ORDER M.C. Desai, C.J. - This is a petition for certiorari for the quashing of an order passed by Sri. Syed Husain a Deputy Director of Consolidation on 6.3.1962 u/s 11(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and an order passed by a Director on 2.8.1962 refusing to revise it u/s 48 of the Act. 2. One ground taken in the petition is that Sri. Syed Husain, who was a Deputy Director, had not been authorized to hear the appeal u/s 11(2) by "the Director of Consolidation." An appeal u/s 11(2) must be filed before the District Deputy Director and must be heard and decided either by him or by "such other Deputy Director, Consolidation as may be authorized in this behalf by the Director of Consolidation." "Director of Consolidation" is defined in Section 3(4) to mean "the person appointed as such by the State Government to exercise the powers and perform the duties of the Director of Consolidation under this Act.... and shall include an Additional Director of Consolidation and a Joint Director of Consolidation. Other Consolidation authorities defined in the Act are Consolidation Officer, Consolidator, District Deputy Director and Deputy Director. Section 42, as it existed prior to its deletion by Act No. XXXVIII of 1958, was to the effect that "the State Government may for the purpose of this Act appoint: (a i) Consolidator, (i) Assistant Consolidation Officer...(iv) Deputy Director of Consolidation; and (v) Director of Consolidation.'' The present Section 42 is simply that the State Government "may appoint such number of officers and authorizes as may be required for the purposes of consolidation.... Section 44 lays down that the State Government may (i) delegate to any office or authority any of its own powers and "(ii) confer powers of the Director of Consolidation....on any officer of authority." Sri. IDN Sahi was appointed by the State Government a Commissioner of Consolidation. On 23.12.1958 the State Government issues a notification in exercise of the power conferred by Section 44 conferring "the powers of Director of Consolidation under the said Act....on Sri IDI Sahi, Commissioner of Consolidation with effect from December 19, 1958. On 3.3.1960 Sri. IDN Sahi, describing himself as Commissioner of Consolidation "(Chakbandi Ayukta)" i(sic) purported exercise of the powers conferred by Section 11(2) authorized Sri. Syed Husain to hear and decide appeals filed u/s 11(2). On 3.3.1960 Sri. IDN Sahi, describing himself as Commissioner of Consolidation "(Chakbandi Ayukta)" i(sic) purported exercise of the powers conferred by Section 11(2) authorized Sri. Syed Husain to hear and decide appeals filed u/s 11(2). On 18.1.1962 the contesting opposite party filed an appeal u/s 11(2) before the District Deputy Director, who transferred it for disposal to Sri. Syed Husain and the latter on 6.3.1962 heard and allowed it. The Petitioner did not challenge his jurisdiction to hear the appeal on the ground that he had not been authorized to hear it by the Director of Consolidation. The appeal was argued only on merits and on its being allowed, the Petitioner applied to a Director to revise the order of Sri. Syed Husain u/s 48. In this revision application also the Petitioner did not contend that Sri. Syed Husain was not competent to decide the appeal on account of his not being authorized to decide it by the Director of Consolidation. The Director dismissed the revision application on 2.8.1962 and on 4.9.1962 this petition for certiorari was filed for the quashing of his and Sri. Syed Husain's orders. 3. The first question is whether Sri Syed Husain had been authorized within the meaning of Section 11(2) to hear the appeal. Only the Director of Consolidation could authorize him and nobody else such as the Commissioner of Consolidation. Here he was authorized by Sri. IDN Sahi, who was Commissioner of Consolidation. In the order authorizing him he rightly did not claim to be Director; instead he claimed to be Commissioner of Consolidation. He had been conferred u/s 44 the powers of Director of Consolidation by the State Government but that did not convert him into Director. The Act distinguishes between appointment of an officer and conferment of that officer's powers upon some other officer or authority. "Director" means only the person appointed as Director by the State Government i.e. appointed in exercise of the powers conferred upon the State Government by Section 42. A person upon whom the State Government confers powers of Director u/s 44 is not Director because he is not appointed as such. The Commissioner of Consolidation upon whom Director's powers are conferred by the State Government u/s 44, remains Commissioner of Consolidation, though he also becomes competent to exercise Director's powers also. A person upon whom the State Government confers powers of Director u/s 44 is not Director because he is not appointed as such. The Commissioner of Consolidation upon whom Director's powers are conferred by the State Government u/s 44, remains Commissioner of Consolidation, though he also becomes competent to exercise Director's powers also. Merely because Director's powers are conferred upon him, he does not become Director; he does not become Director because he has not been appointed as such in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 42. What is required under the definition of "Director" is appointment and not conferment of powers. The provisions of Sections 42 and 44 are independent provisions, mutually exclusive. If a person is appointed as Director he can do all that can be done by the Director under the Act; he needs nothing in addition to the order of appointment. By being appointed as Director he becomes competent to exercise all the Director's powers. Any other person who exercises any of the Director's powers legally does it not because he is Director but because the State Government can legally authorize and has in fact authorized, him to do (though he is not Director). The very fact that such authority is needed for his being competent to exercise them proves that he is not appointed as Director. In Paras Nath Singh v. Sate of U.P. (1)( 1960 AWR 327 ) I pointed oat that an Assistant Collector, Second Class upon whom the powers of Assistant Collector First Class are conferred, does not thereby become Assistant Collector First Class. On the same reasoning I hold that Sri. IDN Sahi was not Director and had no power to authorize Sri. Syed Husain to hear the second appeal. This is also consistent with the use of the article 'the' in Section 11(2) which means the particular person appointed as Director and cannot include all other persons upon whom Director's powers may be conferred. In Gaya Dutt v. SDO II Mahamjganj, District Rae Bareli (2) (1964 ALJ 145. I had said that "the Sub-Divisional Officer" does not include any other person upon whom Sub-Divisional Officer's powers are conferred and means the particular officer appointed as Sub Divisional Officer." 4. Though I find that Sri. In Gaya Dutt v. SDO II Mahamjganj, District Rae Bareli (2) (1964 ALJ 145. I had said that "the Sub-Divisional Officer" does not include any other person upon whom Sub-Divisional Officer's powers are conferred and means the particular officer appointed as Sub Divisional Officer." 4. Though I find that Sri. Syed Husain had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal, I find that the Petitioner is not entitled to certiorari against his order for more than one reason. Firstly, he has applied for certiorari against it after about six months and he had no justification for coming so late. He did file a revision application against it, but not on this ground and, there-tore, he is not a titled to argue that the time spent by him in the revision application should be deducted in determining whether he is guilty of laches or not. He could not refrain from taking the plea before the Director and still argue that he was seeking relief against the order of Sri. Syed Husain and, therefore, the time spent in obtaining relief from it should not be taken into account in considering laches. It does not matter that he had no right to apply to the Deputy Director in revision and that Section 48 confers not a right upon a party to apply in revision but a power upon the Director to revise an order of the Deputy Director. The fact is that the Petitioner did apply to the Director and could have applied to him to revise the order of Syed Husain on the ground that it was beyond his jurisdiction and yet he failed to take this plea. It was not brought to the notice of the Director that Sri. Syed Husain had not been authorized to hear the appeal by himself or his predecessor and he cannot be blamed for not setting aside the order of Sri. Syed Husain on the ground that he was not competent to pass it. 5. lithe Petitioner takes the stand on the legal position that Section 48 does not confer any right upon him but merely confers certain power upon the Director, he should not have spent any time in going to the Director and should have come to this Court within reasonable time, i.e. within 90 days, for relief against Sri. Syed Husain's order. lithe Petitioner takes the stand on the legal position that Section 48 does not confer any right upon him but merely confers certain power upon the Director, he should not have spent any time in going to the Director and should have come to this Court within reasonable time, i.e. within 90 days, for relief against Sri. Syed Husain's order. He could not blow hot and cold in the same breath; he could not contend that he had no right to apply in revision and that still he should be allowed to waste time in applying for revision. 6. Then the Petitioner has to blame himself for his failure to plead not only before Sri. Syed Husain but also before the Director that the former had no power to hear the appeal. The remedy was in his own hands and yet he failed to avail himself of it. His sole excuse for the failure is that he did not know the law. Nobody can plead ignorance of law. 7. Then the so called ultra vires order of Sri. Syed Husain is now replaced by the Director's order and may be said to be merged in it. The Director had jurisdiction to pass the order that he did and, therefore whatever jurisdictional defect might have been in the order of Sri. Syed Husain no longer exists, because the order itself does not exist, having been merged in. or replaced by, the Director's order. The Director has gone into the merits and finding no substance, refused to revise the order of Sri. Syed Husain. The Petitioner now feels that he is still aggrieved by the order passed by Sri. Syed Husain on the ground that it was without jurisdiction. 8. On merits also there is no substance. The consolidation authorities might have wrongly used the word 'void' instead of Voidable but that does not affect the correctness of -the order passed by them. The illegal transfer has been avoided at the instance of the party who had the power to avoid it. After it has been avoided by that party, it has become void. 9. In the result I dismiss the petition for certiorari. Having regard to the fact that each of the contesting parties has failed and succeeded in part, I leave them to bear their costs themselves.