ORDER -This revision arises from an order passed by the trial Court holding that the State of Madhya Pradesh is a necessary party to the suit and directing the plaintiff to join the State Government as a party. Aggrieved by that order, the plaintiff has come up in revision. 2. To state briefly, the plaintiff’s case is that the Phuljhar Seva Samiti, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, is in occupation of the suit accommodation as tenant on Rs. 150 per month. A total sum of Rs. 11,500 was received by the plaintiff. The defendant-tenant is in arrears of rent to the extent of Rs. 5,400. The plaintiff claims a decree for ejectment and for arrears of rent. 3. It is also stated in the plaint that at the time that the suit accommodation was given on lease to the defendant-society, it was agreed that in case the society paid Rs. 16,000 in all to the plaintiff within three years of the defendant’s entering into possession of the suit accommodation the plaintiff would execute a deed of sale in respect of it, in favour of the society. However, the society paid only Rs. 11,500; not the entire sum of Rs. 16,000. The amount thus received was adjusted towards rent. Resisting the suit, the defendant-society contended that although, as averred by the plaintiff, there was an oral agreement for the sale of the land and the building standing thereon for Rs. 16,000, yet, the price was not to be paid within three years as alleged by him, but it was to be paid “by and by,” meaning, at the convenience of the defendant. It was also contended that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant; that the defendant-society never agreed to pay Rs. 150 per month as rent; that the plaintiff had no right to adjust the amount of Rs. 11,500, which was paid as part of the pricey towards rent; and that possession was given to the defendant in pursuance Of the oral agreement of sale. 4. It was also averred in the written statement that the school, for which the suit accommodation was taken by the defendant-society, had since been transferred to the Government of Madhya Pradesh, so that the latter was a necessary party. 5 On these pleadings, ten issues were framed by the trial Court. 4. It was also averred in the written statement that the school, for which the suit accommodation was taken by the defendant-society, had since been transferred to the Government of Madhya Pradesh, so that the latter was a necessary party. 5 On these pleadings, ten issues were framed by the trial Court. For the purposes of this revision, issues No. 1 and 8 may be reproduced here: “1 (a) Whether the governing body of the Phuljhar Sewa Samity, Saraipali, of which the defendant is the Secretary, entered into an oral agreement with the plaintiff to take the house and plot in suit on rent at Rs. 150 per month in the month of April or May 1953 on the terms and conditions as detailed in 2 (a, b, c, d and e) of the plaint? Or (b) Whether the plaintiff sold the said accommodation to the defendant and also agreed to receive the consideration by and by? 8. Is State of Madhya Pradesh, through Education Department, a necessary party to this suit?”. Taking up issue No. 8 as a preliminary issue, the trial Judge has found that the State of Madhya Pradesh is a necessary party to the present suit and it should be impleaded as a defendant. 6. In this revision, Shri Mishra, learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that the defendant’s aim and object is to complicate the matters and to prolong the litigation. He relies on section 23 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. 7. Now, it is settled law that a person is a necessary party if he ought to have been joined as a party in order that an effective decree may be passed in the suit. But, if his joinder would only be a matter of convenience, he is a proper party. In other words, in order to hold that a person is a necessary party, it has to be shown that there is a legal bar to the maintainability of the suit in the absence of that person. On the defendant’s own showing, as the school was transferred by the defendant to the State Government, it cannot be said that an effective decree cannot be passed unless the State Government is joined as party. On the defendant’s own showing, as the school was transferred by the defendant to the State Government, it cannot be said that an effective decree cannot be passed unless the State Government is joined as party. Even without joining the Government as a party, if a decree is passed, it would not be infructuous or inexecutable, because section 23 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, will come to the plaintiff’s aid. That section runs thus: “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law where the interest of a tenant in any accommodation is determined for any reason whatsoever and any decree or order is passed by a Court under this Act, for the recovery of possession of such accommodation, the decree or order shall, subject to the provisions of section 16, be binding on all persons who may be in occupation of the accommodation and vacant possession thereof shall be given to the landlord by evicting all such persons therefrom.” (Italics by me) This provision is subject to section 16, which creates certain rights in favour of a sub-tenant referred to in section 15. There is also a proviso to section 23, which saves a person, who has an independent title to such accommodation. Sections 15 and 16 and the proviso to section 23 of the Act are not attracted by the pleadings in the written statement. 8. It is quite clear from the plaint averments that the suit is based on the relationship of landlord and tenant. It is only if the plaintiff succeeds in proving that the relationship of landlord and tenant was created that a decree can be passed in his favour in this suit, but not otherwise. In rebuttal, the defendant may show that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant and the possession was transferred to it in pursuance of an oral agreement of sale. But, in case the plaintiff succeeds and a decree for ejectment is passed, the plaintiff will be entitled to the benefit of section 23. That, however, is a matter of proof. 9. But, in case the plaintiff succeeds and a decree for ejectment is passed, the plaintiff will be entitled to the benefit of section 23. That, however, is a matter of proof. 9. In Benares Bank Ltd. v. Bhagwandas1, two tests were laid down for determining whether a person is a necessary party; (1) that there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the matter involved in the proceedings in question, and (2) it should not be possible to pass an effective decree in the absence of such party. These tests were held by the Supreme Court as true tests. (See Deputy Commissioner, Hardoi v. Rama Krishna Narain and others2). Both the tests have to be satisfied before it can be held that a person is a necessary party. “Here, they are not.” 10. Shri Pandey, learned counsel for the defendant-society relies on Sampatbai v. Madhusingh.3 In that case, the plaintiff’s suit was against his brother’s wife for a declaration that after the death of his father and his brother (husband of the defendant), he alone was entitled to the pacca tenancy rights in the suit lands and that Sampathai had no right in them whatever, and that the mutation made in her favour with regard to those lands was illegal and ineffective. The plaintiff also claimed possession of the lands in suit and also mesne profits from the defendant. One of the objections, which the defendant took in defence, was that Narayan, who was the adopted son of her husband, was a necessary party to the suit. The trial Judge rejected that plea. Thereafter, an application was made on behalf of the minor Narayan for being made a defendant in that suit. When this last mentioned application of Narayan was dismissed, a revision was filed against it. The considerations, which weighed in that case, do not apply here. In the present case, the State of Madhya Pradesh has not made any application for being made a party to enable it to defend the suit more effectively. 11. To say anything further about it will be prejudging the question. Suffice to say that there is a world of difference between the Court directing a plaintiff to join a person as a necessary party and permitting such person to intervene. 11. To say anything further about it will be prejudging the question. Suffice to say that there is a world of difference between the Court directing a plaintiff to join a person as a necessary party and permitting such person to intervene. And, this is more so when the Government is held to be a necessary party, because that patently involves the danger of the suit being thrown out for want of notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code. In the present case, the plaintiff does not claim any relief in the suit against the State Government; nor does he want to join it as a party even if the State be in actual possession, because he feels secure under section 23 of the Act and the State has not applied for leave to intervene. 12. Shri Pandey then relies on Messers I. & M. Ltd. v Pheroze Framroze1, in support of his contention that a sub-tenant is a proper party. In my opinion, it is not necessary to consider the effect of that decision and its applicability to the present case, in view of the clear provisions contained in section 23 of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. Learned counsel further relies on Heeralal v. Vishwanath2, in which it is observed that if a Co-operative Bank is added as a party not because the plaintiff wanted it on record, but because the Court had directed it to be impleaded, neither the Bank nor the State Government can take shelter under section 77 of the M.B. Co-operative Societies Act, for claiming dismissal of the suit for want of notice. That was a suit against the State Government, it was not as if the Government was directed to be made a party so that the question of notice under section 80, Civil Procedure Code, did not arise. I do not think it is at all necessary to consider the applicability of section 77 of the M.B. Co-operative Societies Act. 13. Finally, Shri Pandey argues that even if the order of the trial Court is wrong, it cannot be a ground for interference in revision. As to that, it may first be pointed out that the trial Judge did not take into consideration the provisions of section 23 of the Accommodation Control Act, 1961. If it had, it would have reached a different conclusion. As to that, it may first be pointed out that the trial Judge did not take into consideration the provisions of section 23 of the Accommodation Control Act, 1961. If it had, it would have reached a different conclusion. It is a ground for interference in revision, if a subordinate Court exercises its jurisdiction in disregard to an express provision of law. Moreover, in Razia Begum, v. Anwar Begum3, it has been laid down that the question of addition of parties under Rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is generally not one of initial jurisdiction of the Court, hut of a judicial discretion, which has to he exercised in view of all the fact and circumstances of a particular case, but in some cases, it may raise controversies as to the power of the Court, in contradistinction to its inherent jurisdiction in the limited sense in which it is used in section 115 of the Code. As would appear from the foregoing discussion, not only that the trial Court did not take into account section 23 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, but it also did not apply its mind to the real dispute between the parties in the suit. That calls for interference in revision. 14. In the result, the revision is allowed. The order passed by the trial Court is set aside. Costs in this revision shall be costs in the cause. Counsel’s fee Rs. 40.