Judgment :- 1. The respondent in this revision petition was prosecuted for an offence under S.16(1)(a)(ii) read with S.7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act - Act 37 of 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) - for having stocked for sale and sold 500 grams of Thuvaraparippu which, on analysis, has been found to be adulterated with coaltar dye. Where a second offence is committed by the accused under the Act, S.16(1)(a)(ii) provides for enhanced punishment which may extend to two years and so the case was tried as a warrant case. 2. After the prosecution witnesses were examined the following charge was framed against the accused by the learned District Magistrate: "That you, on 21st day of December 1962 at 11 a.m. sold 500 grams of dhall from the stock kept in your shop to the Food Inspector of Chittoor-Thathamangalam Municipality (Sri M.N. Narayanan Nair) for the purpose of analysis, that the said dhall on analysis was found to contain coaltar dye, metanil yellow and is therefore adulterated, that you have been previously convicted on 26th April 1961 for a similar offence by this court and sentenced to pay a fins of Rs. 60 in C.C 86/63 and that you have thereby committed an offence punishable under S.16 (1) (a) (ii) and 7 of the P.F.A. Act read with R.23 of the P.F.A. Rules and within my cognizance. And I hereby direct that you be tried before me on the said charge." On the charge being read over and explained to the accused, he was asked whether he pleads guilty and on his pleading guilty to the charge the accused was convicted and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 200. 3. On appeal to the Sessions Judge of Palghat it was contended that the charge for enhanced punishment ought not to have been clubbed along with the charge for the substantive offence and on that account the entire trial is vitiated. Reliance was placed on the following observation in Moidu v. Food Inspector, 1961 KLT. 415 "S. 16 (1) (a) (ii) deals with a second offence of the type contemplated by S.16(1)(a). Reliance was placed on the following observation in Moidu v. Food Inspector, 1961 KLT. 415 "S. 16 (1) (a) (ii) deals with a second offence of the type contemplated by S.16(1)(a). Therefore, the learned Sessions Judge was right in observing that the charge under S.16(1)(a)(ii) should not have been mentioned in the original charge the procedure being that the charge of a previous conviction should have been framed only after the accused had been found guilty and convicted of the main offence charged against him." Learned Sessions Judge, thereupon, set aside the conviction and sentence and ordered the accused to be retried. 4. The Food Inspector who is the complainant in the case has challenged the correctness of the order on the ground that the view taken by the learned judge is wrong and is not warranted by the various provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code. When the revision petition was admitted, this court ordered notice to be issued to the respondent to show cause why the fine that had been imposed should not be enhanced to one of Rs. 2,000 which is the minimum prescribed and that is calendar revision 13 of 1964. 5. It was contended before us that in the decision relied on by the learned Sessions Judge the effect of sub-section (7) of S.221 has not been considered at all. It may be that the usual practice in court is to frame a charge for the substantive offence and then if the accused pleads guilty to that charge frame another charge for the previous conviction, but the question here is whether framing of a composite charge as was done in this case is legally justifiable. Sub-section (7) of S.221, Cr. P.C., provides that if the accused having been previously convicted of any offence, is liable by reason of such previous conviction, to enhanced punishment of a different kind, for a subsequent offence and it is intended to prove such previous conviction for the purpose of effecting the punishment which the court may think fit to award for the subsequent offence, the fact, date and place of the previous conviction shall be stated in the charge, and that if such statement has been omitted the court may add it at any time before sentence is passed. The charge would then be read over to the accused and explained and he should be called upon to plead to the separate charge of previous conviction. S. 255A enjoins that evidence about the previous conviction cannot be given until and after the accused has been found guilty of the principal or substantive offence. The effect of these two sections read together is that the accused could be charged with the previous conviction at the same time when he is charged with the substantive offence and if he is found guilty of that offence he will be tried on the charge of previous conviction by reason of which be is liable to enhanced punishment. The form of the charge as given in Form No. 28 in Schedule V of the Code also shows that the previous conviction could be mentioned in the charge framed for the substantive offence. We have therefore to hold that the charge framed is not defective. 6. That in a warrant case such a composite charge could be framed becomes clear if we refer to S.310 Cr. P.C. which deals with the framing of charge in sessions trials. S.310 says: "In the case of a trial by a Jury or by the judge himself when the accused is charged with an offence and further charged that he is by reason of a previous conviction liable to enhanced punishment or to punishment of a different kind for such subsequent offence the procedure prescribed by the foregoing provisions of this chapter shall be modified as follows, namely: (a) Such further charge shall not be read out in court and the accused shall not be asked to plead thereto, nor shall the same be referred to by the prosecution, or any evidence adduced thereon unless and until, (i) he has been convicted of the subsequent offence, or (ii) in the case of a trial by a jury, the jury have delivered their verdict on the charge of the subsequent offence, (b) in the case of a trial held by the judge himself, the court may, in its discretion proceed or refrain from proceeding with the trial of the accused on the charge of the previous conviction." This difference in the procedure hid down for the warrant case and the sessions cases would indicate that in a warrant case the procedure is to club the two charges together. Probably, this difference in the procedure had not been brought to the notice of His Lordship in the decision cited supra. 7. We are fortified in the view that we take by the decision in Emperor v. Dalip Singh AIR. 1944 Lahore 25 where the procedure has been if we may say so with respect, correctly laid down: "When it is proposed to charge an accused person with previous convictions under S.75, no evidence on the point shall be led before the charge is framed. The accused should not be questioned about his previous convictions when examined under S.342, as clearly that is only for the purpose of enabling him to explain matters appearing in evidence against him and his previous convictions should not have appeared in evidence against him at this stage. When, however, the learned Magistrate considers it fit to frame a charge under S.254 in respect of the substantive offence, he should then have recourse to S.221(7) and in that charge should include the previous convictions. He should then ask the accused to plead to that charge making it clear to him that he is pleading to the previous convictions distinctly from the original offence. Then comes S.255 A and it seems to us that under that section if the accused admits his previous conviction or convictions, they do not have to be proved separately and the Magistrate can take them into consideration in convicting and sentencing him for the main offence. If, however, the accused does not admit his previous convictions, the Magistrate has to proceed to judgment on the substantive charge and if that is a judgment of conviction, he has then to take evidence according to law, i.e., under S.511 of the Code as to the previous convictions and then come to a separate finding upon them after which he will pass the proper sentence under the substantive section read with S.75 Penal Code." This is the view taken by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in State of Bombay v. Govind Masu AIR. 1951 Bombay 332 where it is stated: "The effect of S.221(7) and 225 A, Cr. 1951 Bombay 332 where it is stated: "The effect of S.221(7) and 225 A, Cr. P.C., read together is that the accused is to be charged with the previous convictions at the same time when he is charged with the subsequent offence and if he is found guilty of that offence, he will be tried on the charge of previous convictions, by reason of which he is liable to enhanced punishment." 8. Learned Sessions Judge has omitted to consider whether assuming that the charge framed in the case was defective it has, in any way, prejudiced the accused at the trial and had occasioned a failure of justice requiring a retrial of the case. Under S.537 Cr. P.C., no finding, sentence or order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless such error, omission or irregularity has, in fact, occasioned a failure of justice. 9. It has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent that in this case the District Magistrate has committed an irregularity in examining a witness P.W. 4 who has given evidence regarding previous conviction. It is true that no evidence regarding previous conviction should have been led before charge had been framed and the accused had pleaded not guilty. It was further pointed out that the accused had not been questioned under S.342 Cr. P.C. But it is not mandatory at that stage. All these may not be sufficient to vitiate the trial. Then again it was submitted that the questions put to the accused do not show that he had been separately questioned whether he pleads guilty to the substantive offence as distinct from the previous conviction. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and the learned State Prosecutor, we feel that in the interests of justice it would be better that we maintain the order of retrial passed by the learned Sessions Judge though not for the reasons mentioned by him. The revision petition is, therefore dismissed and the rule issued by this court is discharged. Transmit the papers to the District Magistrate promptly who will expedite the hearing of the case. Dismissed.