Judgment :- 1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff in O.S. No. 43 of 1958 of the court of the Subordinate Judge of Palghat. The suit which has been dismissed was for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 30,000/- from the defendant, the State of Kerala represented by the Collector of the Palghat District, as compensation for eviction from survey field Nos. 98,117 and 119 of the Kadukkamkunnu amsom in the Palghat District. The court below was of the view that the appellant was entitled to succeed but for its conclusion that the suit was barred by limitation under S.14 of the Madras Land Encroachment Act, 1905. 2. The three survey fields concerned form part of the bed of the Malampuzha river. Both sides of that river in the relevant area belonged in jenm to the Emur Bhagavathi Devaswom; and the appellant, it has been held, was a tenant of that Devaswom in respect of those riparian lands. 3. According to the English common law the ownership of the bed of non-tidal rivers usque ad medium filum aquae vests in the riparian owners. The ambit of this principle, however, has been tailored by the Privy Council to suit the character of Indian rivers and in consonance with justice, reason, equity and good sense. In Maharaja of Pittapuram v. Province of Madras (AIR. 1949 Privy Council 3) the Board said: "Their Lordships consider that the appellant's contention, that the English Common Law rule that the bed of non-tidal rivers belongs to the riparian proprietors should apply to Madras not only runs counter to the trend of judicial dicta but conflicts with good sense, and that the rule to be applied is that the bed of a navigable river in any part of India, whether tidal or not, is vested in the Government unless it has been granted to private individuals." 4. In State of Madras v. Maharaja of Pithapuram (AIR. 1952 Madras 510) the Madras High Court summed up the law on the subject as follows: "(1) The bed of a navigable river in any part of India whether tidal or not, is vested in the Government, and not in the zamindar or other private persons owning lands on both sides of the river, unless it has been granted to such private individual. The English common law rule that the bed of non-tidal rivers, even though they are navigable, belongs to the riparian proprietors, does not apply to Madras State. (2) To create a title to the river bed in the Government the river should be navigable at that part of it where the disputed plots are situated. (3) A river in India is not navigable in the legal sense unless it is navigable throughout the year, though it need not be navigable for a portion of the day, as at low tide. (4) Facilities for passage of large river crafts, which may not be capable of rising to the dignity of ships, seem to be generally considered sufficient to call a river affording such facilities a navigable river." According to the lower court the Malampuzha river is a non-tidal and non-navigable river and in view of that survey field Nos. 98,117 and 119 should be considered as belonging to the Emur Bhagavathi Devaswom in jenm subject to the tenancy right found in favour of the appellant. 5. The survey fields in question have been registered as river porombokes. The lower court has held, and quite correctly, that the registration cannot affect the rights of the real owner. It said: "The mere registration of these lands as Government poromboke cannot improve matters for the Government for the simple reason that under S.19 of the Malabar Land Registration Act, such registration shall not be deemed to affect the rights of any person in respect of any estate or interest therein." 6. On the evidence on record we entertain no doubt that the lower court was right in its conclusion that the Emur Bhagavathi Devaswom was the jenmi and the appellant the tenant of survey field Nos. 98,117 and 119. The evidence has been discussed at length in the judgment of the court below and we consider it unnecessary to cover the ground afresh. On the basis of the finding entered, the sole question for consideration is the question covered by issue No. 7: Whether the suit is barred by the provisions of S.14 of the Madras Land Encroachment Act, 1905. 7. On the basis of the finding entered, the sole question for consideration is the question covered by issue No. 7: Whether the suit is barred by the provisions of S.14 of the Madras Land Encroachment Act, 1905. 7. S.14 of the Madras Land Encroachment Act, 1905, reads as follows: "Nothing contained in this Act shall be held to prevent persons deeming themselves aggrieved by any proceedings under this Act except as herein before provided, from applying to the civil courts for redress; Provided that the civil courts shall not take cognizance of any suit instituted by such person for any such cause of action unless such suit shall be instituted within six months from the time at which the cause of action arose. Explanation. - The cause of action shall be deemed to have arisen (a) in respect of any assessment or penalty, on the date on which such assessment or penalty was levied; (b) in respect of eviction or forfeiture, on the date of eviction or forfeiture." It is clear from the section that the starting point for calculating the six months within which the suit should be instituted is the date of eviction. Sub-section (2) of S.6 of the Act deals with the manner in which an eviction can be made. Sub-section (2) of S.6 of the Act deals with the manner in which an eviction can be made. It says: "An eviction under this section shall be made in the following manner, namely:-By serving a notice in the manner provided in S.7 on the person reputed to be in occupation or his agent requiring him within such time as the Collector may deem reasonable after receipt of the said notice to vacate the land, and, if such notice is not obeyed, by removing or deputing a subordinate to remove any person who may refuse to vacate the same, and if the officer removing any such person shall be resisted or obstructed by any person, the Collector shall hold a summary inquiry into the facts of the case, and if satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was without any just cause and that such resistance or obstruction still continues, may issue a warrant for the arrest of the said person and on his appearance commit him to close custody in the office of the Collector or of any Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar for such period not exceeding 30 days as may be necessary to prevent the continuance of such obstruction or resistance or may send him with a warrant in the form of the schedule for imprisonment in the civil jail of the district for the like period: Provided that no person so committed or imprisoned under this section shall be liable to be prosecuted under S.183, 186 or 188 of the Indian Penal Code in respect of the same facts.' 8. There is no doubt that as far as survey field Nos. 117 and 119 are concerned a proper notice was served in the manner provided in S.7 and that the eviction was effected in conformity with the provisions of the Act. Ext. B-9 dated 5-2-1955 is the notice in respect of those survey fields. It was served on 8-3-1955 and gave the appellant fifteen days' time to leave the property and as the appellant had already left the property owing to the flooding consequent on the construction of the Malampuzha dam nothing further remained to be done. 9. The eviction from survey field Nos. 117 and 119 as disclosed by Exts. B-3 and B-4 was on 19-7-1957. 9. The eviction from survey field Nos. 117 and 119 as disclosed by Exts. B-3 and B-4 was on 19-7-1957. Giving the appellant the benefit of six months from the date of eviction and of the two months under S.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, read with S.15 (2) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, the suit should have been instituted prior to 27-6-1958, the date on which it was actually filed in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Palghat. 10. The contention of the appellant is that the expiry of the period of six months provided in S.14 will not bar his claim as the land did not belong to the Government but to the Emur Bhagavathi Devaswom in jenm and to himself in tenancy from that Devaswom. The bar of limitation provided in S.14, as we understand it, applies to all cases in which the Act has been invoked for the purpose of eviction, whether the land concerned was as a matter of fact the property of the Government or not. 11. The identical question came up for consideration before the High Court of Madras in Surya Rao v. Secretary of State (AIR. 1935 Madras 7). That Court dealt with the matter as follows: "The District Munsiff and the lower appellate Court held that, the cause of action being the eviction of the tenant and as the suit was not filed within six months from that time, the suit was barred. Here it has been argued, as it was in the lower Courts, that these were not proceedings under the Act because the Act does not apply to the property of any zamindar as this property is claimed by the plaintiff to be or any person claiming through or holding under any of them. But the short answer to that contention is that these proceedings purported to be proceedings under the Act. The contention that the Act did not apply to the land in question was one which could be raised in the suit." 12. S.18 of the Travancore Land Conservancy Act, 1091 (M.E.) was similar in wording to S.19 of the Travancore-Cochin Land Conservancy Act, 1951, which replaced it and to S.20 of the Kerala Land Conservancy Act, 1957, which replaced both the Travancore-Cochin Land Conservancy Act, 1951, and the Madras Land Encroachment Act, 1905, as in force in the Malabar district. S.18 of the Travancore Land Conservancy Act, 1091 (M.E.) was similar in wording to S.19 of the Travancore-Cochin Land Conservancy Act, 1951, which replaced it and to S.20 of the Kerala Land Conservancy Act, 1957, which replaced both the Travancore-Cochin Land Conservancy Act, 1951, and the Madras Land Encroachment Act, 1905, as in force in the Malabar district. S.18 of the Travancore Land Conservancy Act, 1091 (M.E.) was in the following terms: "No suit against Government shall be entertained in any of Our Civil Courts in respect of any order passed under this Act except upon the ground that the land in respect of which such order has been passed is not a land which is the property of Government whether a poromboke or not: Provided that Civil Courts shall not take cognizance of any such suit unless it shall be instituted within one year from the date on which the cause of action arose." 13. The section came up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Travancore High Court in Dekshinamurthi v. Sirkar (12 T.L.J. 169). Viraraghava Aiyengar, C.J. said: "I shall assume for the purpose of this appeal that the land in suit is really the property of the plaintiff and not Government property and that the Division Peishkar's view to the contrary cannot be supported on the merits. Even if this be so, a suit to set aside the said order must be brought within one year as enacted in the proviso to S.18. The proceedings taken by the Division Peishkar are judicial in their nature, and the orders passed by him under S.10 may be right or may be wrong, and if wrong orders happen to be passed by this public functionary, in the exercise of statutory powers vested in him, parties affected prejudicially by those orders are bound to seek for relief in the manner provided by the statute."; and Sesha Aiyar, J: "Granting that the right of action is a part of the general liberty which belongs to the subject, none can deny that that right can be infringed upon by statute. S.18 disables a person to bring a suit in respect of any order passed under the Act, unless two conditions are satisfied. S.18 disables a person to bring a suit in respect of any order passed under the Act, unless two conditions are satisfied. They are (1) it is only on the ground that the land in question is not the property of Government that a suit can be entertained: and (2) such suit shall be filed within one year from the date of accrual of the cause of action." Under S.14 of the Madras Land Encroachment Act, 1905, there is only one trammel on the liberty of the subject to resort to the civil courts for redress and that is that the suit should be instituted within six months from the time at which cause of action arose. 14. We are in agreement with the views expressed by the High Courts of Madras and Travancore in the decisions mentioned above. As far as survey filed Nos. 117 and 119 are concerned the eviction was in conformity with the provisions of the Act and the cause of action has to be considered as having arisen on the date of eviction under sub-section (2) of S.6, namely on 19-7-1957, and the suit instituted on 27-6-1958 as barred by limitation. 15. The position as regards survey field No. 98, however, is different. In respect of that field the eviction was not in conformity with the provisions of the Act and different considerations should apply. The date of eviction as disclosed by Exts. B-3 and B-4 was 26-9-1957. Ext. B-10, the notice under S.6 in respect of that survey field, is dated 3-9-1957. It gave the appellant fifteen days' time from the date of service to leave the property. It was served only on 15-10-1957 that is, over a fortnight after the date of eviction. 16. The eviction, therefore, was not in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the suit cannot hence be considered as having been filed beyond time. It follows that the appellant is entitled to compensation in respect of that survey field. 17. The amount of compensation payable in respect of survey field No. 98, as indicated in Para.10 of the judgment under appeal, is Rs. 3,439-14-5. The quantum is not disputed before us; and the said sum is hereby decreed with six per cent interest from the date of suit till the date of payment. 18. 17. The amount of compensation payable in respect of survey field No. 98, as indicated in Para.10 of the judgment under appeal, is Rs. 3,439-14-5. The quantum is not disputed before us; and the said sum is hereby decreed with six per cent interest from the date of suit till the date of payment. 18. In the result the appeal has to be allowed to the extent indicated in the last preceding paragraph and dismissed as regards the remainder of the claim made by the appellant. We do so; but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs.