Judgment G.N.Prasad, J. 1. This is an appeal by the decree-holder against the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court holding that the sale held on the 14th February 1953 by the executing Court was void and inoperative. The relevant facts are as follows: 2. The decree was obtained by the appellant on the 8th January 1951 for arrears of rent in respect of the judgment-debtors holding bearing khala No. 14 in village Lachhmanpur. The application for execution of the decree was filed on the 25th July 1951 in the Court of the Munsif, Third Court, Arrah, which had passed the decree. That Court, on the 27th July 1951, passed an order transferring the execution case to the Court of the First Additional Munsif at Arrah, which was known as the Court of the Execution Munsif. The order of transfer was made in pursuance of a Standing Order of the District Judge for transfer of such execution cases to the Court of the First Additional Munsif at Arrah. The decree-holder, in the first instance sought to proceed against plot No. 30, which is one of the plots appertaining to khata No. 14, and the usual processes, including the notice contemplated by Sec.158-B (2) of the Bihar Tenancy Act, were issued and served upon the judgment-debtors on the 14th August, 1951. Thereafter, the sale proclamation was also issued fixing the 10th December 1951 for conducting the sale. But the sale could not be held for want of bidders. Thereafter, on the 25th January 1952, the decree-holder applied for amendment of his execution petition by substituting plot No. 47 (another plot appertaining to khata No. 14), in lieu of plot No. 30, and sought to execute the decree against plot No. 47. This prayer for amendment was allowed on the 21st February 1952 and the usual processes of attachment and sale proclamation were thereafter issued. But again the sale could not be field for want of bidders and the decree-holder had to file fresh requisites on the 9th July 1952 In due course, the sale was held on the 14th February 1953 and plot No. 47 was purchased by the decree-holder for Rs. 400/-, subject to certain encumbrances which had duly been notified in the sale proclamation. On the 16th March 1953, the sale was confirmed, and this was followed by delivery of possession on the 21st August 1953. 400/-, subject to certain encumbrances which had duly been notified in the sale proclamation. On the 16th March 1953, the sale was confirmed, and this was followed by delivery of possession on the 21st August 1953. More than four years thereafter, there was a proceeding under Sec.144, Code of Criminal Procedure, between the parties, in which a restraint order was made against the judgment-debtors on the 3rd April 1958. On the 12th May 1958, the judgment-debtors filed an application before the executing Court for setting aside the auction sale held on the 14th February 1953, on the usual grounds of suppression of execution processes and substantial injury and alleging that on that account they were kept out of knowledge of the execution proceedings until they learnt about it on the 5th May 1958. The prayer for setting aside the sale was made upon the fooling that the sale was void and inoperative and, therefore, the application for setting aside the sale was governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 , which gave the judgment-debtors a period of three years for making the application, computed from the date of their knowledge, whereby their right to apply accrued. 3. The application was resisted by the decree-holder who maintained that the execution processes had been duly issued and served and that the judgment-debtors had full knowledge of the proceedings and the execution sale, which was by no means void or inoperative. It was further alleged that the application for setting aside the sale was barred by limitation since it was governed by Article 166 of the Limitation Act, 1908 , which provides a period of thirty days from the date of the sale for the purpose of making an application for setting aside the sale held under the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. The executing Court did not accept the case of the judgment-debtors and held that the application was barred by limitation. On appeal, however, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge look the view that the sale was without jurisdiction and that the proper article applicable was Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 . The appellate Court further found that the judgment-debtors had no knowledge of the execution proceedings and the sale held thereunder until the 3rd April 1958, when the order under Sec.144, Code of Criminal Procedure, was made against them. The appellate Court further found that the judgment-debtors had no knowledge of the execution proceedings and the sale held thereunder until the 3rd April 1958, when the order under Sec.144, Code of Criminal Procedure, was made against them. In this view, the appellate Court held that the application for setting aside the sale was not barred by limitation, and it allowed the same. The reasons why the appellate Court held the execution sale to be void and inoperative were twofold; (i) that the First Additional Munsif acquired no jurisdiction to proceed with the execution by virtue of the order of transfer passed by the Munsif, Third Court, on the 27th July 1951, because such an order of transfer could only have been made by the District Judge in exercise of his powers under Sec.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A Standing Order of the District Judge was not a valid order of transfer which must be made in respect of each individual case under the appropriate provision of the Code of Civil Procedure: and, (ii) that after the amendment of the execution petition, which was allowed to be made on the 21st February 1952, no notice under Sec.158-B (2) of the Bihar Tenancy Act was issued to the judgment-debtors, in consequence of which the executing Court acquired no jurisdiction to conduct the sale. 5. Against the decision of the lower appellate Court, the decree-holder preferred an appeal which was heard by Choudhary, J. The learned Single Judge did not express any opinion upon the question whether the execution case had or had not been validly transferred to the Additional Munsif in pursuance of the order passed by the Third Munsif on the 27th July 1955. But the learned Judge upheld the decision of the lower appellate Court as to the effect of the failure to issue a fresh notice under Sec.158-B (2) of the Bihar Tenancy Act subsequent to the amendment of the execution case made on the 21st February 1952. But the learned Judge upheld the decision of the lower appellate Court as to the effect of the failure to issue a fresh notice under Sec.158-B (2) of the Bihar Tenancy Act subsequent to the amendment of the execution case made on the 21st February 1952. The learned Single Judge relied upon a Bench decision of this Court in Gajanand Sha V/s. Dayanand Thakur, AIR 1943 Pat 127 in support of his view that when a new properly is sought to be proceeded against which was not included in the application for execution in the first instance, the execution must be deemed to be a fresh application necessitating the issue of fresh notice under Sec.158-B (2) of the Bihar Tenancy Act. Retying upon another Bench decision of this Court in Ramdhari Singh V/s. Saligram Singh, AIR 1954 Pal 429 the learned Single Judge has taken the view that the issue of a notice under Sec.158-B (2) of the Bihar Tenancy Act in respect of a decree for arrears of rent, which is sought to be executed in accordance with the provision of the said Act. goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the executing Court, and in the absence of such a notice, the execution sale is void and inoperative. The learned Judge also agreed with the view taken by the lower appellate Court that the application to set aside the sale filed on the 12th May 1958 was within time, being governed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 , and the right to apply accrued to the judgment-debtors when they learned about the sale on the 3rd April, 1958. 6. The decree-holder has preferred this appeal under the Letters Patent with the leave of the learned Single Judge. 7. Before dealing with the merits of the appeal. I ought to point out that the reference to Sub-section (2) of Sec.158-B is not strictly correct, inasmuch as. that Sub-section, as it originally stood, was replaced by a new Sub-section which was re-numbered as Sec.158-B (a) under the Bihar Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1938 (Bihar Act XI of 1938). 7. Before dealing with the merits of the appeal. I ought to point out that the reference to Sub-section (2) of Sec.158-B is not strictly correct, inasmuch as. that Sub-section, as it originally stood, was replaced by a new Sub-section which was re-numbered as Sec.158-B (a) under the Bihar Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1938 (Bihar Act XI of 1938). and it is in the following terms When the application mentioned in Sec.158-AA is made and the decree-holder wants to proceed against the tenure or holding or portion of the tenure or holding in respect of which the decree was obtained, the Court executing the decree shall, before proceeding to sell the tenure or the holding or a part of the holding, give to the parties to the decree notice of the application and of the date on which the sale proclamation shall be drawn up, and may, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (5 of 1908), simultaneously issue attachment". 8. The substantial questions for our decision are whether it was imperative to issue a fresh notice under the aforesaid Sub-section 158-B of the Bihar Tenancy Act, after the amendment of the execution petition on the 21st February 1952, and if so, whether the omission to do so had such far reaching consequence as to render the execution sale void and inoperative. The answer to these questions would depend upon the true purpose for which the said notice has to be given, and the purpose will become clear from the provision of Sec.158-AA to which reference has been made in Sec.158-B (a). Sec.158-AA, so far as it is material, provides that if the judgment-debtor fails to pay to the decree-holder or to deposit in Court the amount of the decree within a period of three months of the passing of the decree then the decree-holder is entitled to apply for execution of the decree by attachment and sale of the property of the judgment-debtor, movable and immovable. But if the decree-holder wants to proceed against the holding or portion of the holding in respect of which the decree was obtained, then the Court must give to the judgment-debtor the notice contemplated by Sec.158-B (a). But if the decree-holder wants to proceed against the holding or portion of the holding in respect of which the decree was obtained, then the Court must give to the judgment-debtor the notice contemplated by Sec.158-B (a). In other words the object of giving the notice under Sec.158-B (a) is to inform the judgment-debtor that (i) the decree which the decree-holder has obtained against him has remained unpaid for more than three months of the passing of the decree, and (ii) the decree-holder wants to proceed against the holding or portion of the holding in respect of which the decree was obtained by him, or to put it simply, that it is proposed to execute the decree as a rent decree set that the sale may have the character of a rent sale, as distinguished from a money sale. Therefore, the main purpose of giving the notice to the judgment-debtor under Sec.158-B (a) is to clothe the execution sale? with the character of a rent sale in order that, what may pass to the purchaser is the holding or part of the holding, and not merely the right, little and interest of the judgment-debtor therein. It follows that if no such notice has been given to the judgment-debtor, then the execution sale will not have the character of a rent sale, but it would still be good as a money sale and what will pass to the purchaser is only the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor in the holding or portion of the holding. The omission to give the notice under Sec.158-B (a) cannot have the grave consequence of entirely invalidating the sale or rendering it void. 9. This conclusion receives support front a Bench decision of this Court in Durga Singh V/s. Mt. Ram Dasi Kuer ILR 6 Pat 80: (AIR 1926 Pat 508) which was a case of failure to give notice to the co-sparer landlord as contemplated by Sec.168-B (2) as it then stood. After making reference to certain previous decisions on the point, their Lordships held that the provision for notice to the co-sharer landlord was for the benefit of the co-sharer landlord, and the notice was not essential to the validity of the sale. After making reference to certain previous decisions on the point, their Lordships held that the provision for notice to the co-sharer landlord was for the benefit of the co-sharer landlord, and the notice was not essential to the validity of the sale. Their Lordships further pointed out that the omission to serve the notice did not nullify the sale, and the effect would only he that the sale would be a sale in execution of a decree for money. The same view was reiterated by another decision of this Court in Bacha Singh V/s. Daro Singh, AIR 1932 Pal 284 10. In AIR 1954 Pat 429 relied upon by the learned Single Judge, there is, no doubt, an observation which ostensibly lends support to the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the requirement of notice under Sec.158-B (2) is a mandatory provision, similar to the requirement of a notice under Order 21, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the executing Court, and for this proposition reference has been made to Sir Kameshwar Singh V/s. Bishwanath Jha, AIR 1947 Pat 33, in which a Bench of this court pointed out that the failure to comply to the mandatory provision of Sec.158-B (2) must have the same consequence as failure to comply with the provision of Order 21, Rule 22 in cases where that provision is applicable. But it should be noticed that in both the Bench decisions, the execution sale under consideration was held prior to the amendment of Order 21, Rule 22, which was made by this Court in May 1947, when a new Sub-rule (3) was added which reads as follows: "Proceedings held in execution of a decree shall not be invalid solely by reason of any omission to issue or failure to serve a notice under Sub-rule (1) or to record reasons where such notice is dispensed with under Sub-rule (2), unless the judgment-debtor has sustained substantial injury thereby." In the instant case, however, the execution sale under consideration was held after the afore said amendment of Order 21, Rule 22, Code of Civil Procedure, and, therefore, the observations made in AIR 1954 Pat 429 and AIR 1947 Pat 33 on the analogy of the former provision of Order 21, Rule 22, Code of Civil Procedure, can have no application to the facts of the present case. This is also clear from an observation made by Das, J. (as he then was) at p. 431 of AIR 1954 Pat 429 to the effect that there the appeal was argued on the footing that Order 21, rule 22. as it stood before the amendment of 1947, was applicable. In my opinion, the present case cannot be decided on the analogy of the un-amended provision of Order 21, Rule 22, Code of Civil Procedure. So far as cases governed by the amended provision of Order 21, Rule 22, Code of Civil Procedure, are concerned, the law is well settled that the failure to issue a notice under Order 21, Rule 22 does not render the execution sale invalid vide Sukhdeo Gond V/s. Brahamdeo Tewar,. AIR 1957 Pat 431 , Jagarnath Raut V/s. Commr. of Buxar Municipality, AIR 1961 Pat 480 and Bansi Sao V/s. Debi Prasad, AIR 1961 Pal 508. Therefore, if the present case were to be decided on the analogy of Order 21, Rule 22, as it stood on 14-2-1953, the date of the impugned sale, then the conclusion must be that the sale was not inoperative or void. It was at best an irregularity which could not affect the jurisdiction of the executing Court to hold the sale. 11. It was at best an irregularity which could not affect the jurisdiction of the executing Court to hold the sale. 11. It was, however, contended on behalf of the respondents that since Section 158-B (a) has remained unaltered, the effect of non-service of the notice provided therein must still be the same as was laid down In the two Bench decisions, AIR 1947 Pat 33 and AIR 1954 Pat 429 , despite the addition of Sub-rule (3) to Order 21, Rule 22, Code of Civil Procedure. made in 1947. But I do not find it possible to accede to this contention, because it proceeds upon the assumption that the same view would have been taken by the learned Judges, if the execution sales which were under consideration in the two Bench decisions had taken place subsequent to the aforesaid amendment of Order 21, Rule 22, Code of Civil Procedure. It is impossible to predicate that their Lordships would have interpreted Sec.158-B (a) in the light of the unamended provision of Order 21, Rule 22, even if the sales in the cases before them had taken place after May 1947. It may be pointed out that no decision has been brought to our notice in which it has been held that an execution sale held after May 1947 without complying with the provision of Sec.158-B (a) is a nullity. Therefore, the true scope and object of Sec.158-B (a) must depend upon the answer to the question as to how far the execution proceedings are articled by contravention of its provisions. In this connection the following observations made by Mookerjee, J. in Rajani Kanta Ghose V/s. Sheikh Rahman Gazi, AIR 1924 Cal 408 may usefully be quoted: "No hard and fast rule can be drawn between a nullity and an irregularity. But this much is clear that an irregularity is a deviation from a rule of law which does not lake away the foundation or authority for the proceeding or apply "to its whole operation whereas a nullity is a proceeding that is taken without any foundation for it or is so essentially defective as to be of no avail or effect whatever, or is void and incapable of being validated. One test is well-established and is often useful as was observed by Coleridge, J., in Holmes V/s. Russell (9 Dow. One test is well-established and is often useful as was observed by Coleridge, J., in Holmes V/s. Russell (9 Dow. 28): "It is difficult sometimes to distinguish between an irregularity and a nullity; but the safest rule to determine what is an irregularity and what is a nullity is to see whether the party can waive the objection; if he can waive it, it amounts to an irregularity; if he cannot, it is a nullity. " Applying this test, we have to see whether the judgment-debtors in the present case could have waived the requirement of the notice under Sec.158-B (a) in case they had appeared in the execution proceeding despite non-service, of such a notice upon them in my opinion, there was nothing to preclude them from waiving such an objection and to allow the execution case to proceed without service of notice under Sec.158-B (a) upon them. Therefore, the conclusion must be that it was a case of irregularity and not of nullity affecting the very foundation of the jurisdiction of the executing Court. For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the learned Single Judge was in error in upholding the decision of the lower appellate Court that the execution sale in question was void and inoperative and that the application for setting aside the sale was governed by Article 181, and not by Article 166 of the Limitation Act. 1908. In my judgment, the most that can be said is that the execution sale was voidable at the option of the judgment-debtors but their right to apply for setting aside the sale was governed by Article 166, and as such the application which was filed by them on the 12th May 1958 was barred by limitation and should have been dismissed on that ground alone. 12. In coming to the above conclusion I nave proceeded upon the footing that the learned Single Judge was right in his view that the execution petition which was amended on the 21st February 1952 by substitution of plot No. 47 in lieu of plot No. 30 was a fresh execution in the eye of law, necessitating the issue of a fresh notice to the judgment-debtors under Sec.158-B (a). I wish, however, to point out that in AIR 1943 Pat 127 relied upon by the learned Single Judge, the real question which their Lordships had to consider was the effect of such an amendment to the execution petition made after the expiry of twelve years from the date of the decree. It was in that context that it was held that an application for addition of a new property in the execution petition where the decree had become time-barred under Sec. 48, Code of Civil Procedure, must be regarded as a fresh application for execution Such a contingency did not arise in the present case where the amendment of the execution petition was applied for only a little over one year after the date on which the decree was passed in favour of the appellants. I do not. however, express any concluded opinion on this point and assume for the purposes of the present case that a fresh notice to the judgment debtors was necessary after the amendment of the execution petition. The conclusion still remains that the execution sale held on the 14th February 1953 was not void and inoperative and that the application for setting aside the sale made on the 12th May 1958 was hopelessly barred by limitation. It was beyond time even upon the fooling that the judgment-debtors got the knowledge of the sale for the first time on the 3rd April 1958, as found by the lower appellate Court. 13. Since I propose to set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge, I must, in fairness to the lower appellate Court, consider whether it was right in holding that the First Additional Munsif had no jurisdiction to proceed with the execution case on the ground that the order of transfer was passed on the 27th July 1951 by the Munsif. Third Court, and not by the District Judge himself. The question really is whether the Standing Order of the District Judge, in pursuance of which the order of transfer was passed by the Munsif, Third Court, was valid in law. Third Court, and not by the District Judge himself. The question really is whether the Standing Order of the District Judge, in pursuance of which the order of transfer was passed by the Munsif, Third Court, was valid in law. Sec.13(2) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act (Act XII of 1887) lays down: "If the same local jurisdiction is assigned to two or more Subordinate Judges or to two or more Munsifs, the District Judge may assign to each of them such civil businesses cognizable by the Subordinate Judge or Munsif, as the case may be, as, subject to any general or special orders of the High Court, he thinks fit." From this provision, it is clear that if there are two or more Munsifs with identical local jurisdiction, then it is open to the District Judge to prescribe that all civil businesses of a particular nature shall be transacted by one or more Munsifs functioning under him, and for the purpose of making assignment of the civil businesses to each of his subordinate Munsifs, it is open to the District Judge to make a Standing Order indicating that all cases of a particular class shall be dealt with by a particular Court. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that every Munsif is a Munsif for the entire district, although by an. administrative order he exercises jurisdiction over a limited part of the district: see, for example. Ram Bilas Mal V/s. Raghimath Sahay, 1937 Pat WN 757 and Suban Rai V/s. Kesho Prasad Singh, AIR 1930 Pat 230. That being the legal position I see no reason why in exercise of his powers under Sec.13(2) of the Civil Courts Act, the District Judge could not have by a Standing Order assigned the execution cases filed in the Courts of the different Munsifs at the Sadar station in Arrah to the Additional Munsif functioning at the same station. In my opinion, it was competent for the District Judge to pass such a Standing Order under Sec.13(2) of the Civil Courts Act, even apart from the power of transfer of cases which he could have exercised under Sec.24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I, therefore, hold that the lower appellate Court was not right in its view that the First Additional Munsif had no jurisdiction to execute the decree or to hold the sale. I, therefore, hold that the lower appellate Court was not right in its view that the First Additional Munsif had no jurisdiction to execute the decree or to hold the sale. 14 For the aforesaid reasons, the order of the lower appellate Court and that of the learned Single Judge must be set aside and the application for setting aside the safe filed by the judgment-debtors must be dismissed. The appellant is entitled to his costs of both the appeals in this Court. Narasimham, J. 15 I agree