Judgment :- 1. S.63 clause (g) of the Kerala Municipalities Act, 14 of 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), states: "63. Disqualification of councillors - Subject to the provisions of S.65, a councillor shall cease to hold office as such if he xxx xxx xxx (g) is employed as a paid legal practitioner on behalf of the council, or accepts employment as a legal practitioner against the council;" And sub-clause 3 of S.65 of the Act which is the only material portion thereof reads: "65 (3) If at any time, on the application of any person whose name appears in the electoral roll and who is not otherwise disqualified or of the commissioner under direction from the council or suo mote the District Judge, after such enquiry as he considers necessary and after giving an opportunity to the councillor concerned to be heard, is satisfied that any councillor elected under S.9 or S.59 has incurred any of the disqualifications mentioned in S.63 after his assumption of office as councillor, the District Judge shall declare that such councillor concerned shall vacate his office. Such declaration shall be final. Pending such declaration, the councillor shall be entitled to act as if he were not disqualified." The petitioner who is a Member of the Municipal Council, Attingal applied to the District Judge of Trivandrum (3rd respondent) under S.65(3) of the Act for a declaration that the 1st respondent, the Chairman of the Council had ceased to hold office by reason of the provisions of S.63(g) of the Act. The application was dismissed by order evidenced by Ext. P-3. This O.P. has been filed to quash Ext. P-3. The 2nd respondent is the Commissioner of the Municipality. 2. There was a criminal prosecution in C.C. No. 423 of 1963, Sub Magistrate, Attingal, against one Kasim Pillai for arrears of tax due to the Municipality. The prosecution seems to have been under S.150 of the Act read with R.32(2) and 39(1) of Schedule II. The charge sheet was filed on 27-3-1963 and the case stood posted for hearing on 8-4-1963. It was eventually adjourned to 14-5-1963. 3. Meanwhile, on 7-5-1963, the accused, Kasim Pillai, paid the arrears of tax of Rs. 7.58. He paid the compounding fee of Re. 1/- on 8-5-1963 and the matter was compounded between the 2nd respondent (Commissioner) and the accused. It was eventually adjourned to 14-5-1963. 3. Meanwhile, on 7-5-1963, the accused, Kasim Pillai, paid the arrears of tax of Rs. 7.58. He paid the compounding fee of Re. 1/- on 8-5-1963 and the matter was compounded between the 2nd respondent (Commissioner) and the accused. Under orders of the Commissioner, a petition for compounding was forwarded on 8-5-1963 to the Revenue Inspector, for the matter being brought to the notice of the court. It would appear that the Revenue Inspector was kept under suspension on account of some delinquency and therefore could not be present in Court, on 14-5-1963 to which date the case stood adjourned; nor was any representation made to the Magistrate on that day regarding the compounding of the case. The accused did not appear and a warrant for his arrest was issued, and the case stood adjourned to 20-5-1963. The accused was arrested on 20-5-1963 and the case was adjourned to 27-5-1963. 4. On 21-5-1963, the 1st respondent who is the Chairman of the Attingal Municipality and an Advocate, appeared before the Magistrate on behalf of the accused and moved for the bail which was granted. On 27-5-1963, the 1st respondent filed a memo dated 25-5-1963 before the Magistrate, disengaging himself from the case. On 27-5-1963, the Revenue Inspector brought to the notice of the Court that the matter had been compounded, and orders were passed on the same date acquitting the accused. 5. According to the petitioner, the 1st respondent's appearance on 21-5-1963 before the Sub Magistrate, Attingal on behalf of the accused in C.C. No. 423 of 1963 would attract the provisions of S.63 clause (g) of the Act. The District Judge held in Para.11 of Ext. P-3: it ... with effect from 8-5-1963 which is the date on which Kasim Pillai compounded the case with the Commissioner he is deemed to have been acquitted of the offence and as such the Municipality has no claim to sustain against Kasim Pillai with the result the appearance of the respondent as an advocate on behalf of Kasim Pillai on 21-5-1963 cannot be regarded as his appearance against the Municipal Council." S. 393 (b) of the Act reads as follows: "393. Provision respecting institution, etc. Provision respecting institution, etc. of civil and criminal actions and obtaining of legal advice - The Commissioner may (b) compound any offence against this Act, the rules, bye-laws or regulations which may by rules made by the Government be declared compoundable; " 6. It was admitted before me that no rules have been made by the Goverment under the Act declaring offences which are compoundable. It was further admitted that pending the issuance of such rules, the rules issued under the corresponding S.372(b) of the Travancore District Municipalities Act 23 of 1116, and published in the gazette dated 5-9-1944 would govern the case ; and that under the said rules, the offence in question was compoundable by the Commissioner. There was no controversy either, that as between the 1st respondent and the 2nd respondent the compounding, was over on 8-5-1963. 7. The only point that was stressed by counsel for the petitioner was that in spite of the compounding on 8-5-1963 the case was pending before the Magistrate, that proceedings actually took place before the Court on 20-5-1963 when an order for warrant of arrest was issued against the accused, and again on 21-5-1963 when an application for bail was moved by the 1st respondent and granted. That the proceedings were alive before the Court and continued on 20-5-1963 and 21-5-1963 could not be controverted, and was indeed admitted by counsel for the 1st respondent. The only point taken up on his behalf was that these were not proceedings "against the council" within the meaning of S.63(g) of the Act. 8. Counsel on both sides proceeded before me on the assumption that although the S.345 of the Criminal Procedure Code was not in terms applicable, the principle of the said section would apply to the compounding in question. The material part of S.345 of the Criminal P.C. runs as follows: "345. 8. Counsel on both sides proceeded before me on the assumption that although the S.345 of the Criminal Procedure Code was not in terms applicable, the principle of the said section would apply to the compounding in question. The material part of S.345 of the Criminal P.C. runs as follows: "345. (1) The offences punishable under the sections of the Indian Penal Code in the first two columns of the table next following may be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that table ; (2) The offences punishable under the sections of the Indian Penal Code specific the first two columns of the table next following may, with the permission of the Court before which any prosecution for such offence is pending, be compounded by the persons mentioned in the third column of that table; (6) The composition of an offence under this section shall have the effect of an acquittal of the accused (with whom the offence has been compounded.)" 9. Counsel for the petitioner contended that the acquittal of the accused was only on 27-5-1963, on which date alone the court was appraised of the compounding of the offence and passed the order of acquittal. Counsel for the respondent took up the position that the compounding here in question did not require the permission of the Court, and was complete on 8-5-1963; in any event, from 8-5-1963 there was no case "against the council" in which the 1st respondent could be said to have accepted engagement. My attention was called to some cases where the question had come up for consideration as to whether the permission of Court was required at all for the offence falling under S.345(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. But the case most in point-indeed it appeared to be the only one in point-was the decision reported in Mohamed Kanni Rowther v. Pattani Inavathalla Sahib (ILR. 39-Mad. 946). In the said decision it is observed: "S. 345, Criminal Procedure Code, lays down that certain offences, of which the offence of hurt is one, can be compounded by the parties and no leave of the Court is necessary for the purpose, while of certain other offences such as grievous hurt, there can be no composition without the permission of the Court before which they are pending. Where the parties have actually composed their disputes in the four classes of cases it is not clear, on principle, why it should be necessary for the validity of composition (hat any petition should be presented by the parties admitting the fact or why any of the parties should afterwards be allowed to withdraw from it. The composition spoken of in S.345 is in the nature of a contract though I do not think it requires monetary consideration." 10. This view was reaffirmed in the decision in Kumaraswami Chetty v. Kuppusami Chetty reported in (AIR. 1919 Mad. 879) where it is observed as follows: "An offence is complete when the acts constituting it have been committed, apart from whether any complaint or charge has been "laid before the Court or not. The allusion to "the accused" in para 6, S.345, only describes his character at the time of the trial when the question of the effect of the composition is under consideration. As regards certain classes of offences which may be compounded, the legislature provides that they may be compounded only with the permission of the Court. In those cases, the operation of the composition is necessarily suspended until the Court sanctions it. But in the other cases, no such permission is needed and no reason is apparent to me or has been suggested, why the legislature, having permitted certain classes of offences to be compounded by the parties themselves without any reference to Court, should insist that the composition should be arrived at after the person alleged to have committed the offence has been brought before the Court. In the absence of clear language showing that that was the intention of the legislature, I should not be prepared to impute to it any such intention." 11. It appears to me that the compounding of the offence was complete on 8-5-1963 and that it had the effect of acquittal of the accused. Thereafter, when the 1st respondent appeared for the accused on 21-5-1963, it is difficult to regard him as having accepted engagement "against the council" as contemplated by S.63 (g) of the Act. 12. Strict professional ethics or propriety might have counselled the 1st respondent to disclose to the Court on 21-5-1963 that the case had actually been compounded on 8-5-1963. That, however, cannot affect the merits of the question for consideration in this O.P. 13. 12. Strict professional ethics or propriety might have counselled the 1st respondent to disclose to the Court on 21-5-1963 that the case had actually been compounded on 8-5-1963. That, however, cannot affect the merits of the question for consideration in this O.P. 13. I am not satisfied that the view taken by the District Judge discloses any error of law apparent on the face of the record. 14. I dismiss the O.P; but in the circumstances, with costs. Dismissed.