code. 15. Another point, which has strenuously been argued at the Bar is about the order of the Magistrate said to have been passed under Section 522, Cr. P. C. directing that the complainant shall be put back into possession of the disputed accommodation. It can hardly be doubted that in a case where the possession has been snatched and the accused is convicted of an offence attended by criminal force or show of force or criminal intimidation, the court may order the dispossessed person to be restored to possession of the same. The accused-applicant having been convicted under Section 448, I. P. C. it was a fit case in which the Magistrate should have also ordered restoration of possession over the property to the complainant. However, a difficulty has arisen because of a subsequent event. The accused-applicant having been convicted under Section 448, I. P. C. it was a fit case in which the Magistrate should have also ordered restoration of possession over the property to the complainant. However, a difficulty has arisen because of a subsequent event. As observed at the outset, the Sessions Judge had dismissed the appeal of the applicant by his order dated 18-9-64 and had fully maintained the conviction and sentence of the applicant, as well as the order for restoration of possession. But the very next day, that is, on 19-9-1964 Smt. Ram Sumerni, owner of the house, executed a sale deed thereof in favour of Har Pieari Devi and three others. The argument of Mr. Kakkar, therefore, is that in view of the fact that the landlady has lost all rights, title and interest in the disputed house (the same having now vested in the transferees) she cannot be restored possession thereof. The argument is plausible and fascinating, but has no real substance. It is true that after execution of the sale deed by the landlady in favour of the transferees on 19-9-64 she had lost proprietary rights and title in the property. However, there still remained an interest in her to regain possession and deliver the same to her vendees. Even if it were accepted for the sake of argument that she had lost even the last named in the rest, it cannot be said that the criminal court would be incompetent to deliver back possession to her on that account. The right of a dispossessed complainant has been recognised under Section 522(l), Cr. P. C. itself. The mere fact that the complainant has been forcibly dispossess from the premises entitles him to regain possession under the above statutory provision of law. It furnishes not only a prompt but also rough and ready justice to the person, who has been dispossessed from the property by show of force. The contentions and highly balanced questions of right and interest in the immovable property between the parties inter se as also those relating to third parties inter se can be decided later on by a civil court of competent jurisdiction, as provided by Section 522(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The contentions and highly balanced questions of right and interest in the immovable property between the parties inter se as also those relating to third parties inter se can be decided later on by a civil court of competent jurisdiction, as provided by Section 522(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, it cannot be said that the mere fact of the sale of the disputed property to third parties would disentitle the complainant to be restored to possession under the provisions of Section 522 (1), Cr. P. C. The Section does not at all speak of rights and interest of the dispossessed person or the per son dispossessing hint The existence of rival claims, rights and interest in the property is irrelevant and foreign for the purposes of delivery of possession under Section 522(1), Cr. P. C. The only thing to be seen in such a case is whether a person has been forcibly dispossessed or has been kept out of possession by show of force; and if that be so, he would be entitled to be restored to possession under the aforesaid section, irrespective of his rights, title and interest in the property. If the legislature wanted the rights, title and interest of the dispossessed person to be taken into consideration for the purposes of Section 522, Cr. P. C., it would have easily said so, as has been done in the case of Section 517, Cr. P. C. Under Section 517(l), Cr. P. C. the property has to be delivered "to any person claiming to be entitled to possession thereof." Under this section the title to possession of the claimant has to be determined. But this is not so under Section 522(l), Cr. P. C., where the only thing to be seen is whether a person was in possession and whether he had been forcibly dispossessed from the property. In this view of the matter, the orders, of the courts below directing the disputed house to be delivered to the complainant under Section 522, Cr. P. C. were perfectly correct and justified. 16. In the result, I hold that the applicant has been rightly convicted and sentenced under Section 448, I. P. C. and I see no reason to interfere with the orders of the courts below. The revision is accordingly dismissed. P. C. were perfectly correct and justified. 16. In the result, I hold that the applicant has been rightly convicted and sentenced under Section 448, I. P. C. and I see no reason to interfere with the orders of the courts below. The revision is accordingly dismissed. As the complainant has been improperly kept back from possession over the property since the year 1957, I order that the 'Magistrate would now deliver back the property to him with all expedition. 17. Let the records be sent down to the court below without any delay.